External and internal security in the Australian colonies from their founding to the end of the Macquarie era by McMahon, JF
External and Internal Security in the Australian 
Colonies from their Founding to the End of the 
Macquarie Era 
by 
John Farquhar McMahon BA, MHum. 
Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
• University of Tasmania. 
July 2004. 
1 rontispiece 
New South Wales Corps Officer's Coat 1805 
In 1812 the British Army replaced the long-tailed officers' coat with 
shortened jackets 
Courtesy Tasmanian Museum and Art Gallery collection (S1978.28) 
I agree that this Thesis may be made available for loan. I agree that the 
Thesis may be made available for photo-copying. I note my consent is 
required only to cover the two year period following approval of my 
Thesis for the award of my degree, after which access to the Library 
copy will be subject only to general restrictions laid down in Library 
regulations. 
John Farquhar McMahon 
This thesis contains no material which has been accepted for a degree or 
diploma by the University or any other institution, except by way of 
background information duly acknowledged in the thesis, and to the best 
of my knowledge and belief no material previously published or written 
by another person except where due acknowledgement is made in the 
text of this thesis. 
John Farquhar McMahon 
07 
Abstract 
This thesis considers external and internal security in the Australian colonies 
from the founding of New South Wales to the end of the Macquarie era. As history 
is a continuum, matters outside the nominated time frame of 1788 to 1821 are, where 
relevant, considered. This study is not a sociological history of British forces, nor 
concerned with their many roles, unless applicable. However, to appreciate European 
concepts of sovereignty which influenced Pitt's government in selecting secure 
colonial borders, consideration is given to the discovery of New Holland and New 
South Wales, 
New South Wales lay athwart zones of strategic interest to the Dutch in the East 
Indies and the Spanish in the Pacific. Spanish claims were ignored, but to prevent 
international tension with Holland, Britain selectively prescribed the colony's western 
border. Additionally, with France, under the Bourbons and Napoleon, apparently 
planning settlements in Australia, Britain established outposts at Norfolk Island, 
Risdon Cove and Port Phillip, After 1815, possible Dutch and French intrusion in 
the region saw the establishment of outposts at Melville Island, Albany and 
Westernport. At Swan River in 1829, sovereignty was proclaimed and a settlement 
established, ensuring the whole of Australia became a British domain. 
The garrisons' internal security role was to support and defend the civil power. 
From the arrival of the Second Fleet in 1790, until 1810, the New South Wales 
Corps carried out these duties (receiving historical notoriety for their insurrection in 
1808). Thereafter, other regiments were posted to the colony for shorter periods. 
Tasks included guarding convicts, hunting bushrangers, and protecting settlers on the 
the spreading colonial borders. The Castle Hill Rebellion of 1804, was the most 
serious internal security situation faced. After the Napoleonic Wars, economic 
stringencies seriously limited the garrison's strength, yet the number of convicts 
transported significantly increased, placing a heavy load on the security forces. 
Until 1810, internal security was weakened by a long running struggle for 
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domination between the military and civil powers. This commenced with Marine 
officers' dissatisfaction with Phillip's government and culminated with the New 
South Wales Corps mutiny against Bligh. From 1810, Macquarie established the 
primacy of the civil over the military power. By his departure in 1821, Sydney Cove 
• had developed from a penal settlement into a colony ready for civic reforms resulting 
from the Bigge Inquiry. Maintenance of internal security allowed colonial 
development to take place, whilst threats to external security were the prime reason 
for the continent of Australia coming under British sovereignty. 
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Introduction 
This thesis will argue that wars, rumours of wars, and perceived threats to 
Great Britain's imperial power, or to colonial security, were the imperative which led 
to Australia becoming an undivided continent under British sovereignty. The 
American War of Independence (1775-1783), the French Revolutionary Wars (for 
Great Britain - 1793-1802), the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), which overlapped 
with the War of 1812 (1812-1814), all, in varying degrees, influenced the history of 
early Australia. During the war period from 1793 to 1815, and thereafter, actual or 
perceived threats from either France or Holland were a catalyst for the spread of 
British sovereignty, which by 1829, had embraced the entire continent of Australia. 
As this process took place, internal security provided by the military garrison, 
enabled the civilian power to govern, and providing the stability which saw the rough 
'camp' at Sydney Cove develop into a substantial colony. Therefore, a study of 
external security implications and the parallel application of internal security, the 
dual subjects of this thesis, contribute to an understanding of how the hurried 
foundation of a small penal colony in 1788, in a remote and recently discovered 
land, unexpectedly initiated the remarkable expansion of British sovereignty over an 
entire continent.' 
The time frame for this thesis covers the naval governors, Captains Arthur 
The Macquarie Dictionary, ed.-in-chief A Delbridge, Dee Why, revised 1982, extracts from 
pp.1532, 622 and 913 respectively, for 'external', 'internal' and 'security'. These are defined 
separately, but these definitions linked together provide the meaning of the phrases "external" and 
"internal security" as applied in this thesis. "Security" being 'freedom from danger, risk, etc; 
safety: freedom from care, apprehension, or doubt; confidence: something that secures or makes 
safe; a protection; a defence: protection from or measures taken against espionage, theft, 
infiltration, sabotage, or the like'. To complete the meaning, the above definition is linked with 
either a definition of "external" as 'pertaining to or concerned with what is outside or foreign', or 
"internal" meaning 'internal affairs: pertaining to the domestic affairs of a country'. 
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Phillip, John Hunter, Philip King and William Bligh and the last of the autocratic 
governors, Lachlan Macquarie, the first army governor. By the time Macquarie 
departed in 1821, Sydney had developed into a thriving town, more appropriate to a 
substantial crown colony than a penal settlement. Van Diemen's Land was 
expanding outwards from Hobart and Launceston, and with a road over the Blue 
Mountains opened, New South Wales stood on the brink of pastoral expansion. 
Politically, after Macquarie's departure, future colonial governors coming to 
Australia, did so with gradually decreasing powers, as the principles of 
representative government were introduced by the British parliament. The formative 
period of absolute rule appropriate to a penal settlement had ended and social, 
economic and political development suitable to a crown colony, emerged. 
History can seldom be compartmentalised by strict time frames such as 
delineated above. For instance, one factor which influenced the British 
government's security planning for the proposed settlement at Botany Bay, was the 
Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494, which indirectly affected the siting of the western 
border selected for the new colony. Again, during Macquarie's governorship, 
external security problems associated with the post- Napoleonic Wars period 
became matters of concern, but it was not until 1829, eight years after Macquarie's 
return to England that these were resolved. Whilst external security precautions 
were reactions to current, but usually long running international affairs, internal 
security involved such issues as the day to day guarding of convicts and the 
protection of settlers on the expanding borders of white settlement. But longer term 
factors also influenced internal security. When the British Parliament, in 1787, 
enacted legislation to establish a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction for Botany Bay, its 
implementation in the colony led to the Marine Officers disputing the ruling of the 
civil power in the colony, causing internal security concerns. Likewise, after 
Phillip's departure in 1791, the indulgence of the officers of the New South Wales 
Corps by their commander (then acting governor), Major Francis Grose, became a 
cause of continuing friction between the civil and military powers up to the time of 
the Corps' mutiny in 1808. 
xii 
At times there was an overlapping between internal and external security concerns. 
In the case of the Castle Hill rebellion of 1804, it is argued that, an external imperial 
factor, the reduced establishment for British infantry units after the Peace of Amiens 
of 1802, was a major factor contributing to this rebellion. A further imperial link 
with this insurrection was that the majority of Castle Hill rebels were radicalised 
convicts, transported for their part in the 1798 Irish rebellion. Similarly, the often 
unsatisfactory internal security record of New South Wales Corps' guard 
detachments on convict transports is, in part, attributed to the stresses of recruiting 
during the French Revolutionary War. The 1797 mutiny on Lady Shore was 
exacerbated by this recruiting problem which had adverse internal and external 
security implications. In this context it is noted that the poor record of the Corps' 
guard detachments at sea, an important element of the unit's internal security duties, 
has been generally ignored by historians. 
In considering the somewhat hurried planning for a settlement at Botany 
Bay, the British government took care not to offend the Dutch, who by right of 
discovery had a potential claim over New Holland. However, some Dutch rights 
were pre-empted, by including the Gulf of Carpentaria and Van Diemen's Land 
within the declared borders of New South Wales. With Spain in decline as a world 
power, their Toredillas Treaty claim to the Pacific was ignored in proclaiming the 
colony's loosely defined eastern boundary, intended to ensure any off-shore, yet to 
be discovered, islands, were also subject to British sovereignty. Additionally, the 
directive to Phillip to occupy Norfolk Island, as a defensive measure to counter any 
French claim by La Perouse, directly challenged Spanish Pacific pretensions. It is 
considered that suggestions by several historians that the island was settled 
primarily to provide raw materials for the British Royal Navy, are not supported by 
evidence. 
The decision by Great Britain to establish a government controlled penal 
settlement at little known Botany Bay, half a world away, was at that time unique in 
the annals of the British Empire. Despite the short preparation time, fortunately 
internal security procedures already existed, which made the concept a workable 
proposition. Security routines in transferring convicts from gaols and prison hulks 
to transport ships were based on those which had been employed during the private 
transportation of convicts to the former American Colonies. Also, practised 
procedures existed for the assembly of adequate transports, in this case suitably 
modified to secure convicts and with store ships fully laden with supplies for at least 
two years. This was accomplished in the short time frame assisted by experience 
gained in providing fleets for the transportation of troops, particularly in the recent 
American War. The only noteworthy mishap in security preparations was the 
deficiency of adequate ball ammunition for the marine 'battalion'. A case of gross 
negligence, which is attributed to the lack of supervision by the marines' 
commander, Major Robert Ross, before sailing. Adequate ammunition was 
essential to meet the marines' tasks to assist ships' masters with security in transit, 
and then provide internal and external security for the proposed settlement. 
This dereliction of duty by Ross was possibly the beginning of an unhappy 
association between Governor Phillip and his lieutenant-governor. In the colony, 
relations deteriorated to the extent that the two men were unable to effectively work 
together. Friction quickly developed between the civil power, represented by the 
governor, and the military power, led by the lieutenant-governor who commanded 
the marines, and whose officers, from the founding of the settlement in 1788, 
objected to sitting as members of the criminal court. A serious incident occurred in 
1789, when, with famine rampant, six marines, found guilty by the court of 
systematically robbing store houses, were executed. Thereupon, their company 
commander insisted that he would no longer accept being rostered for criminal court 
duty. It appears that Ross encouraged this attitude amongst his officers, which 
Phillip was forced to counter, otherwise the administration of colonial justice 
would have been thrown into confusion. On another occasion, Ross threatened his 
marines would use their bayonets if apprehended by the civil watch, as authorised 
by regulations Ross himself had previously approved. Other such instances 
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contributed to heightened confrontation, to the extent that the British government 
ordered the recall of the marines to England, and their replacement by a specially 
recruited unit, the New South Wales Corps. 
In 1791, due to ill health, Phillip departed the colony, and was replaced by 
Corps' commander, Major Grose, who assumed the position of acting governor. 
He supplanted the authority of the civil power, by placing the administration of 
justice into the hands of the military, and during this time, his officers received 
favoured treatment receiving land grants and government support. Grose illegally 
allowed military officers (joined by their civilian counterparts) to trade, which they 
then monopolised in the settlement. With substantial profits being made, this 
became a significant feature of the early colony. In due course, London ordered the 
succession of naval governors, Hunter, King and Bligh, to stamp out this "rum 
trade". This was the primary source of what became a long running dispute 
between the civil and military powers. 
The defining point in this battle for supremacy, saw Captain John Macarthur 
acting as spokesman for the army officers, persuade Hunter to capitulate to the 
Corps' wishes. It was agreed that four soldiers accused of mutiny, would not now 
face serious, even capital, charges, despite an earlier statement by Hunter to that 
effect. These men were the ringleaders of a riotous mob of soldiers who openly 
demolished ex-convict John Baughan's home. Instead of disciplinary action, 
Hunter agreed that the four men be paraded before their officers who would speak 
to them. He then failed to support his magistrate, William Balinain, who was 
prevented from investigating the incident because of pressure from the Corps' 
officers. This was a demonstration of the dominance of the military over the civil 
power. As such, it would have encouraged the officers into their belief that they 
could resist, with impunity, endeavours to curtail their monopolist activities. 
Ultimately Hunter, then King, were recalled to England because of agitation by the 
Corps and their supporters. King was replaced by Bligh, well known for his fiery 
temper and the Bounty mutiny. Selected as a disciplinarian likely to curb the power 
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of the monopolists, Bligh's subsequent opposition to the military officers was a 
source of annoyance to them and their civilian associates. This was the background 
to, but not the cause of, the Corps' mutiny against Bligh in 1808. 
At the time of the Corps' rebellion, their commander in Sydney, who became 
leader of the insurgent government, was Major George Johnston. In his first 
dispatch to London (written by Macarthur) Johnston listed the various "reasons" 
which he claimed led to the mutiny. Surprisingly, amongst these, no reference was 
made to the military, and in particular to the six officers (discussed later) who were 
probably going to be charged with treason. Instead, other causes were advanced for 
the necessity for the Corps to arrest of Bligh, such as preventing an insurrection by 
the people, and saving Bligh from being 'massacred'. 
Many historians have advanced explanations as to why the mutiny occurred. 
AGL Shaw for example considers the insurrection resulted from a personal feud 
between Bligh and Macarthur, with J Ritchie supporting this argument. HV Evatt 
refers to self-interest of the trading monopolists as a crucial factor. A Atkinson 
described the influence of British 'patronage networks' which provided the 
background to the rebellion. This short selection demonstrates the wide diversity of 
secondary opinions as to the cause of the rebellion. Interestingly, in 1810, 
Governor Macquarie advised London that while Bligh's govenunent was for some 
unpopular, he had 'not been able to discover any Act of his [Bligh's] which could 
in any degree form an excuse for ... [the] Mutinous Proceedings against him'. 2 In 
reporting this, Macquarie had the benefit of interviewing witnesses as well as 
studying written records. He would have been aware of the many explanations for 
the insurrection which were later incorporated in historians' considerations of the 
cause, or causes, of the mutiny. This illustrates the complexity of motives 
associated with the insurrection of 1808. 
Although many issues involving Bligh caused irritation to the colonial elite, it 
2 See below, Chapter 11, p.300, footnote 141 refers. 
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appears unlikely that these caused the military officers to risk being charged with 
the capital offence of mutiny. Why would Johnston have hazarded his neck to 
support Macarthur against Bligh in January 1808, when in December 1807, he had 
been one of four magistrates who committed Macarthur for trial? Without a doubt, 
Macarthur's manipulation of events at his criminal trial 011 25 January 1808, 
provided the catalyst for the mutiny. At the start of the trial, this precipitated the 
refusal of the six officers, who made up the court, to accept Richard Atkins as 
judge-advocate. But it is argued that it was the likely regimental consequences of 
Bligh's intention of laying charges, probably of treason, against these six offices, 
which ignited the flame of mutiny. With the vital interests of the Corps at stake, 
Johnston, his officers and men marched on Government House. Historically, this 
was the culminating point in the struggle for supremacy between the civil and 
military powers. 
In addition to this struggle for power, another theme runs through the study 
of internal security in the colony. While it appears to be stating the obvious, 
nevertheless, it was critical to the colony's survival that internal security had been 
maintained at all times. This provided the stability which allowed the penal 
settlement to develop into a crown colony. Even during the critical Castle Hill 
rebellion of 1804, discipline was maintained over the majority of convicts (those 
who rebelled were quickly brought back under control). There was a potential for 
serious disturbances during the Corps' mutiny, when on the evening of 26 January 
1808, Bligh attempted to flee to the Hawkesbury. His intention was to raise a local 
militia to defend his government. Had he been successful, the Corps may have been 
locked into skirmishing with free settlers at the expense of maintaining a rigid 
discipline over the widely dispersed convicts. With the spirit of the Irish Rebellion 
of 1798, and of Castle Hill in 1804 very much alive, severe repercussions may have 
ensued. Additionally, major breaches of military discipline occurred which 
weakened internal security, such as the soldiers' riot when Baughan's home was 
destroyed and when Paterson fought his duel with Macarthur. Yet, these breaches 
did not reach a level of intensity which caused security to break down. 
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With the installation of Macquarie as governor, and replacement of the Corps 
by the 73rd Regiment, never again was the colony at risk. Nevertheless, difficulties 
associated with bushrangers especially in Van Diemen's Land, and to a lesser extent 
with Aborigines on the mainland, continued to cause internal security problems. But 
with the power of the civil government firmly established by Macquarie, the 
subordinate, but at times fractious military, although under strength for their task, 
maintained order in the colony. 
External security concerns in the colony were generally directed towards 
countering various real or perceived threats of foreign settlement; initially in the 
colony, and later covering the remainder of New Holland. As a result, prior to any 
significant spread of settlement, the continent of Australia came under British 
sovereignty. This contrasts with the growth of the British Empire into India and 
northern America, where sovereignty followed occupation and settlement. But a 
paradox is noted regarding actual threats faced by the colony during the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. Some historians argue that following the 
explorations of James Cook and the French explorers, notably Louis de 
Bougainville, follow up exploration or settlement was suspended in the Pacific and 
around Australia during the War of American Independence. Likewise, it is 
considered that during the long almost continuous period of warfare between 1793 
and 1815, no attempt was made against New South Wales, and actual threats did not 
exist, because the various enemy nations had more worthwhile strategic targets 
elsewhere. In this way, the wars helped guard British interests in Australia, rather 
than create a threat to external security. Even during the short Peace of Amiens, 
insufficient time prevented this situation from substantially altering. 
The role of Britain's Royal Navy, although unseen by colonists, provided a 
protective security umbrella. Before the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805, the French and 
Spanish navies were drawn off in the struggle for possessions in the West Indies, or 
in an endeavour to meet and destroy the British fleet. After Trafalgar, the maritime 
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superiority of the Royal Navy was available to protect the far flung possessions of 
the British Empire. Nevertheless, individual merchant ships were always at risk 
from being attacked by French or American warships or privateers. This was 
illustrated by the capture of the colonial ship Emu when some of Lieutenant-
Governor Thomas Davey's possessions were lost, and, of great disappointment to 
the male population of Van Diemen's Land, the ship's consignment of female 
convicts was released elsewhere. In hindsight, enemy action against New South 
Wales was improbable, but perceived threats caused very real concern, particularly 
to Governor King, when the 1800-1804 French expedition, commanded by Nicolas 
Baudin, was in Australian waters. 
During the governorships of Phillip and Hunter, as a precaution before the 
start of the French Revolutionary War and during its progress, several minor 
defence works were erected. These took the form of small batteries intended to 
protect the close approaches to Sydney Cove, as opposed to what would have been a 
major task of guarding the entrance to Port Jackson. Geographic isolation rather 
than cannon was apparently considered the primary basis for defence of the 
settlement. Fort Phillip was designed to offer protection against internal 
insurrection as much as to oppose a foe landed at the Cove. Likewise, Hunter 
directed that construction of a new magazine be undertaken, not because of any 
external threat, but to increase security against the Irish prisoners sent to the colony 
after the 1798 rebellion in their homeland. Apparently for the inhabitants of Sydney, 
major excitement generated by the French Revolutionary War centred on observing 
the arrival of occasional Spanish prizes taken off the coast of South America. 
Like Hunter, Governor King's initial concern centred on any internal threat 
posed by Irish Convicts. It was only after advice that a British Admiralty passport 
had been issued for Baudin's scientific expedition, that King became apprehensive 
over external threats to the colony in the form of French settlements. His concern is 
understandable, as in 1798 the improved shipping route to Sydney through 'Basses 
Strait' had been discovered. This waterway, with its added bonus of sealing wealth, 
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was of vital interest to the colony, and its domination by a foreign power could 
create a stranglehold over British shipping. King was alive to French interest in 
Australia, personally visiting La Perouse at Botany Bay in 1788. Then in 1792, 
Bruni d'Entrecasteaux had conducted extensive explorations in southern Van 
Diemen's Land including a survey of the magnificent anchorage Riviere du Nord, 
the Dervvent River. Now a new French expedition was in the offing. 
Fuelling King's anxiety was the British discovery of Port Phillip, which was 
formally claimed for Great Britain in February 1802. Despite this, it was feared in 
Sydney that the French could well have occupied this strategically placed port as 
Baudin's ships progressed through southern Australian waters. The final spur 
which caused King to take action to counter the French, happened immediately after 
the departure of Baudin's ships from Port Jackson. Lieutenant Colonel William 
Paterson reported there had been some talk by the French in Sydney of their 
intention of forming a settlement in Van Diemen's Land. 
• As a result of this report, King ordered a small party to chase Baudin, and 
reaffirm to him Britain's sovereignty over Van Diemen's Land and adjacent islands 
and waters. By 1803, on King's orders, and without waiting for approval from 
London, a small outpost was established at Risdon Cove on the Derwent River, to 
demonstrate British sovereignty. Meanwhile, King had written to London stressing 
his disquiet about the possibility of a French initiative at Port Phillip and also 
advised the potential for fisheries in those waters. 
Independently of King's advice, Lord Hobart at the War and Colonial Office 
had become aware of the discovery of Port Phillip and the importance of its 
location. This information reached London during the Peace of Amiens (1802- 
1803), at which time Hobart was deeply suspicious of Napoleon's intentions. 
During this peace, two British naval vessels had been under orders to transport 
convicts to Sydney. To forestall French moves, one warship was diverted to carry a 
small expedition, under Lieutenant-Governor David Collins, to establish a settlement 
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at Port Phillip. 
Subsequently, as he was having disciplinary problems with both his marine 
guards and convicts, Collins obtained Governor King's approval to relocate the Port 
Phillip settlement to the Derwent River. Collins argued that the New South Wales 
Corps soldiers at Risdon Cove would provide needed reinforcements to maintain 
order amongst his people. It is ironic that while these outposts were established at 
both Risdon Cove and Port Phillip to counter an external security threat by the 
French, because of internal security concerns Collins was authorised to transplant 
his settlement to Van Diemen's Land. By so doing, he considerably strengthened 
British sovereignty in that island. The French threat, and no other cause, was 
responsible for the initial lodgement of the British in Port Phillip and Van Diemen's 
Land. 
After 1804, for the remainder of the Napoleonic Wars, and during the War 
of 1812 with the Americans, no perceived external threats developed to cause 
concern in the colony. However in 1810, and allegedly again in 1814, the French 
reportedly indulged in wishful thinking in relation to attacking New South Wales. 
In 1810, Napoleon directed that a French naval squadron capture Sydney. This was 
an unenforceable order as the French did not have an adequate naval capacity for 
such a distant challenge to British maritime supremacy. Additionally, late in the 
same year, with the British seizure of II de France (Mauritius) and their earlier 
capture of the Cape Colony, Napoleon, as well as having no worthwhile navy, lost 
his last convenient naval base from which such an ambitious operation could be 
mounted. In 1814, an attempt by adventurer, Jorgen Jorgenson, to convince the 
British that the French were planning a descent on Port Jackson was treated with 
disdain. Nevertheless, Macquarie used this information to request (unsuccessfully) 
that his military establishment be increased. He did this not because of concern 
over the alleged external threat, but as an excuse to have his hard pressed garrison 
reinforced to meet internal security requirements. 
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Macquarie's bid to increase his colonial troop strength was primarily to 
counter bushranging which had reached crisis proportions, especially in Van 
Diemen's Land. After the failure of a proclamation by Macquarie offering pardon 
to the greater bulk of bushrangers in that island, Lieutenant-Governor Davey 
illegally declared martial law. Although this was a sensible measure, it was speedily 
rescinded by Macquarie's direction. Davey's replacement, Colonel William Sore11, 
conducted a well planned campaign against the bushrangers, still without 
eliminating them. However, his suggestion to establish places of secondary 
punishment was sound, and with London's approval, these were developed at 
Macquarie Harbour in Van Diemen's Land, and at Port Macquarie, on the mainland 
north of Sydney and Newcastle. 
The later period of Macquarie's administration generally coincided with an 
outcry by some free settlers, who as `exclusionists' demanded Macquarie's 
dismissal. The disciplines and forms of rule associated with a penal settlement, sat 
uneasily with the expectations of free settlers who came out to the colony. They 
neither wished to associate with former convicts, nor tolerate Macquarie's dictatorial 
manner which at times was considered irrational. As a result of this turbulence, 
London commissioned Judge John Bigge to conduct a wide-ranging inquiry which 
led to recommendations that the absolute power of governors be restricted by the 
introduction of reforms. These were implemented in 1821 when Governor Sir 
Thomas Brisbane replaced Macquarie. Nevertheless, despite criticism, when 
Macquarie departed, he left behind well established towns and the infrastructure 
essential for the economic future of the colony. 
The Aborigines, dispossessed of their land, fought a determined guerilla 
campaign in Van Diemen's Land in the late 1820's to 1831, which is referred to as 
the 'Black War'. At no time between 1788 and Macquarie's departure in 1821 did 
such a level of conflict existed anywhere in the colony. Both Phillip and Macquarie 
made efforts to protect the Aborigines according to the standards of that era. Phillip 
attempted to learn the local tribes' language, and did not order retaliation when he 
was speared. Macquarie, like Phillip, had a paternalistic attitude towards the 
Aborigines and opened his Native Institute for children. Later, he intended to settle 
dispossessed Aborigines on 10,000 acres of 'distant' country. But, in proposing 
this, Macquarie made no reference to those local tribes who could be displaced from 
their 10,000 acres so that a sanctuary could be created for Macquarie's already 
dispossessed Aborigines. Despite their earnest intentions, both governors, under 
circumstances which they considered justified, ordered retaliatory raids against 
particular tribes. While Phillip initially ordered six natives be captured and hanged, 
or killed and decapitated, Macquarie's orders resulted in fourteen men, women and 
children being massacred. 
Under Phillip's Commission of April 1787, he was empowered to grant land 
to settlers and thereafter this system of grants, and later sale, of "unoccupied" land 
continued. Consequently as the borders of white settlement expanded, increasing 
numbers of Aborigines were dispossessed of their traditional lands, resulting in 
heightening antagonism between them and the settlers, and leaving a legacy of 
concern over "land rights". It was inevitable that clashes would occur on the 
expanding borders with both sides committing revengeful acts against the other. 
The spread of white settlement came about under the protection of British 
sovereignty. Although a vast area of Australia had been initially claimed, by the time 
of the declaration of peace in 1815, only coastal strips radiating from Sydney, and in 
Van Diemen's Land inland from Hobart and Launceston were settled. It is itself a 
paradox that in the next fourteen years of peace, as a result of external security 
threats, the whole continent came under British sovereignty. Factors which caused 
this expansion were evident and remarked on by Macquarie while still governor. 
But the process of negating these threats was only completed in 1829, eight years 
after Macquarie's departure. Only two nations were responsible for British 
concerns. These were France, again a monarchy under the restored Bourbons, and 
Holland, which by 1815 had regained her independence from France, and had 
troops serving with the British at Waterloo. By 1816, the Dutch Fast Indies, 
captured by the British during the war, had been returned. 
For the Dutch, their immediate preoccupation was to reimpose their authority 
over the Fast Indies, now Indonesia. For them, a threat to their sovereignty and 
trade came from the British, who during the latter part of the war had exercised 
government over, and gained intimate knowledge of the region. There were two 
potential enveloping threats of concern to the Dutch. From the north, in addition to 
the British base at Penang, their establishment of a factory at Singapore was seen as 
an opening move to further increase British influence outwards from that island. 
Simultaneously, from the south, based on New South Wales, traders could attempt 
to move into the island chain with consequent loss to the Dutch, not only of trade, 
but erosion of their control of outer islands. On the other hand, Earl Bathurst, 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, was particularly concerned that the 
spread of Dutch influence over the waters of the Indies could result in maritime 
trade routes being denied to the British. Therefore, despite an Anglo-Dutch treaty 
about to be signed (delineating spheres of influence and stopping the powers 
unilaterally expanding), by Bathurst's direction, in 1824 there was an actual 
extension of British sovereignty in northern Australia which was demonstrated by 
the establishment of Fort Dundas. In 1825, the western boundary of New South 
Wales was extended further westward into New Holland, to guarantee sovereignty 
over the hinterland claimed in 1824. Thereafter, it was concern over France's 
intentions which resulted in the further expansion of British sovereignty. 
From 1818, the first post-war French scientific expedition in Australian 
waters aroused colonial and British government suspicions of French intentions in 
the western or southern coastal regions of the continent. Later expeditions 
reinforced these fears, together with a growing realisation that it would be 
detrimental to British interests if another country established a lodgement in 
Australia. As a consequence, on orders from London, Governor Ralph Darling 
dispatched parties to form outposts at sites of potential French interest. During 
1826, these were established at King George's Sound, now Albany, and at 
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Westemport, in today's Victoria. 
Despite these British moves in 1826, reports still continued to be received 
from Paris that France was investigating the possibility of establishing a penal 
colony in New Holland. Consequently, Bathurst arranged the dispatch of a warship 
to New Holland to proclaim sovereignty over that region. Fortuitously, a 
commercially driven proposal was simultaneously being made in London for 
government approval to establish a non-convict settlement on the Swan River. 
Therefore, in addition to dispatch of the naval vessel, the War and Colonial Office 
approved the establishment of this proposed settlement. The result was that in May 
1829, Captain Charles Fremantle proclaimed sovereignty over what had been New 
Holland and a few months later this sovereignty was confirmed by a settlement at 
Swan River. 
In summary, despite hardship, convict rebellion, and insurrection by the New 
South Wales Corps, internal security was maintained over the convicts in the 
fledgling colony. This enabled the ordered development of the penal settlement to 
proceed towards a crown colony. This was despite a continual struggle between the 
civil and military powers to gain dominant authority during the period from 1788 
until 1810. The civil power prevailed, which ensured that as a result of the Bigge 
Inquiry, the colony could commence moving towards representative government. 
Unfortunately, caught in the expansion of white settlement, the Aborigines suffered, 
as is still reflected to this day. 
At the same time, conceived or real threats during both war and peace were 
responsible for the continent coming exclusively under British sovereignty. Until 
1815, apart from a perceived French threat in 1801-1802, which resulted in the 
settlement of Van Diemen's Land, the land mass of Australia was not subjected to 
foreign expeditions which could have resulted in divided sovereignty over the 
continent. After 1815, several French and Dutch threats to imperial, as well as 
colonial interests, resulted in outposts being established in northern and western 
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Australia to demonstrate British sovereignty. By 1829, the British government still 
concerned over French intentions, proclaimed and demonstrated sovereignty over 
New Holland, thus ensuring British domain was established over the entire 
continent of Australia. 
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Chapter 1 
External Security Considerations in Establishing 
Botany Bay 
Surprisingly, for such a geographically isolated site as Botany Bay, planning 
for the establishment of this penal colony involved consideration of historical 
factors which had shaped contemporary European power politics and associated 
colonial aspirations. This was to ensure that the future British settlement was not 
placed in jeopardy by disputation with its distant neighbouring European colonies; 
the Dutch East Indies, and Spain's Pacific interests centring on the Philippines. 
Also, the intentions of Britain's traditional enemy, France, had to be carefully 
watched. Nevertheless, once the decision was taken to settle Botany Bay, despite 
somewhat hurried consultations by the British government,' reasonable precautions 
were put in place to ensure the external security of the proposed colony. 
There was a complicated historical background the British government 
needed to consider in their deliberations. On 7 June 1494, Spain and Portugal 
signed the Treaty of Tordesillas which was sanctioned by the Pope in 1506. Under 
. this treaty, Spain claimed the whole of the Pacific Ocean, and the Portuguese the 
Indian Ocean, the division being the antimeridian of the Tordesillas Line. This 
antimeridian was ultimately fixed at 134 degrees 40 minutes east of Greenwich 
(Figure 1). 2 Subsequently, the Dutch ousted the Portuguese from the spice rich 
East Indies', which conveniently lay to the west of the Tordesillas antimeridian, 
' See below, Chapter 2, for detailed references covering the planning period. 
OHK Spate, The Spanish Lake, The Pacific since Magellan, Vol.1, Canberra, 1979, pp.28-29. 
For 134 degrees 40 minutes, and Figure 1 map p.56. The Tordesillas meridian was 370 leagues 
west of the Cape Verde from pole to pole. 
3 With exception of a foothold in Timor. 
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Figure 1: The Tordesillas Antimeridian 
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securing a monopoly over that trade. However, as Spain's Pacific interests were 
centred on Manila, based on trade between the Americas and Orient, their interests 
did not clash with those of Holland. Both nations maintained a de facto recognition 
of the antimeridian of the Treaty of Tordesillas. 
Europeans had long believed that situated in these southern oceans was the 
world's fifth continent, Terra Australis, considered to be of potential commercial 
and scientific interest The Spanish were first to claim what they thought to be this 
continent. In 1606, Pedro Fernandez de Quiros' colonising expedition discovered 
the New Hebrides, now Vanuatu, and with little justification Quiros thought he had 
reached Terra Australis, naming the land La Austrialia [sic] duel Espiritu Santo.' 
During Quiros' short lived colony, he proclaimed:- 
I take possession ... of all this region of the south as far as the Pole, which 
from this time shall be called Australia [Austrialia?] duel Espiritu Santo, 
with all its dependencies and belongings: and this for ever, and so long 
as right exists, in the name of the King, Don Philip, third of that name King 
of Spain' 
During the colony's withdrawal, Luis Vaes de Torres' ship became separated, and 
having proved Quiros had only discovered islands, Torres continued with the 
original intention of discovering Terra Australis.6 As he passed through the strait 
between New Guinea and Cape York, which now bears his name, Tones 'coasted' 
along New Guinea's southern coastline failing to take possession of any part of 
Australia.' Quiros' proclamation, and the Tordesillas Treaty's exclusive claim to 
the Pacific, thereafter remained Spain's justification for claiming Terra Australis. 
From 1613, taking advantage of the "roaring forties" (the strong eastward 
moving wind patterns between latitudes 40 and 50 degrees south), Dutch East India 
Company ships were swept from the Cape of Good Hope across the southern 
Indian Ocean towards the Indies. In doing so, some ships' crews inadvertently 
OHK Spate, Spanish Lake, pp.132-138. 
5 RI King, The Secret History of the Convict Colony, Alexandro Malaspina 's report on the 
British settlement of New South Wales, Sydney, 1990, p.9. 
ORK Spate, Spanish Lake, p.139. 
JC Beaglehole, The Exploration of the Pacific, London, 3rd ed., 1966, pp.102-103, also map 
facing p.98, for Torres' route. 
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discovered and charted much of what came to be called New Holland, unaware that 
this was part of Terra Australis. Later, the English captain William Dampier, like 
the Dutch before him, was unimpressed by the inhospitable western coast lacking in 
promise of economic exploitation. Despite their right of discovery, at that time 
recognised by European powers as a criteria for the recognition of sovereignty, the 
Dutch made no claim, but continued their search for the fabled fifth continent. 
In 1642, Abel Janszoon Tasman was instructed to locate the 'remaining 
unknown part of the terrestrial globe'. He discovered and annexed Van Diemen's 
Land (Tasmania) and charted some of 'Staten Landt,' (New Zealand) hoping that 
this was 'the mainland coast of the unknown South-land' •8  It remained for 
Captain Cook to prove New Zealand was separate from the continent which 
incorporated New Holland. In accordance with his Admiralty secret 'Additional 
Instructions', and by right of discovery, in August 1770, Cook took possession of 
the eastern seaboard of this land, as such action 'will rebound greatly to the Honour 
of this Nation as a Maritime Power, as well as to the Dignity of the Crown of Great 
Britain'. 9 This land claimed by Cook became known as New South Wales.' With 
Spain's declining power, that nation's claims were ignored when Cook took 
possession of his discoveries for the British crown. 
As Cook did not sight Van Diemen's Land (claimed by Tasman), nor chart 
the Gulf of Carpentaria, his claim lay outside Dutch mapped parts of New Holland, 
over which the Dutch could have exercised sovereignty by right of discovery. 
Further, coastline charted by Cook lay far to the east of the antimeridian of 
Tordesillas and outside the region recognised by Spain as a Dutch sphere of 
influence. There was no potential for Anglo-Dutch animosity in Cook's claim. 
JC Beaglehole, Exploration of the Pacific, pp.143-144 and 147-151. P Chapman, 'Tasmania 
and a Dutch Discovery', Australian Natural History, Vol.20, No.2,1980, p.40. The west coast of 
Van Diemen's Land was sighted on 24 November, and as recorded by Tasman, 'possession of the 
said land as our lawful property' was formally taken on 3 December 1642. 
9 Great Britain Admiralty, Secret instructions to Capt. Cook of 30111 July 1768, National Library 
of Australia (henceforth NLA), MS 108/C, p.1. 
19 Historical Records of New South Wales, Volume 1, Part 1, (henceforth HRNSW, 1, P1.1), p.78 
and pp.169-170, Note 75, for Cook's editor naming the land. 
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In the Seven Years War (1756-1763), France and England fought for 
dominance of world-wide empire and command of the seas which guaranteed 
imperial ambitions. At the Battle of Quiberon Bay, in November 1759, France's 
naval power was shattered. By the time the war ended, with the Treaty of Paris in 
1763, France had lost Canada and her overseas empire was in ruins." It is 
noteworthy that the war brought to public attention two men who influenced the 
pre-settlement phase of Australian history. These were Louis de Bougainville and 
James Cook. Bougainville, a colonel and aide-de-camp to the French commander 
Montcalm, had the mortification of seeing him die of wounds, and then the 
humiliation of negotiating the surrender of Quebec to the British. He vowed to 
restore France's prestige by giving 'to my country in the Southern Hemisphere 
what she no longer possesses in the northern one'. 12 Cook established his 
reputation as a navigator, by charting the treacherous St. Lawrence thus allowing 
Wolfe's army to negotiate the river and attack Quebec. 
To restore her post-war imperial standing, France needed to re-establish her 
trade routes. In the event of a crisis, or war with the Dutch, replenishment and 
repair facilities at Cape Town would have been denied to French ships en route to 
her few remaining Indian trading posts, the Indies or China.' France's Indian 
Ocean base at Port Louis, Ile de France, hard to enter, but easy to defend, had 
limitations as a major maritime base. Useful as an intermediate port, it lacked 
natural resources to support shipping concentrations or a large garrison!' As a 
consequence, a series of naval expeditions was dispatched with a view to developing 
11 GS Graham, A Concise History of The British Empire, London, 1970, pp.78-79 and 82-83. 
RE and TN Dupuy, The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present, 
London, fourth ed. 1993, pp.698-700 and 740-741. 
12 J Dunmore, French Explorers in the Pacific, The Eighteenth Century, Vol.!, Oxford, 1965, 
pp.58-59. 
" LR Marchant, France Australe, a study of French explorations and attempts to found a penal 
colony and strategic base in south western Australia 1503-1826, Perth, 1982, p.4, for strategic 
importance of Cape Town. Alliances and coalitions of powers were fluid during this period. In 
1748, William of Orange opposed a French invasion of the Netherlands. During the War of 
American Independence, the Dutch-English War of 1780-1784, found the Dutch allied with France. 
This alliance was renewed in 1785. From 1793-1795, France fought and conquered Holland. 
J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.1, p.35. 
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alternative sea routes. This was the underlying strategic aim to the declared 
scientific objectives of these expeditions. 
J Dunmore points out that this revival of French interest, especially in the 
Pacific, was the result of the circumnavigation of the world by Bougainville from 
November 1766 to March 1769. He completed this voyage with the intention of 
making good his pledge to establish the French in the southern hemisphere. This 
led to expeditions by Marion du Fresne, Kerguelen with Comte de Saint Allottrarn, 
the captain of his second ship, and later, La Perouse.' Du Fresne's visit to Van 
Diemen's Land was the first of a series of visits by French expeditions, which 
ultimately led to alarm at Sydney Cove over French intentions, especially after the 
discovery of Bass Strait. 
Doubt has been cast over a reported French claim to sovereignty over a part 
of Australia. Such a claim is referred to by LR Marchant and J Dunmore. In 
March 1772, Saint Allouram, separated from Kerguelen's ship, anchored off Dirk 
Hartog Island, and reputedly annexed some, or all, of the west coast of Australia for 
France.' As footnoted by Dunmore, details of the extent of annexation are not 
known as Saint Allourarn's ship's log 'contains little beyond navigational details', 
but some 1998 press articles offer apparent confirmation of this annexation." It 
was reported that at the northern tip of Dirk Hartog Island, a silver 1766 Louis XV 
coin was found under the lead seal of a broken bottle. 
There is strong, but indirect, evidence to suggest Saint Allourarn did not 
make a claim on any part of the Australian continent. This opinion is based on 
instructions, issued in the name of Louis XVI, to d'Entrecasteaux, whose 'principal 
object ... [was] to search for the vessels under the command of Sieur de La 
Perouse'. In d'Entrecasteaux's 'Itinerary or Plan of Navigation', he:- 
' J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.!, p.108, also pp.95-96, sighting Queensland's Great Barrier 
Reef. 
16 LR Marchant, France Australe, pp.50-52 and 58-67, for Saint Allourani. 
J Dunmore, French Erplorers, Vol.1, pp.210-211 and Footnote 2, p.210. Weekend Australian, 
2425 January 1998, p.6 and [Hobart] Mercury, 23 January 1998, p.35. 
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will be informed from journal extracts that have been remitted to him with 
the present instruction, that in 1772, Sieur de Saint-Alouin [sic], 
commanding ... Gros Ventre, and returning from the southern land of 
Kerguelen, came ashore and anchored there; but since he did not possess 
the necessary instruments to fix the geographical position, he was not able 
to determine whether the Neptune Oriental map ... is accurate, or needs 
rectification. Sieur d'Entrecasteaux will determine this". 
It is considered that if Saint Allourarn had taken possession of part of Australia at 
this location, the event would have been notated here in d'Entrecasteaux's 
instructions. Indeed, Dunmore's comment that Saint Allourarn's log contained 
'little beyond navigation details' would appear to bear out that Saint Allourarn was 
concerned about chart accuracy and not French territorial expansion. But, 
irrespective of whether France, as well as Britain, had made a claim on the 
Australian continent, the War of American Independence interrupted further moves 
by either country into that region. Nevertheless, at a later date, the revival of such a 
claim (even if suspect) could provide an excuse to the French to annex an area of 
New Holland, and be a further reason for British concern over French intentions. 
In 1778, French and British enmity was reignited when France joined with 
the American colonies in their fight for independence. French naval forces were of 
critical importance in that war, and in 1779 were joined by those of Spain, and then 
in 1780, by Holland. This was a formidable naval coalition pitted against the 
British, now desperately engaged in a world wide struggle, which resulted in the 
loss of her American colonies. Peace was finally restored with Holland in 1784, 19 
just three years before the First Fleet sailed for Botany Bay. 
Britain's humiliating loss of her former colonies in the War of American 
Independence, meant she could no longer transport convicts to these locations, 
where 'between 1769 and 1776 about 960 convicts a year ... [had been] sent '. The 
full dimension of the problem, which caused British gaols and prison hulks to 
18 Bruny d'Entrecasteaux Voyage to Australia & the Pacific 1 791-1 793, ed. and translated by E and 
M Dukyer, Carlton, 2001, pp.284-285. 
18 The Treaty of Versailles of January 1783, resulted in peace between Britain and the Franco-
Spanish alliance. EH Kossmann, The Low Countries 1780-1940, Oxford, 1978, p.42, for the 
'Fourth Dutch War' against the British, ending in 1784. The Stadtholder of House of Orange was 
held 'responsible for the total inertia of [the Dutch] army and navy' in that war (p.43), and this 
contributed to the rise to power of the vehement opposition 'Patriots', see below footnote 22. 
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overflow, can be gauged from numbers transported to the American colonies 
between 1719 and 1772, when 'perhaps 30,000 from the whole of England' were 
dispatched.' The post-war convict build-up was the imperative which forced the 
British government to search for alternative sites for a penal colony, 'either within 
his Majesty's dominions, or elsewhere'. 21 After support waned for a convict 
settlement on Lemane Island, up the Gambia River in western Africa, investigation 
was ordered of Das Voltas Bay, in south western Africa. It was hoped that this bay 
would prove to be suitable as a penal colony, which could become a port of 
refreshment as an alternative to Cape Town on the British sea route to India. As the 
report on this stretch of African coastline proved negative, encouraged by the advice 
of Sir Joseph Banks, who had accompanied Cook in 1770, Botany Bay was 
selected. 
While there was an urgent requirement to establish a new penal settlement, at 
the same time, Prime Minister Pitt's government was concerned by a 1785 treaty 
between Holland's 'Patriots' and France.' This included an agreement between 
the two powers to mutually reinforce their respective naval strengths in the Indian 
Ocean. This alliance had the potential to deny Cape Town's facilities to British 
ships, critically interrupting the shipping route between England and her prized 
possessions in India. With the Dutch Patriots negotiating to hand over the 
strategically important Ceylonese (Sri Lankan) naval base of Trincomalee to France, 
that nation would have had a chain of bases from the Cape, through Ile de France 
to Ceylon, giving France domination over the British on India's Coromandel Coast. 
Admiral H Richmond described this situation as reaching a 'crisis' by 1787.' 
Therefore, when it was decided to form a penal settlement at Botany Bay, which 
" AGL Shaw, Convicts and the Colonies A Study of Penal Transportation from Great Britain and 
Ireland to Australia and other parts of the British Empire, Canton, reprinted 1978, pp.34-35. 
21 CMH Clark, Select Documents in Australian History 1788-1850, Sydney,1970 reprint, p.28. 
" EH Kossmann, The Low Countries, pp.36, 39. The Patriots were a 'reformist party' of the 
'urban patriciate'. They were determined to undermine the pro-British party of [Stadtholder] 
William V (pp.42-43). Prussia invaded Holland in 1787, defeated the Patriots, and restored the 
Stadtholder's party to power (p.58). 
" A Frost, Convicts and Empire A Naval Question 1776-1811, Melbourne, 1980, p.77. 
24 H Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, Oxford, 1946, pp.163-164. 
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would be of only very limited value as a 'strategic outliner to 	the British 
government was apprehensive lest that decision inflame tension between the pro-
French government of Holland and Britain. 
To avoid friction, the British government limited the western boundary of 
New South Wales to 135 degrees of longitude east of Greenwich, being the closest 
meridian outside, and to the east, of the Tordesillas antimeridian of 134 degrees and 
40 minutes. This decision ensured Anglo-Dutch diplomatic relations remained 
relatively stable, with the supply emporium of Cape Town remaining open to ships 
in passage to and from India and later Botany Bay. More significantly, it removed 
the possibility of conflict, and of Dutch warships or privateers, based on Cape 
Town, or the Indies, striking against Britain's long maritime communication routes. 
Despite British care not to offend Dutch sensitivities, in October 1786, the Dutch 
Ambassador lodged a diplomatic protest with the British government. He stated 
that the British were planning a settlement in a 'territory which ... belongs to 
another country'. 26 Probably, his complaint was based on Tasman's claim of right 
of discovery to Van Diemen's Land, which was included within the boundaries of 
the proposed colony. Also, as Tasman in 1644, charted the Gulf of Carpentaria, 
which lies to the east of the 135th degree of longitude, it is conceivable that the 
Dutch Ambassador was also referring to this region, which by discovery, could also 
be claimed as Dutch territory.' 
In implementing the decision to settle Botany Bay, Captain Arthur Phillip, 
Royal Navy (henceforth RV was appointed 'Captain-General and Governor-in- 
" A Frost, Convicts and Empire, pp.105-115, p.126 for Botany Bay 'off the shipping routes... 
[being] a second choice', p.129, 'outliner'. H Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, p.164. Links 
the establishment of Port Cornwallis on the Andaman Islands, and settlement of Botany Bay, as 
being influenced by this adverse strategic position for the British. 
" Historical Records of Australia, Series 1, Volume I, (henceforth HRA, 1, 1), Sydney, 1914, 
pp.1-2, for Phillip's first commission of 12 October 1786. HRNSW, 2, p.737. Irish press report 
of 30 October 1786, for Dutch diplomatic protest. 
" The New Cambridge Modern History, Atlas, Vol.XIV. eds. HC Darby and H Fullard, 
Cambridge, 1970, pp.284-285, map showing Tasman's route. 
28 During this period, the term "Royal Navy" has been noted as applying to British, Portuguese, 
Spanish, French and Dutch navies. In this thesis, it is used to refer to that of Britain only. 
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Chief of the penal colony. Prior to the departure of the transports now known as 
the "First Fleet", carrying administrators, guards, convicts and stores to Botany 
Bay, Phillip received two commissions signed by King George III. He received the 
first in October 1786, but this was replaced by a more detailed second commission 
granted in April 1787, shortly before the First Fleet sailed from England on 13 May 
1787. 
As noted by AGL Shaw, Phillip's first commission appointed him governor 
of a 'strictly military-penal operation'.' Indeed, following the granting of this 
commission, later the same month commissions were 'issued to subordinate 
officers necessary to the administration ... [which stated] that each was to carry out 
his duties according to the rules and disciplines of war'. 31 The military nature of 
the future colony was indicated by the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Howe, who 
'understood that the whole was to have been under Military Law, Convicts as well 
as Soldiers [Howe's emphasis]' . But as later pointed out to Howe by the Under 
Secretary of the Home Office, Evan Nepean, under British law, civilian convicts 
'were not amenable to Military discipline'.' Therefore, in 1787, to resolve this 
troublesome legal issue, Parliament passed an act' :- 
which provided for the creation of a Court of Criminal Jurisdiction in New 
South Wales; on April 2nd, a more elaborate Commission was granted to 
Captain Phillip. ... [Additionally] On April 2nd, also, a Warrant was 
issued for a Charter of Justice which made provision for Courts of 
Criminal and Civil Jurisdiction' 
By this action, the nature of Phillip's status as governor was changed 'from that of 
" HIM, 1, 1, p.2. This was the title granted in the second commission, in the first, he was 
styled as 'Governor' (p.1). 
3° AGL Shaw, '1788-1810', A New History of Australia, ed. F Crowley, Melbourne, 1974, p.4, 
for two commissions to Philip, of October 1786, and April 1787. For wording, HRA, 1, 1, 
pp.1-2 and 2-8 respectively. 
3 ' ACV Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development in Australia, New South Wales 1 788-  
1856, Queensland 1859-1922 (with Notes to 1963 by the Editor), ed. RB Joyce, St. Lucia, 2nd ed. 
1963, pp.3-4. Officials were: the lieutenant-governor, deputy judge-advocate, chaplain, principal 
and assistant surgeons. 
" A Atkinson, 'The first plans for governing New South Wales, 1786-87', Australian Historical 
Studies, Vol.24, No.94, April 1990, p.36. 
33 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.67-70, for 27 George III, 1787. 
34 ACV Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development, p.4. HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.61-67, for 
second Commission and 70-76 for 'Letters Patent Constituting The Courts Of Law'. 
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a military to that of a civil one'.' Likewise, the appointed judge-advocate for the 
marine garrison, Captain Collins, received a second commission as judge-advocate 
'in the settlement'. But, as pointed out by Atkinson, while New South Wales 
became, strictly speaking, 'a colony and civil Government', nevertheless 'Elements 
of military authority remained'.' As a result, a potential was created for friction 
between the civil and military powers, as indeed happened on many occasions in the 
earlier colonial period. 
Phillip's two commissions defined the territory over which he was to govern. 
This extended from Cape York in the north, to South Cape, the southern extremity 
of Van Diemen's Land, now Tasmania. The western and eastern boundaries were 
described as:- 
all the country inland westward as far as the one hundred and thirty-fifth 
degree of east longitude reckoning from the meridian of Greenwich 
including all the islands adjacent in the Pacific Ocean within the latitudes 
aforesaid of [Cape York to South Cape].' 
For a penal settlement, this was a vast territory incorporating 'more than a third of 
the continent',39 giving rise to a supposition that with the loss of the American 
colonies, the government found it 'mentally gratifying to feel a vast area was being 
acquired'. Another opinion was that 'the presence of a French expedition [led by 
La Perouse] in southern waters may have suggested to the British Government the 
possibility of competition in colonisation'.' In the latter case, this would have 
represented an external security concern in the founding of New South Wales. 
Despite arguments that strategic needs of empire may have contributed to the 
settlement of Botany Bay, there remained the clear political imperative of the need to 
ease the strain on the nation's gaols. A later Secretary of State for War and the 
35 A Frost, Arthur Phillip 1738-1814 His Voyaging, Melbourne, 1987, p.148. 
" J Currey, David Collins A Colonial Life, Melbourne, 2000, p.52. 
37 A Atkinson, 'The first plans', p.40. 
38 HIM, 1, 1, p.2. J King, 'In the Beginning ...' , The Story of the Creation of Australia Front 
the Original Writings, South Melbourne, 1985, p.126, for a similar description in a photographic 
copy of Phillip's original, and much amended, Instructions, pp.! 25-148. 
39 A Atkinson, 'The first plans', p.29. 
40 HIM, 1, 1, p.711, Commentary Note 1. 
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Colonies, Earl Bathurst, in 1819, made this point in writing to Commissioner 
Bigge. Botany Bay was not 'established with any view to Territorial or 
Commercial Advantages ... [but] as Receptacles for Offenders in which Crimes 
may be executed [expiated] at a distance from home'. 41 M Gillen forcefully argues 
this case, noting 'It is very doubtful ... if British officials had a clear idea of what 
was intended for and hoped from the settlement at Botany Bay beyond the rush to 
get rid of the convicts'.' While she quotes Admiral Howe's December 1784 
comment that he saw little advantage 'in commerce [flax, timber or an alternative 
route to China] or war' from locating a colony at Botany Bay, she also quotes a 
comment by Sydney, used by A Frost to support his naval oriented arguments. 
Namely, that a settlement at Botany Bay was 'a means of preventing the emigration 
of Our European Neighbours [France] to that Quarter'.' Providing a counter view 
to Frost, Atkinson states that 'despite the disadvantages' of a distant colony, for the 
Home Office under Sydney's direction, it had two advantages. Because of its 
remoteness, it would be hard for convicts to find their way back to England, and 
secondly, 'it was useless', making survival the sole aim of the convicts. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to enter into further discussion on the origins of 
British settlement of Australia, but, the evidence suggests that the primary aim of 
founding Botany Bay was to dispose of unwanted convicts. Nevertheless, as 
discussed below, strategic concerns regarding French intentions in Australia, 
including Norfolk Island, were considered as external security risks for the 
proposed colony. 
Before the departure of the First Fleet in 1787, British suspicion of French 
intentions in the South Pacific, were strengthened by reports of another French 
expedition to the region. In 1785, inaccurate intelligence regarding this expedition 
reached London. Commanded by Count de La Perouse, two ships were due to sail 
41 HRA, 1, 10, p.4. 
" M Gillen, 'The Botany Bay decision,1786: convicts not empire', The English Historical 
Review, Vol.97, 1982, pp.762-763. 
43 M Gillen, 'Botany Bay decision', pp.744 and 756 respectively. 
" A Atkinson, The Europeans in Australia A History, volume one The Beginning, Melbourne, 
1997, p.58. 
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in three months, and it was incorrectly believed by the British that the intention was 
to establish a settlement in New Zealand. This well equipped expedition was 
recognised within France as being of national significance, with strong backing 
from King Louis XVI, who interested himself in its planning.' On reaching the 
Russian outpost on the Kamchatka Peninsula, La Perouse received changed sailing 
instructions stating:- 
The King desires ... you may look over the new English settlement which 
should have been formed by the time you go to the eastern coast [of 
Australia], but His Majesty intends you stay no more than absolutely 
necessary.' 
RI King sums up this additional task for La Perouse as 'simply an intelligence 
gathering operation'." 
Because intelligence regarding La Perouse's proposed voyage was 
combined with knowledge of the renewal, in the same year, of the Franco-Dutch 
alliance, Britain's strategic sensitivities were aroused. As a counter-measure, the 
British considered precautions were necessary to prevent the French claiming or 
settling Norfolk Island, situated about 900 miles north east of the proposed 
settlement site at Botany Bay. Should hostilities occur, it was deemed feasible that 
Norfolk Island could provide an offshore base from which Franco-Dutch or even 
Spanish operations could be mounted against Botany Bay. As a defensive 
measure to counter this, Phillip's Instructions directed that:- 
Norfolk Island situated in the lat. [blank], and long. [blank] east from 
Greenwich about [blank], being represented as a spot which may hereafter 
become useful, you are, as soon as circumstances will admit of it, to send a 
small establishment thither to secure the same to us [King George III], and 
prevent its being occupied by the subjects of any other European powee 
About eight months later, La Perouse noted in his log that his ships sailed 
" LA Triebel and JC Batt, The French Exploration of Australia with special reference to 
Tasmania, Hobart, undated, but late 1950's, pp.17-18. 
" RJ King, 'What brought Laperouse to Botany Bay?', Journal of the Royal Australian Historical 
Society (henceforth JRAHS), Vol.85, P12, December 1999, p.144 and Note 15, p.146, French 
directive of December 1786. 
" RJ King, 'What brought Laperouse?', p.145. 
" AGL Shaw, '1788-1810', p.3 and footnote 7. 
49 HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.89. 
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'From Norfolk Island to within sight of Botany Bay', which he entered in January 
1788 (Figure 2). 59 Surgeon Arthur Bowes, aboard Lady Perzrhyn, recorded the 
reaction to sighting La Perouse's ships, 'some supposed them to be two large 
English ships ... others that they were Dutch ships com'g after us to oppose our 
landing.'' Marine Captain-Lieutenant Watkin Tench, wrote 'The astonishment of 
the French at seeing us had not equalled that we had experienced'.' 
Phillip reacted quickly to La Perouse's unexpected arrival at Botany Bay. 
While he had only commenced landing the greater part of the marines and convicts 
at Sydney Cove on 27 January 1788, on 1 February, Lieutenant Philip Gidney 
King, RN, wrote that Phillip 'signified his intention of sending me to Norfolk 
Island with a few people & stock to settle it. Lieut Ball of ye Supply was ordered 
to receive the Stores on board necessary for that purpose.' Next day, Phillip 
ordered King to take 'a Cutter for Botany Bay, to visit Monsieur De La peruse on 
the part of Governor Phillip & to offer him whatever he might have occasion foe.' 
Thirteen days later, the Norfolk Island colonising party consisting of King as 
Superintendant [sic] and Commandant' and twenty one others, departed in 
HMS Supply. Phillip probably expected La Perouse's dispatches from Sydney to 
report on this new settlement at Norfolk Island, stifling any further French designs 
on that island. Phillip's action in ordering the occupation of Norfolk Island, is an 
example of an historical continuum of pre-settlement factors resulting in the post-
settlement implementation of external security precautions. 
Despite Phillip's haste to occupy Norfolk Island, there remains disputation 
as to why Phillip's Instructions ordered him to settle the island in the first place. 
" Triebel and Batt, French Exploration of Australia, p. 24 and Figure 2 - map between pp.32-33. 
51 HRNSW, 2, p.391. Journal entry of 24 January 1788. 
52 W Tench, 1788, Comprising A Narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay and A Complete 
Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson, Melbourne, 1996, p.39. M Austin, 'The Early 
Defences of Australia', JRAHS, Vol.49, Pt.3, November 1963, p.190, for the marine rank of 
"captain-lieutenant", abolished in 1803. 
The Journal of Philip Gidney King: Lieutenant, R.N. 1787-1790, Sydney, 1980, p.37. 
54 HRA, 1, 1, pp.32-34. Phillip's commission and instructions to King of 12 February 1788. 
55 Journal Philip Gidney King, p.40. Party consisted of: a master's mate, surgeon's mate and an 
adventurer, and from HMS Sirius, two marines and a seaman; nine male and six female convicts. 
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Figure 2: La Perouse's passage past Norfolk Island to Botany Bay 
Being a section of La Perouse's chart published in 1797, showing part of 
the south-west Pacific known at the date 
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During his second voyage, in October 1774, Cook in recording his discovery of 
Norfolk Island noted:- 
We found ... kin to New Zealand, the Flax plant ... but the chief product of 
the isle is Spruce Pines which grow here in vast abundance and to a vast 
size ... My Carpenter tells me that the wood is exactly of the same nature as 
the Quebeck [sic] Pines. Here then is a nother [sic] Isle where Masts for the 
largest Ships may be had.' 
So scant was the supply of timber, that once American supplies were cut off by the 
American War of Independence, the sea keeping ability of both the West and East 
Indian Royal Navy fleets had been limited by a lack of masts and spars, as well as 
cordage and sails manufactured from flax. After a naval battle on 6 July 1782, 
Admiral Hughes reported to London that his East Indian fleet required amongst 
other items 'sixteen lower masts, seventeen topmasts, eighteen lower and topsail 
yards and four bowsprits'.' 
Frost argues that in the post-war period, the British Admiralty was so 
concerned over availability of suitable timber and flax from within the British 
Empire, that, based on Cook's report, they required the supplies of Norfolk Island 
be guaranteed by its settlement. Richmond supports this argument concentrating 
on the stranglehold that Russia had over such essential naval stores.' While the 
requirement for suitable timber may appear self-evident, in no document was this 
stated as a reason for Phillip to occupy Norfolk Island. Likewise, the island was 
not settled as a result of any directive to secure its flax supply. However, possibly 
as a result of Admiralty instigation, Phillip in his instructions was directed that:- 
56 A Frost, Botany Bay Mirages, Illustrations of Australia's convict beginnings, Carlton, 
reprinted 1995, p.73. 
57 A Frost, Botany Bay Mirages, p.66. 
56 A Frost, Botany Bay Mirages, pp.62-75. AGL Shaw, '1788-1810', p.3, refutes the 
proposition. G Blainey, Tyranny of Distance, how distance shaped Australia's history; South 
Melbourne, first Macmillan ed. 1975, pp.16, 18-19, argues that because of flax and timber 
'Norfolk Island seems to be a key to the plan to send convicts to Australia.' (p.18). It is 
conceivable that in the Heads of a Plan (HRNSW, I, Pt.2, pp.17-20), copied to the Treasury 
(p.14), the mention of cultivation of New Zealand flax and timber suitable for 'masts and ship 
timber' (p.19) was offered as much as an inducement for the Lords Commissioners to fully support 
the scheme of transportation, as it was an opinion on suitable supply sources for 'our fleets in 
India'. 
H Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, pp.166-167. 
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advantages may be derived from the flax-plant which is found in the islands 
not far distant from the intended Settlement, not only as a means of 
acquiring clothing for the convicts and other persons who may become 
settlers, but from it's superior excellence for a variety of maritime purposes 
... attend to its cultivation' 
This quotation regarding flax, but not timber, suggests Admiralty interest in vetting 
all likely sources of supply for naval use. As Shaw notes, an examination of the 
potential for flax supplies was 'eminently sensible' but did not provide motivation 
for establishing Botany Bay.' Although Cook had noted flax growing on Norfolk 
Island, there is no evidence to suggest that the prime reason for its occupation was 
anything other than strategic concern to deny an off-shore base to a potentially 
hostile power. 
While the British government endeavoured to protect their planned penal 
settlement from external security threats; once established, Botany Bay's harbour 
could then possibly be seen by other powers as a forward British base from which 
future maritime operations could be launched. Such a concept was incorporated in 
the first unofficial proposal for a settlement in New South Wales, written by an 
imperial enthusiast, who as a midshipman had sailed with Cook to Botany Bay. 
James Matra, in August 1783, as a part of his lengthy paper,' wrote:- 
The place which New South Wales holds on our Globe, might give it a 
very commanding Influence in the policy of Europe. If a Colony ... was 
established ... & if we were at War with Holland or Spain, we might 
very powerfully annoy either ... We might with a safe & expeditious 
Voyage, make Naval Incursions on Java, & the other Dutch Settlements, 
& we might with equal facility invade the Coasts of Spanish America, & 
intercept the Manilla Ships, laden with the Treasures of the West. This 
check which new South Wales would be in time of War, on both these 
Powers, make it a very important Object, when we view it in the Chart of 
the World, with a Political Eye.' 
In event of war with Holland or Spain, an external threat to Botany Bay 
could be envisaged. These nations, possibly anticipating British offensive 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.89. 
" AGL Shaw, 'The hollow conqueror and the tyranny of distance', The founding of Australia the 
argument about Australia's origins, ed. G Martin, Sydney, 1978, p.126. 
J King, In the Beginning, pp.12-20, for eight and a half handwritten pages. 
63 J King, In the Beginning, p.18, quotation from original document. 
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operations emanating from Port Jackson, could consider a pre-emptive strike on 
Sydney as being worthwhile. A minor example of Sydney's utilisation as a forward 
base, and port which also offered 'refreshment to ... crews', took place after the 
colony was established. This was the planned expedition against the disputed 
Spanish possession of Nootka Sound, on the west coast of North America, which, 
in 1790, London ordered Governor Phillip to support. After the foundation of the 
colony, defensive measures were taken against the possibility of an external threat. 
These took the form of mounting relatively insignificant batteries to guard the 
entrance to Sydney Cove.' 
To summarise, precautions taken by the British government in planning the colony 
at Botany Bay proved adequate. These were designed so as not to unduly 
antagonise the Dutch, while at the same time, take defensive measures at Norfolk 
Island to pre-empt possible Franco-Spanish moves. As a result, the colony was 
established with minimum risk to its external security. 
64 HRA, 1, 1, pp.161-163. Grenville to Phillip of February 1790, 'refreshment' p.163. 
65 See below, Chapter 3, for details. 
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Chapter 2 
The First Fleet 
The First Fleet which transported convicts to New South Wales was unique. 
Prior to the War of American Independence (1775-1783), private contractors had 
performed the transportation role after sentence, conducting in effect a 
transportation "trade" with America, selling the labour of convicts for profit. 
Contractors provided their own onboard security. Once a consignment of convicts 
had been signed over to the contractor's agent, the British govemment was no 
longer involved.' The former colonies in America, which became the United States 
of America, having prohibited British convict transportation, forced the British 
govemment, to seek alternative destinations for convicts. After 'having sought in - 
vain upon the African coast' 2, the decision was made to establish a penal colony at 
Botany Bay. For the British authorities, this was the first time they would be 
responsible for securing and transporting convicts to a distant shore, together with 
sufficient food and supplies for at least a two year period. On arrival a permanent 
settlement was to be established under a stable administration supported by the 
military power, namely a marine battalion. The unusual nature of the enterprise was 
summed up during the First Fleet's voyage by the colony's judge-advocate 
designate, marine Captain David Collins, who wrote 'All communication with 
families and friends now cut off, they were leaving the world behind them'? 
While the concept of government responsibility for every phase associated 
with the First Fleet was theoretically novel, practised administrative systems already 
W Oldham, Britain's Convicts to the Colonies, Sydney, 1990, pp.1-32. 
D Collins, An Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, 
p.5. 
D Collins, An Account, p.9. 
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existed which could be adapted for organising such a large venture, with the 
Treasury and Navy Board experienced in administering the transporting of troops 
to and from Great Britain.' This machinery was utilised in tendering for, and 
inspecting vessels, and victualling them to carry convicts and stores to New South 
Wales.' Similarly, transportation to America had given the court, gaol and port 
authorities, under Home Office direction, workable procedures for shipping 
convicts overseas. Also American transportation, together with the infamous slave 
trade, had given Britain's mercantile marine experience in maintaining security over 
prisoners at sea, while the Royal Navy was experienced in imposing discipline over 
crews supplemented by press gangs and from gaols. These capabilities were 
utilised to implement the government's decision to establish the new colony. 
Although interdepartmental planning had already commenced, on 18 August 1786, 
the Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Lord Sydney, was formally directed to 
advise Treasury that royal approval had been given for the expedition to New South 
Wales.' 
Surprisingly, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Howe, wrote to Sydney 
on 3 September 1786, commenting that he would not have selected Captain Arthur 
Phillip, RN, 'for a service of this complicated nature' as naval commander of the 
fleet to Botany Bay, and then as colonial governor. If, as Howe inferred, there had 
been no prior consultation with him, nor with his department, over the Home 
Office's appointment, he had every right to be waspish.' Phillip's unusual 
qualifications, while appreciated by the Home Office, did not appeal to the gruff 
Howe, probably because following the Seven Years War, Phillip's 'connexions 
HRA, 1, 1, p.730, Commentary Note 62. The Admiralty was responsible for naval policy and 
the Navy Board was responsible for chartering transports, victualling, and transportation of 
convicts. The Navy Board controlled the Commissioner of Victualling, and Transport 
Commissioners. 
C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 1969, p.10. Commissioner of 
Victualling's responsibilities were to let and supervise contracts for the voyage and provision of 
supplies for the colony; pp.12-18 for Transport Commissioners' role, including appointment of 
the Naval Agent who represented the Commissioners during preparations to sail and on the voyage. 
HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.14. To Treasury of August 1786. Sydney, at the Home Office, had 
overall responsibility for transportation. 
HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.22-23. A Frost, Arthur Phillip 1738-1814 His Voyaging, 
Melbourne,1987, p.142, for Howe commenting 'waspishly'. 
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[sic] with the British navy in the next fifteen years were largely nominal'.8 
Nevertheless, two men who knew Phillip, commenting upon his attributes, noted he 
was 'made on purpose for such a trial of Abilities'. 9 
Apart from probable preferment due to patronage, there were several factors 
which fitted Phillip for command of the First Fleet, and as governor of the future 
colony. From 1774-1778, Phillip had successfully served as a captain in the 
Portuguese navy, where his duties included securing and transporting convicts from 
Lisbon to Brazil. During this time Phillip had operated mainly in South American 
waters, through which the projected First Fleet would have to transit, relying on 
friendly relations at Rio de Janeiro for resupply. Additionally, after the War of 
American Independence in 1784-1785, Phillip served as a spy in France, reporting 
on French naval rearmament. He was then controlled by Under Secretary Evan 
Nepean of the Home Office, who continued to hold that appointment in 1786. 10 
Thus Phillip's internal security experience in transporting convicts, was 
supplemented by an exposure to European opinion on external affairs and an 
appreciation of French naval capabilities. 
The manning of the First Fleet, together with providing civil and military 
personnel for the future administration of New South Wales, was a naval 
responsibility. This included making arrangements for raising a special marine 
force, as stipulated in Sydney's letter of 18 August 1786. In this he directed that 
marines were 'not only to enforce due subordination and obedience [at Botany 
Bay], but [were] for the defence of the settlement against incursions of the 
natives'." While control of the convicts was apparently considered of prime 
internal security importance, the possibility of an Aboriginal threat was still 
recognised in London. This was despite Sir Joseph Banks' answer to a question at 
8 Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.2 : 1788-1850, I-Z (henceforth ADB, 2), London, 
1967, p.326. 
9 A Frost, Arthur Phillip, p.142. 
" A Frost, Convicts and Empire, A Naval Question 1776-1811, Melbourne, 1980, p.92; p.212, 
note 16, for source. 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.21. Sydney to Admiralty of 31 August 1786. 
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the Beauchamp Inquiry in 1785, on whether obstruction from the natives would 
prevent five hundred being put ashore at Botany Bay. To which Banks' reply was 
'Certainly not - from Experience I have had of the Natives of another part of the 
same Coast I am inclined to believe that they wo ° speedily abandon the Country to 
the New Comers.' 12 
Regarding the projected troop strength to maintain security in the future 
colony, Captain Collins privately expressed concern, and in doing so indicated a 
few of the many uncertainties that must have beset all those embarked on the First 
Fleet. He wrote:- 
Let me next call your observation to the smallness of the force we take out 
with us, a force so inadequate that none of the various officers for that 
purpose in town will insure either lives or property on this occasion. Admit 
that the natives to be few (which tho' advanced by Cook, yet, when I 
consider the vast extent of New Holland ... I much discredit [Cook's 
opinion], and think I meet in the interior parts numerous hordes and tribes 
of the natives) ... what we have [next] to fear from the superior numbers 
of our ['disciples' - J Currey's editing] we take from, the various colleges in 
England, most of them justly entitled to their degrees (that last and highest 
degree of exaltation, the gallows) and many of them consumate [sic] 
batchelors [sic] and masters of Arts.' 
While Sydney instructed that the marines 'will be embarked on board a ship 
of war and the tender', he continued that if 'persons who may contract for the 
passage of the convicts should be desirous of obtaining military assistance for their 
greater security, they may be accommodated with a part of the marines'.' In the 
event, the appointed contractor, William Richards decided that military assistance 
inboard was desirable, and so marines were allocated to convict transports as guard 
detachments. 
Despite the presence of these marine guard detachments, the responsibility 
12 RJ King, 'Terra Australis: Terra Nullius aut Terra Aboriginum?', Journal Royal Australian 
Historical Society (henceforth JRAHS), Vol.72 , Pt.2, October 1987, p.77. Quotation from 
Beauchamp Inquiry transcript of 10 May 1785. 
13 J Currey, David Collins, A Colonial Life, Carlton, 2000, p.33 and Note 11, p.323. Collins to 
his brother George of February 1787. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.14-15. Sydney to Treasury of August 1786. 
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for securing the convicts, while aboard, remained with the ship's master. This was 
a continuation of the system used to regulate transportation to America. The lawful 
basis of this was later explained by Commissioner John Thomas Bigge in his first 
report of June 1822. He pointed out that under 'the provisions of the 4th Geo. I. c. 
II, ... a property in the services of convicts is assigned to the person who contracts 
to transport them.'' The practical application of this law was demonstrated when a 
convict, John Powers, briefly escaped during the First Fleet's stopover at Teneriffe. 
Judge-Advocate Collins noted that Powers' disappearance was marked 'by the 
activity of the master of the transport in which he had embarked (a penalty of forty 
pounds being the forfeiture on his entire escape) and a party of marines'. 16 Prior 
to the sailing of the First Fleet, the situation was made explicitly clear by Under 
Secretary Nepean of the Home Office to the Comptroller of the Navy:- 
I hope that it has occurr'd to you in your engagements for transports that the 
owners, as well as the masters and mates, must enter into the bonds which 
the Acts of Parliament require for the safe custody of the convicts whilst on 
board the transports ... the courts will not vest them with custody of the 
convicts without it' 
With the master having prime responsibility for security on his ship, scope 
for future disagreement existed in any disputation between him and either the guard 
commander or naval agent, and later the naval appointed surgeon superintendent. In 
1822, Bigge referred to the control and punishment of convicts as the cause of 
'frequent altercations between them during the voyage'.' Nevertheless, for the 
First Fleet, co-operation between ships' masters and marine guard commanders 
operated without reported friction. Unlike later military guards who were detailed, 
often unwillingly, for the unsoldierly duty of guarding convicts,' the marine 
officers and other ranks were to be volunteers.' 
15  Report of the Commissioner Of Inquiry Into The State Of The Colony of New South Wales. 
Ordered ... to be Printed, 19 June 1822, [The Bigge Report], Adelaide, 1966, p.7. 
16 D Collins, An Account, p.6. 
17 HRNSW, I, Pt. 2, p.34. 
18 The Bigge Report, p.7. 
19  M Austin, The Army in Australia 1840-50 Prelude to the Golden Years, Canberra, 1979, p.23. 
20 HRNSW, I, Pt. 2, pp.21-22. Sydney to Admiralty of August 1786. 
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Sydney made the decision that 'about 180' marines would be dispatched to 
New South Wales!' This resulted in a service decision to employ four companies 
each with an establishment of one captain, three subalterns, three each sergeants and 
corporals, two drummers, and forty private marines. Additionally, there was a major 
commanding the 'battalion', Brevet Major R Ross, and his two staff officers, 
Adjutant, Second Lieutenant J Long and Quarter-master, First lieutenant J Furzer. 22 
Additionally, as deputy judge-advocate for the marine garrison, as well as for the 
civil power, Captain David Collins accompanied the First Fleet. His different status 
to that of his brother marine officers is indicated in a letter he wrote to his father, a 
marine major general, who as Commandant, Portsmouth Division, was also his 
commanding officer. David Collins wrote 'I was not put on full pay, but to have 
ten shilling a day, and to be considered an extra officer.' 23 Marine Captain-
Lieutenant Watkin Tench noted that of 212 marine officers and men, 210 were 
volunteers. From official correspondence, it is apparent that the two non-
volunteers were officers detailed at short notice to fill sudden establishment 
vacancies. For example; 'direct L't Maxwell to embark on board the Scarborough 
... and to proceed in her to Botany Bay, in room of L't Morrison, who has absented 
himself from his duty.'" This instruction was issued a month after the 
Scarborough's marine detachment was embarked for guard duties.' 
In October 1786, an order to raise the four companies was sent to the Marine 
Commandants at Portsmouth and Plymouth together with details of special 
21 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2 , p.15. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.106. 
" J. Currey, David Collins, p.14, for commanding officer; and p.29, for letter quotation. His 
father was Major General Arthur Tooker Collins, whose acquaintance with First Sea Lord, Admiral 
Howe, contributed to David Collins' appointment (p.28). Major Ross had also served with Tooker 
Collins at the siege of Louisburg in the Seven Years War. Ross and David Collins were both in 
the battle of Bunker Hill in 1775 (p.58) and the two messed together on Boston Common. In 
1775, Tooker also came out from England as their commander (pp.22-23). This gives an 
indication of various links of patronage in First Fleet appointments. 
" W Tench, 1788, Comprising A Narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay and A Complete 
Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson, Melbourne, 1996, p.19. The term "battalion" was 
contemporarily applied to the marine contingent. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.387. Secretary to Admiralty to Marine Commandant, Portsmouth, of 26 March 
1787. 
" J Easty, Memorandum of the Transactions Of A Voyage From England To Botany Bay 1787- 
1793, A First Fleet Journal, Sydney, 1965, p.3, embarkation date, 27 February 1787. 
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conditions of service to be offered to attract other rank volunteers. These were that 
after three years, subject to good behaviour, marines could elect to take their 
discharge 'on return to England' or in the colony. Further, they would be 
victualled whilst on duty in New South Wales.' These terms were attractive to 
marines who, like land force soldiers, were required to enlist for life, and when 
ashore, had the cost of their rations deducted from their meagre pay. Marine 
Private John Easty confirmed in his journal the attractive nature of the inducement 
that prompted him to volunteer. He wrote that after guarding convicts for three 
years, he would 'then be discharged at our [his] own Request'.  For marine 
officers, such as Captain-Lieutenant Tench, with 'London ... full of half-pay 
officers looking for preferment'" volunteering was a way of returning to full time 
duty.' Demonstrating the diverse reasons for volunteering, Midshipman Newton 
Fowell was keen to get a posting on an overseas bound warship as an aid to 
promotion, and his patron's influence with Under Secretary Nepean, secured 
Fowell a berth in HMS Sirius.' In Currey's opinion Collins volunteered because 
he was maintaining a married life style 'beyond his means on half-pay he was in 
debt'" 
While naval vessels were being commissioned and crewed TM, and marine 
companies raised, work had commenced at naval dockyards to modify chartered 
merchant ships as secure convict transports. Conversion included internal 
strengthening of bulwarks where convicts were to be housed. Strong bars were 
27 Australian Joint Copying Project (henceforth AJCP), reel 1164, Admiralty (henceforth ADM) 
2/1177, folios 491-493. Major General Carruthers, Chatham, to Colonel Tripper, Portsmouth 
Division and Lieutenant Colonel Hughes, Plymouth Division of 8 October 1786. HRNSW, I, 
Pt. 2, p.23, for extract with edited amendments. 
" Manual of Military Law (MML), London, 1914, p.159. Also: J Moore, The First Fleet 
Marines 1786-1792, St. Lucia, 1987, p.8. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.2. 
" J Currey, David Collins, p.28. 
" ADM 2/11 77, folio 325. Admiralty to Tench and four other officers of 27 October 1786. 
" The Sirius Letters, The Complete Letters of Newton Fowell, Midshipman & Lieutenant 
Aboard The Sirius, Flagship Of The First Fleet, On Its Voyage to New South Wales, Sydney, 
1988, pp.23, 26 and 28. 
" J Currey, David Collins, p.28. 
" HRNSW, 2, pp.380-381. As late as 24 February 1787, Phillip wrote to the Secretary to 
Admiralty advising Sirius 'is very short of complement' and requested assistance. 
24 
fitted on doors to prevent movement between compartments and on gratings and 
hatchways which gave access to the upper deck. According to W Oldham 
barricades which in some American convict transports had been fitted on deck to 
segregate convicts, were apparently not installed. He noted that Captain Teer, the 
naval officer responsible for fitting out the fleet, maintained that as the two main 
transports, Alexander and Scarborough, each had an elevated quarter deck, three 
feet higher than the main deck, these would serve the same purpose. Later, 
loopholes were cut in doors and hatches to fire on any mutinous gathering.' A 
journal entry by Lieutenant King, differs in detail from Oldham's account. He 
wrote 'There is also a barricadoe of plank about 3 Feet high, armed with pointed 
prongs of Iron on the upper deck, abaft the Mainmast, to prevent any connection 
between the Marines & Ships Company, with the Convicts.'" Reconciling King's 
contemporary notation with Oldham's secondary report, indicates that barricades 
were erected on Charlotte and Friendship but not on Alexander and Scarborough, 
nor on the transports carrying female convicts - Prince of Wales and Lady 
Penrhyn. 
The utilisation of space for security in convict transports required balancing 
against the need to provide for the health of the crew, marines and convicts, with 
each group crammed in a confined space for months. Commissioner Bigge in his 
1822 report, highlighted the types of problems faced in planning transportation 
ships' layout. He expressed concern over the location of ships' hospitals, 
positioned in the bows, which he described as 'best situated for a separate place of 
confinement for offenders', rather than a hospital.' He noted the improved 
conditions for convict sick if the hospital was located further aft. But this would 
create security problems, and a risk of an infection spreading to the crew. Having 
raised the issue, Bigge discarded his own proposal, writing 'that immediate control 
over the others [convicts not confined to hospital] that is now afforded to the 
military guard, which would be lost, if the hospital were interposed between their 
35 W Oldham, Britain's Convicts, pp.126-127. 
" The Journal of Philip Gidney King: Lieutenant, R.N. 1787-1790, Sydney, 1980, p.6. 
" The Bigge Report, p.6. 
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apartment and the prison.' Regarding transports carrying female convicts, Bigge 
noted that special security precautions were required to prevent the crew breaking 
into the hospital.'" 
Security of stores was of high priority. In loading the storeships 
Borrowdale, Golden Grove and Fishburn, King wrote that the provisions and 
stores for two years subsistence in the new colony were distributed so 'that an 
accident happning [sic] to one Ship would not have disagreeable consequences, 
which must be the case, if ye whole of one Species of Stores was on board each 
Ship.' 4°  For the convict transports, in addition to food, water, and stores of a naval 
nature, specialised supplies for the prisoners were also carried. The scale of items, 
per 100 convicts, was recorded in the 1812 Select Committee on Transportation. 
While this list would have been refined over the intervening twenty five years, it 
would represent a fair sample of stores carried in the First Fleet. These items 
included; hospital 'Night-caps', 'Brimstone, crude', 'Combs, large' and items for 
female convicts, including a detailed range of 'Child-bed Linen'. Of note, is the 
section titled Articles of Security, which included handcuffs, 'Joined barrels with 
chains - 100 pairs' and 'New strong oak blocks, with large stake and iron-work 
complete - 2 number'. Presumably the oak blocks with fittings were designed to 
pinion refractory convicts to the upper deck as was the fate of John Powers during 
the voyage of the First Fleet.' 
With the possibility of external threat or internal insurrection arising at 
Botany Bay, the ordering and loading of ordnance was of vital concern. On 31 
October 1786, Phillip requested Sirius be issued with a total of 20 cannon of 
several descriptions which could 'be of great use ... on board or on shore'.' 
Additionally, on 15 November, the Admiralty requested the Board of Ordnance 
" The Bigge Report, p.6. 
" The Bigge Report, p.5. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, pp.6-7. 
'Report from the Select Committee on Transportation. Ordered ... to be printed, 10 July 
1812', British Parliamentary Papers, Crime and Punishment Transportation 1, Appendix No.28, 
Shannon, 1969, pp.108-109. 
42 HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.28. 
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supply the marines 200 muskets and twelve carbines, all with bayonets, together 
with necessary spare flints and other requirements for muskets. With minor 
amendments, the cannon and muskets together with other items, such as tents, were 
listed as ordered to be sent to Botany Bay in estimates prepared for Prime Minister 
William Pitt of 21 December 1786." This list is unusual for two reasons; no 
provision was made for supply of small arms ammunition and some items of 
ordnance have been authorised for a surprising reason, namely:- 
'200 musquets for barter', and 
'200 cutlasses for barter'. 
Although barter was a common form of exchange with indigenous 
populations, or when specie was rare, the nature and quantity of these barter 
weapons is perplexing. It is virtually incomprehensible that these, rather than 
trinkets, were intended for barter with the Aborigines, or Pacific islanders with so 
little known about them at this time. No reference has been noted in Phillip's 
Instructions, or other correspondence, regarding trading with the Dutch or native 
rulers in the East Indies. There is a slight possibility that weapons ostensibly 
requisitioned 'for barter' were actually earmarked as reserve colonial stock against 
a possible threat from the French or Dutch. As the marines were issued 200 
personal firearms which could counter any danger from insurgency, or from the 
Aborigines, it is speculated that the Home Office did not want publicity given to any 
preparatory counter measures. 
Alternatively, the muskets could have been ordered as long term replacement 
spares. The 200 cutlasses, not a normal issue to troops, would have provided 
suitable counter-insurgency weapons, at sea and ashore, where the application of the 
code of minimum force dictated the use of cutlasses rather than ball ammunition for 
crowd control. This is confirmed by Easty who, as a guard aboard Scarborough, 
'was Confind for Droping the Cutlash'.' In this case, an official or clerk 
" HRNSW, 2, p.372. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.33. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.4. 
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preparing the list of stores, could have used the convenience of listing them 'for 
barter' to avoid haggling with Treasury officials to get approval for these additional 
weapons. Substance for this argument is gained from a comparison with the list of 
stores ordered for Collins' Port Phillip expedition, which included fifty marines, 
but made no reference to barter weapons. Under the heading of 'Arms and 
Ammunition' the following were listed:- 
Sea Service Swords or Cutlasses 	100 
Spare Musquets for Marines 	50 
Compared to Phillip's barter weapons , this represents a 100 per cent increase in 
the proportion of cutlasses issued to the marines available to use them. Regarding 
Collins' fifty spare muskets, this is in similar proportion to those issued for the 
First Fleet 'for barter' (200 weapons for a total establishment of 212 officers and 
men). 
For the First Fleet, the 200 stand of arms listed on the ordnance estimates for 
the marines, were the personal issue weapons with which they embarked. Private 
John Fasty wrote that on 22 January 1787, a month after the publication of the 
ordnance estimates, 'Captain Shea reueued [reviewed] the arms and acquitrements 
and Comdem all the Bad ones and ordered to be Suplyed with new ones'.' This 
process was to ensure that the 200 stand were serviceable and that any weapons 
approaching a state of unserviceability were replaced at public expense before the 
First Fleet sailed. 
In comparison to ammunition ordered for Collins' expedition,' no small 
arms ammunition is shown on the First Fleet authorised ordnance list, which - 
although inexcusable - is probably why the marines embarked without any. Major 
" Records of the Port Phillip Expedition Correspondence October 1801-February 1803, Appendix 
VI, Vol.1, ed. J Currey, Melbourne, 1990, p.126. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.3. 
" Records of Port Phillip Expedition, p.126. 'Ball Cartridges' to the following quantities were 
to be supplied `Musquet 600' and 'Carbine Pistol 5000'. The emphasis on pistol ammunition 
indicates the close quarters value of pistols aboard ship. Fifty pairs of pistols were ordered. 
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Ross, who received his appointment in October 1786, 49 had adequate time to correct 
this omission before the first marines embarked in December 1786. By his own 
admission, he only visited his embarked guard detachments on 12 March 1787. As 
a result he advised the Admiralty that he had obtained 'a small quantity of 
ammunition for the present use of the detaclunene.' Two days later the Admiralty 
responded, advising Ross that approval was given to supply him with ammunition 
required by the marines in Portsmouth and during their passage to Botany Bay. 
The quantities required were to be as Ross 'may think necessary'. 51 It appears that 
Ross did not 'think' on this matter, as some months later, Phillip, in a dispatch 
from Teneriffe, wrote:- 
I understood when the marines ... were embarked that they would be 
furnished with ammunition; but since we sailed [I] find that they were only 
supplied with what was necessary for immediate service while in port 
[Portsmouth], and we have neither musquet balls nor paper for musquet 
cartridges, nor have we any armourer's tools to keep small arms in repair' 
This lack of ammunition was a monumental security blunder. The first 
record of an ammunition deficiency was in December 1786, an Admiralty 
memorandum, stated:- 
Lieutenant Geo: Johnstone [sic], commanding the Party of Marines ordered 
to embark inboard the Alexander transport at Woolwich [Figure r] 
tomorrow, to guard & assist the Master in preserving Order amongst the 
Convicts in their Passage round to Spithead-, having represented to my 
Lords Commrs. of the Admty that he has no Ammunition ... their 
Lordships ... [are] pleased to order him to be supplied with such a 
proportion of Ammunition ... as may be necessary' 
Whilst initially the Portsmouth or Plymouth Marine Divisions, or Board of 
Ordnance could be suspected of being inefficient, once Ross officially became 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2 , p.26. Ross's commission was dated 24 October 1786. Ross had several 
months warning of his dual appointments of battalion commander and lieutenant-governor before 
the first marine guard detachments embarked. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.386. Stephens to Ross of 13 March 1787, which refers to Ross' letter of 11 
March. 
51 HRNSW, 2, p.386. The Admiralty advised the Marine Commandant Portsmouth, General 
Smith, to execute this directive. 
52 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2. pp.106-107. Phillip to Sydney of June 1787. 
" P Taylor, The Atlas of Australian History, Frenchs Forest, 1990, p.20. 
" AJCP reel 1164, ADM 2/1178, folio 40. Initials (Stephen's?) to 'Rt. Honble. Lieut General, 
& Principal Officers of Ordnance' of 13 December 1786. 'Johnstone' being 'Johnston', who 
commanded the New South Wales Corps in Sydney at the time of the 1808 mutiny. 
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aware of the situation on 11 March 1787, two months before the First Fleet sailed, 
his failure to effectively correct the situation was an unpardonable dereliction of 
duty. Secondary sources have suggested different reasons for this lack of 
ammunition. One view was that the ammunition like 'the feminine apparel was 
[somehow] left behind when the expedition sailed.'' Another account is that 'the 
Ordnance Office, notorious for its inefficiency, had failed to deliver the 
expedition's small-arms ammunition' and once the fleet was at sea this was 'kept a 
close secret for fear that it might encourage the prisoners to mutiny.' In fact, the 
marines had their Portsmouth immediate use ammunition at sea, as explained in 
Phillip's dispatch quoted in the preceding paragraph. Further, once Phillip was 
aware of this shortage, the marine's ammunition was supplemented by 'what little 
the Sirius can supply'.' Because there was some ammunition available to the 
marines (although of a limited quantity), the unsubstantiated statement that this 
shortage was kept 'a close secret' to prevent mutiny, is of doubtful credibility. 
In the event, Phillip solved the ammunition shortage, purchasing 'ten 
thousand musquet-balls' from the Portuguese arsenal at Rio de Janeiro.' While 
the purchase of this quantity of ammunition appears excessive, there is no record of 
any rebuke coming from London for this capital outlay which represented a 
significant increase to the ordnance estimates prepared for Prime Minister Pitt in 
December 1786." It is a possibility that the 10,000 rounds were linked to the 
unusual requirement of 200 muskets and cutlasses 'for barter'. If Phillip had 
received a prior London brief that a foreign threat to the colony was possible, the 
question of using the authority in his commission to raise levy forces in an 
emergency, would have been discussed.' In such an event, he had the capability to 
arm (with 'barter' weapons), and supply with Portuguese ammunition, a militia of 
200 trusty convicts, in addition to the marine battalion. Such an external security 
" W Oldham, Britain's Convicts, p.139. Oldham refers to this as a `Gilbertian situation', p.140. 
" C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.99. Bateson does not quote an authority for this statement. 
" HRNSW, I, P1.2, p.108. Phillip to Nepean of June 1787. 
58 HRNSW, I, P1.2, p.112. Phillip to Nepean of September 1787. 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2 , pp.32-33. 
60 HRNSW, I, P1.2, p.64. 
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threat was not fanciful. When La Perouse's ships were first sighted off Botany 
Bay, there was speculation on Lady Penrhyn as to whether these vessels were 
'Dutch ships com'g after us to oppose our landing'.' 
Rather than 10,000 Portuguese rounds being an excessive quantity, it can be 
argued that this was insufficient for the marines' requirements in the event of an 
armed incursion by a European power. Considering that the capacity of an 
ammunition pouch was sixty rounds (of total six pounds weight)," in order to fill 
192 marine ammunition pouches (being the establishment of marine other ranks), a 
total of 11,520 rounds was required. Even making allowance for those rounds 
supplied in England and from Sirius, 10,000 Portuguese rounds were inadequate 
for an initial issue to the marines if placed on a war footing. In a request by 
Commissary Andrew Miller in 'A List of Articles most wanted in the Settlement' 
of July 1788, as well as ordering armourers' tools (a vital store for upkeep of 
muskets) were components for more small arms ammunition as 'none [was] sent 
out'. By the nature of his duties, Miller must have been aware of the ammunition 
purchase at Rio de Janeiro, therefore the question arises why still more ammunition 
was needed. 
It is improbable that 10,000 rounds would be required in Botany Bay against 
a convict insurrection, or for marine musketry training. Tench in his account of his 
service in the colony, to December 1791, does not once refer to the marines 
conducting live firing!' With a tactical doctrine of massed volley firing, in which 
muskets were pointed rather than aimed, the need for live firing exercises was 
minimal compared to that for later generations of rifle equipped soldiers. In the 
colony, survival and guard duties, rather than training, fully occupied the marines. 
This was confirmed by an officer's letter of April 1790 in which he stated that 'So 
incessantly have we been employed that no military manoeuvre of the least 
" HRNSW, 2, p.391. Bowes' journal entry of 24 January 1788. 
" M Windrow and R Hook, The Foot soldier, Oxford, date unknown, biographical page missing, 
P.48 . 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.155. 
64 W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, pp.43-226. 
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consequence has been practised ... since our embarkation'. There is, however, one 
reference to ammunition being allocated for internal security training. This is 
recorded by King in December 1788, where, on Norfolk Island, he formed a small 
militia, which after training, fired six rounds per month.' Whether the 10,000 
Portuguese were adequate under conditions existing in the early days of settlement, 
or as Commissary Miller requested in July 1788, that more ammunition was 
required, was never put to the test, but this question of ammunition illustrates how 
the 'tyranny of distance' affected the infant colony. 
Except for ammunition, and problems caused by an increased numbers of 
convicts to be transported, stores and personnel were efficiently embarked. In 
planning the allocation of marines within the fleet, the size of each transport was 
balanced against the limitations imposed by gender of those to be shipped, 
including marines' wives and children as well as female convicts and their children, 
as per the attached loading tables (Figure 4 67)• While the transports Alexander and 
Scarborough carried the greatest numbers of convicts, their smaller guard 
detachments were adequate for security. 
Under the ships' masters, the marines' responsibility for guarding and 
administering the convicts commenced aboard two transports, Lady Penrhyn and 
Alexander, while still in the upper Thames. The male convicts on Alexander created 
such a disturbance on the 19-20 January 1787, including taking 'their hands out of 
irons', that the ship's master ordered boats to be rowed around the vessel to prevent 
convicts escaping.' The security situation eased on 30 January, when these two 
transports proceeded down river to 'Gravesend, where the Sirius joined them next 
day'.' Meanwhile, preparations proceeded to load other transports at Portsmouth 
and Plymouth. In each case the marines boarded first, to be organised in their 
" HRNSW, 2, p.761. Published letter by unnamed officer of April 1790. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.174. Details, see below, Chapter 3, p.52 and footnote 52. 
" HRNSW, 1, 131.2, p.79, for Figure 4 table. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.399 and W Oldham, Britain's Convicts, p.135. 
" J Hunter, An Historical Journal Of Events Al Sydney And At Sea 1787-1792, Sydney, 1968, 
p.2. Gravesend is on the Thames, some fifteen miles down river from Woolwich, see Figure 3. 
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duties before the convicts came aboard. Easty and his detachment embarked on 
Scarborough on Tuesday, 27 February at Mother Bank anchorage off Portsmouth. 
He wrote in his journal that on Sunday, 4 March '185 Convicts Embarked on bord 
[sic] the Scarborough for Botany Bay'. It would appear that the marines 
conducted a thorough search as next day a convict was 'Punished with 1 Dosen 
Lashes for hideing a knife in his Shoe'.' 
The numbers embarked on the transports awaiting sailing, presented a health 
problem which concerned Phillip. In pleading for fresh rations, he wrote to Under 
Secretary Nepean that ignoring the plight of the convicts 'which humanity forbids, 
the sending of the marines that are on board the transports [for] such a voyage ... in 
a worse state than ever troops were sent out of the Kingdom, even to the nearest 
garrison'.' Because of Phillip's insistence on fresh rations, clean prison 
compartments and regular periods on deck, a good standard of convict health was 
maintained during the long delay between boarding and finally sailing on 13 May 
1787. This was despite the fact that male convicts remained individually chained to 
prevent escape. As noted by Phillip, this long interval between embarkation and 
when the First Fleet sailed:- 
was very usefully employed in making the convicts fully sensible of the 
nature of their situation; in pointing out to them the advantages they would 
derive from good conduct, and the certainty of severe and immediate 
punishment in case of turbulence or mutiny. Useful regulations 
were at the same time established for the effectual governing of these 
people; and such measures were taken as could not fail to render abortive 
any plan they might be desperate enough to form for resisting authority, 
seizing any of the transports, or effecting, at any favourable period, an 
escape.' 
Officers and private marines gave differing accounts of this period. From 
Captain-Lieutenant Tench's viewpoint, although the delay was 'Unpleasant', it 
allowed the guard detachments time `to adopt such a system of defence as left us 
7° J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.3. 
HRNSW, I, Pt.2, p.58. 
" The Voyage Of Governor Phillip To Botany Bay with contributions by other officers of the 
First Fleet and observations on affairs of the time by Lord Auckland, introduced and annotated JJ 
Auctunuty. Sydney, 1970, pp.6-7. 
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little to apprehend for our own security in case a spirit of madness and desperation 
had hurried them [the convicts] on to attempt our destruction.'" Here internal 
security is equated with survival, by those charged with enforcing it. As a voice 
from below, Fasty was concerned with the mundane details of life which concerned 
him, his punishment when dropping his cutlass and `Liuke hines [Luke Haines] 
Confind for Dessbeadeadne [Disobedience] off [sic] orders'. Also, on Thursday 3 
May 1787, one sergeant, one corporal and six privates from each ship were detailed 
to board the Charlotte, to witness punishment imposed on a Private Nash by court 
martial 'for unsoldier Like behaveyour sentanced 200 and received 150 Lashes' 
Easty's greatest concern, expressed in his journal on 6 May, was that 'the Marines 
rum Should be takin from them att time of Dis Enbarken from the Ships in Botany 
Bay'.' Four days later his sole entry for the day reads 'Major Ross promised us 
the Liquir for the 3 years in the Country'.' Both discipline and morale boosting 
were blended to help maintain an efficient security force. 
After a last minute delay caused by seamen from the transports and store 
ships being short paid', at 4am on Sunday, 13 May 1787, the First Fleet weighed 
anchor.' Naval officers from Midshipman Fowell to Governor Phillip, only noted 
nautical details during the departure of the First Fleet. Of the marines, Collins' and 
Easty's journals contained the same type of entry. Collins referred to HMS 
Hyaena accompanying 'the little fleet' during the initial part of the voyage. The 
general lack of any expression of sentiment suggests that during the waiting period 
before sailing, a degree of inevitability had become common amongst the free and 
convicts, and that any activity was considered better than remaining moored at 
Mother Bank. Tench on Charlotte, observed 'A few [convicts] excepted, their 
countenances indicated a high degree of satisfaction, though in some the pang of 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.18. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, pp.4-5. 
" J FAsty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.5. HRNSW, 1, P1.2, pp.100-103. Marines' memorial 
and resulting correspondence. 
76 Journal Philip Gidney King, p.7. HRNSW, 1, P1.2, pp.103-104. Phillip to Admiralty of 12 
May 1787. 
7 ' HRNSW, 2, p.408. Journal, Captain Brown of Fishburn. 
78 D Collins, An Account, p.6. 
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being severed, perhaps forever, from their native land could not be wholly 
suppressed'.' Possibly, with such a passive acceptance of their fate, concern over 
future mutinous activity amongst male convicts was lessened. 
Despite the apparent quiet after sailing, the marines' muskets remained 
loaded at all times. This is established in a diary entry, of 15 May 1787, by 
Surgeon-General John White, noting that 'Corporal Baker ... on laying a loaded 
musquet down, which he had just taken out of the arms chest, was wounded by 
Additionally, until well at sea, the male convicts remained individually chained. 
Contemporary accounts, written in narrative form, differ as to when these chains 
were struck off, but shortly after their removal a mutiny plot was quashed. Journals 
kept in the form of a day by day diary, such as those of Easty, are useful in 
reconstructing exact sequences of events when cross referenced with reports and 
general narratives. In this case, Easty's diary is particularly valuable as he was on 
Scarborough, where the mutiny was plotted. 
Governor Phillip's hurried account of the planned mutiny, quashed on 18 
May, was written two days later as Hyaena was about to be released by him, to take 
his routine dispatches back to England. He wrote:- 
Since I have sealed my letters I have received a report from the officers on 
board the Scarborough respecting the convicts, who, it is said, have formed 
a scheme for taking possession of the ship. I have order'd the ringleaders 
on b'd the Sirius' 
Although Phillip wrote to Nepean earlier on 20 May, that 'the sea runs too high to 
send [a boat] on board the different transports to get any particular account of the 
state of the convicts,' it is surprising that he only learnt of this plot on that day. 
Marine Sergeant James Scott noted on 19 May that 'Wind Contineud fresh, With 
Rain; ye Fleet. All in sight-' It seems unusual that some signal concerning the 
attempted mutiny was not passed from Scarborough to Sirius prior to 20 May 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.19. 
" J White, Journal of a Voyage to New South Wales, Sydney, 1962, p.52. 
81 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.106. Philip to Nepean. 
82 HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.105. Phillip to Nepean. 
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1787." 
Unravelling details of the planned mutiny on Scarborough, is a composite of 
accounts that mention it•" Hunter wrote that 'a few days previous to this scheme, 
[Phillip] directed the irons ... should be taken off' in the interests of hygiene.' 
Easty recorded that on Scarborough the planned insurrection was detected and 
preventative measures taken on Friday, 18 May. Therefore, the convicts' fetters, 
must have been removed on or about 16 May, three days after sailing. On the 
evening of Friday 18 May, the convicts, now released from their chains, planned to 
seize the ship that night, and as the wind was favourable, sail Scarborough to 
France. This plot, which was 'fixed very well' was instigated, in Easty's words, by 
Thiliph Farrall [Phillip Farrell] Late boatswains Mate of his Maj'ts ship Golaih 
and the other Tho's Grafise [known as Griffiths] late Marster of a french 
Privater'.' If the mutiny had been successful, these two experienced seaman 
planned to supervise the working of the ship, so that after slipping away from the 
convoy by night, they would have a fair chance of sailing to France. But, prior to 
implementing the mutiny, an informer gave warning of the plot. With the guard 
turned out and their muskets covering the convicts through loop holes, the prisoners 
were again ironed, with ringleaders being double ironed and probably isolated. 
On 20 May, with seas moderating, Easty wrote that 'an 5 in the Evining 
hoised out the boat and went on bord the Commodores ship [presumably for senior 
officers to report the plot] and att the Same time sent the boat again with 2 Convicts 
for Mutiny'.' Taken on board Sirius, the two ringleaders were each punished with 
" J Scott, Remarks on a Passage to Botany Bay 1787-1792, A First Fleet Journal, Sydney, 
1963, p. 1 . 
" Collins, Tench and King made no reference to the mutiny. 
" J Hunter, An Historical Journal, pp.3-4. 
" A Frost, Arthur Phillip, p.154. On this evidence, Frost is apparently incorrect in stating that 
Phillip had 'so little concern [over this attempted mutiny] that he gave permission for the males to 
be tmfettered'(presumably after the event). Unfettering took place before the mutiny, only on 
Scarborough were convicts later rechained. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, pp.7-8. The Sirius Letters, p.44, for 'fixed very well' and 
p.157, Note 4 to Letter 11, for background and criminal record of both men, each sentenced to 
seven years transportation. 
88 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.7. 
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twenty-four lashes, a mild sentence for such a serious charge, and to prevent a 
recurrence of mutiny, were transferred from Scarborough to Prince of Wales, 
which carried only ten female convicts. It is not known how long the conspirators 
remained in their double chains, but according to Surgeon White, after their transfer 
they behaved very well. After the event, Hunter recorded that, with the marines' 
vigilance, the attempt would have been doomed to failure. 9° Finally, the bulk of 
Scarborough's convicts remained chained until 2 June, being released after Major 
Ross came on board at 4pm and spoke to them.' 
Commissioner Bigge, 35 years after the voyage of the First Fleet, made a 
pertinent comment on informers which apparently applied to the mutiny plot of 20 
May 1787. He wrote:- 
The fear of combinations amongst the convicts to take the ship, is proved by 
experience ... to be groundless; ... they possess neither fidelity to each 
other, nor courage sufficient to make any simultaneous effort that may not 
be disconcerted by timely information' 
But, Bigge's statement did not absolutely apply as will be considered in Chapter 7, 
concerning the Lady Shore. In this instance a female convict, unhappy with being 
ill treated by her lover, a conspirator in the New South Wales Corps, gave such a 
warning, which was not heeded. 
Reference has already been made to the next security breach, at Teneriffe 
(Figure 5"), where a convict escaped and Captain Collins noted that if the man had 
got clear away, the ship's master would have forfeited forty pounds under his 
contract bond. The circumstances of John Powers' escape from Alexander were 
that he was on deck on the evening of Friday, 8 June 1787, being 'permitted to 
work as a Seaman',' and 'as the means of absconding must have been accidentally 
" J White, Journal of a Voyage, p.52. 
" J Hunter, An Historical Journal, p.4. 
91 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.11. 
" The Bigge Report, p.3. 
P Taylor, Atlas of Australian History, p.22. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.11. M Gillen, The Founders of Australia A Biographical 
Dictionary of the First Fleet, Sydney, 1989, p.292, records the name as 'Power'. 
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offered'', he let himself down over the bows. Floating down to a boat that was tied 
astern of Alexander, Powers drifted until it was safe to row to a Dutch East 
Indiaman. Here, Powers offered himself as a sailor, and being refused made for• 
shore, where steep cliffs forced him to remain on the beach. Next morning, seeing 
the ship's boat, a marine corporal and six privates found and recaptured Powers.' 
The sequel to this, as recorded by Captain Hunter, was that Powers was 'punished, 
and put in irons until we got to sea, when he was liberated in the same manner as 
the rest.' 
Hunter's comment that Powers was released from irons 'in the same manner 
as the rest' once at sea, indicates that as a security measure while the fleet was in 
port at Teneriffe, male convicts were chained, with "trusty" prisoners such as 
Powers being exempted. But, although individually chained at both Teneriffe and 
later Rio de Janeiro:- 
With respect to the convicts, they have been all allowed the liberty of the 
deck in the day, and many of them [at Rio de Janeiro] during the night, 
which has kept them healthier than could have been expected.' 
While there were no reported security incidents in the fleet's passage from 
Teneriffe, or in the long stay from 6 August to 4 September 1787 at Rio de Janeiro, 
inspections kept the marines alert. Easty noted that on Monday, 13 August 1787, 
'the Commodore and Major ross [sic] went round the fleet and Spoke to the 
men'.' Such an inspection of all detachments, by the senior naval and military 
officers together, would have been more than a ceremonial occasion for all ranks of 
the marines, with the commanders assessing the efficiency, morale and welfare of 
the troops. All matters requiring close attention, when any unacceptable slipping of 
standards could affect the overall security of the fleet, or of individual transports. 
" Voyage of Governor Phillip, p.12. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.23, and J Hunter, An Historical Journal, pp.6-7. J 
Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.3, for marines. 
" J Hunter, An Historical Journal, p.7. J White, Journal of a Voyage, p.54. White recorded 
that Powers 'by an artful petition he got written for him, he so wrought on the governor's 
humanity as to procure a release from his confinement.' 
" HRNSW, I, Pt.2, p.113. Phillip to Nepean of September 1787. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.30. 
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As Frost points out, it was Phillip's previously expressed intention, that whenever 
the opportunity offered, he would inspect conditions aboard transports and speak to 
the convicts.' In this case, the marines must have been the focus of Phillip's 
interest. 
It was not until a week before the arrival of the fleet at Cape Town, that the 
next security problem arose. The narrative for this attempted mutiny is mainly 
taken from from the journals of Lieutenant King and that dedicated diarist, Easty. 
Disaffected convicts and some sailors realised that once the fleet rounded the Cape 
of Good Hope, and entered the little known southern oceans, hope of a successful 
escape to a friendly port would be lessened. Therefore, it was essential they act 
before the fleet left the Atlantic Ocean. Surprisingly, with the exception of 
Surgeon Arthur Bowes' The Mitchell Journal', 'this incident was ignored in 
Phillip's dispatches from Cape Town, and also in other known reports and letters 
from the First Fleet. 
According to Easty, prior to noon on 6 October 1787, a plot on Alexander 
instigated by two convicts and four seamen was foiled. This probably took place at 
night, as an officer on Scarborough noted that Alexander 'threw out three signals 
of distress', indicating the use of night pyrotechnics rather than day signal flags.' 
This would have occurred either on the night of 5-6 October if Easty was correct, or 
100 A Frost, Arthur Phillip, p.143. HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.51, for Phillip's 'Views on the Conduct 
of the Expedition', 
1 " The Journal of Arthur Bowes Smyth: Surgeon, Lady Penrhyn 1787-1789, eds. PG Fidlon and 
RJ Ryan, Sydney, 1979, p.39. There are significant differences between this 1979 publication and 
the HRNSW version of Bowers' Journal, published in 1893, (HRNSW, 2, pp.389-394). 
Apparently, the explanation lies in the 1979 editorial comment that another work 'alluding to the 
existence of a rough, day-to-day set of notes or diary from which Bowes entered his observations in 
a later copy - or copies' (p.xvii). Presumably, copies of Bowes' Journal held at the Australian 
National Library, Canberra; Mitchell Library (`The Mitchell Journal'), Sydney; and British 
Museum, London; are derived from these rough notes on which the HRNSW copy is possibly 
based 
102 HRNSW, 2, p.740. Unnamed officer's letter published in the Dublin press in June 1788. 
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on 6-7 October if the officer on Scarborough, and Fishburn's log, were correct.' 
Prior to the plot being foiled, knives and metal bars had been smuggled to the 
convicts by the four seamen as preparation for the planned mutiny. Pasty, but not 
King, also referred to sailors smuggling pistols and their intention to 'take the Ship 
from the marines'.' Whether the marines had warning from an informer is not 
known. But effective counter action was taken, after which the master and guard 
commander were rowed across to Sirius to report to Phillip. Fishburn's log of 7 
October, records that the fleet Tay too 4 hours, the Commodore's boat being on 
board the Alexander'." As a result, four seamen were transferred to the flag ship 
for trial and two convicts were later sent to Scarborough where they were 'stapled 
to the Deck'.' Probably the 'New strong oak blocks, with large stake and iron-
work complete', mentioned earlier as a specialist maritime store for use on convicts, 
secured the two ringleaders to the deck. 
As a result of Sirius passing the information to Lady Penrhyn on 9 October 
1787, Surgeon Bowes' journal entry concerning the mutiny on Alexander provides 
an insight into its background. He noted that the ship's company and convicts:- 
were very mutinously inclined when at Rio de Janeiro & threatened ... [the 
ship's officers] much, declaring they wd. do as they pleased for all Capt. 
Sinclair [the ship's captain], who they sd. had no power over them, & who 
indeed appeared to have lost all Authority over his people' 
Ultimately the ship's master was the dominant factor in maintaining, or failing to 
maintain security on convict transports. In Alexander's case, there was a strong 
armed marine detachment of two first lieutenants, two sergeants and thirty one 
corporals and below.' In the wake of the American War of Independence, this 
guard most probably had the  breadth of experience, as well as numbers, to carry out 
1 " Mercury, Hobart, 8 September 2003, p.5. An article concerning different dates attributed to 
Bowen's landing at Risdon Cove in September 1803, notes one apparent reason for this confusion 
on dates. Then, ship's logs commenced daily at noon, with entries first shown 'as pm and then am 
for the following morning'. This could be the explanation for the difference in dates between 
Easty's journal and Scarborough, and Fishburn's logs. 
'" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.45. 
"5 HRNSW, 2, p.408. 
1 " Journal Philip Gidney King, p.20, and J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.19. 
1 " Journal Arthur Bowes Smyth, p.39. 
1 " HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.79. Return of marines aboard the First Fleet vessels as at April 1787, 
shown as Figure 4. 
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their duties efficiently, had they been properly directed by Captain Sinclair. 
Amongst secondary sources,' Bateson, using non-referenced primary 
sources, stated the convicts' aim was to escape 'at the Cape', rather than at sea. He 
claimed that John Powers, who tried to escape at Teneriffe, was the ringleader and 
that he was sent on board Sirius where he was heavily ironed and stapled to the 
deck. Also transferred to Sirius were three sailors from Alexander. Bateson 
concludes by stating that a convict informer was moved to Scarborough for his 
own protection."' M Gillen notes that John Power[s] was stapled to the deck from 
6 to 13 November 1787, until after the First fleet sailed, while, as a less likely 
circumstance, another First Fleet reference book, states that Powers was chained to 
the deck for the rest of the voyage." 
During the fleet's stay at Cape Town from 13 October to 12 November 
1787 112, the marines began preparing for their security role on disembarkation at 
Botany Bay. Three days after the fleet's arrival, the marines 'under arms' went 
ashore for a drill parade."3 This was the first time the whole battalion had been 
assembled together, as detachments had embarked separately in England. Three 
weeks after the parade, officers and men were allocated to one of four companies 
which would become functioning sub-units on arrival in the new colony."' 
Additionally, as a security precaution, on 17 October, Marines Lieutenant Maxwell 
and Sergeant Scott examined ammunition stored in Prince of Wales's magazine 
and 'found 196 Carteradges Damaged'. These were dried out and reconditioned.'" 
Including W Oldham, Britain's Convicts, p.151, giving it a fleeting mention (quoting King as 
his source, Note 709). 
C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.109. 
M Gillen, Founders of Australia, p.292. D Chapman, 1788 The People of the First Fleet, 
North Ryde, 1981, p.165. 
112  HRNSW, 1, Pt .2, pp.118 and 121, for arrival and departure dates. 
113 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.49. Some marines would have remained on board for 
guard duties. 
114 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.55. 
115 J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.21. No doubt similar checks were carried out on the other 
transports. 
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After Cape Town, and for the remainder of the voyage to Sydney Cove, there 
were no reported mutiny attempts. Nevertheless, amongst the marines, lapses of 
security and discipline continued, such as drunkenness and disobedience of orders. 
Throughout the voyage, harsh punishments were imposed to prevent any 
deterioration in security. Oldham and Bateson give numerous examples of 
offences and punishments. An unusual offence, involving a marine, was committed 
by the convict Thomas Barret, on Charlotte, who manufactured counterfeit coins 
from scrap metals such as shoe buckles. At Rio de Janeiro, on 5 August 1787, he 
was caught using this "money" to buy fresh provisions from a Portuguese boat 
that came alongside before the fleet entered the port.' As an accomplice of 
Barret's, Private James Baker was disciplined with 200 lashes on 31 August for 
offering 'a similar base metal' coin.' 17 
Easty's journal records typical examples of marine disciplinary 
punishments. Referring to himself in the third person, he wrote that on 31 July 
1787 'in the Evening Wm duglays [Douglas] & Jno Easty Confind and put in 
Irons for being Drunk on Duty'. They were released the following night.' Had 
the guard commander on Scarborough decided that the circumstances of this 
offence warranted a flogging, under military law, this sentence could only be 
imposed by a court martial, whereas chaining offered an immediate and 
administratively simple form of punishment. As noted earlier, Easty recorded 
disciplinary action taken against a marine shipmate, a luckless individual, Private 
Luke Haines, who on 31 March 1787 was confined for disobeying orders. On 11 
August, at Rio de Janeiro, Haines was again confined pending court martial for 
fighting Marine Thomas Bullmore (who in turn was later confined for fighting on 
20 October). As a result, four days later, Haines was sentenced to 200 lashes, but 
execution of the sentence was delayed as he was sick. This took place on 28 
116 J White, Journal of a Voyage, p.70. White spells Barret with one 't', but in his entry of 27 
February 1788 (p.116), recording that the same man was the first convict hanged in the colony, he 
spells the name with two 't's. 
117 C Bateson, Convict Ships p.109, for a marine uttering. D Chapman, People of the First 
Fleet, p.34, for Baker the marine involved and his punishment. Confirmed by J White, Journal of 
a Voyage, p.76. No record has been noted of Barret's punishment. 
us J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.27. 
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August, when he received 150 lashes, but, due to his condition, fifty lashes were 
deferred. By 1 September, Haines was `releaced' [sic] presumably from the ship's 
sick bay, and 'forgiven' the remaining fifty lashes. Then, during heavy seas on the 
run to Botany Bay, he was hurt in a fall on 28 November. Thereafter, Haines 
avoided trouble until 2 January 1788, when he was charged with unsoldierly 
behaviour. He was immediately court martialled and sentenced to 100 lashes, but in 
this instance, was 'forgiven his Punishment'!' 
Disciplinary problems in the colony continued for Haines, culminating in his 
being hanged in March 1789, together with five other marines, for stealing from 
government stores!' The pugnacious Bullmore had an even shorter time to live, 
and in November 1788 died from 'Some Bows [sic] that he recieved [sic] from 
James Baker when thay ware fighting on the 7 instant'2 21 Baker in turn, who had 
earlier received 200 lashes for offering counterfeit money (made by Thomas Barret, 
who was the first convict executed in New South Wales) was one of four marines 
sentenced to 200 lashes for the manslaughter of Bullmore', he was also one of the 
six marines hanged with Haines. 
After leaving Cape Town, on 25 November 1787, at 'eighty leagues to the 
eastward', Phillip split the fleet into two convoys, one fast and one slow. By 
reaching Botany Bay before the main fleet, Phillip had hoped to have completed, in 
advance, a detailed reconnaissance and plan for the arrival, disembarkation and 
establishment of a suitable settlement. Such a plan would have helped convicts by 
ensuring an orderly, and early, transition from crowded ship board conditions to the 
shore, lessening internal security problems caused by convict discontent. But, as 
the slow convoy arrived at Botany Bay only one day after Phillip's planned fast 
convoy, this prior reconnaissance and planning could not be undertaken, Port 
1 " J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, pp.4, 30-32, 34, 67, 79. 
120 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.111, and see below Chapter 4, pp.87-89. 
121 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.107. 
122 HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p. 217, four tried in the criminal court for murder and pp.219-220, for 
result of trial. Easty only mentions involvement of James Baker in his journal. 
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Jackson had yet to be examined.' 
Meanwhile, when the fleet entered the high southern latitudes, weather 
conditions became more uncomfortable. Combined with the practised routine of 
ship board security, this justified a reduction in the number of marine sentries. The 
first concession was made on 10 December 1787, when orders were issued that at 
night when it rained, only two sentinels were required on deck.' Five days later, a 
decision was made that only four sentries were required on deck during the day.' 
With security continuing at this reduced level, the fleet was reunited at Botany Bay. 
Here Captain Collins acknowledged that 'under the blessing of God, was happily 
completed in eight months and one week ... a voyage which ... the mind hardly 
dared venture to contemplate'.' Echoing the same sort of sentiment, Private Easty 
wrote that after '8 Kellander mounths and 6 days from Endgland [sic] the Bay 
[Botany] is very hand Some one as Ever I Saw in my Life'. ' 12.7 Despite several 
plots to mutiny and the extraordinary nature of the voyage, the First Fleet had 
arrived safely, with the maintenance of security being a significant factor in this 
achievement. 
1 " HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.50. Phillip had originally hoped to arrive 'two or three months before the 
transports'. In the circumstances, this would not have been possible with Phillip delaying splitting 
the fleet until after departing Cape Town. A Frost, Arthur Phillip, pp.143-144, for what Phillip 
could have achieved by arriving early. HRNSW,1, Pt.2, p.131. Phillip to Sydney of May 1788. 
For arrival of Sirius on 18 January, the fast convoy of three transports on 19 January and slow 
convoy next day. 
'" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.70. 
1 " J Fasty, Transactions Of A Voyage,p.72. 
126 D Collins, An Account p.10. 
127" J. Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.89. 
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Chapter 3 
Survival and Security 
In the embryo colony, matters of security and order were to be significantly 
influenced by factors quite apart from those of social control. Fewer than four 
months after arriving at Botany Bay, Phillip reported to the Home Office that 
'people were healthy when landed, but the scurvy has, for some time, appeared 
amongst them, and now rages in a most extraordinary manner." The struggle to 
survive was made more difficult by the recalcitrance of the convicts and refusal of 
the marine officers to supervise them.' Also prolonged periods on starvation 
rations caused a further decline in health, producing lethargy, while there was an 
unavoidable wait while agriculture and animal husbandry developed. The wreck of 
the supply ship HMS Guardian in 1791 was a severe blow in the struggle for 
survival in the small colony.' 
Food was not the only necessity in short supply. Surgeon John White 
appealed to Governor Phillip for medicines as well as food to be obtained from 
Cape Town, as his stocks 'have long since been expended'. He also requested that 
sheets and blankets be sent from England for the hospital as 'none were sent out 
although demanded: 5 The situation continued to deteriorate, and in December 
1791, Surgeon Harris of the New South Wales Corps reported that the regiment 
' HRA, 1, 1, p.20. Phillip to Sydney of May 1788. 
HRA, 1, 1, pp.55-56. Phillip to Nepean of July 1788, for convicts and marine officers. Also, 
p.195, Phillip to Grenville of July 1790, for convict recalcitrance and lack of supervisors. 
• D Collins, An Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, 
p.80. 
• HRA, 1, 1, p.185. Phillip to Grenville of June 1790. 
• HRA, I, 1, p.78. White to Phillip of September 1788. 
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had been sent out to Botany Bay without any kind of medical necessaries. 6 
Footwear, including leather to repair soles, was almost non existent. Captain-
Lieutenant Tench recorded that 'Many a guard have I seen mount, in which the 
number of soldiers without shoes exceeded that which had yet preserved remnants 
of leather: 7 In this environment the marine battalion had to carry out Sydney's 
directive to not only enforce due discipline on the convicts but to defend the 
settlement against incursions by the natives. 
Before the First Fleet sailed from England, Phillip, pondering the security of 
the future colony, wrote:- 
On landing in Botany Bay it will be necessary to throw up a slight work as a 
defence against the natives - who, tho' only seen in small numbers by 
Captn. Cook, may be very numerous on other parts of the coast - and 
against the convicts; ... [this] will be the work of a few days only; but some 
small cannon for a redoubt will be necessary. Within the lines the stores 
and provisions will be secured; 8 
As well as forecasting the need for some defensive precautions against both the 
Aborigines and convicts, to minimise internal dissent Phillip planned that convicts 
be located separately from both the garrison and Aborigines.' However, in 
establishing the 'camp' at Sydney Cove, topography together with the amiable 
behaviour of the convicts, changed Phillip's preplanned priorities. A press report of 
1789 described the establishment of the camp and security measures undertaken:- 
The moment Commodore Phillip had made good the landing of the 
Marines, and some lines of limitations were marked out, the Convicts were 
put on shore; and the Artizans [sic] amongst them ... proceeded to cut down 
wood to form their habitation ... in the evening the workmen and others 
returned on board ... leaving only the Marines, and a detachment of 
Seamen, to guard the works as they advanced towards completion. The 
natives, when they discovered the preparations on foot, and that their 
visitors were likely to become stationary, appeared so dissatisfied, that 
several pieces of ordnance were mounted on the lines to awe them: they 
however kept at a distance, and though they did not provoke a fire, they 
declined all communication." 
• HRA, 1, 1, p318. Harris to Phillip of December 1791. 
W Tench, 1788, Comprising A Narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay and A Complete 
Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson, Melbourne, 1996, p.124. 
• HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.52. Undated views by Phillip. 
• HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.52. 
" Newspaper cuttings album 1770-1857, article published 1789, NLA, MS4658. No folio 
pagination or bibliography except year of publication notated for each article. 
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With neither the convicts nor Aborigines showing undue belligerence, Phillip 
did not order the building of a redoubt. Instead, the marines maintained order in 
camp by patrols and sentry posts, and outside the camp by providing armed escorts. 
While Phillip had to juggle numerous conflicting priorities, which initially did not 
justify defensive works, his lieutenant-governor, Major Ross, exhibited a traditional 
attitude on fortifications, possibly influenced by his North American experiences 
fighting the French then Americans." Six months after the landing, Ross 
commented to the Admiralty:- 
I must observe to their Lordships that the detachment [of marines] is at this 
hour without any kind of plate of defence to retire to in case of an alarm or 
surprize, tho' I have, in justice to myself, repeatedly mention'd and urged 
his Excellency to get something or other effected (sic) for that purpose.' 
Ross' lack of loyalty to Phillip and sense of displeasure when his advice was not 
followed is evident here. Ross also demonstrated a certain mental rigidity in his 
inability to appreciate the low level of security threat after six months in the colony. 
Ross justified his denunciation of Phillip by referring to an incident in which 
two rush cutters were murdered only 'a few weeks past'. He blended recounting 
the horror of this incident with an apparently contradictory argument that the 
Aborigines showed no inclination to come near. By virtue of his observations, Ross 
drew the conclusion that the Aborigines were not the harmless, inoffensive race they 
had been represented to be." Hence there was need for a redoubt. Six weeks 
before this formal complaint, on 31 May 1788, Phillip had visited the site where the 
two men were murdered and their bodies mutilated. Because the murdered men had 
earlier interfered with native canoes, in Phillip's opinion, the natives were not the 
aggressors.' With no reason to disbelieve Phillip's account, Ross' letter of 10 
July, representing that this incident proved that the Aborigines were a serious threat, 
may have been a deliberate exaggeration or a serious lack of judgment. 
" J Moore, The First Fleet Marines 1786-1792, St Lucia, 1987, pp.34-35, for Ross' service. 
12 HRNSW,1,Pt.2, p.171. Ross to Secretary of the Admiralty, of July 1788. 
13 HRNSW,1,131.2, p.171. 
HRNSVV,1,Pt.2, p.148. Philip to Sydney of July 1788. 
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Nevertheless, precautions against native raids were necessary, with sentries 
being especially vigilant by night. One incident involved a night sentry who alerted 
the guard commander that about thirty Aborigines were approaching the camp in a 
hostile manner. The officer, while taking 'every precaution to prevent an 
[Aboriginal] attack, ... at the same time gave orders that no molestation, while they 
continued peaceable, should be offered them.' When the ship's bells rang the hour 
and the sentries called `All's well', subsequent sounds made by the Aborigines 
indicated they were startled and had slipped away. Tench later supposed that their 
intentions were either 'to pilfer or to ascertain in what security we slept'. While 
this incident appears to vindicate Phillip's, as opposed to Ross' view on building a 
redoubt, Tench used it to support Ross' argument.' 
Despite Ross' criticism, Phillip was fully conscious of the need for 
fortifications. From his subsequent orders, it is obvious that Phillip believed the 
most likely threat was from a foreign maritime incursion. With a lack of cannon 
and defenders, Phillip could not cover the shipping channel at Sydney Heads nor 
the numerous landing sites inshore between the Heads and Sydney Cove. He only 
had the capability to construct limited defence works on the foreshore approaches to 
the cove.. Phillip appointed Second Lieutenant William Dawes as engineer and 
artillery officer,' and amongst his orders was the directive that a battery be built to 
defend Sydney Cove (Figure 6'). As a result, an earth redoubt mounting two six 
pounder cannon was constructed at what is now Bennelong Point. This was later 
replaced by a substantial work with eight six pounders on the western side of the 
cove at Point Maskelyne, now Dawes Point Subsequently, the battery at 
Bennelong Point was allowed to fall into a state of disrepair as was a small battery 
built on the northern end of Garden Island.' 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.79, for detail in this paragraph. 
16 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.172. HRA, 1, 1, p.46, also p.724, Commentary Note 41, for Dawes' 
career. 
'' The Voyage Of Governor Phillip To Botany Bay with contributions by other officers of the 
First Fleet and observations on affairs of the time by Lord Auckland, introduced and annotated JJ 
Auclunuty, Sydney, 1970, Figure 6 chart facing p.80. 
18 TR Frame, The Garden Island, Kenthurst, 1990, pp.54-55, for Sydney Cove batteries, and 
p.58, for a Garden Island battery, built in 1799, of a four pounder and six pounder gun. 
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While Phillip took precautions against external threat, his greatest problem 
remained maintenance of order with convicts able to move with ease around the 
open penal camp. A temporary Government House was located on the eastern side 
of the cove 'with a large body of convicts encamped near[by].' 19 The marine 
officers' huts and other ranks' tents and barrack huts (then under construction) 
were centrally located at the head of the cove on the western side of the Tank 
Stream. Further around the western foreshore were one or two stores huts, the 
male and female convict tent lines, hospital and finally the observatory on the 
western headland. To maintain order in this scattered settlement, also to prevent 
Aboriginal infiltration, the marine battalion provided two guards, each of one 
subaltern, one sergeant, two corporals, one drummer and twenty one marines.' 
Probably one guard was mounted near Government House and the other on the 
western shore to guard store huts and the convict lines. Tench noted that to provide 
'public security ... directions to use force, in case of necessity [were given and 
offenders could] perish by the bayonet.' This was no idle threat as marine 
sentries mounted night duty with loaded muskets to enforce a curfew. 
Another of Phillip's major concerns while awaiting regular shipments from 
England, was conserving those stores including food, which had arrived with the 
First Fleet, and developing some self-sufficiency of food supply. Unfortunately, 
the open prison system and shortage of supplies resulted in thieving becoming a 
major problem. In a speech to the convicts, Phillip gave early warning that he would 
not tolerate crime. This caution followed the military and civil ceremonial on the 
morning of 7 February 1788, at which Phillip's commission and letters-patent for 
19 W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.44. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.44. Tench referred to 'two guards, consisting of ... 
[double the total number of all ranks as listed in the text above]'. Logic indicates that the figures 
quoted by Tench related to the grand total of the two guards, with one of the four companies 
rostered each twenty-four hours. 
21 W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.44. 
49 
the establishment of civil and military courts in the colony were read." He then 
addressed the assembled convicts declaring that:- 
he should be ever ready to show approbation and encouragement to those 
who proved themselves worthy of them by good conduct; while, on the 
other hand, such as were determined to act in opposition to propriety, 
would inevitably meet with the punishment they deserved.' 
Four days after Phillip's warning, Collins recorded that to check various 
'enormities' of crime, it was necessary to assemble the first Court of Criminal 
Judicature. Tench described the working of this court of seven members (the 
Judge-Advocate and six officers of His Majesty's sea or land forces) which 'is 
altogether new in the British annals'. In capital cases, no death sentence could be 
given unless five, at least, of the seven members present concurred.' In his first 
dispatch from the colony, Phillip referred to the necessity for assembling the 
criminal court and that six men were condemned to death.' This report of the 
court's findings was incorrect,' as at the court's first sitting on 11 February 1788, 
only three convicts were tried and none were condemned.' Samuel Barsby 
received 150 lashes for assault on Drum Major Benjamin Cook.' In Private 
Easty's opinion, this was a trifling punishment for what he called 'Mutany'.' A 
second convict was convicted for theft and 'confined for a week upon a small rocky 
22 W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.46. J Scott, Remarks on a Passage to Botany Bay 
1 787-1 792, A First Fleet Journal, Sydney,' 1963, pp.35-36. J Easty, Memorandum of the 
Transactions Of A Voyage From England To Botany Bay 1787-1793, A First Fleet Journal, 
Sydney, 1965, p.96, for military activities. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.14, for civil ceremony. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.15. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.48. 'Letters Patent Constituting the [Colony's] 
Courts of Law' confirm Tench's statement (HRNSW, 1, Pi.2, pp.74-75). 
26 HRA, 1, 1, p.22. To Sydney of May 1788. 
2 ' HRA, 1, 1, p.716, Commentary Note 14, for inaccuracies in Phillip's dispatch of May 1788. 
Collins was confused over the name of the first convict executed. This death sentence was passed 
at the second sitting of the criminal court. He stated (D Collins, An Account, p.15) that James 
Barrell was hanged. In fact, Thomas Barrett was the first convict executed, on 27 February, and 
James Bennet, or Bennett, on 1 May 1788. J White, Journal of a Voyage to New South Wales, 
Sydney, 1962, pp.116 and 132. J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, pp.98 and 101, gave 
Bennet(O's first name as John [`.1nol and dates the execution as 2 May. 
J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.97. 
" J Moore, First Fleet Marines, pp.98-99, for details. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.97. 
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island on bread and water.'" This island became known as Pinchgut, now Fort 
Denison (Figure 6). The third man was acquitted. Tench noted that to maintain 
security whilst the court was sitting, it was:- 
surrounded by a guard under arms, and admission to everyone who may 
choose to enter is granted. Of late, however, our colonists are supposed to 
be in such a train of subordination as to make the presence of so large a 
military force unnecessary, and two sentinels (in addition to the provost-
martial) are considered as sufficient.' 
For initial sittings of the criminal court, this was a deliberate show of force to 
discourage any convict attempt to obstruct justice, while giving spectators 
confidence that justice would be done. 
Collins, as deputy judge-advocate, presiding over the court,' was concerned 
that in the first sittings of the Criminal Court 'The mildness of these punishments 
seemed rather to have encouraged than deterred others'.' He had cause to express 
this view, particularly in Barsby's case where insolence by convicts against the 
military, if not repressed, would weaken the marines' disciplinary hold over the 
convicts. By the Criminal Court's second sitting, shortages of supplies had 
worsened, with thieving becoming endemic. Therefore, members of the court took a 
tougher stance. Tench noted that 'the day was at hand on which the violation of 
public security could no longer be restrained by the infliction of temporary 
" D Collins, An Account, p.15. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.48. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.48. To establish under law whether; firstly the 
accused was guilty and if so, secondly, the sentence; required two separate decisions of the court's 
members. Their opinions were given in turn 'beginning with the youngest member [of the court] 
and ending with the president'. Thus, although Collins, as president, may have been in a position 
to informally influence the decisions of the court, legally his opinions on guilt, and later the 
sentence, were respectively given after all other members had advised their decisions. This practice 
is still followed in military courts martial, except the ascending order commences with the most 
junior officer in rank, not age (possibly written in error by Tench in the above quotation). Also 
the functions of president and judge-advocate are now separated. Nevertheless, this legally explains 
why Collins, as judge-advocate, could complain of the light sentences imposed by a court of which 
he was president. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.15. 
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punishment.' That day came on Wednesday, 27 February 1788." 
Sergeant Scott recorded that on 27 February, 'Thos. Barrett, a Convict, Was 
tried for Breaking Open the Publick Stores, & Exacuted the Same Evening at 6. 
0Clock'.' During the execution, security was tight with Major Ross and his 
marine battalion present under arms, 'in case an insurrection sh'd take place (as 
was wisp'd ab't) or a rescue sh'd be attempted.'" This was a reasonable 
precaution as Phillip 'obliged' all convicts to be present to witness the execution,' 
which took place from 'the Arm of a large Tree situated between the Tents of the 
Men & Women Convicts'. 41 The reluctant convict hangman, only carried out his 
task after he had been 'severely threaten'd' by Major Ross, that otherwise the 
marines would be ordered to shoot him.' Phillip was apparently determined to 
drive home a severe warning to the convicts, as he indulged in an act of macabre 
theatre with two other convicts, `Heny. Lovel & Jos. Hall'', who were due to be 
hanged with Barrett. At the scaffold, Ross announced that these two were to be 
reprieved for twenty-four hours. White explained what happened the following 
afternoon:- 
When the awful hour arrived, they were led to the place of execution, 
and, just as they were on the point of ascending the ladder, the judge 
advocate arrived with the governor's pardon, on condition of their being 
banished to some uninhabited place." 
Phillip intended that this banishment was to be near the South Cape of Van 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.49. 
" Confirmed by the journals of White (Journal of a Voyage, p.116), Scott (Remarks on a 
Passage, p.36), Fasty (Transactions Of A Voyage, p.98) and Surgeon Bowes (HRNSW, 2, p.394). 
But, in The Journal of Arthur Bowes Smyth: Surgeon, Lady Penrhyn 1 787-1 789, eds. PG Fidlon 
and RI Ryan, Sydney, 1979, p.75, Bowes gives the date as the 26 February. This may be a 
transcribing error from the original copy as described pp.xv-xviii. 
J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.36. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.50. 
39 HRNSW, 2, p.394, quoting Bowe's Journal. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.50. 
" Journal Arthur Bowes Smyth, p.75. 
" Journal Arthur Bowes Smyth, p.75. 
43  J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.36. D Chapman, 1 788 The People of the First Fleet, North 
Ryde, 1981, p.138, spelling 'Lovell', and Voyage of Governor Phillip, p.273, spelling `Lavell, 
Henry'. 
44 J White, Journal of a Voyage, p.116. 
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Diemen's Land, where `by their forming connexions with the natives, some benefit 
may accrue to the public.' Presumably, other events overtook this drastic 
punishment as Hall and Lovell were sent to Pinchgut until their sentence of 
banishment to South Cape was remitted in celebration of the King's birthday on 4 
June 1788." On this occasion, the log book of the transport Alexander recorded 
that 'four convicts [were] pardoned who were under sentence of death.' As Hall 
and Lovell had been initially sentenced to death, it is likely they were amongst these 
four. 
Precautions against a convict insurrection when Barrett was executed, were 
vindicated by an attempt made against Lieutenant King's administration on Norfolk 
Island. The first indication of trouble came shortly after the island received 
additional numbers from the mainland on 13 October 1788. This group of 
twenty-one male and eleven female convicts was accompanied by a party of one 
midshipman and nine marines and sailors.' On 25 October, one of these convicts, 
Leonard Dyer, received '4 dozen lashes for Mutinous Expressions & daring 
Language to Mr Donovan'.' With these additional convicts on the island, King 
must have felt uneasy about internal security, recording on 31 December 1788 that:- 
Having Six Musquets, besides the Marines Arms, I judge it proper to 
instruct all the Free people on the Island (being Six) In the use of Fire arms 
In case of the Marines being sick or any other exigency wherefore I gave 
orders to the Sergeant & Corporal of Marines to exercise them regularly 
every Saty Morning As well as the Marines - when the former are tolerable 
expert, I mean that they shall fire half a dozen rounds once a Month - which 
is putting the Island In the best state of defence in my power 52 
In addition to establishing a militia, from this time a military picquet was mounted 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.22. Phillip to Sydney of May 1788. This is the first reference to Van Diemen's 
Land being used as a place of further exile. Phillip does not explain what public benefit may 
accrue from such a 'connexion'. 
" D Chapman, People of First Fleet, p.110. Hall remained on Pinchgut until the King's 
birthday in June. Chapman (p.138) is not concise on Lovell, sentenced to death in June 1788, 
then banished to Norfolk Island for life. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.401. 
" See above, Chapter 1, for island's settlement. 
" The Journal of Philip Gidney King: Lieutenant, R.N. 1 787-1 790, Sydney, 1980, pp.136-137. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.209. Detail including composition of the military party. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.147. Midshipman Donovan arrived on the same ship as Dyer 
in October. 
52 Journal Philip Gidney King, p.174. 
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every night.' 
King's concern over security remained high, and on Friday, 23 January, he 
recorded 'At noon read the Articles of War, As well as the Rules & Regulations for 
the Marines when serving on shore'. Such a military parade was a solemn 
occasion as it reminded the garrison's marines of their duties and draconian 
punishments for breaches of the Articles.' The following day, possibly by 
coincidence, a planned insurrection was exposed.' 
The convict plot on Norfolk Island hinged on two factors; that Sirius must 
be standing off shore on a Saturday, whilst at the same time King and the marines 
were following their normal Saturday routine. On that day King usually went to his 
farm outside the main settlement. There, it was intended he be seized, while a 
convict took a message back to the settlement claiming King required to see senior 
personnel at his farm. They in turn would be seized. Meanwhile, the marines who 
were usually in 'the woods to get cabbage-tree' would also be confined on their 
return and the island secured. Having detained the first boat's crew to come ashore 
from Sirius, two convicts would then row out in one of the island's small craft to 
advise the ship their boat had been staved in landing. Whereupon, the convicts 
anticipated another ship's boat would come ashore, and in turn these sailors would 
also be detained. The convicts 'were then to go and take possession of the ship, 
with which they intended to go to Otaheite [Tahiti].' 57 This plan was betrayed by a 
" D Collins, An Account, p.52. 
54 Journal Philip Gidney King, p.189. 
" Manual of Military Law (MML), London, 1914, p.13. The Mutiny Act of 1712 made the 
wartime Articles applicable to troops serving overseas in peacetime. The Articles of War were 
enforceable in New South Wales and its dependencies by virtue of the Mutiny Act of 1718, 
authorising the application of the Articles to the British Army within the kingdom and 'in any of 
His Majesty's dominions beyond the seas.' The significance of the Rules and Regulations for the 
Marines when serving on shore was that these made marines subject to the Articles of War, as 
opposed to naval discipline. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.189. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.294. Phillip to Sydney of February 1790. D Collins, An Account, p.50. 
Captain Willis took possession of Otaheite (Tahiti) in 1767 for Britain. In 1768, Bougainville 
also claimed the island for France, which in the same year was visited by Cook. These visits 
spread the fame of Tahiti as a place of delightful refuge. It could be no coincidence that the 
Norfolk Island convicts planned to escape there, and that two months later the mutiny on HMS 
Bounty centred around return to Tahiti. 
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woman convict who was living with Robert Webb, a member of Sirius's crew 
domiciled on the island.' 
King recorded that on Saturday 24 January 1789 'at 9 AM Robert Webb ... 
informed him that a plan was laid by the Convicts to take the Island.' Then with 
information gained in different depositions, he had the suspected ringleaders 
arrested. As a defensive precaution, King moved the marines' and free settlers' 
accommodation 'round the Store houses & [then] caused every person to come in 
out of the Country's where, as a Saturday indulgence, the convicts were allowed to 
work on their own gardens.' On Monday morning, King formally examined 
witnesses on oath, keeping irons on three and releasing one who appeared less 
guilty. That afternoon, no doubt as a defensive measure, by clearing ground for all 
round fields of fire, the convicts were employed 'Cutting down trees & opening an 
avenue round the Conunand'ts house.' Next day, Tuesday, further ground was 
cleared 'to place the Convicts by themselves.'" Later, on the return of the next ship 
to Sydney Cove, the ringleader was sent there to be tried for his life, but no capital 
punishment could be inflicted as no attempt had been made to carry the scheme into 
execution.' Subsequently, when Supply next visited, the island's garrison was 
increased by a lieutenant, a non-commissioned officer and fourteen privates, 
together with two guns intended to be placed in a small redoubt Phillip considered 
these reinforcements would prevent the convicts making further attempts.' 
Meanwhile in Sydney, as supply conditions worsened, executions and 
floggings did not discourage thieving. Phillip reported to London that 'individuals 
had ... suffered by having their gardens robbed, or by losing of poultry, [therefore] I 
" D Chapman, People of First Fleet, p.196. Webb sailed with King when Norfolk Island was 
first settled. He lived with Elizabeth Henderson, who initially gave him warning of the plot. 
They married in Sydney in 1791. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.189. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.184-185. Confirmed by King's entry of Saturday, 17 January 
1789. 
" Journal Philip Gidney King, p.191. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.294. 
63 HRN SW, 1, Pt. 2, p.295. 
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found it necessary to establish a watch'." Collins remarked that 'the first attempt 
towards a police [force] was commenced by establishing a night-watch'. With no 
free settlers available for recruitment, the watch was made up from selected convicts. 
Whilst on duty, each was provided with a short staff for identification.' This watch 
is of historical interest as it was the first small move in the long process of 
transferring responsibility for maintenance of order from military to civil power. 67 
It also created additional tension between Phillip's civil government and the military, 
when Ross belatedly made representations against his marines being subjected to 
the convicts of the watch. 
Prior to the establishment of the watch, suitable regulations had to be framed. 
Ross was consulted and had amendments incorporated in the draft of this 
document.' At this time, he raised no objection to the wording of the fifth clause 
which read:- 
Any soldier or seaman found stragling [sic] after the taptoo has beat, or may 
be found in the convicts' huts, is to be detained, and information to be 
immediately given to the nearest guard-house.' 
The regulations were signed into effect by Phillip on 7 August 1789, 7° and the 
watch worked efficiently to the extent that for three months no robbery was 
committed at night The watch was 'cautioned against having any dispute with a 
soldier or sailor' and during this period no complaints about the behaviour of the 
watch were received. Indeed, 'they acted very properly on several occasions when 
they met with soldiers or sailors in the night ... [who] when stopped ... were left at 
the guard-house till next morning, when, if nothing criminal was laid to their charge, 
" HRA, 1, I, p.134. Philip to Sydney of February 1790. 
65 D Collins, An Account, p.61. 
66 D Collins, An Account, p.62. 
" HRA, 1, 2, p.69. Phillip's concept was reintroduced by Hunter when he became governor. In 
a Government and General Order of November 1797, Hunter appointed 'constables' for 'the 
preservation of peace and good order as for the security of property generally'. The Duke of 
Portland approved this 'system of police' in September 1798 (p.226). See below, Chapter 12, 
p.319 and footnote 79, for comment on Macquarie's 'Police Regulations for the Town of Sydney' 
(HRA, 1,7, pp.406-412). 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.134. Phillip to Sydney of February 1790. 
69 HRA, 1, 1, p.138. 
7 ° HRA, 1, 1, p.139. 
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they were delivered to their proper officers.' 71 
The successful functioning of the watch was jeopardised when Ross 
unexpectedly complained to Phillip after a marine was apprehended in the convicts 
camp, and delivered, as usual, to the guard. When Phillip tried to reason with Ross 
that 'Soldiers had been frequently stopped in the night by the watch ... in the 
convicts' camp or in suspicious places ... preventing many robberies', Ross would 
not accept this argument. He repeatedly claimed that a soldier being stopped, when 
not committing an unlawful act was an insult to the corps. Phillip finally 
succumbed to Ross' persistence and had the fifth clause rescinded. Nevertheless, 
he noted 'having examined the report made by the captain of the day to his 
commandant ... I saw nothing which ... could be deemed an insult to the corps'.' 
Meanwhile, Phillip was not aware that Ross declared the marines would not 'be 
controuled [sic] by the convicts, while they [the marines] had bayonets in their 
hands.' Phillip only learnt of this inflammatory statement after the matter was 
settled, and commented to London 'I should not [at the time] have been induced to 
have withdrawn the order ... by so pointed a menace'.' This incident emphasises 
the difficulties that Phillip had in his dealings with his lieutenant-governor which 
was not conducive to the maintenance of good order, upon which rested the 
colony's internal security. 
A contributing factor to the establishment of the night watch was the repeated 
raiding of vegetable gardens by runaway convicts as the open prison system at 
Sydney Cove, later duplicated at outlying settlements such as Rose Hill (later 
Parramatta'), gave convicts the opportunity to stray. As an early indication of this 
problem, at the muster parade on 7 February 1788, when Phillip's commission was 
7 ' HRA, 1, 1, pp.134-135. 
72 HRA, 1, 1, p.135. Possibly Ross objected because the marine was not actually 'found in the 
convicts' huts' as specified in Clause 5. However, the marine was certainly `stragling' in the 
convicts' camp. 
" HIM, 1, 1, p.136. 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.135. Around the settlement, the marines wore their bayonet side arms. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.203. 
57 
read, Collins noted that nine convicts were missing. Also, it was impossible to 
prevent them straggling, and despite fears of danger from Aborigines, many 
convicts solicited crewmen of La Perouse's expedition to be taken on board the 
French ships.' For those convicts who made the short overland trek to Botany 
Bay before the French sailed on 10 March 1788, Phillip recorded that these 
approaches were rejected by the French 'with great propriety'.' These early 
runaways were the start of a recurring pattern of convict escapes. 
From contemporary accounts, it is apparent runaway convicts during 
Phillip's administration did not menace security. With the scarcity of food in the 
colony, it made little difference whether convicts who stole by night crept from their 
sleeping lines, or from the surrounding bush, where they hid from both the 
Aborigines and authorities. In December 1791, Tench noted that no less than 
thirty-eight convict men were missing, living in the woods by day, and at night 
plundering gardens for subsistence.' A mass escape occurred on 1 November 
1791, when twenty-one recently arrived Irish convicts, including a pregnant female, 
absconded in a deluded attempt to walk 'to China [Tench's emphasis]'. Tench's 
account of the incident gave the impression that in this case search parties were sent 
out more to save rather than arrest and punish the escapees as had been threatened 
by Phillip.' This view is supported by Collins who mentions that, by chance, the 
female was found by a ship's boat on the northern shore of Port Jackson. Next 
day, her husband was also rescued by a boat, and for several days boats were sent 
out searching for others in the group.' 
While sympathy was shown for the Irish escapees, who were 
undernourished yet still had to labour,' no leniency was shown to runaway convicts 
fleeing from crimes committed in the colony. Despite any extreme privations 
" D Collins, An Account, p.14. See above, Chapter 1, pp.11-13 and Figure 2, for details of La 
Perouse's expedition and Phillip's reaction. 
" Voyage of Governor Phillip, p.46. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.212. 
" W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, pp.208-209. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.131. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.132. 
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suffered as a result, these convicts were not treated lightly. In the case of Edward 
Corbett, Phillip advised London that a convict 'who had committed a robbery, and 
absconded on 5 June [17881, returned on 24 June, almost starved'. Phillip then 
described Corbett's terrible hardships, but nevertheless he was tried, pleaded guilty, 
and hanged with another convict. On 25 June 1788, the day after Corbett's return, 
Easty wrote 'this day Sam! Peaton and Edward Corbit was Excuted'.' 
The likely options for convicts who escaped into the bush were death, 
survival by stealing until apprehended, or giving themselves up. Phillip' .s 
assessment of the situation was that preventing these desertions was impossible but 
that this 'evil ... will cure itself.' London was apparently unconcerned by reports 
of these runaways as they were unlikely to escape back to England. The same 
sanguine view was not taken over escapes by sea. From the commencement of the 
settlement, regulations were gazetted to prevent this. In Phillip's instructions of 
February 1788, for the establishment of a settlement on Norfolk Island, King was 
instructed that:- 
You will be furnished with a four-oared boat, and you are not on any 
consideration to build or permit the building of any vessel or boat whatever 
that is decked, or any boat or vessel that is not decked, whose length of keel 
exceeds twenty feet; and if by any accident any vessel or boat that exceeds 
twenty feet keel should be driven on the island, you are immediately to 
cause such boat or vessel to be scuttled, or otherwise rendered 
unserviceable' 
This, and similar orders issued to control boat building and use of small craft in 
Sydney Cove, was intended to prevent convicts absconding by sea. After an escape 
by boat in 1790, existing regulations were further tightened.' 
Small boats were required for fishing to supplement the colony's short 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.150. Phillip to Sydney of July 1788. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.104. D Chapman, People of First Fleet, p.77, lists 
this man as 'Edward Connick also Corbett', who surrendered because he was 'frightened by an 
earthquake'. Easty (p.103) records that the earthquake took place at 4pm on 22 June 1788. 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.309. Phillip to Nepean of November 1791. 
85 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.137-138. 
86 These boat building restrictions for security, are separate from, and unrelated to, Philip's 
Instructions, for the prevention of trade with 'the settlements of Our East India Company ... the 
coast of China, and the islands ... [colonised] by any other European nation' (HRA, 1, 1, p.15). 
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rations. Controlling these craft was difficult in the face of the convicts' 
determination to use them in escape bids, creating a continual internal security 
problem. In 1790, five men used a stolen punt to travel from Parramatta to Sydney 
where they stole a 'very small and weak' boat, with few stores and with one week's 
rations 'they purposed [sic] steering for Otaheite'. A seaward search failed to find 
any trace of them and it was considered that they died at sea.' Surprisingly, in 
1795, when HMS Providence, due to bad weather, put into Port Stephens, four men 
barely recognisable as white, surrendered. One had died, while the other four had 
been well treated by the local Aboriginal tribe, who considered them to have been 
resurrected tribal forebears who had fallen in battle, and returned from the sea to 
visit them.' 
Meanwhile, in contrast to the ill conceived venture of the five convicts; in 
1791, a successful escape to Timor of eleven persons, involved careful planning and 
preparation, determined execution, recapture due to misadventure, and ultimately, the 
surprise pardoning in England of the lone survivor, Mary Bryant. The leader was 
Mary's husband William, an experienced fisherman, who, until lashed for privately 
selling fish, controlled the fishing boats employed in Port Jackson to supplement 
rations. Demoted, he continued, under close supervision, working on fishing boats. 
Despite this, Bryant stockpiled escape stores including two muskets, one hundred 
pounds each of rice and flour and fourteen pounds of pork.' He also obtained a 
compass, quadrant and chart, most likely from the Master of the Dutch ship 
Waaksemheyd. The escape party consisted of William and Mary, their two 
children, and seven other convicts, one of whom had navigational experience. Of 
the eight men, five had had experience in boat handling. Waiting until there were no 
ships in port to give chase, they loaded the governor's well-found six oar cutter,' 
and slipped out of the harbour unobserved on the night of 28 March 1791. 
87 D Collins, An Account, p.99. 
" D Collins, An Account, pp.250-251. 
" CH Currey, The Transponation Escape and Pardoning of Mary Bryant, Sydney, 1983, passim. 
" CH Currey, Escape of Mary Bryant, pp.12-13. 
" CH Currey, Escape of Mary Bryant, pp.14-15. 
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Eventually all arrived safely in Timor (Figure 7 93). This incident demonstrates a 
breach in the colony's security, and as a consequence Collins recorded:- 
Orders were given for limiting the length of such boats as should be built 
by individuals to a size as might deter the convicts from attempts to take 
them off. Also regulations as to the people employed in boats after sunset, 
whose names were to be given in writing to the officer on guard, to 
prevent any convict taking them from the wharves under pretence of 
fishing or other services.' 
This order published on 9 April 1791, stated that except where prior permission was 
given, no boat was to be built whose length exceeded 14 feet.' This was a further 
tightening of the restrictions imposed after the five convict escaped in 1790." 
Subsequently, Collins noted that when it became known the Dutch had arrested the 
escapees in Timor, handing them over to a British naval captain, other attempts to 
flee there were discouraged.' This discouragement assisted security as this form of 
escape 'during the absence of the King's ships [from Port Jackson] ... was never 
difficult' . 
Precautions also had to be taken against convicts endeavouring to stow away 
on departing ships, as they had attempted to do on La Perouse's vessels. Often 
convicts were aided and abetted by ships' masters who were short of crew. Not 
only convicts, but dissatisfied Royal Naval sailors, made their escape in this way. 
" D Collins, An Account, pp.112-113 and 149-150. W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, 
pp.180-181. Tench returned to England, on HMS Gorgon, which at Cape Town took on board six 
of Bryant's convict party, of whom four died in transit and one apparently committed suicide. 
Previously Tench had travelled out to the colony in the same ship as Mary Bryant and a male who 
later joined Bryant, and presumably knew the others in the small colony, Tench was 
knowledgeably situated to interview the Bryant survivors. In a long footnote (pp.181-183), Tench 
recounts their adventures and misfortunes. His summary was 'They had miscarried in a heroic 
struggle for liberty after having combated every hardship and conquered every difficulty.' HRA, 1, 
1, p.269 for passing mention by Phillip of the sea escapes of 1790 and 1791, also p.369 for names 
of escapees in 1791, including record of deaths of Bryant's children. Scott who was also on 
Gorgon, recorded that on 6 May 1792, the last of Mary's two children died (J Scott, Remarks on a 
Passage, p.82). 
" CH Currey, Escape of Mary Bryant, Figure 7 facing p.1. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.115. 
95 HRNSW,I , P1.2, p.486. 
96 W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.181. 
97 The escapees remained free for a period in Timor. The Dutch authorities suspicious of their 
account that they were survivors from a wrecked ship, arrested them. They were handed over to 
Captain Edwards, who had commanded HMS Pandora, carrying Bounty mutineers, which sunk in 
northern Queensland waters. Pandora's survivors were making for Batavia via Timor. 
98 D Collins, An Account, p.150. 
Figure 7: Escape to Timor of Bryant's party 
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This happened when Charlotte sailed in May 1788 with a crew member from each 
of Sirius and Supply. Phillip was convinced that Captain Gilbert, the Charlotte's 
master, suggested to both sailors that they desert." Again, Joseph Sutton, a Second 
Fleet (ex-Surprize) convict, was found hidden on Neptune before sailing in August 
1790. He had been smuggled on board by a ship's boat. 'John Bate, a quarter-
master of the ship, [admitted] preparation had been made when the people [sailors] 
stowed the hold for concealing convicts.'' 
Phillip reported to London that because of connivance of masters, mates and 
seaman, convicts could not be prevented from stowing away.' Nevertheless, he 
took all possible precautions. As with Neptune, searches were conducted of ships 
before departure, while contact between ships and convicts ashore was, where 
possible, prevented. Frame notes that in 1789, Phillip introduced a Boat Guard, 
based at Garden Island, to patrol the harbour and foreshores of Sydney Cove, to 
detect smuggling and prevent the passing of letters between convicts and crews of 
anchored ships.' These precautions were in part successful as the steward of Lady 
Juliana, who had developed a deep attachment to a female convict during the 
outward voyage, discovered. With his ship about to depart Sydney Cove in July 
1790, he lamented 'I wished to have stolen her away, but this was impossible, the 
convicts were so strictly guarded by the marines'.' 
A further control measure introduced by Phillip in 1791 was that departing 
masters were formally given orders to deliver up any convict who may be found 
hidden on board their ships to the governor or commanding officer at the first 
British port of call. Phillip recommended that such a clause be inserted in Navy 
" HRA, 1, 1, p. 206. Phillip to Nepean of August 1790. 
100 HRA, p. 207. M Flynn, The Second Fleet, Britain's Grim Armada of 1790, North 
Sydney, 1993, p.559. For Sutton, cross referenced as `Suttle, Joseph (c.1759-)'. He was also one 
of the five men who escaped by boat, later wrecked at Port Stephens in 1790. Sutton/Suttle was 
the only one to dip before rescue by HMS Providence. 
101 HIM, 1, 1, p.317. Phillip to Nepean of December 1791. 
1 " TR Frame, Garden Island, p.54. 
J Nicol, John Nicol, mariner Life and Adventures 1776-1801, Melbourne, reprinted 1999, 
p.130. C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 1969, pp.120-124, for account of 
voyage. 
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Board contracts for the engagement of transport vessels. In this way the fear of a 
heavy penalty on return to England, may have the desired effect.' In July 1792, 
Evan Nepean replied, advising Phillip that 'The Steps which have been taken to 
restrain so pernicious a Practice in future are not dissimilar to those you have 
suggested'.'" 
While the convicts were subject to directions from His Majesty's 
Government, the original inhabitants had no concept of being subject to George 
III's jurisdiction, and presented Phillip with a different set of problems. The 
commission issued to Phillip in April 1787 contained a fundamental flaw which 
resulted in armed clashes between Aborigines and whites later in the colonial era. 
Included in the royal assent to Phillip:- 
And Wee ... give and grant unto you full power and authority to agree for 
such lands tenements and hereditaments as shall be in our power 
[emphasis added] to dispose of and them to grant to any person or 
persons' 
Hereditament is defined as a law 'which, as directed by will or settlement, belong 
absolutely to the first person entitled'.' Thus by right of discovery, and 
occupation, the land 'in our power' could be granted unconditionally by Phillip 
regardless of any prior tribal land occupation. 
While giving Phillip approval to dispose of land that 'shall be in our power', 
he was also ordered to 'endeavour by every possible means to open an intercourse 
with the natives, and to conciliate their affections, enjoining all our subjects to live in 
amity and kindness with them'.' Further, Phillip's contradictory Instructions 
stated that there was to be no unnecessary interruption in the exercise of the 
Aborigines several occupations.' As H Reynolds points out:- 
The question of how the British gained possession of this land was, 
understandably, a matter which concerned many colonists ... Many were 
104 HRA, i 	pp.317-318. 
1 " HRA, 1, 1, p.361. 
106 HRA, 1, 1, p 7. 
The Macquarie Dictionary, ed.-in-chief A Delbridge, Dee Why, 1985, p.819. 
1 " HRA, 1, 1, p.13. Philip's Instructions. 
109 HRA, 1, 1, p.14. 
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like G.A. Robinson who, in 1832, admitted that he was 'at a 
loss to conceive by what tenure we hold this country. HO 
This introduces the British colonial concept that the continent was an 
"empty land" available to be granted to individuals. Giving legal status to this 
perception is an 1822 London counsel's opinion, namely the 'colony was acquired 
neither by conquest nor cession, but by the mere occupation of a desert or 
uninhabited land." 11 The term now frequently applied to this concept is "terra 
nullius".' Nevertheless, whether the land was uninhabited was a matter of doubt 
before the First Fleet sailed, as it was considered that the local Aborigines might 
oppose the landing or settlement at Botany Bay, which would then be a 'case of 
foreign Settlements acquired by His Majesty's arms', legally a conquest not an 
occupation."' It will be recalled that in 1786 Sydney made provision for this. Apart 
from directing that the marines were to enforce subordination and obedience at 
Botany Bay, they were also responsible for 'the defence of the settlement against 
incursions of the natives'. Thus from a force structure viewpoint, the marines were 
established for either an occupation or a conquest (on a modest scale) to establish 
and hold the penal settlement. Their numbers and firepower could be reasonably 
expected to meet all foreseeable threats; for example, Banks' journal recorded that 
the maximum number of Aborigines seen at Botany Bay, at one time, was '22 
Indians ... all armed with Lances'.' Even later, when Phillip was exploring the Port 
Jackson/ Broken Bay region, the sighting of about two hundred armed Aborigines 
in two parties, was not cause for any concern.' 
110 H Reynolds, The Law of The Land, Ringwood, reprinted 1988, p.25 and pp.7-55 for late 18 
century European concepts of legality in making claims on and gaining sovereignty over 
previously unclaimed territory occupied by natives. 
HIM, 4, 1, p.414. Validity of Statute, 20 George II. 19, could be questioned. The doubt 
being that the King's governor had no 'legislative power ... without the controul [sic] of a local 
Assembly'. But such a consideration is outside the scope of this thesis. 
112 C Pearson, 'Shifting war on terra nullius', Weekend Australian, 26-27 June 2004, p.18, for 
continuing debate (including other references) on the origin and use of the term terra nullius. 
1 " HIM, 4, 1, p.414. Again the implications of the governor's 'legislative power as conqueror' 
is not pertinent to this thesis. 
114 The Endeavour Journal of Joseph Banks 1 768-1 771, Vol.2, ed. JC Beaglehole, Sydney, second 
ed. 1963, pp.57-58. Collins' concern before the First Fleet sailed that the marines had insufficient 
strength (see above Chapter 2, p.20 and footnote 13), proved groundless. 
ns HIM, 1, 1, p.76. Phillip to Sydney of September 1788. 
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Contacts between Aborigines and whites during the early days of the 
settlement were of a wary nature. Phillip made genuine efforts to conciliate the 
Aborigines, but was frequently frustrated by inflammatory acts by sailors and 
convicts who persisted in stealing souvenirs or otherwise causing friction. The 
Aborigines quickly came to appreciate the significance of the marine's red coats 
and power of the whites' firearms." 6 In turn, the colonists had respect for the native 
spears :- 
which are made of the stem of the grass tree, about twelve or fourteen feet 
long, pointed with fish bone or teeth, and bearded with shell, stuck on with 
gum, and are very dangerous weapons; they will throw them fifty or sixty 
yards, and strike within two or three inches' (Figure 8' ) 
Interaction between the Aborigines and settlers was described in an account of the 
new settlement published in 1789:- 
Offence is often given by the men, while the officers are most studious to 
preserve harmony, ... It has been uniformly remarked by our people that 
defenceless stragglers are generally ill-treated by the natives ... while 
towards parties armed and on their guard they behave in the most amicable 
manner.' 
A similar opinion was expressed by George Thompson, who arrived in the 
colony in October 1792. He wrote that the natives 'are very treacherous and 
deceiving: if they chance to meet any person in the woods singly, it is ten to one but 
that they spear him and strip him of his clothes [and as] ... they are much frightened 
[by a musket]: few people travel the woods without one." 2° While such incidents 
caused concern, especially to new arrivals such as Thompson, these called for 
preventative security measures, rather than alarm. Unfortunately, contemporary 
116 J White, Journal of a Voyage, p.111. 
" 7 G Thompson, Slavery and Famine, Punishment For Sedition; or, An Account of the Miseries 
and Starvation at Botany Bay. By George Thompson, Who sailed in the Royal Admiral, May, 
1792. With some Preliminary Remarks. By George Dyer, BA. Late of Emanuel College, 
Cambridge; Author of the Complaints of the Poor, London, MDCCXCIV, p.13. NLA, F199. 
R and T Rienits, The Voyages of Captain Cook, London, 1968, Figure 8; p.55, for etching, 
and p.53 for drawing of spear thrower (woomera). Both are of Botany Bay Aborigines, drawn by 
Francis Parkinson, who sailed with Cook on his first voyage (1768-1771) as Bank's natural 
history draughtsman. Parkinson died at sea after HMS Endeavour's departure from Batavia. 
" 9 Voyage of Governor Phillip, p.29. 
120 G Thompson, Slavery and Famine, pp.12-13. 
Figure 8 : Ab origines wi th spears, spear throwers and shield . 
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Aboriginal opinion regarding white transgressions was unrecorded or ignored. 
Nevertheless, Phillip displayed sensitivity in understanding the Aborigines' 
viewpoint, as illustrated earlier in this chapter in relation to the two murdered and 
mutilated convict rush cutters, of whom he wrote there was not the 'least doubt of 
the convicts being the aggressors' after misusing a native canoe."' Both sides 
valued their own property but were careless with that of the other. It was with relief 
that Phillip wrote the Aborigines 'have not attempted to annoy the settlers by setting 
fire to the grass, as they did when Captain Cook was on the coast; nor have they, 
which is more important, shown any desire to burn the crops of corn ... 
indispensable to the welfare of the settlement.' 
As problems with the Aborigines escalated, a female convict wrote in 
November 1788, 'the savages still continue to do us all the injury they can, which 
makes the soldiers' duty very hard, and much dissatisfaction amongst the 
officers.'' After a period of attempted conciliation, which continued after Phillip 
himself was wounded by a spear in September 1790, he finally ordered stern 
counter measures be taken against a particular tribe, the Bideegal, living at the head 
of Botany Bay.' This was to be the first operation mounted against Aborigines in 
Australia's history, involving both marines and New South Wales Corps soldiers. 
For the forthcoming reprisal raid, Phillip's General Order, of 13 December 
1790, stated that if it were 'impracticable' to capture six men, the expedition was 'to 
put that number to death'.' Tench was ordered to command the force and was told 
by Phillip 'I am resolved to execute the prisoners who may be brought in, in the 
most public and exemplary manner, in the presence of as many of their countrymen 
as can be collected'. Tench claimed, that at Phillip's invitation, he suggested more 
121 See above, p.46 and footnote 14, also HRA, 1, 1, p.47. 
1 " Voyage of Governor Phillip, pp.78-79. 
1 " Sydney Cove 1788, ed. J Cobley, London, 1980, p.249. 
1 " W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, pp.164-166 for the wounding and later death of 
Phillip's convict gamekeeper John McIntire which precipitated the punitive expedition: p.167 for 
Phillip's orders for the raid: pp.167-176 for descriptions of two military expeditions undertaken and 
for quotations unless otherwise attributed. D Collins, An Account, pp.104-105. D Chapman, 
People of First Fleet, p.140, for McIntire's details. 
125 HIM, 1, 1. p.293. J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.59, entry for 14 December 1790. 
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lenient treatment of the six Aborigines to be taken prisoner. Phillip and Tench 
agreed it would be acceptable if only two were hanged as an example and the other 
four sent to Norfolk Island for a period, then released, as it would appear to the 
local Aborigines that 'we have dispatched them secretly.' 
Because of the terrible nature of the retribution initially ordered by Phillip, 
Second Lieutenant William Dawes when detailed by his senior marine officer' to 
be a part of the punitive expedition, refused, citing ethical reasons. This led to him 
being paraded before Phillip, where he again refused the duty. Later, after 
counselling by Reverend Richard Johnson, Dawes wrote to Phillip stating he would 
now carry out his orders. Reynolds, quite correctly describes Dawes' attitude as a 
'portentous clash of will, aspiration and conscience'. However, his depiction of 
Dawes opposing the concept of 'Empire with a vision of flourishing colonial 
enterprise', is certainly incorrect.' Applying eighteenth century standards, Phillip 
had a job to do and had no interest in moral qualms expressed by a junior officer. 
Phillip did not take any disciplinary action against Dawes, but eleven months later 
referred to this refusal in connection with another separate censure.' Meanwhile, 
the force organised under Tench's command, consisted of three officers, including 
the reluctant Dawes, two surgeons, and forty six other ranks, with rations for three 
days. This operation commenced on 14 December 1790 and was a 
failure (Figure 9'). 
Phillip then ordered a second raid. As a deception plan, the local Aborigines 
were told the party was marching in the opposite direction to try to apprehend the 
native who had speared Phillip at Manly. This expedition, consisting of thirty-nine 
all ranks, for security and to avoid the extreme heat of day, departed on 22 
126 Captain James Campbell commanded the Sydney Cove detachment as Ross, with two 
companies, was then on Norfolk Island. 
127 H Reynolds, This Whispering In Our Hearts, St. Leonards, 1998, p.2. 
128 HRA9  , 1, pp.290-293. Phillip to Grenville of November 1791, with enclosures regarding 
Dawes. As a marine (irrespective of whether commissioned or not) Dawes could not be brought 
before a general court martial without approval of the Admiralty in London (see below, Chapter 4, 
p.84 and footnote 58). Hence Phillip's comment that Dawes' expression ... would have subjected 
him to a court-martial had he been amenable to one' (p.294). 
129 J Connor, The Australian Frontier Wars 1788-1838, Sydney, 2002, Figure 9 map p.32. 
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Figure 9: Two raids ordered by Phillip on an Aboriginal tribe 
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December 1790 at nightfall, with a full moon to aid night movement. They were 
away until the 25 December, and again the operation was a failure. Fasty was on 
both excursions and described them in detail, noting that the first was 'a 
Troublesome Teadious March' and his description of the second raid was that it 
was worse.'3° 
In January 1791, Collins wrote of the cause of escalating tension with 
Aborigines:- 
It was much to be regretted, that any necessity existed for adopting these 
sanguinary punishments; and that they had not been yet able to reconcile 
these people to the deprivation of those parts of the harbour occupied by the 
English; but while they entertained the idea of the English having 
dispossessed them of their residences, they must always consider them as 
enemies; and upon this principle would make a point of attacking them 
whenever opportunity and safety concurred.' 
Collins' concluding words, above, described a fundamental characteristic of 
selection of targets in what was later to become known as guerilla warfare. A term 
that came into common English usage as a result of the Peninsula War' and which 
was applied during the the Black War in Van Diemen's Land to describe 
Aboriginal tactics.' 
K Windschuttle recently rejected use of the word 'guerilla' in describing 
Aboriginal hostile actions, because the Aborigines did not have 'any military, 
political or patriotic objectives... [nor] military or other kind of organisation'. 
While this statement is historically ingenious, it is technically incorrect.' From the 
late 1820's to 1831, during the Black War small Aboriginal tribal bands created 
1" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, respectively pp. 120-12! and 121-123. 
D Collins, An Account, p.107. 
132 The Macquarie Dictionary, ed.-in-chief A Delbridge, Dee Why, revised 1985. p.779. The word 
'guerilla' is the Spanish 'diminutive of guerra, WAR'. 
H Melville, The history of Van Diemen 's Land, From the Year 1824 to 1835, inclusive, 
During the Administration of Lieutenant-Governor George Arthur, ed. G Mackeness, Sydney, 
1965, p.33. He referred to 'the "Guerilla" war with the aborigines' 
'' K Windschuttle, The Fabrication of Aboriginal History, Van Diemen's Land 1803-1847, 
Vol.1, Paddington, 2002, p.130. Windschuttle's argument that Tor the guerilla warfare thesis to 
be creditable ... acts [of hostility] have to be elevated above the [philosophic motivating] level of 
crime or revenge (p.99), is also rejected. Terror is often used to enforce support for a guerilla 
group. Such a group could be an unprincipled bandit gang, or alternatively, politically motivated 
"freedom fighters". 
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havoc in their determined efforts to oppose white settlement of their lands. As an 
illusive enemy, they used typical guerilla tactics in their carefully planned 'hit and 
run' raids against settlers and their property, who for defence relied on a 
combination of outposts and widely dispersed regular army, field police and 
mobilised special civilian patrols.' J Connor describes such an attack in February 
1830 against an isolated farm in southern Van Diemen's Land, where a house, 
servants' huts and fences were destroyed without casualties to the Aborigines, who 
then taunted the unfortunate settlers from a safe distance.' Henry Melville, writing 
about the Black War in 1835, significantly used the word 'guerilla' in describing 
the form of warfare practised by the Aborigines. But this situation developed later, 
from the inception of the colony until Macquarie departed in 1821, occasional 
skirmishes between whites and mainland or Tasmanian Aborigines did not reach the 
same level of hostilities as in the Black War. Military offensive operations, when 
mounted, were usually of a limited scale against particular tribes. 
Frost points out that, despite Phillip's two punitive raids in 1790, by the time 
he departed the colony in 1792, his humane policy towards the Aborigines ensured 
that 'the two races were more at ease with each other in the Sydney area.' 
Nevertheless, the 'situation was rather different on the fringes of European 
settlement beyond Parramatta ... [where the whites] were intruding on the territories 
of tribes'.' A state of armed neutrality could best describe the nature of 
Aboriginal-white relations outside Sydney. This wariness is seen in Major Ross' 
orders to the marine detachment detailed to assist in establishing a settlement at 
Rose Hill. Their task was defined as 'for the protection of some convicts, ... 
[detailed for] clearing and cultivating some ground for corn.'' Because of such 
preventative measures in the fringe areas, tensions never reached crisis proportions 
JF McMahon, 'The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's 
Land with Particular Reference to the Black Line', Hobart, unpublished MHum Thesis, University 
of Tasmania, 1995, pp.36-37 and 39-41. Describes the Aboriginal skills employed in their hit and 
run guerilla warfare. For early 1830 contemporary comments on effectiveness of the Aboriginal 
campaign, pp.44-45. 
1" J Connor, Frontier Wars, pp.84-85. 
1 " A Frost, Arthur Phillip 1738-1814 His Voyaging, Melbourne, 1987, pp.184-196, passim, for 
Phillip's attitude and policies. 
138 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.198. 
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and at no time during Phillip's administration did friction between the colonists and 
Aborigines create any grave internal security problems. It is also probable that the 
small-pox epidemic, which from about April 1789 killed almost half the Aboriginal 
population living around Port Jackson, contributed to their apparent quiescent 
attitude towards the whites. Such a death rate would have seriously weakened the 
fabric of their social organisation, and reduced manpower so that any possibility of 
a coordinated attack against the whites by a tribal group was remote.' 
As with the Aborigines, Phillip was able to prevent any serious convict 
troubles breaking out. This was despite an open prison system, chronic food 
shortages and low morale due to no contact with England for two and a half years, 
until the arrival of Lady Juliana on 3 June 1790. While Phillip kept the Aborigines 
in check, and maintained control over the convicts, he was never able to resolve his 
differences with Ross, or between that difficult man and the officers he commanded. 
These command tensions within the marine battalion, were known to the troops, as 
recorded by Sergeant Scott and Private Easty,' and were probably detrimental to 
the unit's efficiency. The degree to which the marines were affected in the 
performance of their internal security duties is debatable, but Phillip was conscious 
that this disruption adversely impacted on the functioning of his administration. 
HRA, 1, 1, p.145. Phillip to Sydney of February 1790, and pp.744-745, Commentary Note 
118, considers 'that small-pox was [inadvertently] introduced in 1788' by First Fleet members or 
La Perouse's crews. There is no evidence to support the controversial suggestion that the small-
pox was deliberately introduced. 
' 4° J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.37. J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.99. 
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Chapter 4 
The Military and Civil Powers During Phillip's 
Government 
As considered in Chapter 2, the first known instance of Phillip's uneasiness 
over military matters was recorded shortly after the First Fleet sailed from 
Portsmouth, when he expressed concern to London, upon learning that the marines 
had insufficient ball ammunition. That Ross, as the marine commander, either did 
not know of, or rectify, this situation before sailing was a dereliction of duty. This 
was not an auspicious start to the working relationship between Phillip and Ross, and 
in the close proximity of Sydney Cove, this relationship soured. Ross' protest over 
the night watch was perhaps both an effect and further cause of the deterioration of 
relations between the two men. Phillip was particularly aggravated by Ross' threat 
that marines would use their bayonets if challenged by the convict watch.' 
As well as friction between Phillip and Ross, there were other irritations 
internal to the military which contributed to tensions in the colony. For example, 
Ross was often at loggerheads with many of his subordinate officers, while the 
marines were particularly discontented over the savage punishments imposed on 
See above, Chapter 3, p.56 and footnote 74. 
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them compared to those administered to the convicts.' Such tensions, at all levels 
within the battalion, caused individuals' dissatisfaction to fester (as discussed later) 
into a partial breakdown of military discipline, as evidenced by organised thieving by 
some marines. 
As early as February 1788, Surgeon Bowes observed a disturbing lack of 
harmony at Sydney Cove. He recorded 'I am sorry to say this government (if a 
government it can be call'd) is all anarchy and confusion - discontent and jealousy 
being evidently seen amongst the different heads of the settlement.' This was a 
veiled reference to clashes between Phillip and Ross, the only two men in the colony 
who held dual executive civil and military appointments. On the civil side, neither the 
deputy judge-advocate, nor the senior surgeon, was responsible for decisions of 
government. Amongst the naval officers from Sirius and Supply (under Phillip's 
single service command) only Captain John Hunter was of sufficient seniority to be 
unofficially considered a 'head' in the settlement. Hunter was in an unusual 
position as he held a 'dormant commission ... [from] his Majesty ... to be Governor' 
in the event of Phillip's 'death or absence'. 4 As this commission was never invoked, 
Hunter remained second captain of Sirius, with no official civil status in the 
government of the colony. Therefore, the only 'heads', who were subjected to, or 
caused 'discontent and jealousy' were Phillip and Ross. It is reasonable to conclude 
that Ross was the instigator of this discontent as Governor Phillip, the ultimate 
HRNSW, 2, p.394. A Bowes' Journal of 11 February 1788. C Barnett, Britain and Her Army 
1509-1970, A Military, Political and Social Survey, Harmondsworth, Pelican 1974, p.140. This 
anomalous situation between convict and military punishments, could be attributed to the 
brutalisation of the army (and by extension the marines) which was introduced by William of 
Orange (1689-1702) based on 'new continental ideas of discipline'. The Life of A Regimental 
Officer During the Great War 1793-1815, from correspondence of Colonel Samuel Rice, C.B., K.H. 
51st Light Regiment and from other sources, compiled by Lieutenant Colonel AF Mockley-
Ferryman, Edinburgh, 1913, p.203. 'Old and tried officers held views similar to those of the great 
Duke [Wellington], - by the lash alone could the discipline of the army be maintained'. McGuffie 
recorded accounts of military service in India where brutalisation was so bad that soldiers deliberately 
committed offences in order to be sentenced to transportation. Three unfortunates were shot instead 
of being transported: refer:- Ryder, 'Discipline and executions in India in the 1840's', Rank And 
File, The Common Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914, TH McGuffie compiler, London, 1964, 
pp.102-105. Additionally, while a convict was only subject to common law, a serviceman was 
subject to that law as well as to military law. 
HRNSW, 2, p.394. A Bowes' Journal of 22 February 1788. 
HRNSW, 1, P1.2, pp.93-94. Sydney to Phillip of 28 April 1787. 
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arbiter, had every incentive to foster and maintain civil and military harmony. 
From several official documents prepared before the First Fleet sailed, it is 
beyond dispute that Phillip was Ross' superior officer in both a military and civil 
capacity. Phillip's commission, read before the assembled marine battalion and 
convicts at Sydney Cove on 7 February 1788, stated 'we do hereby strictly charge 
and command all our officers and soldiers ... , and all others whom it may concern, to 
obey you as our Governor thereof: 5 In Ross' commission, he was charged to 
'follow such orders ... as you shall receive from us, our Governor of the said 
territory for the time being, or any other [from] your superior officer, according to 
the rules and discipline of war'. 6 The Articles of War, which codified the 'rules and 
discipline of war' were a powerful tool available to Phillip in his command of the 
military and civil staff, and through them over the convicts. The Lords of the 
Admiralty directed Ross that at Botany Bay:- 
the detachment shall be disembarked there you are to take the same under 
your command, and follow such orders and directions as you shall from 
time to time receive from his Majesty through one of his Principal 
Secretaries of State, or the Governor of the settlement for the time being.' 
Ross' record of service, as a subordinate commander to Phillip, must be assessed in 
the context of this precise Admiralty directive. 
Following the normal chain of military command, any orders Phillip issued to 
officers or marines under Ross' command, would be passed through Ross, or his 
adjutant. Only in exceptional circumstances should this command chain be by-
passed. On the other hand, marines who were on the strength of Sirius' or Supply's 
detachments were not part of Ross' command. They were commanded by their own 
detachment officers, who in turn were responsible to their respective ship's naval 
captain. This system, however, was not inflexible: a subordinate from either the sea 
or land forces had to accept lawful orders from any superior officer of either service. 
Therefore, within the conventional chain of command and control, there was a degree 
5 HRA, 1, I, p. 1 . 
6 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.26. 
HRNSW, 2, pp. 383-384. Directive of March 1787. 
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of flexibility. This was required in the new settlement at Sydney Cove, where there 
were unavoidable overlapping spheres of civil and military administration, where 
convicts, merchant and naval sailors, and marines under varied commanders, worked 
together. In that early period, distinctions between civil and military responsibilities 
would not only have been blurred, but at times appeared irrelevant. As lieutenant-
governor and military commander, Ross had to operate in this confusing, and 
previously untried penal environment, with no clear precedent to guide him or his 
officers. 
In this small community, officers' behaviour and personalities would have 
influenced the efficient working of command and control in the colony. Frost 
summed up personal relationships between Phillip and officers under his command 
in the colony:- 
Phillip's character was [not] flawless. Ross complained bitterly about what 
he took to be Phillip's failure to inform him fully - really, to have 
confidence in him; and Campbell made the same criticism. The marine 
officers were certainly no friends of Phillip, ... the Viceroy of Brazil 
remarked that he [Philip] was 'distrustful', and even Hunter made a muted 
comment to this effect 
Ross appears to have been a mentally rigid officer, as evidenced by his 
continuing insistence on a redoubt being built. He may have felt uncomfortable in 
his dual role as military commander and lieutenant-governor. As suggested by 
Currey, Ross 'began to see Collins's official actions as part of a conspiracy between 
the governor and his secretary to reduce his own authority' . Apparently, to 
maintain his military status, he demanded that insignificant protocols of command, 
and minutia of service custom be followed. As discussed later, he did not apply 
these same high standards to himself in respect to the rights of other officers, and 
was inclined to be hasty and vocal in his judgments. It is not surprising that he 
clashed with Governor Phillip, who, in the tradition of an autocratic naval captain, 
8 A Frost, Arthur Phillip 1738-1814 His Voyaging, Melbourne, 1987, p.263. 
J Currey, David Collins A Colonial Life, Melbourne, 2000, p.61. 
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kept his own counsel from his civil and military subordinates, including Ross!' 
Phillip's attitude left Ross feeling slighted as lieutenant-governor. When Phillip 
decided to split the fleet after departing from Cape Town, Ross stated 'I received my 
first intimation of his design from the mess of the Sirius's gun-room.' Later, in the 
settlement:- 
The Governor's [designs] I am unacquainted with, as he has never done me 
the honor of informing me of his or asking me for mine; neither has he 
made me or any other person that I know of acquainted with any part of the 
intentions of Government, nor have I been let into any part of his plan". 
While Phillip's "stiff" attitude does not condone Ross' behaviour as a subordinate 
commander, it may explain the consistency of his antagonistic manner towards 
Phillip!' In the small community at Sydney Cove, such tensions had the potential to 
cause a deep cleavage between the civil and military power, adversely affecting the 
coordination of internal security. J Currey considered Tor two years Ross had 
continued to discover affronts where none was intended and wilfully withheld the 
support of the military in the administration of the settlement'!' 
As early as 16 May 1788, Phillip advised London that he was having 
problems with the marine officers. In this instance, Phillip absolved Ross and 
Collins from any involvement.' Nevertheless, in a Commentary Note to Historical 
Records of Australia, referring to this dispatch, an opinion was given that 'it is 
probable that their [the battalion marine officers] actions were only further evidence 
of simmering discontent on their own part, and covert opposition on the part of 
1 ° A Atkinson, The Europeans in Australia A History,volume one The Beginning, Melbourne, 
1997, p.113, summed up Phillip's manner of administering the colony:- 'The Governor's own 
habits of authority were naval habits'. 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.173. Ross to Stephens of July 1788. 
12 A Atkinson, The Europeans in Australia, p.63, argues that Ross 'had his own reasons for 
resenting Phillip's silence. A major of Marines was little inferior to a post captain in the navy'. 
While this author has sympathy with Ross' position as explained by Atkinson, nevertheless, Ross 
was inferior by military rank and civil appointment, to Phillip. As such, Atkinson's statement 
does not recognise the principal on which military command rests. This was especially so as Ross 
was only a substantive captain, his rank of "major" being honorific (and unpaid), resulting from 
being gazetted a 'brevet-major' on 19 March 1783, in recognition of his service in the War of 
American Independence. J Moore:The First Fleet Marines 1786-1792, St Lucia, 1987, for Figure 
10, p.294, for Major Ross retired as a substantive captain. 
J Currey, David Collins, p.68. 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.35. 
Figure 10: Marine in uniform of 1790's 
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Major Ross."5 Phillip, in this dispatch listed several causes for complaint. 
Phillip's first complaint concerned the refusal of the officers to 'occasionally 
encourage' convicts to work and also oversee regulations such as those prohibiting 
'straggling in the woods'. One stated reason in refusing to carry out this 
supervisory role was that 'the officers did not understand that any interference with 
convicts was expected, and that they were not sent out to do more than the duty of 
soldiers.' Another matter of concern to Phillip was that 'sitting as members of the 
Criminal Court is thought a hardship by the officers, and of which they say they 
were not informed before they left England."' Both complaints appear frivolous as 
the officers were not, as claimed, unexpectedly required to have dealings with 
convicts, nor were they overworked. This attitude adopted by the marine officers was 
to the detriment of their duty defined by Sydney, 'to enforce due subordination and 
obedience' over the convicts. Therefore, the officers could hardly support the claim 
that the duties required of them by Phillip, their lawful military superior, were 
unacceptable because these were not of a strictly military nature. With two 
exceptions, the battalion officers had volunteered for special duties at Botany Bay for 
three years, and, as marines did not usually provide peacetime garrisons overseas, 
were well aware they would not be employed in a conventional marine role.' 
Before considering the officers' complaints of hardship in sitting as members 
of the Criminal Court, it is necessary to consider the court, its legality and 
shortcomings. The 'Act of Parliament Establishing The Colony' specifically stated 
that the Criminal Court 'shall consist of the Judge-Advocate ... together with six 
officers of his Majesty's forces by sea or land'.' Under this act, Phillip was 
authorised to convene 'a Court of Judicature ... according to the laws of this realm'. 
This court was novel, in that military officers dispensed, in theory, the criminal law of 
England. In 1803, drawing  on Collins' An Account of the English Colony in New 
" HRA, 1, I, p.721, Commentary Note 28. 
16 HRA, 1, 1, p.35. 
J Moore, First Fleet Marines, p.17. For Marine Corps 'employed outside its usual line of 
duty'. 
18 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.67-70 for act of parliament and pp.70-76 for letters patent. 
76 
South Wales which had been recently published in Britain, Jeremy Bentham argued 
that the judicial processes in the colony were not conducted in accordance with 
English law approved by parliament.' He considered that under the governor, justice 
was `Star-Chamberised; legislature and judicature confounded and lodged together, 
both in one and the same hand'. Phillip 'had [been granted by parliament] power to 
create the offence, but neither he nor anybody else has any power to punish or try 
the offender for it, when committed. The Governor by his proclamations, had power 
to enact new laws'. But he had no authorised power `to punish such as shall fail of 
observing those proclamations' as such offences are not 'English-made laws 
[enacted by parliament]'.' 
In historical retrospect, constitutional historian ACV Melbourne commenting 
on Surgeon Balmain's 1802 complaint against the administration of colonial justice, 
considers Balmain was concerned over practical issues relevant to the free settlers, 
rather than Benthamite theory. Melbourne notes that Balmain referred to problems 
of corruption and that 'several officers were ill-bred and ignorant, while others were 
young and inexperienced'. Instead of being concerned over the legality of the law 
before the courts, Balmain claimed 'he was giving expression to a general demand 
for a system of jurisdiction which would afford greater security and which would 
resemble more closely the legal forms established in the mother country.' 21 This 
being so, the few free settlers of this time, were not concerned about the legality of 
government proclamations and orders coming before the courts, which were issued 
without British parliamentary approval. Rather, they were concerned about being 
subjected to court martial style trials. 
As later discussed, the officers' complaint that 'they were not informed [of 
Criminal Court duties] before they left England', seems well founded. Nevertheless, 
they were publicly, and formally, informed of this duty on 7 February 1788, at the 
19 'Extracts from a Plea for a Constitution by Jeremy Bentham, 1803', in HRA, 4, 1, p.885, 
Appendix B. HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.69, quotes the act. 
" 'Plea for a Constitution, by Bentham', p.888. The quotation incorporates Bentham's emphasis. 
21 ACV Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development in Australia, St. Lucia, 1963, p.40. 
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same parade at which Phillip's commission was read. This is confirmed in Collins' 
and Tench's journals which attest that as well as the commission, 'the act of 
parliament for establishing trials by law ... for holding the civil and criminal courts' 
and letters patent establishing the Civil and Criminal Courts were also read, both 
stated the composition of the court. Therefore, from 7 February 1788, the marine 
officers could not plead ignorance of their Criminal Court responsibilities. 
It is understandable some marine officers would have been concerned at being 
required to exercise a judicial function relating to criminal law. Lieutenant Ralph 
Clark, considered it the worst duty he faced, and he 'would rather be on Guard for a 
Month than to Sitt on the tryal of these poor wretches'.' Nevertheless, officers were 
accustomed to the court martial type procedures adopted by Collins in the Criminal 
Court, and were practised in the application of military law. A later deputy judge-
advocate was to comment on:- 
the very great similarity the [Criminal] Court ... bears to a Court-Martial. ... 
the nature and form of its proceedings ... have made many of the Publick 
suppose that it was, in fact, a Court-Martial; and many of those Officers 
who have often sat as Members of the Court have always considered it as a 
Court-Martial.' 
Ross may be seen as deficient as a commander in not immediately putting a 
stop to the officers' complaints about court duty. This could indicate covert support 
for his officers' intransigence, a position incompatible with Ross' responsibility to 
Phillip, as lieutenant-governor. Alternatively, the officers were so disaffected, they 
used attendance at the Criminal Court as an excuse to stir up trouble, creating 
problems for Ross. Disregarding the question of Ross' loyalty to Phillip, in either 
case, doubt is cast on Ross' ability to exercise control over his officers. 
" W Tench, 1788, Comprising A Narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay and A Complete 
Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson, Melbourne, 1996, p.46. D Collins, An Account of the 
English Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, p.14. Tench's statement is 
technically incorrect. The Court of Civil Jurisdiction was established by the Great Seal, by order in 
council, not by act of parliament. 
" J Currey, David Collins, pp.62-63. 
24 HRA, 4, I, p.49. Bent to London of May 1810. 
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While the marine officers were displaying dissatisfaction by acting in an 
obstructionist manner, there were also tensions amongst the other ranks. This is 
indicated by an extraordinary entry in Private Easty's journal for Wednesday, 19 
March 1788. He wrote 'this day the BataIlion [sic] of marines Turned out and Said 
that thay Could not work aney longer with out being Paid for ie. If accurately 
reported, this was organised mass disobedience of orders, technically a mutiny. No 
other reference to this has been found to confirm Easty's account, which may relate 
to the marines not receiving pay for 'extra works for the public service' in 'hutting 
both officers and privates'!" Subsequently, Ross expressed concern over this issue 
and had it rectified. Alternative sources of trouble which may have caused the stop 
work were noted in Scott's journal of 13 March, six days before the marines' mass 
disobedience. He wrote of concern amongst the married men over repayments for 
their wives' liquor allowance and general shortage of rations.' In addition to the 
above grievances, it is conceivable that the marines were also indicating their 
resentment that on the day before the "stop work", five of their officers had been 
placed under arrest by Ross (discussed later)." Easty does not endorse Scott's 
complaints of 13 March, as he was suffering his own personal problems. On 12 
March 1788, he `recievd 150 Lachess' for earlier 'bringing a featneale Convict into 
Camp'. Possibly the effects of this punishment, prevented him making journal 
entries until 18 March.' 
In the month prior to the marines refusal to work, Bowes had recorded 
another cause of dissatisfaction amongst the marine other ranks. On 11 February, he 
compared the over-harsh disciplining of a marine (200 lashes for striking a convict 
woman) to a lesser punishment of a convict for a more serious offence (150 lashes 
" J Easty, Memorandum of the Transactions Of A Voyage From England To Botany Bay 1787- 
1793, A First Fleet Journal, Sydney, 1965, p.100. HRA, 1, 1, p. 81, for artifices' days worked. 
26 HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.182. Ross to Phillip of August 1788. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.172. Ross to Stephens of July 1788. 
" J Scott, Remarks on a Passage to Botany Bay 1787-1792, A First Fleet Journal, Sydney, 1963, 
pS7. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.99. Entry for 18 march 1788. J. Scott, Remarks on a 
Passage, p.37, noted the arrests a day later. 
30 J. Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, pp.98-99. 
79 
for striking a sentry). Bowes' opinion was that 'This severity shown to the marines 
and lenity to the convicts ... excited great discontents amongst the corps'. He had 
reasonable grounds to ponder 'where it [the discontent] will end, unless some other 
plan is adopted, time will discover.'" Bowes', Easty's and Scott's journals for 
February and March 1788, provide an unhappy picture of the marines' morale. The 
convicts, with a similar social background, and in close contact with their jailers, 
including the shared favours of convict women, would have been aware of, and taken 
advantage of this discontent, inevitably lowering internal security standards. 
The arrest of five officers, a singular event considered in the following 
paragraphs, was publicly announced in a General Order of 22 March 1788 issued by 
Phillip's Headquarters.' The order stated that at a battalion court martial, five named 
officers, including Captain-Lieutenant Tench as President, had passed sentence on 
Private Joseph Hunt, which was considered, by Ross, as tending to subvert military 
discipline. He therefore requested:- 
that a general court-martial may be ordered to assemble for the trial of the 
aforesaid officers for refusing to make any alteration in the said sentence, or 
that it might be settled in any manner' most likely to restore harmony and 
support military discipline and good order which is so absolutely necessary 
to be maintained.' 
The order however, concluded that as there were insufficient commissioned officers 
in the colony to form a general court martial, the officers under arrest were to return 
to duty.' This reflects Phillip's judicious use of a technicality to release the officers 
from their arrest without being seen to diminish the authority of Ross who had 
requested the order for a court martial. 
3 ' HRNSW, 2, p.394. See above, Chapter 3, p.49 and footnote 29, for the striking of 'a centry' 
(Drum Major Benjamin Cook). 
" HRNSW, I, Pt.2, pp.163-164. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p. 162. With insufficient officers available to form a general court martial of 
thirteen members, Phillip suggested Ross seek 'the opinion of the officers who compose the 
detachment' to resolve the issue. Hence the words 'settled in any manner'. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p. 163. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.139-140. Phillip advised Sydney in May 1788 that he 'used every means 
in my power to prevent a general court-martial, the inconveniences of which were obvious ... I did 
not judge it prudent to put the guards [on the accused officers] in the charge of serjants, which must 
have been done' as no other officers were available. 
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The circumstances behind these unusual arrests were that a battalion court 
martial found Hunt guilty of having struck another marine, William Dempsey. The 
court offered Hunt a choice of sentence, either 'ask public pardon before the 
battalion of William Dempsey' or receive 100 lashes. Following procedure, the 
court's proceedings were passed to Ross, the convening officer, for confirmation of 
the court's finding and sentence.' Ross, properly, directed the court to reconsider 
the sentence, as it was not consistent with martial law, being incorrect to award Hunt 
a choice of two sentences.' Although they erred in law, the members of the court, 
acting within their lawful rights, replied they did not see any reason to rescind the 
sentence they had already given. As a 'confirming authority can order a revision 
once only', legally Ross now had two options, either confirm or refuse confirmation 
of Hunt's sentence, with a refusal 'annul[ling] the whole proceeding'.' After the 
court's unsatisfactory review, Ross should have discharged that court and ordered a 
fresh trial for Hunt. However, Ross erred in law by referring the sentence back to 
the court a second time, ordering the members to 'finish the court-martial ... by 
passing only one sentence for one crime'.' In response the court refused, correctly 
noting that it was not 'proper or military [for the sentence] to come again under our 
cognizance after we have revised them'.41 Thereupon, Ross had the five officers 
arrested and charged with disobeying his order to alter Hunt's sentence. As a 
commanding officer, Ross' action was illegal, as in his role as confirming authority, 
he had no power to dictate a court's sentence on an offender. 
" Manual of Military Law (MML), London, 1914, p.52, paragraph 90. Being a 'regimental 
[battalion] court martial', Ross as convening authority, was also confirming authority for the 
finding and sentence. Note: As a body of law tends to be consistent as it slowly develops, it is 
considered reasonable to apply this Manual's 1914 principals to late eighteenth century courts 
martial. Contemporary writings surrounding Hunt's court martial appear to confirm this view. 
" HRNSW, I, Pt.2, p.159. Adjqtant Long to Tench. MML, passim. Ross was correct as there 
is no reference to a convicted soldier being offered a choice between two sentences. Rules of 
Procedure (for courts martial) state 'The court shall award one sentence in respect of all offences of 
which an offender is found guilty (p.602 paragraph 48). As the court had 'informally expressed' 
Hunt's sentence, Ross, as confirming authority, had the authority to recall the court to 'vary [this] 
... so that it shall be properly expressed' (p.606, paragraph 56(A) and Note 1). 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.141. Postscript to court martial proceedings. MML, p.52, paragraph 97, a 
court can 'adhere to their finding'. 
" MML, pp.52-53, paragraph 97. 
HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.160. 
°' HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.161. Court members to Ross. 
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In all probability, Tench and his fellow court members, knew that their 
sentence was invalid, even before their error was twice explained by the adjutant's 
letters when Ross ordered the two reviews. Their knowledge of military law, 
demonstrated by legally, refusing Ross' second request for a review, indicates that 
they probably also knew the original sentence was invalid. It must therefore be 
considered that the court's sentence was designed to deliberately provoke Ross, who 
in his own words, had 'put up with such mortifying things, more particularly from 
Captn.-Lieut. Tench'.' Ross explaining the incident to the Admiralty, noted that the 
sentence wrested 'out of the hands of the commanding officer a most essential and 
necessary power, the power of mitigating or inflicting the punishment order'd the 
prisoner'.' Under these circumstances, it appeared to Ross that his options were 
'either giving up the consequence of the commanding officer, or putting the 
President and members of the court under an arrest'.' 
Thus it was at Ross' request, Phillip promulgated General Order of 22 March 
1788 (referred to earlier) ordering a general court martial for the five officers. 
Additionally, Phillip endeavoured to resolve the impasse by a compromise within the 
bounds of military discipline, enabling Ross to drop charges against the officers. 
Phillip interviewed Tench suggesting that the alteration of a few words in the 
sentence would make it legally coned.' The five officers, feeling affronted over 
their arrest and release without trial, refused mediation. They issued a declaration, 
stating 'we once more repeat that a general court-martial only can bring the matter to 
a proper issue.' While the five officers wanted to vindicate their own stand, and 
presumably expose Ross as an incompetent commanding officer, this destabilising 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.158. Ross to Stephens of July 1788. 
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and demoralising event, within two months of Sydney Cove's establishment, would 
have impacted on unit efficiency. More conflict between Ross and his officers was 
soon to follow, in connection with building barracks for the marines. 
In Ross' dispatch to the Admiralty of October 1788, he complained of neglect 
shown by his officers towards their men:- 
It is with much regret that I now inform their Lordships of ... a shameful 
inattention of all the captains (Captn. Campbell excepted) to the effecting 
[of] the barracks for their companies; in place of which their attention seems 
to have been chiefly employ'd in the effecting houses and outhouses for 
themselves, their servants, and stock' 
Ross' complaint was valid, and apart from Campbell, the other three company 
commanders, and their subordinate officers, appear to have been remarkably 
dismissive of their troops' welfare, despite their living in inadequate tents. 
Company commander, Captain John Shea, was the leading officer in resisting 
Ross' efforts to give priority to the marines' welfare. Ross questioned Shea about 
his marines' accommodation, receiving an insubordinate answer that was not one 'I 
thought I had a right to expect from 	Therefore, Ross had Shea formally 
brought before Phillip. Questioned by Phillip, Shea twice replied 'he did not 
conceive it to be any part of his duty [to be involved in building his men's barracks], 
but that he would do whatever he was order'd.'' Shea's concession to Phillip, 
previously denied to Ross, diffused an awkward and tense situation within the 
battalion. Present at this interview were Judge-Advocate Collins, Lieutenant G. 
Johnston, Phillip's aide-de-camp ( later commander of the New South Wales 
Corps), and the battalion's adjutant, Second Lieutenant Long. The presence of these 
particular officers, as potentially hostile witnesses, indicates that Shea's actions were 
considered so prejudicial to good order and discipline that a general court martial 
charge was considered a possibility as a result of this interview. The General Order 
which Phillip then authorised, reflected no credit on either Ross as a commander, nor 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.195. Ross to Stephens of October 1788. 
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his officers as leaders:- 
The major-commandant of the detachment having represented that he cannot 
make the necessary inquiry into the manner in which barracks erecting for 
the detachment is carried on, from some of the officers not conceiving it to 
be any part of their duty to direct the forwarding of that work, - and 
requesting that such orders may be given as may enable him to oblige them 
to attend that service, - the Governor is very sorry to be under the necessity 
of giving an order for any officer's attendance to which is undoubtedly a 
part of his duty, and particularly so in the present situation of the colony. 
The officers by every means in their power are to [hasten the building of 
barracks] ... and make any such report to their commandant as he may ... 
think necessary to demand.' 
This damning order was followed two days later by a Battalion Order by Ross which 
included the directive that the officers were to cooperate with 'Mr. Brewer, who is 
appointed to direct the [marine] carpenters and surveyors in the works to be 
performed'.' 
This order by Ross gave rise to another clash with Tench regarding actions of 
two marines in the latter's company.' Both were sawyers, working under Tench's 
orders that timber cut at the pit was not to be removed without his approval. Since 
then, 'the serjeant and corp'Is ... have frequently since repeated them [this order, 
amongst others].'" After 31 August 1788 Brewer was authorised by Ross to deal 
directly with battalion personnel, and was given approval, by Ross, to collect rafters 
cut at Tench's pit for use in Shea's company barracks. When Brewer requested 
these rafters, one of the sawyers, Private Strong, `express'd very civilly his 
apprehensions of Captn. Tench's displeasure ... and requested that a written order 
might be procured of Captn. Tench to let them go.' After making their objection, the 
sawyers did not prevent Brewer having the rafters removed.' 
Brewer reported this incident to Ross, who sent his adjutant to establish with 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.196. Order of 29 August 1788. 
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Tench the accuracy of the sawyers' statement. Tench denied having given any such 
order.' To resolve the issue, Ross ordered the sawyers be court martialled, charged 
with 'disobedience of orders, in preventing the person authorized from bringing in 
materials to errect the barracks for Captn. Shea's coy.' As it was not proved that the 
sawyers were aware of the battalion order, they were acquitted. At the court martial, 
Tench admitted that he had issued the order which earlier he had denied giving, 
namely not to allow any timber to be removed without his authority. This 
contradiction of his own word casts doubt on Tench's honesty in his dealings with 
his commanding officer. 
In October 1788, further problems occurred between Ross and his officers, 
when Ross charged quartermaster, First Lieutenant James Furzer, with 'neglect of 
duty, contempt, and disrespect to his commanding officer'. Ross requested Phillip 
convene a general court martial to hear these charges.' Phillip responded by 
ordering the assembly of a court of thirteen officers including Collins. The latter, 
whose loyalty to the governor was undoubted, presented written advice to Phillip that 
'in conformity to an Act of the British legislature ... for ... regulation [of marines] 
while on shore' that it would be illegal for a general court martial to sit without 
'authority of the Commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admire.' 
With the court lacking authority to sit, the matter was resolved when Furzer 
apologised to Ross, who then requested that Phillip withdraw the application for a 
general court martial. Furzer was released from arrest, returned to duty and the 
matter officially forgotten. But his arrest was noted in Scott's journal on 1 and 3 
October 1788, that it was intended to 'try him [Furzer] on Monday 6th. Inst. by a 
55 HRNSW, I, Pt.2, p.197. 
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58 HRNSVV, 1, Pt.2, p.206, for objection signed by the officers including Collins (205-206). J 
White, Journal of a Voyage to New South Wales, Sydney, 1962, pp.165-166, noted the battalion 
was 'governed and regulated by the same rules and instructions as the marine divisions at Chatham'. 
Note 8, to White's Chapter XXI, p.263, stated that in 1791 'Phillip received authority ... to 
summon general courts-martial.' While battalion courts martial were for minor offences; serious 
offences, by a marine officer or soldier (as drawn to Phillip's attention by Collins), had to be 
deferred until authority to hold a general court martial was received from England. Execution of any 
sentence required similar confirmation. This did not apply to a marine charged with a civil offence, 
who could be tried and sentenced in the colony's Criminal Court. 
85 
General Court Martial. - No court Martial. (Made Up)'.  This confirms that the 
other ranks were aware of dissension amongst their officers. An officer, evading the 
due process of military law would not have impressed the marines who were 
subjected to brutal punishments. 
Seventeen days after Furzer's general court martial was aborted, Phillip wrote 
to Sydney of 'the very unpleasant situation of the detachment doing duty in this 
country, from the discontents between the Commandant and the officers ... [and] I 
am sorry ... it is not in my power to restore that harmony which is so very requisite 
in our situation.' 6° Fourteen months later, in February 1790, in a further dispatch, 
Phillip referred to Ross" warmth of temper, which has been the source of many 
discontents'.61 Ross in return felt estranged from Phillip, and in a private letter to 
Nepean at the Home Office, of November 1788, complained of 'our Governor's 
manner of expressing himself, for he communicates nothing to any person here but 
to his secretary (Capt. Collins)' 62 
Ross clearly resented Collins' close working relationship with Phillip. This 
was understandable, for in addition to Collins' duties as deputy judge-advocate, in 
June 1788 Phillip appointed him his secretary. In 1789 Collins took up permanent 
residence in the newly completed Government House.' Three incidents, involving 
friction between Ross and Collins, illustrate the strained relationship which had 
developed between the two men. In one case, the `Lieut.-Governor and Captn. 
Campbell in the presence of convicts and others' abused Collins and Hunter, sitting 
as Justices of the Peace. As a result, Collins 'wished to resign his office of Judge-
Advocate' and Hunter 'wished to be excused attending one day in the week as a 
Justice of the Peace'.' 
" J Scott, Remarks on a Passage, p.41. 
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On another occasion, before Phillip departed on a journey to Rose Hill, he 
instructed Collins that a particular convict be relocated from one work gang to 
another. Phillip in giving this instruction assumed the convict, a plasterer, had 
finished tasks required by Ross. Collins issued the instruction, unaware the man 
was still working on a marine officer's hut. Additionally, this task was being 
performed on the western side of Sydney Cove, an area over which Phillip had given 
Ross supervisory responsibility for convict work parties. Ross, quite properly, sent 
Provost Marshall Brewer to query by what authority the man had been moved. 
Collins, realising the situation was delicate, immediately directed that the plasterer 
continue until any tasks required by Ross were completed. But despite Collins' 
quick correction of this unintentional slight, Ross considered this 'an insult offered 
to me in my character of Lieutenant-Governor'. 
In his letter of complaint to Phillip, Ross admitted Brewer informed him 
Collins 'knew nothing more of it [the order he passed] than when the Governor was 
going away he left such orders with him.' Thus in complaining about the 
impropriety of the order by Collins,' Ross was using this as an excuse to assail 
Phillip. Ross correctly stated in his complaint that in the absence of Phillip he was 
responsible for decision making in the settlement. Therefore he argued, Collins 
should have consulted him, as lieutenant-governor, before changing a convict's 
employment. Collins, an experienced officer, appreciated Ross' authority in 
Phillips's absence, but probably considered that Phillip's instruction to relocate a 
convict from one gang to another was so routine and trivial that it did not warrant 
referral to Ross for confirmation. This issue, over a minor oversight, generated 
considerable heat and increased tension between officers who respectively 
represented the colony's civil and military powers. 
A serious challenge to Phillip's authority was made by Ross, following the 
death of Captain Shea in February 1789. Ross, without reference to Phillip, offered 
" HRA, 1, 1, pp.151-155: for correspondence generated by this incident. 
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the command of Shea's company to Collins. This flouted military protocol, as Ross 
had no authority to unilaterally remove an officer appointed to the staff of his 
superior. He also ignored the fact that Collins held a civil as well as a military 
appointment by virtue of a royal commission, with any reappointment theoretically 
requiring the sanction of an Order in Council. In a crisis, only Phillip, acting as the 
king's representative in New South Wales, could have vindicated such a 
reappointment. To justify this aberrant offer, Ross informed Collins that he was 
directed so to do by Lord Howe.' As Phillip pointed out to Sydney:- 
the civic Government of this colony may be very materially affected 
by directions of such a nature being given to the commandant of the 
detachment, and by him carried into execution without the knowledge or 
consent of the Governor, and which I presume never was intended by Lord 
Howe. The first information I received of any such offer ... was from the 
Judge-Advocate's saying that he would not accept the offer.' 
Ross' action as a senior officer is difficult to understand. Was he attempting to 
destroy the close working relationship between Phillip and Collins, which Ross may 
have blamed for curtailing his own role as lieutenant-governor? Alternatively, was he 
so lacking in staff experience that he did not know he was at fault, or that he just did 
not think or care about the consequences of his actions? As Ross was an 
experienced officer, such possibilities seem unlikely. Yet, somehow he did make this 
inexplicable blunder, raising the question whether other command failures on Ross' 
part contributed to dissatisfaction within the battalion at a risk to efficiency and 
internal security. There was also a serious lack of supervision of the soldiers in 
barracks. 
Inexcusable inefficiency in enforcing barrack regulations led to the battalion's 
most traumatic experience during its tour of duty in the colony. A gang of marines, 
craving spirits and other items, began organised stealing on a large scale. Stolen 
goods in short supply also had a barter value, especially in seeking sexual favours. 
In Collins' opinion, the root cause was the association of the gang with 'some of the 
worst of the female convicts; at whose huts, notwithstanding the internal regulations 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.26-27, for Collins' commission. 
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of their quarters, they found means to enjoy the ill-acquired plunder.'" 
This gang was formed and led by Joseph Hunt, whose court martial had 
earlier led to the arrest of the five officers. The gang obtained and altered keys to fit 
the different locks on the three doors of the provision stores.' When a gang 
member was on night sentry, he would admit the others, locking them in. In this 
way, periodic inspections by duty officers or non-commissioned officers, found the 
sentry alert and the storehouse apparently secure. This scheme worked well for 
about eight months until one of the gang on sentry duty decided to break in alone.' 
Hearing the duty corporal approaching, he panicked and accidentally snapped off the 
key in the lock. Discovered next morning, the broken key was identified by the 
convict blacksmith 'through whose hands most of the work passed', as one modified 
for Hunt. When questioned, Hunt turned King's Evidence implicating six other 
marines. The men were tried under civil law by the Criminal Court, formed 
exclusively by marine officers.' This sat on 25 and 26 March 1789, and the six 
named by Hunt were found guilty by the court and sentenced to death. Easty noted 
that 'the Galleows was Erected before the Sentance was Cast upon them'." 
Scott's journal for 27 March reads 'At. 9 °Clock in the Morning the 
Sentince past. on the Above Prisoners' Was put In Exacution; In Consaquence of 
Jos. Hunt. Convicting the. Six Afforesaid prisoners, he Was pardone,d 	Fasty 
noted that before the executions took place 'between the 2 Store housees when thay 
all Said that Joseph Hunt was the ocation of all thier Deaths as he was the first that 
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bagan the Said Roberry thare was hardley a marine Present but what Shed tears 
offacers and men'. Tench, whose published account was obviously written to 
achieve maximum dramatic impact, wrote 'Six marines, the flower of our battalion, 
were hanged by the public executioner'.' Collins was less generous in his 
comments about the six, noting that while some were held in high estimation by their 
officers, four of the six were responsible for the earlier manslaughter of 'their 
comrade Bulmore [Bullmore]' in November 1788. Additionally, the stolen liquor 
'was productive of many disorders, for which ... they were more than once 
punished.' Further, in the month before the executions, Hunt had received 700 
lashes.' 
The impact of the six executions was soon evident and caused considerable 
repercussions. Understandably, this particularly applied to Captain Campbell, from 
whose company came Hunt, the six executed men, also Bullmore.' A bitter dispute 
developed between Campbell and Collins whether a convict, Mary Turner, should be 
brought to trial as an accessory of the executed marines. Campbell objected to 
Collins' decision that no further action be taken, and vitriolic correspondence 
resulted.' Arising from this, Campbell formally requested Ross to remove his 
(Campbell's) name from the roster of officers scheduled for duty in the Criminal 
Court. Campbell stated he always understood Ross did not have power to command 
officers to sit on this court against their own inclinations. But previously he had 
'volunteered or acquiesced' in doing this duty and was prepared to sit in future only 
on that basis. Finally, Campbell accused Collins of writing a most insulting letter, 
and requested Ross raise with Phillip the question of officers being required to sit on 
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the Criminal Court.' 
Ross submitted Campbell's case to Phillip who could not allow this issue to 
go unresolved as it was essential for convict discipline and the maintenance of 
internal security that the Criminal Court function without disruption. On the day 
after Campbell wrote to Ross, 28 April 1789, Phillip ordered three lieutenants to 
constitute an official inquiry to examine the legality of Campbell's claim. Later that 
day, the lieutenants, apparently unwilling to be seen supporting either Phillip or Ross, 
advised Phillip of their 'incompetency to decide on an affair of such a [legal] 
nature.' 
For the next eight days, historical records are silent on this topic. 
Nevertheless, a great deal must have taken place, as Phillip became aware that 'Major 
Ross ... is of the opinion they [the officers] do not think it a part of their duty.'" As 
discussed earlier, after the act of parliament and letters patent were publicly read on 7 
February 1788, no officer could plead ignorance to the lawful requirement that he sit 
as a member of the Criminal Court. Phillip could not afford to allow Ross' 
publicly stated opinion to go unchallenged, and acted immediately. 
On 6 May 1789, Ross was ordered to put the following question to his 
officers (Campbell being exempted as he had already stated his opinion), 'whether or 
not they think it their duty to sit as members of the criminal court established in this 
country.' Typical of all replies was that of Tench, the senior officer questioned. 
Ross recorded his reply:- 
I had no knowledge of the Act of Parliament [establishing the courts in New 
South Wales] previous to my arrival in this country; from the moment I read 
it I look'd on it as Captain Tench's duty to sit on criminal courts whenever 
ordered, and still look on it as such.' 
The other eleven officers questioned agreed with Tench that they were duty bound to 
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sit on the court. This exploded Ross' assertion that his officers supported 
Campbell's opinion. Despite this overwhelming acceptance of the parliamentary act 
establishing the criminal court, three weeks later disagreement was again recorded. 
Because of a report that Ross improperly endeavoured to influence the 
officers at the meeting of 6 May, on 28 May 1789, Phillip ordered Collins to put the 
following questions to officers who had attended the earlier meeting:- 
Question 1:- Was there such a meeting, and what reason was assigned by 
the major-commandant of the detachment for assembling the 
officers? 
Question 2:- Did the major-commandant at that meeting say that the 
Governor's conduct in calling on Capt. Campbell to sit in his turn as 
a member of the criminal court was oppressive? 
Question 3:- Did he [Ross] ask the officers to join Capt. Campbell in 
refusing to sit as a member of that court, or what was said on that 
subject? 
The replies were recorded by Collins, with Lieutenant Poulden answering that Ross 
had called the meeting 'to lay before it the letters from the Judge-Advocate and Capt. 
Campbell.' Other officers gave more detailed replies further extending this theme. 
In reply to the second question, all officers said the word 'oppressive' was used by 
Ross. Their answers varied on whether he had claimed this was an opinion he gave 
to Phillip, or alternatively, that Ross was making the point to the marine officers that 
he considered the duty oppressive, or Phillip in his handling of Campbell, was 
oppressive. Except for Poulden who gave a negative reply, other officers answered 
the third question by stating that Ross did not directly ask them to support Campbell, 
but that this was implicit in the tenor of his remarks to the meeting.' 
It is a sad reflection on the command relationship between Phillip and Ross 
that Phillip found it necessary to reduce Ross' statements to written evidence which 
could be forwarded to London if necessary After this evidence had been taken, Ross 
apparently realised he had overstepped the bounds of military discretion and acted 
with reticence. In Phillip's dispatch to London, it was noted that:- 
when the officers informed him [Ross] they had been examined respecting 
that meeting, and which they did as soon as they left the Judge-Advocate; 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.245-247. 
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and being asked what questions had been put to them, they desired to refer 
him to the Governor for the questions and their answers; but Major Ross 
has never mentioned that business to me, and I have thought it best to let it 
rest in its present state. 9° 
For an officer jealous of the prerogatives of his command, Ross' failure to 
demand an explanation from Phillip was significant. Phillip's initiatives had finally 
resolved the impasse over marine officer court appearances. The sequel to this 
episode was that Admiralty Secretary Stephens, in a letter to Ross, advised the 
marines were to be withdrawn from the colony, and:- 
Their Lordships are much concerned that any disagreement should have 
arisen between the Governor and yourself; and they are not less so to find 
that any of the private marines should have behaved in such a manner as to 
make it necessary to punish so many of them [the six marines hanged] in the 
exemplary manner you mention.' 
This was a strongly worded criticism of Ross' performance as a battalion 
commander, but this reprimand arrived too late to deter Ross from another serious 
altercation with Phillip. 
Following the May 1789 questioning of the officers, a confrontation between 
Ross and Phillip occurred over the convict night watch.' This incident took place in 
late 1789 or early 1790, as Phillip reported the matter to London in a dispatch of 1 
February 1790. Also, Ross again raised the issue of Collins insulting Campbell 
regarding a prosecution of Mary Turner. Phillip wrote to Nepean that 'the 
Lieutenant-Governor has thought I did not pay proper attention to his complaints of 
the Judge-Advocate's conduce.' Phillip was clearly exasperated with Ross, and it 
may or may not be coincidence that on 2 March 1790, with critical food shortages at 
Sydney Cove, Ross was chosen to command two companies of marines and extra 
convicts dispatched to the more fertile Norfolk Island.' While continuing in his role 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.239. Phillip to Sydney of June 1789. 
91 HRNSW, 2, p.445. Letter of March 1791. 
" See above, Chapter 3, pp.55-56. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.301 Phillip to Nepean of February 1790; pp.301-304 for problems caused 
by Ross. 
" J Easty, Transactions Of a Voyage, p.114. For names of officers, but only the ranks of the 
fifty-six marines embarked. 
93 
of lieutenant-governor, Ross was to 'command and [take] charge of the settlement 
established at Norfolk Island'. 95 Later, Home Secretary, Lord Grenville, who 
succeeded Sydney, wrote to Phillip that 'sending Major Ross to Norfolk Island ... 
appears to have been a judicious measure'? For Ross, it was an opportunity to 
demonstrate that away from Phillip's supervision and frustrating lack of 
communication, he could be a sound commander and civic administrator. 
Accompanied by Supply, he sailed for Norfolk Island aboard Sirius under Captain 
Hunter's command. 
Ross' first test came on his arrival at Norfolk Island when Sirius was 
disabled and later broke up while trying to land stores. 'The instant the ship struck, 
Lieutenant-Governor Ross ordered the drums to assemble all the marines and 
convicts'?" He immediately issued an order that anyone who killed any stock, or 
who plundered stores from the stranded ship, would be hanged. Hunter noted that 
'the shore was lined with the marines, to prevent the convicts from committing 
depredations, it was much, but not wholly prevented.'" Next morning Ross issued a 
summons to all naval and marine officers, including Hunter and the outgoing 
commandant, King, to attend a council at noon on 20 March 1790. 99 The purpose of 
this council was to give 'advice and assistance [to Ross] ... for establishing such 
rules and regulations as may be necessary for the good government of the 
settlement.' As a result of this meeting martial law was declared, the naval chain 
of command ashore for Sirius' crew was agreed, as was the rationing and control of 
the limited stores which were placed under joint naval and marine supervision!' 
Two days later, on Monday, 22 March, an unusual ceremony was held to formalise 
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martial law. All persons on the island were assembled and the resolutions of the 
officers' council were read. As a symbolic act of acceptance of martial law, the 
whole population led by Hunter and Ross, passed under the King's colours at the 
flagstaff, and between the colours of the marine detachment.' This was a sound 
move as the ceremony underlined to both the marines and convicts that no threat 
would be brooked to the island's internal security. As noted by Lieutenant Fowell of 
Sirius, if martial law had not been proclaimed, the greatest punishment that could 
have been awarded on the island was a flogging, but now seven officers could 
constitute a general court martial with five having to concur in a death sentence!' 
Although justified by expediency, this is a clear case which supports Bentham's 
description of colonial law as 'Star-Chamberised; legislature and judicature 
confounded and lodged together, both in one and the same hand'!' 
Because of the cooperative nature of Ross' approach as commandant, he 
successfully maintained stable government on Norfolk Island, and was not reluctant 
to seek advice from the officers' council where necessary. For example, in May 
1790, the council met to consider the exhausted state of provisions in the settlement, 
and decide what measures should be taken. A reduced ration scale was agreed upon 
and proclaimed. This document concluded 'In future all crimes which may be 
considered by any three members of the Council as not capital will be punished by a 
reduction of the present allowance, at their discretion'!" Evidently Ross and the 
naval and marine officers saw the council as a functioning element in the 
administration of the island. The spirit of cooperation under Ross' leadership is 
exemplified in a letter by a senior rating of Sirius' crew. He wrote that 'We have 
great right to remember with gratitude the kindness of our good Friend Major Ross 
... who spared no pains to make us comfortable in our situation, and was ever ready 
to serve us."" This was a vastly difference impression to that which Ross created at 
1 " HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.320. J Hunter, An Historical Journal, p.257 (King's account). 
1" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.381. Letter to his father of July 1790. 
1 " 'Plea for a Constitution, by Bentham', p.888. 
1 " HRNSW, I, P1.2, p.335. Undated Proclamation of May 1790. 
1 " HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.399. Undated letter, possibly written in August 1790. Found amongst 
Banks' papers. 
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Sydney Cove. 
Phillip raised no objection, with London, or with Ross, about the form of 
government set up at Norfolk Island under martial law. By July 1790, Phillip was 
considering practical implications of Ross' relief by an incoming captain company 
commander of the New South Wales Corps. In planning this handover, Phillip saw 
'a strong objection [to martial law continuing], as the small military force to be 
employed there may throw the administration of justice into the hands of a few very 
young men.' He looked forward to the return of King and commented to London 'I 
should gladly increase the civil power if! had the means, but which this colony does 
not afford me." °7 This illustrates the conflict between the desirability of the civil 
power's supremacy, against the need for the military to maintain an iron grip in the 
interests of preserving internal security. 
Meantime, Ross had more basic worries, to supplement the dwindling food 
supply by catching 'the birds at Mount Pitt' and fishing. By August 1790, 
provisions on Norfolk Island was down to twelve weeks supply at a subsistence 
level, with salted meats not being issued until the birds and fishes 'fail us'.' Severe 
disciplinary measures were also proclaimed to meet the desperate situation.' 
However, on 9 August 1790, supplies were received and martial law was rescinded. 
Of critical importance over this trying period, was that Ross maintained internal 
security under wretched conditions, for which he deserved (but apparently did not 
receive) credit. 
During the period of martial law, from March to August 1790, there was no 
breakdown of government nor were draconian punishments actually inflicted as 
cautionary proclamations proved effective. Hunter wrote that by one proclamation 
'much mischief I am of opinion was prevented ... [and] fear of an immediate trial, 
1 " HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.357. Phillip to Grenville of July 1790. HRNSW, 3, p.5, and third 
footnote concerning a court of jurisdiction not being established until 1796, p.74. 
1 " HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.364. Proclamation of 19 July 1790. 
109 HRNSW, 1, P1.2, pp.390-391 and 391-393, for proclamations. 
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and ... immediate execution, kept every body tolerably honese." ° During this period, 
only one general court martial was held, which resulted in convicts being flogged. 
Nevertheless, in February 1791, Ross reported to Phillip that 'unless some criminal 
court or martial law is [again] established, it will scarcely be possible to prevent 
constant robberies, as well as other capital offences'. His concern was the number 
of absconders who raided gardens by night - a recurring problem with scarcity of 
food." 1 
In the constricted island community, Ross did have problems with his fellow 
officers and later soldiers of the New South Wales Corps. Lieutenants Faddy and 
Kellow fought a duel over allegations one of them was lying. Later Kellow was 
shunned for fifteen months by his fellow officers.' In the last few months before 
Hunter and his crew departed from the island in February 1791, relations between 
Ross and Hunter had become frigid. He also had several clashes with Captain 
William Hill of the New South Wales Corps."' Later, on the day before Ross and 
the marines embarked for England, Ross and Hill fought a duel near Sydney 
Town. 114 
At Norfolk Island, Ross had to surmount a serious incident amongst the 
marines, who objected to supplementing their rations by buying vegetables from 
industrious convicts. On 9 April 1791, they refused to draw their rations, but 
determined action by Ross, in parading the marines, unarmed, resolved the matter. 
The men, faced with dire consequences under the Articles of War, if they disobeyed 
Ross' lawful command, thereupon drew their supplies as ordered."' On a 
subsequent occasion, Ross wrote to Phillip expressing concern over the marines' 
complaint that their spirits ration was less than that issued to marines at Sydney 
J Hunter, An Historical Journal, p.123. 
" 1 HRNSW, 1, Pz.2, pp.438- 439. Ross to Phillip of February 1791. 
J Moore, First Fleet Marines, pp.241-242. Kellow later apologised and the matter was dropped. 
1 " J Moore, First Fleet Marines, pp.253-254, for Hill. 
114 Some Letters of Rev. Richard Johnson, B.A. First Chaplain of New South Wales, Sydney, 
1954, Letter of December 1791, pp. 43-44. 
115 J Moore, First Fleet Marines, pp.239-240. 
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Cove. This 'has occasioned more discontent and murmuring amongst them than 
ever were observed in their greatest apprehensions of fami' 
Meanwhile, in England, King was commissioned `to be Lieutenant-Governor 
of Norfolk Island in the Pacific Ocean'. 117 He was subordinated to 'our Governor 
of our territory of New South Wales and islands adjacent'. Therefore, on his return, 
he had equal status with the lieutenant-governor of New South Wales. 
King returned to Norfolk Island on 4 November 1791. He reported to Phillip 
that 'On my landing here a general murmuring and discontent at Major Ross's 
conduct assailed me from every description of people'.' This snide comment was 
prompted by an agricultural programme drawn up by Ross, intended to make the 
island self sufficient by imposing developmental targets on settlers. King probably 
over estimated the degree of opposition to this measure."9 At least he had the good 
grace to inform Nepean that on his arrival the public and private crops were most 
promising. 120 But while Ross was disparaged by King, some of the island's 
detachment of marines and soldiers were scathing in their comments on the newly 
promoted Commander King.' In September 1792, Private Fasty wrote that King 
'behavs more like a madman then a man in trused with the Govrment of an Band ... 
Belonging to Great Britain'.' 
On 5 December 1791, Ross and the two companies of marines from Norfolk 
Island, arrived back in Sydney Cove. The battalion, apart from a company held back 
by Phillip until the strength of the New South Wales Corps was built up, embarked 
116 HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.436. Ross to Phillip. For Philip's explanation to Grenville, pp.466-467. 
117 HRNSW, 1, P1.2, pp.287-288. Commission of January 1790. 
HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.562. King to Nepean of November 1791. King abolished this scheme. 
` 19 A Atkinson, Europeans in Australia, p.78. Less than half the settlers signed a petition on 
which King based his decision. 
1 " HRNSW, 1, 131.2, p.562. 
1 " HRNSW, 1, PI.2, footnote p.474. Promoted March 1791. 
122 J Easty, Transactions Of A Voyage, p.139. 
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for England on 13 December in HMS Gorgon.' In addition to the company 
remaining temporarily in the colony, other marines had taken their discharge to 
become settlers, mainly on Norfolk Island, or had requested transfer to the New 
South Wales Corps. 
In retrospect, Major Robert Ross is one of the more interesting military 
characters in Australia's early history. It is hard to equate the commander who 
repeatedly gave Phillip cause for concern, with the man who displayed fine 
leadership and a spirit of cooperation on Norfolk Island. In the personality clash 
between Ross and Phillip, some blame must be attributed to the latter for his aloof 
manner which helped fuel their mutual antagonism. An independent report offers 
justification for Ross' animosity towards Phillip. Naval lieutenant, Daniel Southwell, 
quotes another naval officer's description of Phillip as 'the pompous despot', and 
personally comments 'Our austere Govr's behaviour alters not for the better, and, [I] 
can assure you, am not disposed to speak in his praise.' Surgeon Bowes was 
another who at times spoke disapprovingly of Phillip. He wrote of Phillip's 
'Rashness' when ordering the fleet to sail from Botany Bay, and coldness to the 
merchant ships' captains who attended his commissioning ceremony at Sydney 
Cove.' It is understandable that Ross performed better on Norfolk Island away 
from Phillip's austere and critical supervision. But, a partial defence of Ross in his 
dealings with Phillip does not justify his intemperate manner and actions which led 
to lapses in internal security. In the final analysis, his superiors judged Ross 
harshly. On return to England, he was never promoted and retired a captain, with his 
brevet rank of major, the same as he had held in New South Wales.' 
In a dispatch of February 1790, Phillip wrote of the turbulence in the colony 
1 " HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.569. Phillip to Grenville of December 1791, and p.554, Phillip to 
Stephens of November 1791, for retaining a company. 
1 " HRNSW, 2, p.722. The Southwell Papers. To his mother, August 1790. 
1 " The Journal of Arthur Bowes Smyth: Surgeon, Lady Penrhyn 1 787-1789, eds. PG Fidlon and 
RJ Ryan, Sydney, 1979, pp.64 and 69 respectively. There are other examples of adverse comments 
regarding Philip on pp.44-45 and 74. 
126 J Moore, First Fleet Marines, pp.294-295. 
99 
caused by Ross and between Ross and his officers. Therefore, Phillip considered 
there was a 'necessity of some change being made, or an additional force being sent 
out'.' This observation is of historical interest as it was the first request by the civil 
power to resolve a continuing clash of interests between itself and the military power 
by having a particular unit withdrawn from the colony. Such clashes between these 
two powers continued under later governors. 
With the departure of the bulk of the marine battalion, the saga of the first 
military unit in Australia ended. For the marines, who sailed from England in May 
1787, the years were long and hard with 'morals and morale low.' Despite many 
trials and tribulations over that time, and leaving a legacy of precedent in the matter of 
tension between the military and civil powers, the marines had maintained the king's 
peace. 
127 HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.291. To Sydney. 
1 " M Austin, PR 86/62, Papers of Brigadier M. Austin, Australian War Memorial, File 
419/4/29, hem (741, Series 20, Handwritten notes on Marines. 
100 
Chapter 5 
Soldiers Replace the Marines 
In June 1789, The Right Honourable WW Grenville' advised Governor 
Phillip that, due to discontents reported as prevailing in the marine detachment, they 
were to be replaced by a corps to be recruited.' This would become the New South 
Wales Corps, so designated as its strength was fewer than the average 800 all ranks 
which constituted a battalion, or regiment of only one battalion.' The Corps' 1789 
establishment of four infantry companies is shown as a table (Figure 11 4). This 
establishment was increased to five companies in 1791, with a sixth added by 
recruiting marines in the colony.' As this was the only regular land force in New 
South Wales for twenty years, it is central to a study of early colonial security. 
With a chequered history, it has become known pejoratively as the "Rum Corps", 
but recently its image has been more sympathetically portrayed. 
A major figure in the New South Wales Corps was Major Francis Grose 
who raised and commanded the Corps, and became lieutenant-governor when he 
' Grenville succeeded Sydney at the Home Office. 
HRA, 1, 1, p.122. 
• Where a regiment consisted of more than one battalion, its battalion/regimental designation 
was, for example, Second Battalion, 73rd Regiment, normally abbreviated to 2173". As only 
single battalions of regiments served in the Australian colonies; in this thesis, the terms 
"regiment", "battalion" and infantry "unit" are interchangeable. 
• HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.232. Displayed as Figure 11, Establishment Table. AJCP, reel 1073, Out 
Letters Secretary-at-War New South Wales Corps, 1789-1803, War Office [henceforth WO] 4/845, 
pp.7-8. On 4 July 1789, the headquarters establishment was increased by two sergeants, as shown 
in Figure 11. 
• HRA, 1, 1, p.740, Commentary Note 102, for fifth company and p.133, Grenville to Phillip of 
December 1789, for recruiting marines. 
Headquarters 
Commanding Officer Major (Note 1) 
Adjutant 
Quartermaster 
Surgeon 
Surgeon's Mate 
Chaplain 
Sergeant Major (Note 2) 
Quartermaster Sergeant (Note 2) 
           
           
         
         
         
         
Company 
 
Company 
 
Company 
  
Company 
           
           
           
Officer Commanding: Major (Note 1) 	Officer Commanding: Captain 
1 x Lieutenant 	 1 x Lieutenant 
1 x Ensign 1 x Ensign 
3 x Sergeants 	 3 x Sergeants 
3 x Corporals 3 x Corporals 
2 x Drummers 	 2 x Drummers 
67 x Privates 67 x Privates 
Notes: 
1. Major Grose was appointed both Commanding Officer and Officer Commanding a 
company. 
2. Added to establishment July 1789. 
Figure 11: Establishment Table New South Wales Corps, July 1789 
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replaced Ross in that appointment.' Following Phillip's decision to return 
prematurely to England, and pending the arrival of the next appointed governor, on 
31 December 1792, Grose took over the duties of administrating the colony.' 
Troubled by old war wounds, Gross himself returned to England in December 
1794.8 Until his death, as a lieutenant general, in June 1814, Grose, as 'Colonel-
Commandant', retained formal links with the New South Wales Corps and the 
102nd Regiment.' This is evidenced in correspondence from the War Office to 
Major General Grose of December 1808, advising him that 'the N. South Wales 
Corps under your command' will be withdrawn from the colony and redesignated 
the 102nd Regiment.' Prior to coming to New South Wales, Grose had soldiered 
for seventeen years. As a young ensign," he fought at Bunker Hill and 
subsequently was wounded twice before being invalided to England in 1779 as a 
captain. After spending two years as a recruiting officer, Grose was on half pay as 
a major when appointed to raise the New South Wales Corps in June 17892 2 It is 
uncertain whether the Horse Guards" offered Grose the command of the Corps 
because he was considered a "sound" officer, or whether he had a patron as 
suggested by P Statham,' 
In regard to Grose's temperament, BH Fletcher points out that in 
• HRA, 1, 1, p.405. Grose's commission of November 1789. 
• HRA, 1, 1, p.403. Phillip departed in December 1792. 
• HRNSW, 2, pp.215-216, for war wounds; for departure, second footnote p.216, and p.314. 
9 WA Steel, 'Captain Henry Steel and the New South Wales Corps, later the 102nd Regiment, 
Part 1', JRAHS, Vol.29, Pt. 1, 1943, p.42, for Grose's 'colonelcy' of the 102nd, and elsewhere 
(p.39) to being 'Colonel-Commandant' of the Corps. 
AJCP, reel 1073, Out Letters Secretary-at-War New South Wales Corps, 1803-1810, WO 
4/846, p.56. 
11 Australian Dictionary of Bibliography, Vol.1: 1788-1850, A-H, (henceforth ABD, 1), London, 
1966, p.488, lists born '1758?'. WA Steel, 'Captain Henry Steel and the New South Wales 
Corps, later the 102nd Regiment, Part 2', JRAHS, Vol.29, Pt.2, p.70, noted Grose 'served at an 
early age with the 52nd Regiment'. CMH Clark, A History of Australia, I, From the Earliest 
Times to the Age of Macquarie, Carlton, reprinted 1974, p.132, states born 1754. 
" For Grose's service record: W Foster, 'Francis Grose and the Officers', JRAHS, Vol.51, Pt.3, 
September, 1965, p.177; HRNSW, 2, footnote p.215; ADB, 1, pp.488-489; HRA, 1, 1, p.773, 
Commentary Note 252. 
" The 'Horse Guards', was the Commander-in-Chief's headquarters in London, as opposed to the 
Secretary-at-War who operated from the 'War Office'. 
P Statham, 'Ins and Outs: The Composition and Disposal of the NSW Corps 1790-1810', 
Working Papers in Economic History, Working Paper No.105, May 1988, p.3. 
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comparison to Ross, Grose was 'unassertive, affable and easy-going, [which] gave 
Phillip little cause for complaint and the two men enjoyed more amicable relations 
than those which had hitherto existed between the civil and military leaders." 5 
However, Fletcher also writes of Grose's 'indolence', 'laxity', and 'reluctance to 
act on his own initiative'. Possibly Grose may have been influenced in childhood 
by his father (also Francis Grose) who had had two militia appointments as a 
captain' and also wrote the 'enduring' satire, Advice to Officers of the British Army. 
Typical of Francis senior's advice to subaltems was:- 
Never read the daily orders. It is beneath an officer of spirit to bestow any 
attention upon such nonsense ... 
When on leave of absence, never come back to your time; as that might 
cause people to think that you had nowhere to stay ... 17 
These satirical innuendoes by his father may have implanted some of the negative 
characteristics in Grose junior of which Fletcher writes. These failings 
subsequently contributed to unfortunate events, such as the officers becoming 
involved in colonial trading, and the loss, by mutiny, of the transport Lady Shore. 
But such matters lay in the Corps' future, and are considered later in this thesis!' 
The War Office when instructing Grose to raise a corps for service in New 
South Wales, advised him he was to command the unit as a major. Presumably this 
was because its establishment strength was inadequate for a lieutenant colonel's 
command. In addition to commanding this corps, Grose was ordered to raise and 
command one of the four companies (usually a captain's command)' 9 . The letter 
continued:- 
in aid of the expenses of which [you will incur] you will be allowed to name 
" ADB, 1, p.488. Entry on Grose by BH Fletcher. Relations between Phillip and Grose were 
for only a comparatively short period. Grose reached the colony in Pitt in February 1792 
(HRNSW, 1, p.595), and Phillip sailed from Sydney in December 1792 (HRNSW, 2, p.1). With 
the austere Phillip being of such a different temperament, it is a matter of speculation, whether, 
over a longer period, relations may have soured between him and Grose. 
" ADB, 1, p.488. In the Hampshire and later Surrey Militia. 
" ES Turner, Gallant Gentlemen a portrait of the British Officer 1600-1956, London, 1956, p.83. 
Grose's book was published in 1782 and 'has been reprinted many times' (p.82). 
" ADB, 1, p.489. 
19 M Austin, 'The Early Defences of Australia', JRAHS, Vol.49, Pt.3, November 1963, p.190. 
For 17th and 18th century practice of majors, and above, on regimental headquarters also 
commanding companies. 
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the lieutenant and ensign of your respective companies, and to receive from 
the public three guineas for each recruit approved ... by [an inspection of] a 
general or field officer appointed for that purpose.' 
In this way Grose would receive payment for recruiting the Corps, and although not 
promoted, would receive financial benefits accrued by British regimental 
commanders, including control of parliamentary budgeted funds allocated for 
purchase of certain stores and equipment' 
In response to the War Office's letter of appointment, Grose proposed that 
should he be promoted to lieutenant colonel, he would, without expense to the 
Government, raise two companies. Alternatively, if he was not to be promoted, he 
was prepared to 'raise [all] the companies on condition of receiving the levy money, 
nominating the captain and subaltern officers'. This would have been to his 
financial benefit, as well as placing him in the position of "patron" over all his 
officers. Nevertheless, the War Office stated it would nominate the three captain 
company commanders, who were each to raise a company (in addition to Grose's 
company). The officers chosen were Lieutenants Nepean, Paterson and Hill, whose 
rank was shown as captain by January 1790.' 
Meanwhile, at London's request, an additional company was enlisted from 
marines already serving in New South Wales. In Phillip's opinion, the men who 
volunteered for this service were 'soldiers who had distinguished themselves by 
" HRNSW, I, PI.2, p.249. Sir G Yonge of War Office to Grose of June 1789. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.492, for 'an assignment to be made ... [to] Maj. Fs. Grose for cloth'g' for 
an additional two companies: HRNSW, 2, p.206, for 'allowance [to Grose] equal to twenty months 
of reckonings' for additional companies: HRNSW, 2, p.43, for monies allocated for pay 'including 
levy money, the allowance for clothing and accoutrements and contingencies'. 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.250. Apparently, based on Grose's request to nominate the 'subaltern 
officers' as well as captains, he misunderstood the approval he had already received (quotation in 
paragraph above) 'to name the lieutenant and ensign of your respective companies' - that is 
presumably to name the subaltern officers in all companies. The wording 'your respective 
companies' could be open to a slight doubt, whether respective captain company commanders, 
rather than Grose were authorised to name the subalterns in each company. But, normal chain of 
command would suggest the interpretation that this was Grose's prerogative. 
" AJCP, reel 1073, WO 17/241, Monthly Returns New South Wales Corps 1790-1809, (no p. 
numbers), return of 1 January 1790. Captains were promoted, without purchase, once their 
companies were approved by inspection of an appointed senior officer. There are no known records 
of monthly returns during July-December 1789. 
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their good conduct for more than four years'. He nominated Captain-Lieutenant 
George Johnston as their company commander, and wrote that the marines enlisted 
'on condition of their serving with the officer [Johnston] under whose command 
they had been left when the rest of the detachment was embarked for England'.' 
Phillip clearly felt confident in Johnston's leadership qualities. The War Office 
later confirmed his appointment to the rank of captain in the Corps.' 
Initially, the New South Wales Corps suffered from several limiting factors 
which thereafter impacted upon the morale and discipline of the unit. As it was not 
raised by reforming an existing skeleton battalion, the Corps lacked a parental 
sponsoring regimental headquarters. Additionally, MH Ellis notes 'the Corps wore 
the silver lace of the militia and colonial regiments'.' This want of a line 
regiment's distinguishing marks, may have caused a feeling amongst the Corps' 
newly recruited soldiers that they lacked those regimental traditions which helped 
bond regular units and accentuated esprit de corps. More importantly, without .a 
parental regimental headquarters, there was no nucleus, or cadre, of trained soldiers, 
especially non commissioned officers - the backbone of the British Army - on 
which to build. The Corps was financially accountable to the Secretary-at-War, a 
political appointee, but operationally to the office of the Commander-in-Chief, an 
" HRA, 1, 1, pp.392-393. Phillip to Dundas of October 1792. Numbers enlisted were: three 
sergeants, three corporals, two drummers (soldiers' sons), forty-six privates (including four time 
expired convicts). M Gillen, The Founders of Australia A Biographical Dictionary of the First 
Fleet, Sydney, 1989, Appendix 7, pp.443-444, for ultimately seventy marines and three sons of 
marines, plus eleven First Fleet convicts (all listed by name) enlisted in the Corps. 
" HRA, 1, 1, pp.445-446. Yonge to Grose of July 1793. At this time, and for many years, 
there was a distinction between rank an officer held in his regiment, as opposed to any superior 
rank he may hold "in the army". Irrespective of the higher "army" rank, when an officer served in 
his regiment, he reverted to his regimental rank and seniority. Johnston's seniority as a captain in 
the Corps was dated from 25 September 1792 (HRNSW, 2, p.56). HRNSW, 3, p.526, for 
regimental seniority of all Corps' officers as at December 1798. 
" MH Ellis, 'British Military Regiments in Australia', JRAHS, Vol.37, Pt.6, 1951, p.313. 
Ellis' statement can not be confirmed by this writer, who is concerned that in three specialist 
books on uniforms, silver lace was reportedly worn by some British line regiments. Possibly the 
militia and colonial troops did not have a thin stripe or 'worm' of the regiment's colour interwoven 
into the white lace material of buttonholes etc. In 1815, when the Corps had become the 102nd 
regiment, the colours of its officers' uniform facings were 'deep yellow' whilst their lace, like 
many other line regiments, was 'silver': refer:- R&H Knotel, & H Sieg, Uniforms of the World, A 
Compendium of Army, Navy, and Air Force Uniforms 1700-1937, translator RG Ball, New York, 
1980, p.258. This does not resolve the question of 'militia' lace. 
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appointment not filled at that time. Therefore, it was not subjected to a critical and 
continuous scrutiny by either a designated regimental or superior headquarters.' 
Apart from an occasional inspection by a senior officer, the future of the unit lay in 
the hands of Grose and his officers. The lack of any dynamic leadership by Grose 
(considered later) coupled with virtually no supervision by any higher headquarters, 
encouraged an excessive spirit of independence in the officers, which was to be 
manifested in the colony by their engaging in trade, an illegal activity for them. As 
early as December 1789, the limitations of Grose and the licence taken by his 
officers was demonstrated by a rebuke to Grose from the War Office:- 
I have received a letter ... signed by all the officers of the corps under your 
command, the impropriety of which ... I am surprized you were not 
yourself immediately struck with. The commanding officer is ... 
responsible for the contents of every such representation ... [Their letter 
was] subversive of the first principles of discipline and subordination ... 
Upon the representation itself I shall only observe that it has been made 
without the smallest foundation' 
As it is unlikely that Grose was unaware of a matter of such common interest 
amongst his officers, he may well have been conniving with them in this attempt to 
get extra benefits. If so, this would represent a serious weakness in Grose as a 
commander. 
Finally, the New South Wales Corps suffered a specific affliction. There 
was neither pride nor glory attached to the begrudged military duty of guarding 
convicts.' As opposed to the Corps' officers, with privileged status in the colony, 
the underprivileged soldiers, who enlisted 'for life' (usually twenty or twenty one 
years), had only the unhappy prospect of guarding convicts in an inhospitable and 
27 C Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, A Military, Political and Social Survey, 
Hannondsworth, Pelican 1974, p.226. After the Treaty of Versailles in 1783, 'No Commander-in-
Chief was appointed and the Secretaries-at-War were political hacks. For want of recruits the 
regiments became skeletons.' 
" Until the introduction of a divisional organisation in the Peninsula War theatre, within the 
British Army's command structure there were no intermediate headquarters between that of the 
regiments and the commander-in-chief in London. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.432. Yonge to Grose. Apparently concerning a hoped for 'additional pay or 
gratuity'. 
" M Austin, The Army in Australia 1840-1850 Prelude to the Golden Years, Canberra, 1979, 
p.23. Brigadier Austin wrote 'Convict duty had never been popular, and was not considered a 
soldierly duty from the time of Major Ross and his marines ... onwards.' 
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distant continent" This was for an indefinite period, for unlike the marines, these 
men were not offered the prospect of being relieved by fresh troops after three 
years. Enlistment handicaps in the New South Wales Corps were also exacerbated 
by recruiting problems experienced by all regiments at that time. The late 
eighteenth century British Army was held in almost universal contempt by the 
civilian population, as the appalling service conditions under which soldiers existed 
were well known.' A soldier writing of recruits to the West Norfolk Regiment in 
1789, recorded:- 
We had several recruits from Norfolk ... and many of them deserted from 
sheer hunger. They were lads from the plough-tail. All of them tall ... I 
remember two of them that went into decline and died during the year, 
though when they joined us, they were fine healthy young men. 
I have seen them lay in their berths, many and many a time, actually crying 
on account of hunger. The whole week's food was not a bit too much for 
one day." 
This account was written in the same year in which the New South Wales Corps 
was raised. 
The time allocated by the War Office for Grose to raise his corps was 
limited. In the War Office letter of 8 June 1789, in which Grose was officially 
informed of his appointment, he was also instructed 'that the corps shall be 
instantly raised and approved, after being reviewed by the 1st of October next?' 
Despite Grose having had previous experience as a recruiting officer, he would have 
faced a daunting task in meeting this deadline. Up to the end of June, he was still 
waiting to complete his establishment of officers. For example, the 22nd Regiment 
was advised by War Office letter, as late as 24 June, that Ensign Fenwick [spelt 
Tenwicke' elsewhere] was appointed a lieutenant in the Corps and that the 22nd 
was to 'permit' him to 'quit the 22d Regiment in order to assist ... in Recruiting the 
n Manual of Military Law (MML), London, 1914, p.159, para.44. Until 1847, enlistments were 
generally 'for life' for peacetime soldiering. 
" C Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp.213-214, 226-227 and 236-238: for peacetime 
inefficiencies. 
" Cobbett, 'Diversions of a recruit, 1789', Rank And File, The Common Soldier at Peace and 
War 1642-1914, TH McGuffie compiler, London, 1964, p.9. Quotation from Cobbett's The 
Progress of a Ploughboy to a Seat in Parliament. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.250. Although the officers' pay was reckoned to commence from the date 
of the 'Beating Order' (to raise their respective companies), commencement of their pay hinged on 
this October inspection (p.249). 
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said Corps'." The vital senior non commissioned officers - the sergeants - also 
had to be posted to the unit or recruited by reengaging ex-servicemen. Under 
supervision of their company commanders, these key personnel had to be formed 
into recruiting teams to 'beat' in towns and villages. These teams usually consisted 
of 'an officer, two sergeants and a drummer ... [who] beat "the points of war" (his 
full repertoire of flants and paradiddles, with some fancy stick-clicking •.. 
Despite difficulties, the raising of the four companies proceeded quickly and 
between 7 July and 9 August 1789 the War Office was able to direct that particular 
companies be individually inspected to establish that the men were of a standard 
acceptable to the army.' In meeting such a tight schedule, Grose's recruits 
inevitably included civil and military felons, who exchanged jail for service in New 
South Wales." Sordid socio-economic conditions probably provided the main 
incentive for potential recruits as summarised by T McAskill in her research of 
prior occupations of New South Wales Corps recruits:- 
By and large, they were ordinary working men of late eighteenth century 
Britain. In the harsh social and economic conditions of the time, some 
resorted to crime as a way of escaping their dilemma; others enlisted in the 
armed forces.' 
3 5 WO 4/845, p.6. 
MH Ellis, 'New South Wales Corps', The Australian Encyclopaedia, Vol.VI, ed.-in-chief AH 
Chisholm, Sydney, 1958, p.294. Noted 'The rank and file included veteran non-commissioned 
officers who had served in the American wars.' No primary source material has been located to 
confirm this reference. 
R Holmes, Redcoat The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, Hammersmith, 2001, 
pp.139-140. 
" WO 4/845, p.10, pp.11-12, p.12, and p.14 respectively for:- War Office letters to Colonel 
Johnson, Chatham Barracks, directing him to inspect companies raised by the following officers; 
Major Grose - letter dated 7 July, Lieutenant Nepean - dated 17 July, Lieutenant Paterson - dated 
31 July and Lieutenant Hill - dated 9 August 1789. The financial approval for receipt of the three 
guinea recruiting levy by these officers is indicated by inclusion in all instructions to Johnson that 
his inspection was 'in order to secure him [the company commander designate] from future loss'. 
39 For civil felons: R Holmes, Redcoat, p.138. This was not an exceptional situation in the 
British Army at that time, ' volunteers...[served] the monarch in a military rather than a penal 
capacity ... insolvent debtors and convicted criminals were frequently allowed to enlist.' For 
military felons: refer below p.119 and footnote 99, p.120 and footnote 101 and figure 13. 
" T McAskill, 'An Asset to the Colony: The social and economic contribution of Corpsmen to 
early New South Wales', JRAHS, Vol.82, Pt. 1, June 1996, pp.55-56. McAskill's continual use 
of the non British or Australian Army word 'corpsmen', rather than using accepted words such as 
'soldiers', 'troops' or 'other ranks', is deplored in this detailed military study, and spoils an 
otherwise carefully researched article. 
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Not unexpectedly, inspections of the formed companies revealed deficiencies 
in the acceptability of recruits. For example, in Lieutenant Nepean's company, 
William Chappell 'who is undersized & over aged' together with five men unfit for 
service were ordered to be discharged. Nepean was instructed that 'They Must be 
replaced as well as the two who deserted previous to the Inspection'!" 
Nevertheless, Grose satisfied His Majesty's 'expectations' that the unit would be 
'approved, after being reviewed by 1st of October'.' On instructions of the War 
Office, a major general carried out this inspection and classified the Corps fit 'for 
active, & immediate Service'.' Despite this, the standards of training and discipline 
would not have been good, considering the short time between the soldiers' 
recruitment and being declared fit for active service. 
The first muster roll of 'his Majesty's New South Wales Corps of Foot' 
covering the period 5 June to 24 December 1789, is summarised (excluding officers 
and staff) as a table (Figure 12). 44 This shows significant wastage rates after 
enlistment. Of 383 other ranks named as having enlisted', only 71 percent were 
effective as at 24 December. The greatest single wastage was 16.71 percent caused 
by desertion. Most of these desertions, totalling forty-eight men (43.24 percent of 
all wastage) were recorded on an 'Intermediate' list of non-effective soldiers as at 
24 December 1789, who only served for an 'intermediate time during the muster 
[period] as set down'.' 
" WO 4/845, p.13. The order to replace these eight men, out of a total of sixty-nine drummers 
and privates (see Figure 11, 1789 Establishment Table), was equivalent, in this company, to a 
11.59 per cent wastage rate after enlistment. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.250. 
43 WO 4/845, p.15. War Office instruction to Major General Jossyn (? - partly illegible) of 22 
September 1789. He was to inspect the New South Wales Corps to assess their fitness 'for 
active, & immediate Service, as well as of the progress they appear to have made in learning their 
exercises.' Also Jossyn was `to distinguish the Respective Numbers of Highlanders, Lowlanders, 
Irish, & English Recruits'. This information is not on record. See below, Chapter 9, p.210, 
footnote 6, for similar detail covering the period 1808-1810. 
" HRNSW, 2, pp.433-436. The 'h' in 'his' is in lower case. 
" Actually 387 are listed, but this number includes four privates, on the Intermediate List, who 
were promoted corporal between 8 September and 4 October 1789, but are still listed amongst the 
privates. 
46 HRNSW, 2, p.436. Phrase extracted from an authenticating certificate appended to the muster. 
, 
Statistical Summary of Rank and File 
Rank 	Totals, 	Discharged 	Died before 	Transferred 	Deserted 	Effectives 
Listed Embarkation 	other regts. 
Sergeant 17 	- 	- 	- 	- 	17 
Corporal 17* 	- 	- - 	1 	16* 
Drummer 7 	- - 	 - - 	 7 
Private 254 	6 	2 	- 	15 	231 
Total 295 	6 	2 	- 	16 	271 
'Intermediate' 88 (92*) 	22 	1 	16*** 	48 	1** (4*) 
List 
Final 383 (387*) 	28 	3 	16 	64 	272 
Total 
Percentage 99.99 	7.31 	.78 	4.18 	16.71 	71.01 
* Four corporals promoted, and shown under that rank, but whose names are duplicated on 
'Intermediate' list as private soldiers. 
** One soldier who was promoted to corporal on 7th November 1789, and whose name was not 
incorpoated in the listing of corporals. 
*** Probably fraudulent enlistees from other units, returned to their original units. 
Figure 12: New South Wales Corps Muster 5 June-24 December 1789 
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In addition to the 272 effective other ranks in Figure 12, there were eighteen 
officers and staff, indicated as effective,' making a total of 290 all ranks. However, 
amongst supporting documents verifying the muster, was a Proof Table, showing 
305 all ranks effective as at 24 December. Confusingly, another supporting 
statement for the muster, lists a total of 291 all ranks.' In comparison, the Corps' 
'Monthly [Strength] Return', as at 1 January 1790 - only a week later than the 
muster - gives the strength as 305 all ranks.' While this exactly agrees with the 
total in the Proof Table, the break up of numbers according to rank is not 
consistent, and therefore considered coincidental. Statham, analysing the 1 January 
1790 Monthly Return (which she incorrectly calls the 'Muster Roll 24/12/89'), 
derives yet another set of figures. She wrote that 376 all ranks were 'sworn in' and 
then deducting eighty-eight lost through desertions, death, etc., she arrives at an 
effective strength of 288 all ranks.' This is only two fewer than the combined total 
of Figure 12 (272) plus the 18 officers and staff. The variety of results obtained, in 
endeavouring to establish the number of effectives in the Corps at one particular 
time, illustrates the difficulty in obtaining an accurate picture of its strength, 
including any detachments, during its service in England and New South Wales. 
Without a broad comparison of desertion rates from other infantry units 
which had also received posting orders for New South Wales, it is hard to draw 
reasonable conclusions regarding the apparently high desertion rate of the Corps. 
As a sample of comparative rates under similar economic conditions, the Corps, 
recruited in a bleak economic period six years after the American War, may be 
" HRNSW, 2, p.433 and footnote. Actually twenty-two officers and staff (chaplain, adjutant 
etc.) are listed, but by 24 December 1789, the following officers had left the Corps:- Fenwick, 
Martin, Kirby and Catterell. Bloxam, although he never joined the Corps, is included as an 
effective as he was not 'Superseded, [until] 19th January 1789' (an error in HRNSW, should have 
read 1790). 
" HRNSW, 2, p.437 for 'Proof Table' (italics as per HRNSW). 
" HRNSW, 2, p.436 (first paragraph). 
5° WO 1 7/241, first two folios. 
" P Statham, 'Ins and Outs', p.4 for 376 'sworn in' (presumably she is including officers who 
are "appointed" to a unit, not "sworn in") less the eighty-eight, making a final total of 288 
effective as at 24 December 1789. As her reference for these calculations she quotes WO 17/241, 
which does not produce statistics in accordance with her statement on p.4. Probably she also 
worked directly from the muster. 
110 
usefully compared to the 17th Regiment, which departed for Australia in an equally 
depressed climate, fourteen years after the next major series of wars, the Napoleonic 
Wars. In 1829, the 17th Regiment suffered twenty-two desertions during the three 
months after the regiment received orders for duty in New South Wales, compared 
to four desertions in the previous quarter.' This regiment's record shows a strong 
disinclination by soldiers to serve in the colony. Indeed, the regiment's newly 
appointed Commanding Officer transferred to half pay within days of the the order 
being received, apparently to avoid service in New South Wales. 
As opposed to the 17th Regiment, the New South Wales Corps was enlisted 
specifically for service in that colony and therefore the "remote convict guard 
distaste" factor should have been less important. Nevertheless, even before the first 
soldiers in the Corps sailed for New South Wales, an additional sixteen men, 
including a corporal, had deserted, over and above the forty-eight desertions 
recorded on the 'Intermediate' listing. Reasons why these forty-eight volunteers 
deserted would have been diverse. But amongst deserters were probably drunkard 
enlistees and others who quickly regretted their actions, freedom seeking prisoners 
released from civil or military jails to enlist, and professionals who joined to receive 
their bonus then disappeared - a common occurrence. Against these reasons, it is 
argued that disillusionment with army life, and the realisation of an indefinite 
continuation of guard duties in far away New South Wales, would have been a 
strong motivating factor for the final sixteen desertions. This was not a happy start 
for the hastily recruited unit. 
Grose summed up the problem of the desertion rate in a letter to Under 
JF McMahon, 'The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's 
Land with Particular Reference to the Black Line', Hobart, unpublished MHum Thesis, University 
of Tasmania, 1995, p.8. Based on a study of AJCP, reel 3749, WO 12, Muster Book and Pay 
Returns, 17th Regiment, 25 June-24 September 1829. 
" C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 1969, p.126. The first convict transport 
guard detachments were required for the Second Fleet (Surprize, Neptune and Scarborough) 
reportedly embarked in December 1789, and sailed on 19 January 1790. Bateson is apparently 
wrong in his December 1789 embarkation date. A War Office letter of 13 November 1789 stated 
that three detachments had already embarked and required 'a proper supply of ammunition for this 
service' (WO 4/845, p.20). Therefore, by late November, probably some convicts were embarked. 
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Secretary Nepean, stating 'should any further desertion take place previous to their 
departure (than which nothing is more likely) I don't know how we shall manage.' 
He had cause for concern, as a detailed enclosure to his letter, showed only 162 all 
ranks available in barracks, after 115 sailed in the three vessels of the Second Fleet 
and twenty-four (not including Grose) were embarked on HMS Gorgon.' The 162 
had to meet guard commitments, scheduled in 1791, for nine transports, now known 
as the "Third Fleet'''. This was a major involvement compared to the Second 
Fleet, of only three transports. While Grose was concerned over a lack of soldiers, 
from the evidence, he had no problems in attracting officers to the New South 
Wales Corps. 
Prime Minister Pitt's post-war economies, created unemployed officers as 
well as destitute ex-soldiers. Many were placed on the half pay list, or expected to 
be. Grose was 'on the Half Pay of the late 96th Regiment'?" Likewise, young 
Ensign John MacArthur was on half pay from 1783 to 1788," until he was 
appointed to the 68th Regiment. Half pay rates were a pittance, particularly for 
" HRNSW, 1, Pi.2 , p.432. Grose to Nepean of January 1791. In the enclosure, Grose is shown 
as 'On board the Gorgon', in fact he sailed in July 1791, on Pitt, which followed the Third Fleet 
(footnote, p.285). No doubt there were other minor irregularities in the figures, nevertheless, they 
indicate the extent of Grose's manpower problem. 
" C. Bateson, Convict Ships, p.132. These were: Matilda, Atlantic, Salamander, William and 
Ann, Active, Albermarle, Britannia and Admiral Barrington, all out of Portsmouth or Plymouth, 
sailing on 27 March 1791, and Queen, from Cork, in April 1791, carrying the first batch of Irish 
convicts to the colony. All ships carried military guards. 
56 R Holmes, Redcoat, p.105. Apart from the 106th Regiment being transferred to the Irish 
Establishment at a significantly reduced (cost saving) establishment, twelve infantry regiments 
were disbanded in 1783, with another ten the following year. 
" WO 4/845, p.3. For Grose this appointment must have been financially advantageous. In 
addition to being back on full pay and receiving the recruiting levy and perquisites of a 
commanding officer, in this new corps, he had a fair likelihood (as happened) of being promoted 
lieutenant colonel without purchase. This represented a considerable financial saving of at least 
£1300 in attaining that rank (see below, p.113 and footnote 63). 
" A Atkinson, 'A New John Macarthur', The Push From The Bush, No. 17, April 1984, pp.44- 
45. Aged sixteen, Macarthur was commissioned in 1782 and placed on half-pay in 1783. He 
returned to duty in 1788 and in 1789 was appointed to the New South Wales Corps as a lieutenant. 
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junior officers. Writing of naval and marine officers (the army would have been 
no different) ES Turner stated:- 
many half-pay officers found their energies absorbed by the struggle to live. 
Quite a number (Nelson included) went to live on the Continent, in the 
belief, not always justified, that they would be able to cut their expenses.' 
Amongst serving officers, insecurity and the prospect of future retrenchment, was 
an obvious motivation to volunteer for what was a secure long term appointment in 
the New South Wales Corps. In addition, the War Office offered special 
inducements to encourage officers to apply. 
For junior ranked officers, there was a strong financial incentive to join the 
new corps. If accepted, they would be gazetted in the New South Wales Corps with 
a step up in rank, without the usual need to 'purchase' the promotion. For example, 
Ensign MacArthur was promoted to lieutenant on posting to the Corps. This type 
of promotion offered a considerable financial gain, without any monetary layout, as 
exampled by the purchase rate for an ensign, the lowest officer rank in British 
infantry. In 1698, almost a hundred years before the Corps was raised, `400 
would buy an ensigncy' in the 1st Foot Guards.' By 1821, 'In pursuance of the 
commands of his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief', the same rank was 
officially revalued for purchase at £1200, whilst the minimum price for an ensigncy 
in the less prestigious line regiments was £453. 62 However, in 1793, £450 was the 
cost of purchasing a first appointment as an ensign, with the prices paid to the War 
Office 'by officers of infantry on promotion were as follows; to lieutenant, £250; 
" J Paget, The Story Of The Guards, London, reprinted 1988, p.134. An ensign's pay up to the 
Crimea War (1853-1856) `was only four shillings and six pence' per day. Presumably an ensign's 
half pay was therefore 2s.3d. (two shillings and three pence). However, this pay example is at the 
increased rate introduced 'In the 1790's [when] a soldier's gross pay was raised from the ac1 a day 
first established under the Commonwealth to is.' (C Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p.241). W 
Foster, `Francis Grose', p.192; records that a lieutenant in the Corps received `three and sixpence a 
day', therefore half pay in that rank, up to the 1790's, would have been been ls.9d., with an ensign 
receiving less. As a comparison, in the early nineteenth century, a baker, a lower grade of civilian 
tradesman, received `at best ten shillings per week', about ls.5d. per day (T McAskill, `An asset 
to the Colony', p.44). 
" ES Turner, Gallant Gentlemen, p.91. 
C Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p.137. 
" English Historical Documents, 1783-1832, eds. A Aspinall and EA Smith , London, 1971, 
p.863. While this was the official rate, normally the actual price negotiated between buyers and 
sellers was considerably higher. 
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captain, 0100; major, 1200; lieut-colonel, 0300'. Not many newly 
commissioned officers were as lucky as Captain Steel, the youngest captain ever to 
join the New South Wales Corps. Apparently due to patronage, he was under the 
age of ten when he was first appointed an ensign in the 55th Regiment, and was still 
under ten when promoted lieutenant three months later.' However, during the 
Napoleonic War, P Chapman notes that:- 
Although first commissions in the army were still purchasable, most 
commissions [as ensign]were not so obtained, since they were open to any 
man over sixteen years of age and able to produce 'a written 
recommendation from a field officer that he was a gentleman fully qualified 
to hold an ensigncy', a qualification which seems to have meant little more 
than basic literacy' 
Finally, on retirement, an officer received 'a lump sum equivalent to the value of his 
commission, so that he got back the sums which he had expended. This was termed 
Retirement by Sale of Commissions, but the regulations varied from time to time'.' 
The War Office stated that for the New South Wales Corps 'lieutenants are 
to be selected from the rank of ensigns'. Also, for a young man, hoping for an 
appointed as ensign in the Corps, this was purchase-free to those over the age of 
sixteen, who were recommended by Grose for first appointment in that rank. At the 
time, this age restriction did not apply in other regiments. Further, if the Corps 
'should be reduced ... officers will be entitled to half-pay' at their higher rank.' 
Therefore, at a time when the worst 'of eighteenth-century [British] military abuses 
flourished'," the New South Wales Corps beckoned to officers as a business 
opportunity, with a bonus of enhanced social status on promotion, or alternatively, a 
return to the active list. The general ethos of the British Army's officer corps, at 
" The Life of A Regimental Officer During the Great War 1793-1815, from correspondence of 
Colonel Samuel Rice, C.B., K.H. 51st Light Regiment and from other sources, compiled by 
Lieutenant Colonel AF Mockley-Ferryman, Edinburgh, 1913, pp.15-16. 
" WA Steel, 'Captain Henry Steel Pt. 1', p.37. The article suggests that it was patronage that 
gained Steel these early promotions in 1795. 
" The Diaries and Letters of G.T.W.B. Boyes, Volume 1 1820-1832, ed. P Chapman, Melbourne, 
1985, p.40. The term' field officer' had, and still applies to officers of the rank of a major or above 
until they become 'general officers'. 
66 The Life of A Regimental Officer, p.16. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.249. Yonge to Grose of June 1789. 
68 C Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p.226. 
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that time, is summed up by Turner:- 
All too often the commission was not sought as a means of entry into an 
honourable profession, but as a gambling counter which could be 
exchanged for a more valuable one. By going on half pay at the right 
moment and exchanging into other regiments, a man could work his way up 
to field rank without ever being faced by the tiresome necessity of 
commanding troops. If unlucky enough to be called for active service, he 
could sell out and, like a stock market gambler, make a tidy profit on a 
commodity he had never seen and never wanted.' 
An expectation of private profit probably motivated some officers to join the 
New South Wales Corps, with hopes centred on obtaining land grants, or 
supplementary civil appointments (with added pay) in the colony. There was also 
the knowledge that being far removed from the supervision of the Horse Guards in 
London, a more laissez faire attitude could be adopted once they were established in 
the colony. Officers of the New South Wales Corps were probably aware of 
Phillip's dispatch of 16 May 1788,7° which questioned whether land would be 
granted to officers in the colony, and of the 'hardship' felt by these officers for 
whom no such approval had been given.' While the New South Wales Corps was 
being raised, London's approval, of 22 August 1789, to make land grants to marine 
other ranks and also to 'persons ... disposed to become settlers'', would have been 
common knowledge in the Corps, and encouraged officers to believe that they, like 
the other ranks, would later receive such an approval. This hope for profit is 
indicated by a letter written by twenty one year old Elizabeth, wife of Lieutenant 
Macarthur, prior to sailing from England. She wrote of 'my husband's exchange 
into a corps destined for New South Wales, from which we have every reasonable 
expectation of reaping the most material advantages.' In commenting on John 
Macarthur's motives, Atkinson notes 'there is no evidence of military ambition. He 
69 ES Turner, Gallant Gentlemen, p.117. 
7° Acknowledged by the Home Secretary on 19 June 1789 (HIM, 1, 1, p.34). That month, Grose 
received his orders to raise the New South Wales Corps. Presumably in the period July-December 
1789, the thrust of Phillip's dispatch would have become common knowledge as a result of 
enquiries by interested Corps officers. 
71 HRA, 1, 1, p.35. For historical background of land grants to officers, Commentary Notes 29, 
pp.721-722, and Note 176, pp.758-759. 
" HIM, 1, 1, p.124. Grenville to Phillip. 
" Some Early Records of the Macarthurs of Camden, ed. S MacArthur Onslow, Sydney, 1914, 
p.2. Letter to her mother, of 8 October 1789. 
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and his wife were willing to try their fortunes abroad'.' Other officers would have 
held similar aspirations. 
Although the officers were ordered not to 'dispose [sell] of their present 
commissions' before transferring from their old regiments to the New South Wales 
Corps, 'they will be considered as purchasers [at the higher rank] in the new 
corps!' This meant that on being promoted without purchase in the Corps, an 
officer's higher rank immediately became a saleable commodity. For example, 
eight days after Ensign Fenwicke, from the 22nd Regiment was gazetted a lieutenant 
in the Corps, his exchange (privately negotiated sale of a full time appointment, 
officially endorsed by Whitehall) was notified in the London Gazette of 24 October 
1789, which read 'Lieutenant Edward Abbott, from half-pay of 73rd regiment, to be 
lieutenant vice Michael Stovin Fenwicke who exchanges [into the 73rd].'' A 
second exchange advised in the same Gazette, also involved a former ensign in the 
22nd Regiment, Lieutenant George Richard Marton [Martin], selling out to 
'Lieutenant John Townson, from half-pay of the 50th regiment'. 77 Martin 
transferred to the 50th on half pay in the rank of lieutenant.' Apparently Fenwicke 
and Martin, whilst still ensigns in the 22nd, had (possibly together) planned their 
small financial windfall. 
Initially, all officers, except Grose (with an honourable war record and his 
recruiting skills) were serving on full time duty prior to their appointments to the 
Corps. With Pitt's stringent peacetime economy, it is assumed that because these 
officers were actively serving, they were of reasonable quality as judged by the 
standards of the day. It was only after Fenwicke and Martin sold out, that half pay 
" A Atkinson, 'John MacArthur', p.45. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pi.2, p.249. 
" I Lee, The Coming Of The British To Australia 1788 to 1829, London, 1906, p.243, quoting 
the London Gazette of 24 October 1789. HRNSW,2, footnote, p.433 for Fenwick exchanging into 
the 73rd. 
77 I Lee, The Coming Of The British, p.243. 'Martin' incorrectly transcribed as 'Marton' from 
the Gazette. The Muster-roll of the Corps from 5 June-24 December 1789 (HRNSW, 2, p. 433) 
lists Lieutenant 'George Richard Martin' with a footnote: 'Transferred to the 50th Regiment, and 
placed on half-pay, 23rd October, 1789.' 
78 HRNSW, 2, footnote, p.433. 
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officers started to join the Corps. The officers, initially gazetted, after Major 
General Jossyn's inspection, were :- 
'Major Frances Grose from half-pay of the late 96th regiment, to be major 
commanding. 
First Lieutenant Nicholas Nepean, from the Marines, to be captain of a 
company. 
Lieutenant William Hill, from the 6th regiment of Foot, to be captain of a 
company. 
Lieutenant William Patterson, from the 73rd regiment, to be captain of a 
company. 
Ensign John Macarthur, from the 68th regiment, to be lieutenant. 
Ensign Michael Stovin Fenwicke, from the 22nd regiment, to be lieutenant. 
Ensign Joseph Foveaux, from the 60th regiment, to be lieutenant 
Ensign George Richard Marton, from the 22nd regiment, to be lieutenant. 
Quartermaster William Duberly to be ensign. 
John Thomas Prentice, gentleman, to be ensign. 
Francis Kirby, gentleman, to be ensign. 
C de Catterel, gentleman, to be ensign. 
John Bain, clerk, to be chaplain. 
Thomas Rowley, gentleman, to be adjutant. 
William Duberly, gentleman, to be quartermaster. 
Surgeon's mate James Macauley, from 33rd regiment, to be surgeon!' 
That the New South Wales Corps officers were prepared to volunteer for 
'service of not the most eligible kind'', indicates some uniformity of motive in 
applying for an unpopular unit. It is surmised that most, or all, of these officers did 
not have finances available to purchase a higher rank in their own, or another 
respected regiment, stationed in Britain. Therefore, to gain promotion, these less 
affluent members of the British officer class had to volunteer to serve abroad. 
Probably the same could be said of the some of the "gentlemen" who grasped the 
chance to become ensigns without purchase. However, the selection of the seven 
ensigns initially commissioned into the Corps appears unfortunate. By January 
1790, Kirby had sold out, De Catterell had 'Retired' and Bloxham was 
" I Lee, The Coming Of The British, p.242. Quoting London Gazette of about 16 October 1789. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.124. Comment by Yonge of February 1794. While this was written in relation 
to the soldiers, a similar opinion would apply to the officers' service. 
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`Superseded'.81 Nevertheless, the financial status of the first officers appointed to 
the Corps (except the two lieutenants who sold out and three young ensigns) does 
not mean that they were not of an equivalent standard to that of other officers in line 
regiments. In the climate of the times, probably Kirby, like Fenwick and Martin, 
sold out to obtain a small, but long term pension, with no expense or effort. 
History has painted a very ambivalent portrait of the New South Wales 
Corps. From its earliest days in colonial service it suffered from adverse 
comments. For example, Governor Hunter, in a dispatch of August 1796, was blunt 
in his condemnation. He wrote:- 
Soldiers from the Savoy [London's notorious military prison' ], and other 
characters who have been considered as disgraceful to every other regiment 
in his Majesty's service, have been thought fit and proper recruits for the 
New South Wales Corps ... to which the dregs and refuse of our native 
country are directed by its laws to be sent as a punishment" 
After the Corps had been re-designated the 102nd Regiment in December 1808, its 
second Commanding Officer was Lieutenant Colonel (later General) Charles 
Napier. He replaced Lieutenant Colonel George Johnston, when Johnston went on 
trial for usurping power from Governor Bligh in 1808. In Steel's opinion Napier 
was 'chagrined' about this appointment, and wrote 'I have been appointed to the 
command of the 102nd, a colonial corps recently returned from Botany Bay, with 
the stigma of mutiny upon it.' In HV Evatt's opinion 'without a doubt, the 
character and standing of both officers and men was distinctly inferior to that of 
regiments engaged elsewhere in the King's service.' More recently, KS Inglis 
" HRNSW, 2, footnote, p.433. R Holmes, Redcoat, p.113. Referring to the two "honorary" 
gentlemen (Rowley and Duberley), adjutants were often ex-sergeant majors, experienced in drilling 
troops as opposed to young officers, and quartermasters were 'always' ex-rankers. Eventually, 
quartermasters were granted the formal rank of "lieutenant and quartermaster". 
" C Barnett, Britain and Her Army, p.244. The British Army's regular infantry consisted of the 
Guards and numbered Line Regiments, the Rifle Brigade was not established until 1816 from 
previously numbered regiments. 
" TG Parsons, 'Courts Martial, The Savoy Military Prison and the New South Wales Corps', 
JRAHS, Vol.63, Pt.4, March 1978, p.257. For description of Savoy - including 'a small square 
of about forty feet ... Cold and damp in winter and stifling in summer it often housed over 100 
men, most of whom contracted gaol fever'. 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.574. To Portland. 
" WA Steel, 'Captain Henry Steel Pt.2', p.74. 
" HV Evatt, Rum Rebellion A Study of the Overthrow of Governor Bligh by John Macarthur 
and the New South Wales Corps, Sydney, 1939, p.26. 
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supported this assessment, stating:- 
Both officers and men were below the average of the British army in 
character and competence; for new regiments such as this one always had 
difficulty in attracting good officers, and service in the colonies was 
regarded as the lowest form of military employment. The ranks of the corps 
included men who had joined in order to get out of military prison' 
Even in the colony, some, including a corporal and three soldiers still 
(unsuccessfully) tried to escape by planning to steal a boat, with the intention of 
reaching Java. The most denigratory description of the Corps comes from the 
standard historian of the British Army, Sir JW Fortescue, who refers to the unit as 
the 'petty police-corps at New South Wales'.' Finally, AGL Shaw wrote:- 
the Corps' rank and file always were an unsavoury lot; there was no real 
decline in their moral standards during their term in the Colony, and they 
merited almost any unsavoury soubriquet they received. 9° 
From contemporary times onwards, there has been a consistent condemnation of the 
"Rum Corps". Nevertheless, there are other opinions which deserve consideration. 
Despite these various criticisms, Shaw does qualify his views by perceptively 
noting the effect of war on that unit, writing 'the Corps probably degenerated as 
time went on, especially after the outbreak of war with France in 1793'. Shaw 
quotes MH Ellis, that recruits in 1795-1796 were 'of a class reckoned 
unmanageable even in the Savoy Military Prison'. 91 Figure 13 from A Military 
History of Australia, shows the annual number of ex-Savoy soldiers in the Corps.' 
By 1794, an increase in this group is noticeable, peaking in 1799, thus bearing out 
Shaw's contention that as a result of war with France, the standard of men was 
lowered. 
" KS Inglis, The Australian Colonists An exploration of social history 1788-1870, Carlton, 
1974, p.181. 
" D Collins, An Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, 
pp.189-191. Up to eight soldiers were implicated (p.190). 
" JW Fortescue, A History of The British Army, 1789-1801, Vol.4, Pt. 1, London, 1906, p.528. 
" AGL Shaw, 'The New South Wales Corps', JRAHS, Vol.47, Pt.2, June, 1961, p.129. 
9 ' AGL Shaw, '1788-1810', A New History of Australia, ed. F Crowley, Port Melbourne, 
reprinted 1990, p.13. 
" J Grey, A Military History of Australia, Cambridge, 1999, p.8. Adapted by Grey from P 
Statham, 'Ins and Outs', Table VII, p.13, and further edited for this thesis. 
Year Corps strength 
in N.S.W. 
No. of 
ex-convicts 
No. of 
ex-savoy 
1790 - - - 
1791 192 5 - 
1792 358 5 4 
1794 496 41 21 
1795 516 58 25 
1796 522 54 24 
1797 535 59 25 
1798 564 72 38 
1799 564 76 40(a) 
1800 577 76 38 
1801 635 93 35 
1802 685 96(b) 34 
1803 682 86 32 
1804 563 71 26 
1805 579 70 26 
1806 587 69 26 
1807 596 65 25 
1808 601 63 21 
1809 802 62 21 
1810 794 57 21 
(a) Maximum representation, 7.09 per cent. 
(b) Maximum representation, 14.01 per cent. 
General Note. 	These figures must be considered an approximation. For 
example, HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.40, refers to 'two soldiers from the Savoy' 
being aboard H.M.S. Gorgon in December 1790. As this ship reached Port 
Jackson in September 1791 (C Bateson, The Convict Ships, p.131), at a 
minimum, two 'ex - Savoy' should be tabulated for the year 1791. 
Figure 13: Composition of the New South Wales Corps 1790-1810 
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A different opinion was expressed by FM Bladen, editor of Historical 
Records of New South Wales, who, in 1895, wrote 'There is ... no evidence to show 
that the privates of the New South Wales Corps were any worse than the average 
British soldier of the day.'" Steel offered the same view in 1943 94 and this 
sentiment has found an echo amongst more recent historians. Brigadier Austin', 
writing critically of an article by TG Parsons' . rhetorically questioned whether 
justice had been done to the record of the New South Wales Corps. Austin's 
response was 'I think not.' Although Parsons had earlier expressed a derogatory 
opinion, he changed his views and later contended that 'Like the eighteenth-century 
British army of which it formed a part, the New South Wales Corps was much 
more of a cross-section of British wage-earning society' than previously admitted.' 
Hence, the quality of its soldiers may have been no worse than in other regiments. 
Parsons' argument is supported by T McAskill who based her findings on a study 
of the occupations of recruits prior to joining the Corps.' 
Parsons' later opinion was based on the unpopularity of the British Army, 
and its harsh conditions of service which made recruiting difficult, and therefore all 
regiments contained a number of convicted military felons. Nevertheless, Parsons 
conceded that certain units were designated to hold military felons. These were 
`batallions [sic] of the 60th Regiment serving in the West Indies; during their 
recruitment the New South Wales Corps and Simcoe's Queen's Rangers shared 
the bulk of the Savoy deserters'.' This statement by Parsons is not consistent with 
his argument that the Corps represented a cross section of the army. It is also in 
conflict with statistics in Figure 13, that according to the source quoted, no ex-
Savoy soldiers joined the Corps in 1790 and 1791. Parsons in his earlier article, 
listed by name three soldiers  who were ordered, as disciplinary punishment, to join 
" HRNSW, 3, p.xxvi. 
" WA .Steel, 'Captain Henry Steel Pt.2', p.70. Stating that they were 'no worse or no better' 
than other units. 
" M Austin, 'Paint My Picture Truly', JRAHS, Vol.51, Pt.4, December, 1965, p.350. 
" TG Parsons, 'The Social Composition of the Men of the New South Wales Corps', JRAHS, 
Vol.50, Pt.4, October 1964, passim. 
" T G Parsons, 'Courts Martial - Savoy ', p.259. 
" T McAskill, 'An asset to the Colony', passim. 
" TG Parsons, 'Courts Martial - Savoy' p.258. 
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the Corps in 1790, but is silent about whether or not they were transferred from the 
Savoy.' He does however quote from a letter of July 1789:- 
I am directed by the S.at W. [Secretary at War] to desire that you will from 
time to time deliver to Major Grose such of the said Deserters as he may 
think proper to remove from the Savoy Prison.' 
This contradicts the table (as does this author's 'General Note' to the table) that no 
soldiers from the Savoy joined the Corps in 1790 and 1791. Irrespective of this 
quibble regarding when the first Savoy "recruits" joined the Corps, Figure 13 
illustrates the trend of enlistments of soldiers from that source. 
Other writers have recently portrayed the Corps in a more favourable light. 
In A Dictionary of Australian Military History, I Grant comments that 'Despite 
problems over pay and poorer quality of the recruits during the Napoleonic War, 
the corps served the colony with great distinction during the period of convict unrest 
between 1800-1804." Another author, G Odgers, while giving passing reference 
to the rum trade and 'constantly quarrelling with the successive naval governors', 
continued with a similar laudatory theme. He wrote 'the Corps proved its value in 
its primary role as a military force when it was called upon to suppress a convict 
insurrection at Castle Hill in 1804." 
Grant's and Odgers' view is played down by J Grey, who disputes 
(correctly in this author's opinion) the military worth of the New South Wales 
Corps, based on its intervention at Castle Hill. He refers to this incident as being 
'militarily insignificant' but agreed with Parsons that 'the overall quality of the 
regiment was not demonstrably worse than ... elsewhere in the British army'.' 
Grey saw the Corps' greatest value as providing a pool of skilled and semi-skilled 
settlers, and also a sound colonial infrastructure from 'trading and farming activities 
both during and after their [members] service in the Corps'. This is also the thrust 
'" TG Parsons, 'Social Composition', p.299. 
TG Parsons, 'Courts Martial - Savoy', p.258 and footnote 78, p.262. 
1 " I Grant, A Dictionary of Australian Military History, Milsons Point, 1992, p.263. 
G Odgers, Army Australia an Illustrated History, Frenchs Forest, 1988, p.13. M Wedd, 
Australian Military Uniforms 1800-1982, Kenthurst, 1982, p.12, for Figure 14. 
'" J Grey, A Military History, p.11 for 'militarily insignificant', p.7 for 'overall quality' and 
p.12 for 'trading and farming'. 
An 1800 British universal 
pattern Shako Plate as worn 
by the New South Wales 
Corps 
Shoulder-belts and 
accoutrement assembly ready 
for wear 
Corporal, New South Wales Corps. 
The Loyal Association were issued with a similar uniform 
Figure 14: Corporal, New South Wales Corps 
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of McAskill's argument, which like Grey's, was expressed earlier by Ida Lee, who 
in 1906, wrote that 'Some of its officers and many of its men ... turned colonists, 
and did much for the country, notably Captain John MacArthur." °5 Grey in writing 
of longer term benefits, which flowed from the Corps' service in the colony, 
considers that 'It is time we set this record against the relentless portrayal of greed, 
self-interest and abuse of office which has been presented as the New South Wales 
Corps' only legacy."°6 Here Grey sharply contrasts two opposing images of the 
Corps. But, the building of long term infrastructure in the colony, no matter how 
worthy, is incidental to an evaluation of the Corps' effectiveness in their primary 
role of maintaining internal security. 
It is debatable, and probably of limited historical significance, whether or not 
the Corps was worse than, or of a comparable standard with other British regiments. 
Intangible factors, such as leadership qualities of officers, and reliability of non-
commissioned officers, dictate standards in a regiment. Such variables cause 
fluctuations in the efficiency of a unit from time to time and from place to place. 
From a consideration of issues raised in Chapters 6 to 11, this author formed the 
opinion that while the other rank material of the Corps approximated that of many 
line regiments, the officers, especially the commanders were at fault in how they 
handled disciplinary lapses by the men. Field Marshall Slim, when summing up 
battalion problems which paralleled those in the Corps, wrote 'In the British Army, 
there are no good battalions and no bad battalions, no good regiments and no bad 
regiments. There are only good and bad officers."' 
The history of the Corps, re-designated the 102nd Regiment, and billeted in 
England under a new commander, bears this out Steel notes that the previously 
'chagrined' Lieutenant Colonel Napier, a strict disciplinarian, later referred to the 
102nd as 'my gents' and claimed that they 'were as fit to take the field as any 
regiment in the Army."' Accepting Napier's assessment, fighting efficiency is the 
I Lee, The Coming Of The British, p.244. 
106 J Grey, A Military History, p.12. 
1 " ES Turner, Gallant Gentlemen, p.unnumbered, following title page. 
108 WA Steel, "Captain Henry Steel', Pt.2', p.74. 
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yardstick by which the standard of a unit should be assessed and not prior civilian 
occupations, or length of "crime sheets", of its soldiers. As a further example of 
factors which affected the regiment's standards, RH Montague favourably 
compared the New South Wales Corps to the 46th (South Devonshire) Regiment of 
Foot which served in the colony from 1814 to 1817. He noted the relative youth 
and inexperience of the 46th's officers and men and lower physical standard of its 
soldiers compared to those of the Corps.' As became evident, after the 
appointment of a good commanding officer in 1811, the 102nd Regiment proved it 
could achieve an acceptable standard. 
In considering the relative standard of the Corps to other regiments, the 
authors quoted above have all been guilty of one major omission. Sadly neglected is 
any reference to discipline and security displayed by detachments of the Corps on 
convict guard duties in transit to the colony. The question of onboard discipline, 
especially on convict transports, raises the disturbing question as to the reliability of 
the Corps to undertake one of its basic security tasks. This is addressed in the next 
chapter, as is the disruption suffered by the Corps as a result of their mainly 
arriving in the colony as small detachments, rather than a complete unit. 
RH Montague, 'The Men of the New South Wales Corps: a Comparison?', JRAHS, Vol.62, 
Pt.4, March 1977, passim. The need to consider the sum of many factors, rather than a selected 
few, was the theme of Brigadier Austin's 'Paint My Picture Truly', passim. 
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Chapter 6 
New South Wales Corps En Route to the Colony 
In The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Bateson paints a disturbing picture of 
many of the military detachments charged with guarding convicts in transit to the 
Australian colonies.' Of the regiments which provided these detachments, the New 
South Wales Corps has a particularly unenviable record, even when allowance is 
made for specific problems which were not faced to the same extent by later British 
regiments. 
When the first guards from the Corps were dispatched in the Second Fleet, 
the only expertise to guide the Home Office, the Admiralty (and their Transport 
Commissioners), as well as the War Office, who issued orders to the Corps, was 
that gained from the former private enterprise transportation to America, and 
arrangements made, at Phillip's initiative, for the First Fleet. Clear directives and 
practised procedures lay in the future, primarily in the post Napoleonic Wars 
period. The Corps had to contend with problems inherent in the developmental 
stages of any bureaucratic initiative. Additionally, three years after the Second Fleet 
sailed,' Great Britain became involved in a major war - the Revolutionary War with 
France - leading to manpower shortages in the armed forces. This adversely 
affected the Corps, as considered in Chapter 5. Ignoring the question of the relative 
quality of the New South Wales Corps compared to other regiments, another factor 
worked to its detriment in regard to its record of providing internal security on 
convict transports. Namely,  the Corps remained significantly longer in the colony, 
C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 1969, pp.35-36. These comments, in 
context, refer to the period after the Napoleonic Wars, but were also applicable from after the Third 
Fleet. 
2 Sailed 19 January 1790. 
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and therefore provided more guards on transports, than any other regiment.' This 
proportionally increased the likelihood of its members being involved in 
disturbances during the long sea passage. 
In the early days of transportation, with voyages of six months or more, 
discontent was rife. The deprivation and squalid conditions suffered by the 
convicts, bred rumours of, or attempts to mutiny. These threats, either real or 
imagined, were a major concern of for ships' officers and military guards.' 
Occasionally, this menace to security was compounded by actions of some guard 
members, who, conspiring with convicts or crew, further heightening tension 
amongst the remainder of the free people on board. 
The role of the New South Wales Corps guard detachments was strictly 
limited to providing sentries and an armed force to put down any mutiny. As with 
the First Fleet, the ships' masters were responsible for the physical security of the 
embarked convicts and determining what security measures should be 
implemented. Subject to the common law of England, particularly relating to 
murder or manslaughter, the masters had absolute power over the convicts and 
could inflict individual punishment, such as flogging or restraining individuals in 
G Odgers, Army Australia an Illustrated History, Frenchs Forest, 1988, p.17. Compared to the 
Corps' twenty years, the next longest serving British regiment was the 99th Regiment (Wiltshire) 
which served in the Australian colonies and New Zealand for thirteen years from 1843 to 1856. 
The 11th (North Devonshire) was next with twelve years (1845-1857) while all other regiments 
served fewer than ten years. 
As a basis of comparison with the 99th Regiment; taken over a thirteen year period, the New 
South Wales Corps provided thirty guard detachments (calculations shown later in this chapter) . 
During the 99th's thirteen years, a total of 163 convict ships came to Australia. However, the 
task of providing guard detachments for these transports was shared between the 99th Regiment and 
eight other regiments whose colonial service overlapped in those years. Additionally, some guard 
detachments were made up of drafts proceeding to India via the Australian colonies. These drafts 
for this calculation are regarded as equivalent to another regiment being stationed in the colonies. 
Therefore, the total of regiments in the country from 1843 to 1856 is considered to be the 
equivalent of ten. Presuming, probably incorrectly, that all 163 ships carried guards, the average 
theoretical commitment would be 16.3 guard detachments per regiment, which is roughly half the 
actual number of guards supplies by the New South Wales Corps over a similar period. 
C Bateson, Convict Ships, pp.217-218, makes the same point in relation to the period 182 1- 
1840. 
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various weights of chains for indefinite periods.' Demarcation disputes resulted 
when a master's concept of security came into conflict with the military guards' 
responsibility to enforce that security, with both parties protecting their "rights". 
A long account of conflicting interest between the Corps' officers and the master of 
Neptune, before the Second Fleet departed from England, is given by Surgeon 
Harris of the New South Wales Corps. The crux of the problem being illustrated 
in this quotation:- 
Cap'n Nepean [the Corps' senior officer, returned] on aboard ... [and] said 
he had determined to take charge of the convicts, as Cap'n Gilbert [the 
master] had usurp'd too much power over him and his soldiers without 
right, and that he had not hitherto obey'd Major Grose's orders, who had 
desir'd him to turn the convicts up and down at will, as all the officers in the 
last ships [marine officers of the First Fleet] had done the same.' 
On the other hand, the master of Neptune was equally jealous of his position. For 
example, when the other Corps officers were ashore, Surgeon Harris was called by 
a sergeant to:- 
quell a riot amongst the women [and was forced to have one placed in irons, 
then] ... Cap'n Gilbert ... hollow'd down the hatchway several vulgar 
phrases ... [and] he said ... who gave me [Harris] authority to command in 
his ship! I told him I assumed no command either in the ship or corps; that 
I was now obeying my [absent] officer's directions, and let me see who 
would hinder me' 
During this altercation with Harris, Captain Gilbert manhandled a sentry who 
responded by threatening to bayonet him. Gilbert and three naval lieutenants, with 
whom he had been drinking, collected and opened an arms chest and 'Mr. Gilbert 
then ordered twelve or fourteen musketts [sic] to be loaded and carried into his 
cabbin [sic] which was done'. About midnight, Nepean 8 returned to Neptune, and 
as he 'did not think himself safe ... took possession of all the loaded arms'.9 
Next morning, Nepean sent Harris ashore to report the incident to Nepean's 
brother, Evan, the Home Office Under Secretary, who was staying at Bath. As a 
result Gilbert was dismissed from command of the ship. 
• C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.19. This situation prevailed until the end of the Napoleonic 
Wars. After which, naval surgeons became available and were employed as surgeon- 
superintendents. This led to the 'effective supervision' of ships' masters. 
• HRNSW, 2, p.428. Surgeon Harris of November 1789. 
• HRNSW, 2, p.430. 
• Accompanied by Lieutenant Macarthur and his wife, who were also travelling on Neptune. 
9 HRNSW, 2, p.431. 
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This altercation varied from the normal relationship that existed between the 
master and guard commander. On Neptune, this was not a one sided argument as 
Gilbert and Nepean were both experienced men, on a comparable level in their 
respective professions, and like Harris, were determined to hold their ground. The 
incident was especially unusual as the army officers had the opportunity to go 
ashore, and using their influential contact, Evan Nepean, have the ship's master 
dismissed. This differed from the normal pattern, as guard commanders were 
usually young ensigns, on posting to the colony as reinforcement officers, or less 
frequently, sergeants. It was hard for them to confront an autocratic master 
supported by his ship's officers. Once at sea, a guard commander was isolated 
from all superior authorities, and without support in any argument over what he 
perceived to be his duties and responsibilities. A guard commander had limited 
opportunities to influence security decisions concerning the handling, or 
mishandling, of the embarked convicts. 
As well as contending with the ship's master and his officers, a guard 
commander had to endeavour to work in cooperation with the ship's surgeon, and 
if carried aboard, the naval agent who was a commissioned officer of the Royal 
Navy. Should a division of ships for which the naval agent was responsible 
become separated at sea, the agent could only attempt to influence the actions of the 
master of the ship in which he sailed. Naval agents' duties included diverse tasks 
such as preventing unnecessary delays on passage and reporting on any failure of 
the ships' officers to provide the contracted scale of rations to soldiers, their 
families and convicts. The naval agent could advise and report on, but not issue 
commands to the master.' An agent's effectiveness was limited by his ill defined 
powers. This is illustrated by a report to Governor Phillip, by the agent aboard 
Kitty, Lieutenant Woodriff. He complained of inordinate delays at transit ports, and 
in fair weather when he requested more sail be set, the master abused Woodriff 
saying 'he never would make more sail on the ship for my [Woodriff] requesting 
HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, pp.678-679. Nepean to Surgeon Kent of December 1792, detailing his 
duties as Boddirtgtons' superintendent. 
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In 1792-1793, following many convict deaths in the Second Fleet, Royal 
Navy surgeons, under the title of 'superintendents', were assigned the additional 
duties of naval agents.' Now, as well as their responsibilities for the convicts' 
health, these medical officers were expected to ensure that the terms of the 
government contract, negotiated by the Transport Commissioners, were followed. 
These officials faced problems as noted by Naval Surgeon Kent who criticised 
Boddingtons' master, Captain Chalmers. Kent wrote 'for the cleanliness and 
comfort of the convicts ... my orders ... were never attended to, and even Captain 
Chalmers told me he only came in the ship to navigate her." 3 Due to the shortage 
of naval surgeons and officers during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars, this sensible scheme only operated on the transports Royal Admiral and 
BeIlona in 1792, and on Boddingtons and Sugar Cane in 1793. 14 However, from 
1815, naval surgeons appointed as `surgeon-superintendents', were carried on all 
convict transports, with increased supervisory powers over the ships' masters!' 
During the wars, civilian surgeons, normally hired by the shipping 
contractors, operated without any official supervision and could be expected to 
defer to the master, who was the senior representative of their mutual employer. A 
surgeon who insisted on maintaining a reasonable standard of hygiene and 
rationing for convicts, would have been an irritant to many masters. Some captains 
had no interest in regularly inspecting and ordering the cleansing of the foul prison 
area or ensuring provision of adequate meals. Through carelessness, or deliberate 
" HRNSW, 2, p.483; report of November 1792. 
12 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.43. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.61. Kent unaddressed report of September 1793. Footnote, p.61 states 
'probably to Nepean'. 
C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.35. BeIlona was a storeship,which also carried seventeen female 
convicts (p.146). There is no record of her having carried a guard (passim). 
" C Bateson, Convict Ships, pp.18-19 for background detail and p.35 for scheme recommencing 
in 1814. The date 1815 (not 1814) is included in the text as Naval Surgeon Arnold was the first to 
sail in Northampton in January 1815 (p.49). Bateson considered that identical reforms to those 
recommended by Dr. Redfem in his report to Macquarie, were introduced in 1814 before the 
Redfern Report reached England (p.4-9). 
128 
short weight issues on some ships, food was often inadequate:6 A particular 
irritant to the master could occur if a company appointed surgeon insisted on 
convicts spending adequate exercise periods on deck - conflicting with the master's 
over-riding concern for security. Another responsibility of the surgeon was, when 
a prisoner was flogged, to stop the punishment if the victim's life was at risk. This 
did not always happen. The sadistic master of Britannia, which reached Port 
Jackson in May 1797, said to a man being flogged 'I will not hang you, it is too 
gentle a death, but I will cut you to pieces'. The convict, who was dead next day 
after having been chained to another man overnight, was not given medical 
treatment. The ship's doctor, who had made no attempt to stop the flogging, 
recorded that the convict died of natural causes:7 
Working within this maritime command structure, with overlapping areas of 
responsibility (or apathy) involving the master, surgeon and naval agent, the military 
detachment commander, whose sole responsibility was to guard the prisoners, had 
little incentive, or scope, to show initiative in handling convict security. Bateson 
notes that no attempt was made by the Navy Board or Transport Commissioners to 
settle the respective spheres of responsibility, and inevitably there were sharp and 
sometimes violent differences of opinion: 8 This explains why Captain Hill of the 
New South Wales Corps could do nothing to alleviate conditions for convicts on 
Surprize. He wrote:- 
The irons used upon these unhappy wretches were barbarous. The 
contractors had been in the Guinea [slave] trade, and had put on board the 
same shackles used by them in that trade ... The slave trade is merciful 
compared with what I have seen in this fleet" 
Hill is referring here to the Second Fleet, comprising Surprize, Neptune and 
Scarborough. 
The first guard detachments of the New South Wales Corps departed 
England on 19 January 1790 aboard the Second Fleet. Thereafter, until 1802, the 
" Ships' masters found a ready market in Sydney Town for foodstuffs fraudulently accumulated. 
HRNSW, 3, p.241; pp.240-277 for magisterial enquiry conducted in Sydney. 
18 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.26. 
19 HRNSW 1, Pt.2, p.367. Private letter from Hill of July 1790. 
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Corps built up strength as further detachments reached the colony. Then, following 
the Peace of Amiens, there was a decline in numbers due to a reduction ordered in 
establishments of all infantry regiments. 2° From 1804, while some guard 
detachments did arrive as reinforcements, the strength of the Corps remained 
relatively static until 1808. 21 Then, under the stimulus of the spread of the 
Napoleonic Wars, the strength of the unit was increased by a large draft of 225 all 
ranks. This chapter considers the thirteen year period from the sailing of the 
Second Fleet until the Peace of Amiens, concluding with HMS Glatton reaching 
the colony in March 1803 with peacetime orders to embark redundant soldiers for 
return to England. In this period, forty-six convict transports and storeships 
departed from England or Ireland with one or more convicts on board. Due to a 
successful mutiny on Lady Shore, only forty-five transports reached Sydney Cove. 
As detailed below not all these vessels carried military guard detachments. 
Additionally, neither HMS Guardian nor Lady Juliana carried a military guard, so 
are not included in this total. These two ships sailed before the New South Wales 
Corps assumed responsibility for guard detachments, which commenced with the 
Second Fleet. Guardian departed in September 1789 with stores and twenty five 
skilled prisoners. After hitting an iceberg, she was later driven ashore and wrecked 
in False Bay to the east of Cape of Good Hope. Lady Juliana, with stores and 
female convicts left England almost six months before the Second Fleet sailed.' 
To establish the number of convict ships for which the New South Wales 
Corps provided guard detachments, transports are divided into categories as 
tabulated below:- 
20 HRNSW, 4, p.832. Bathurst to King of August 1802. 
" P Statham, 'Ins and Outs: The Composition and Disposal of the NSW Corps 1790-1810', 
Working Papers in Economic History, Working Paper No.105, May 1988, Table 2, p.6, listed 
strengths as follows:- 1804 - 563, 1805 - 579, 1806 - 578, 1807 - 596 and 1808 - 601 prior to 
the arrival of a draft of 225 (see Statham's Table 6, p.11). 
AJCP, reel 1073, Out Letters Secretary-at-War New South Wales Corps, 1803-1810, WO 
4/846, p.44. For War Office directive of 3 October 1806 that with effect from 25 December 1806, 
the New South Wales Corps would be augmented to a strength of eight companies each of 100 
rank and file. 
" Despite this early departure, Lady Juliana did not arrive until 6 June 1790, the same month in 
which the ships of Second Fleet arrived in Sydney Cove. 
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His Majesty's Ships (total 2): Gorgon - troop carrier, storeship, limited 
(31) male convict?' and Glatton - convict transport (401 male and female 
convicts). Despite the number of convicts, it is discounted that Glatton 
carried a New South Wales Corps guard as she was under orders to return 
with the Corps' redundant soldiers. The ship's normal complement of 
marines presumably acted as guards. 
Storeships carrying convicts with no military guards (total 3): BeIlona 
(17 female convicts), William and Sovereign (each one convict). Other 
storeships which did not carry convicts are outside this study.' 
Transports carrying military guards (total 28): Surprize, Neptune, 
Scarborough, Matilda, Atlantic, Salamander, William and Mary, Active, 
Queen, Albermarle, Britannia (1791), Admiral Barrington, Pitt, Royal 
Admiral (1792), Boddingtons, Sugar Cane, Surprize (1794), Marquis 
Cornwallis, Britannia (1796), Ganges, Barwell, Minerva, Royal Admiral 
(1800), Earl Cornwallis, Canada,' Minorca, Hercules and Atlas (1801). 
Transports carrying hired civilian guards (total 6): Hillsborough,' 
" AJCP, reel 1164, Admiralty - Entry Books General 1 784-1 793, HO 29/2, p.149. In a letter of 
7 February 1791, Captain Parker, commanding Gorgon, requested that thirty named convicts from 
the Lyon Hulk, Portsmouth, be lumish[ed] him to take on board the Gorgon to assist in working 
the Ship on her Passage to New South Wales'. If these convicts returned to England, still as part 
of the crew, which would appear logical, then Bateson may not be strictly correct in listing 
Gorgon amongst The Convict Ships. 
25 Examples of storeships, not carrying convicts are Prince of Wales and Sylph (refer HRNSW 
3, p.56, both sailed from Portsmouth, 27 June 1796, footnote p.52 for arrival dates). From 
AJCP, reel 1302, Description and Succession Books (Regimental) New South Wales Corps 1808- 
1816, WO 25/642, at least one soldier was listed as travelling to the colony on Prince of Wales, 
arriving in November 1796, therefore that ship or possibly both carried some reinforcements with 
no guard duties. 
26 Canada is listed by Bateson and confirmed by HRNS W,4, Index, p.1063 (six entries). She 
arrived at Sydney in December 1801 in company with Minorca and Nile. The latter carried female 
convicts only and no military guard, and is excluded from further consideration in this footnote. 
Both Minorca and Canada embarked 104 male prisoners each at Portsmouth and sailed on the same 
date. Entries, indicating a military guard on Minorca are recorded in WO 25/642 while there are 
none for Canada. Surprisingly in WO 25/642, there is a significant number of entries listing a 
ship named Kennedy which supposedly arrived in Sydney in December 1801. There is no record of 
a vessel of that name in Bateson, HRNSW (Vol.4) nor HRA 1 (Vol.3), and no other convict 
transports entered Sydney Cove in December 1801, The only conclusion that can be drawn is that 
Kennedy was an alternative name used for Canada by the military authorities in Sydney who 
compiled the Description Book in 1808. As a slight possibility, Kennedy may have been 
renamed, and as Canada made 'three successive voyages' to the colony (C Bateson, Convict Ships, 
p.173). 
27 HRNSW 4, p. 92 confirms that Hillsborough carried civilian guards. 
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Friendship, Anne (Luz St-Anna)", Coromandel, Perseus," and Atlas 
(1802, different ship to 1801)." 
Transports carrying female convicts (total 7): Mary Ann,Kitty,31 
Indispensable, Lady Shore (plus one or two male convicts), Britannia 
(1798, different vessel to those which sailed in 1791 and 1796), Speedy 
and Nile. Apart from Lady Shore, which was also employed as a troop 
carrier, no military guards were carried on these vessels.' 
In summary, the New South Wales Corps provided guards for a total of 30 ships 
between 1790 and 18302' 
• HMS Gorgon (as the 31 convicts worked as part of the crew, guard duties for the 
Corps' twenty-four all ranks would have been nominal), 
• 28 transports carrying male or male and female convicts, 
• Lady Shore, employed as a troop carrier, as well as transporting female convicts. 
" There is doubt whether Friendship and/or Anne carried a military guard. In WO 25/642, no 
soldiers are listed as having sailed on either ship (one soldier is recorded as arriving on the First 
Fleet's Friendship). C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.178, notes that 'there was no military guard' 
on Anne and that the ship's officers and crew efficiently overcame a mutiny. However, HRNSW 
3, p.640 quotes a Transport Commissioners' letter of 6 March 1799 that 'Friendship and Lux St. 
Anna [Anne's name at the time of her capture by the English] ... we conceive it will be more safe 
that a guard should be furnished ... by the War Department ... [of] twenty rank and file ... for each 
ship'. While both Friendship and Anne sailed from Cork, as Anne sailed ten months later, 
whether a guard may, or may not, have been placed on Friendship apparently did not prevent Anne 
embarking hired civilian guards. On the basis of negative evidence from WO 25/642, Friendship 
is listed under the hired guards category. 
" C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.27, for Coromandel and Perseus carrying civilian guards. 
" The Peace of Amiens was signed on 27 March 1802, and Atlas (1802) sailed on the 30 May. 
She sailed before HMS Glatton, whose captain was under orders to return with redundant troops to 
England. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Atlas carried military guards as the Transport 
Office would have had to pay for rations for the outward bound troops and passage money for their 
homeward voyage, whereas the civilian guards' contract ceased on 'the Day of their [the convicts] 
final Debarkation at New South Wales' (refer: AJCP, reel 4400, Admiralty out letters to Navy 
Board, Pay, War Office, Home Office, Colonial Office, ADM 108/20, p.46. Also part of this 
same series, referred to later, are ADM 108/17 and 108/19. That Atlas did not carry military 
guards is negatively confirmed as that ship's name does not appear in WO 25/642. 
3 ' Kitty embarked ten male and thirty female convicts at Portsmouth. Apparently the naval 
Transport Office considered that a military guard was not warranted for these numbers. The escape 
of eight male convicts, when the ship put back to England for repairs, tends to confirm that no 
military guard was embarked. WO 25/642 adds strength to this assumption as no soldiers are 
listed as arriving on Kitty. D Collins, An Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, 
Christchurch, undated, p.162, made reference to only a naval agent and 'medical gentleman' being 
carried aboard. 
" As transports carrying female convicts (including Lady Juliana and the storeship Bellona, not 
listed in this category) did not carry a guard detachment, consideration whether military discipline 
was weakened on such vessels is not pertinent. The case of Lady Shore is atypical, being also 
employed as a troop transport, see below, Chapter 7. It is presumed that where a transport carried 
male and female convicts there would have been increased disciplinary problems amongst the 
soldiers and crew. 
" See above, footnote 3, for a comparison with the 99th Regiment which also provided guards 
over a thirteen year period. 
" HRNSW 1, Pt.2, p.432, for details. As Grose sailed later in Pitt, the numbers given have 
been reduced by 'Major - 1'. 
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Before considering problems associated with merchant marine vessels 
employed as convict transports, incidents of inter-service disharmony aboard HMS 
Gorgon at Portsmouth are examined, as these resulted in accusations of mutiny 
being made against soldiers. The first recorded instance of discontent was in 
November 1790, ten months after the Second Fleet had sailed. Accompanied by 
his family, Major Grose had initially been directed to travel in Gorgon. He 
complained that his officers were forced to mess separately from the naval officers, 
without being allocated adequate cabin space to do so. Additionally, because the 
navy retained the ship's cabins, he was allotted sub-standard accommodation. He 
noted 'I am the first officer of my rank ... who was ever turned into the gun-room 
[where the midshipmen messed] of a ship ... transporting troops.'" Obviously 
Grose and the ship's captain, W Harvey, were at loggerheads and such sentiments 
would have percolated downwards and influenced both the soldiers and crew. 
On 19 December 1790, Grose advised the War Office that Harvey had 
reported to the Admiralty that some of the New South Wales Corps soldiers aboard 
Gorgon had mutinied. Grose stated these were 'frivolous' hearsay allegations.' 
The trouble commenced with a drunken fight between two soldiers from the Savoy, 
resulting in the naval officer of the watch placing them in irons.' Next morning, 
the Corps' cook was also placed in irons as a result of strong words being 
exchanged with a petty officer, who had been refused hot water from the soldiers' 
copper. With their army officers ashore, the soldiers felt aggrieved that their 
comrades had been punished by naval officers, and showing that they were 'injured 
by the confinement of their cook' they refused to 'volunteer' in assisting to weigh 
anchor. Which of these incidents caused Harvey to raise an allegation of mutiny is 
not known, as pertinent naval correspondence has not been located. Grose's letters 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.416. Grose to Nepean of November 1790. This is the probable 
explanation why Grose came out in Pitt which sailed four months after Gorgon. 
" HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.420. Grose to Under Secretary Lewis. Two days later, Grose followed 
this up with a more detailed account of the incident (pp.420-421). The quotations are from both 
letters. No naval accounts of these disturbances are published in HRNSW or HRA, nor has any 
been noted in microfilm copies of AJCP, PRO Admiralty correspondence. 
37 See above, Chapter 5, p.117, footnote 83, for description of Savoy. 
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to the War Office were clearly intended to protect the reputation of his unit and no 
doubt Harvey's correspondence with the Admiralty was of a similar nature. As an 
immediate aftermath, Harvey was relieved of his command and told Banks 'I can 
only account for it that the Major-Commandant and I have disagreed.'" 
In retrospect, the underlying problem in this series of episodes was the lack 
of discipline amongst the detachment's soldiers. Even before the troops were sent 
aboard, doubts had been officially expressed about this draft. Nepean, at the Home 
Office, wrote to the Admiralty in January . 1791:- 
A considerable part of the Corps intended for Service in New South Wales 
being composed of Deserters from different Regiments taken out of the 
Savoy, who would in all probability during their March from Chatham to 
Portsmouth, desert, it will be very desirable that the Gorgon should be 
brought round to Nore, to receive that Corps on board." 
Taken directly from prison to Gorgon, these men would then be constrained by 
severe naval discipline, pending the ship's departure for the colony. While soldiers 
were the focus of inter service correspondence aboard Gorgon, Captain Parker, 
who relieved Harvey, also had a naval disciplinary problem with his crew. For fear 
of desertions, he warned the Admiralty, in late February 1791, that 'the sooner we 
are gone the better'.' No doubt the soldiers cooped up aboard agreed with such a 
sentiment, facing the prospect of a sea passage of about six months to reach the 
colony, as had the notorious Second Fleet which was at sea from January to June 
1790. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.427. Harvey to Banks of January 1791. Harvey was replaced by Captain 
Parker. 
" HO 29/2, p.125. Nepean to Admiralty Under Secretary Stephens of 10 January 1791. The 
original intention in September 1789, was that 241 all ranks were to be dispatched to the colony 
in 'one of the 44-gun ships' (for which task Gorgon was nominated), HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, p.266. 
Nepean's letter indicated that the intention in early January 1791 was to embark a large detachment 
on Gorgon. This is in conflict with the twenty four all ranks (with Grose excluded) shown as 'On 
board the Gorgon' on the parade state supplied by Grose to Nepean of January 1791, HRNSW, 
1 ,P1.2, p.432. This discrepancy is explainable as eight convict transports (Matilda, Atlantic, 
Salamander, William and Mary, Active, Albermarle, Britannia and Admiral Barrington), with guard 
detachments, departed from Plymouth or Portsmouth in March 1791, the same month that Gorgon 
sailed. Queen, also with a guard, sailing the following month from Cork. With an average 
strength guard of an officer and twenty other ranks, these nine transports would have required a 
total commitment for the Corps of approximately 189 all ranks. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.465. Parker to Stephens of February 1791. Gorgon sailed on 15 March 
and arrived Port Jackson on 21 September 1791. 
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The high death rate on the three ships of the Second Fleet, was in part 
attributed by Phillip to security precautions adopted by ships' masters; he informed 
London:- 
while the masters of the transports think their own safety depends on 
admitting few convicts on deck at a time, and most of them with irons on, 
which prevent any kind of exercise, numbers must always perish on so 
long a voyage' 
This inhumane treatment nevertheless, so restricted the convicts ability to carry out 
any mutinous actions, that only on Scarborough were the authorities required to 
take suppressive measures. After the ship had parted company with Neptune and 
Surprize, a convict informer, Samuel Burt (who by letter from Cape Town sent a 
vivid report of this incident to Englane), gave warning of a plot to seize the ship. 
Although the ringleaders were not drastically punished, the convicts' access to the 
deck was further restricted and as a result they had no opportunity to cause trouble 
for the remainder of the voyage. Collins in his account of the horrific condition of 
the landed convicts, only gives this planned mutiny a passing mention.' 
Of the eleven convict transports, known as the Third Fleet, which reached 
Port Jackson in 1791', Collins noted that the sergeant commanding the guard on 
Salamander had 'shown his preference to remaining in England, by deserting 
when the ship was on the point of sailing'.' Neither Collins nor Historical 
Records of Australia or Historical Records of New South Wales makes mention of 
a separate incident recorded by Bateson, that the master of William and Ann was 
'fined for assaulting and beating some soldiers during the passage'. This 
reference indicates that there had been tension between members of the guard of 
HRA, 1, 1, p.188, Phillip to Grenville of July 1790. C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.127 lists 
deaths as:- Surprize - 36, Neptune - 147 and Scarborough - 73. The physical condition of most 
disembarked convicts was extremely poor. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.762. 
43 D Collins, An Account, p.89. 
" Ten of these ships, including Gorgon are listed in footnote 39, above. The other was Mary 
Ann with female convicts and without a guard. 
45 D Collins, An Account, p.124. 
46 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.133. 
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'one sergeant and twelve privates' and the master and possibly some of his crew.' 
The ease with which such an incident can happen was illustrated by the altercation 
on Neptune, between Gilbert and Harris, when a sentry was manhandled. Tension 
on another ship was recorded by Commander King, a passenger on Gorgon. He 
was informed that 'The convicts, as well as soldiers, have been troublesome on 
board the Britannia, by the master's account.'' Despite these relatively minor 
occurrences involving Corps soldiers, in the one serious attempt to seize a ship of 
the Third Fleet, the Corps' guard performed creditably. 
On 9 April 1791, due to bad weather, Albermarle, with the division's naval 
agent, Lieutenant Robert Young RN aboard, became separated from other 
transports in her division. At 7.30am, assisted by knives or saws supplied by two 
sailors, Hayes and Bennet, the convicts on deck had, unobserved, removed their 
irons. They rushed, overpowered and seized the cutlasses of the two New South 
Wales Corps sentries on deck duty. A convict, William Siney, led a charge onto 
the quarter deck and was about to strike down the helmsman when either the ship's 
master, George Brown, or the naval agent (both in different accounts either claimed 
or were given the credit) fired a blunderbuss which wounded Siney in the shoulder. 
He dropped the cutlass and fled below, together with the other convicts on deck. 
An armed party of crew and soldiers went below and methodically secured the 
hiding conspirators. The first one brought up on deck, terrified by the threat of 
hanging and encouraged by a promise of pardon, confessed that the plan was to 
seize the ship and sail to America. He named Siney and Owen Lyons (one of 
whom was an American) as ringleaders. With no other transport in sight, which 
could come to Albermarle's aid if mutiny flared up again, it was mutually agreed 
by the master, ship's officers, naval agent, sergeant guard commander and his 
corporal, that the ringleaders should be hanged from a yard-arm. Siney and Lyons 
were both executed, while other mutineers were flogged. Thereafter, no further 
D Collins, An Account, p.124. 
" King, having delivered Phillip's dispatches to London, was promoted to commander, and was 
returning to the colony to take up his new appointment as lieutenant-governor of Norfolk Island. 
" HRNSW, 1, Pt.2, p.489. King to Nepean of May 1791. D Collins, An Account, p.129, for 
report of Britannia's arrival, but did not mention the size of the guard, nor any trouble on board. 
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trouble by the convicts was experienced. Informers later wrote to the master 
naming the two sailors, Hayes and Bennet as implicated in the plot. They were 
secured, and later put ashore at Madeira in custody, awaiting their return to England 
in a British warship.' 
Of the four convict transports which arrived in 1792 and 1793 with New 
South Wales guard detachments, there were reports of mutiny from three; Royal 
Admiral, Boddingtons and Sugar Cane.' There were no reports of trouble on Pin 
which carried Grose, and who, from Rio de Janeiro, reported that the 'convicts 
behave themselves with great regularity'. With a total of eighty officers and men of 
the New South Wales Corps embarked, it would be surprising if they did 
otherwise. A newspaper report published in January 1792 also noted the 
convicts' good behaviour and added 'several were permitted to assist in the 
navigation of the ship and to attend the watering-parties in landing without their 
fetters'.' This may have been an example of making a virtue out of a necessity as 
Bateson notes that, due to a high death rate, the 'crew was so depleted ... some of 
the convicts had to ... help navigate her'.' Likewise, the deaths of nineteen of their 
comrades and dependents during the voyage would have lowered the remaining 
" This account is an amalgam of several contemporary official reports and press articles. 
Material in HRA, 1, 1, p.313 and Commentary Note 175, p.758, is duplicated in HRNSW, I, 
Pt.2, p.559 and pp.487-488 respectively. These contain Phillip's dispatch giving a brief report of 
the mutiny and Young's official report in which he claims he shot Siney. Many details 
incorporated in the above narrative are obtained from HRNSW 2, pp.447-449, being a British 
consular report from Madeira, of May 1791 (which noted that Brown fired at Siney), and p.781, 
extract from a private letter published in the press in July 1791, that noted one of the ringleaders 
was an American. D Collins, An Account, p.129, recorded information on the mutiny, but this 
was not as detailed as the material in HRNSW, 2. Collins noted that Brown fired the shot, 
although Phillip, in his dispatch, which praised Young (HRNSW,1,Pt.2, p. 559) does not make 
clear whether Young fired or not. 
51 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.139 for 1792 arrivals; Pitt, Royal Admiral and Kitty, and p.145 
for 1793 arrivals; Bellona, Boddingions and Sugar Cane. Kitty and Bellona did not carry guards. 
There were desertions from Kitty before she finally departed from English waters, see above, 
footnote 31. 
" HRNSW, I, Pt. 2, p.526. Grose to Nepean of October 1791, with an attachment giving the 
Corps' strength aboard Pitt at that date, as sixty-seven all ranks, plus seventeen wives and children. 
These figures take into account nineteen deaths of military and family. Pitt also embarked 410 
male and female convicts, illustrating the crowded conditions experienced aboard transports. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.792. From The Bee of 15 May 1792. Presumably this report was sent from 
Cape Town after Pitt arrived on 25 November 1791 (p.459). She did not reach Port Jackson until 
14 February 1792. 
54 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.141. 
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troops' morale. When statistics like this became known in the Corps' barracks in 
England, it would have had an adverse impact on discipline, possibly encouraging 
desertions before embarkation. The possibility of death, or danger at sea would 
have had an impact on both soldiers and convicts alike. One soldier of the New 
South Wales Corps aboard Pitt, when passing Land's End, 'bade adieu to our 
native counny'. Then, commenting on his first sight of Australia wrote, 'on 7th of 
February, 1792, we passed the South Cape of Van Diemen's Land. I looked very 
anxiously at a continent on which I was likely to spend the prime of my life'.' 
While this soldier expressed an anxiety about an indefinite future in the colony, the 
greater apprehension of the convicts, and an urge by some to escape their fate by 
mutiny, is not surprising. 
Of the three ships which arrived in 1792-1793, the seriousness of reported 
mutinies varied considerably. There was little to substantiate suggestions of a 
serious plot on Royal Admiral. Neither Collins, the Historical Records of 
Australia nor Historical Records of New South Wales reported such an incident. 
The only evidence is of a negative nature, being a convict's letter written at Cape 
Town stating that a Jewish convict who had suffered 'continual taunts, and, not 
having any mode of revenge, informed ... there had been a plan concerted on board 
the hulks'. As a result 'eight men intirely [sic] innocent of that crime suffered a _ 
very severe punishment, but in a very short time he [the Jew] was detected ... [and] 
underwent a discipline in itself very severe'. Regarding this incident Bateson 
notes that one convict received three dozen lashes and seven others two dozen 
each.' 
Trouble with guard detachments developed early on the transports 
Boddingtons and Sugar Cane. For Sugar Cane, this commenced at Gravesend, in 
the lower reaches of the Thames, before proceeding to Ireland, to embark convicts 
at Cork. The master, Captain Musgrave, was gravely concerned about the reliability 
" HRNSW, 2, pp.815-816. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.479 and footnote. 
57 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.143. 
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and health of the Corps' soldiers aboard his ship. It was bad enough that the War 
Office advised him that Stanton, a soldier of 'very infamous character ... [who] 
should be kept entirely apart [from convicts, and] ... might be productive of much 
mischief', was to be transferred to his ship. But Musgrave's greater concern, 
was a complaint that the guard were unfit for service. As a result of this, the 
adjutant and assistant surgeon of nearby Chatham Barracks were ordered to 
examine the soldiers. In the presence of Surgeon Superintendent Bell of Sugar 
Caner the army surgeon ruled that 'the men he [Musgrave] objected to' were fit.' 
Next day, Musgrave wrote to Nepean:- 
how utterly impossible it will be for me and my ship's company to keep 
both soldiers and convicts in subjection. ... [The soldiers] were sent on 
board to assist me in keeping the convicts in order ... not withstanding the 
survey [Chatham army inspection], or rather cursory view that was taken, 
that numbers of the recruits are unfit to proceed on the voyage - indeed, two 
... are already in so bad a state that they are incapable of doing anything.' 
As a result of France's declaration of war against the United Kingdom on 1 
February 1793," shipping movements along the southern coast of England were 
constrained by the threat of French privateers. In February, Sugar Cane had to 
wait at transit ports until convoys were assembled, to proceed along the coast from 
port to port. Additionally, she was raided by naval press gangs who 'took the 
whole of our foremast men'.' Some days later, after having left Gravesend, 
Musgrave advised Nepean of a soldier he had placed in irons because the man 
`threaten'd the life of my chief officer'. Musgrave queried what punishment he 
could inflict 'as an example for the rest of the men'. This was a strange request to 
the Home Office on a military disciplinary matter, even though Musgrave's real 
" HRNSW, 2, p.8. Commandant, Chatham Barracks to Mulgrave of February 1793. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.7. The Commandant, Chatham Barracks wrote that 'Mr. Kent [superintendent 
of Boddingtons] attended the above inspection'. The commandant was obviously confused over the 
surgeons' names "Bell" and "Kent", as two days before the commandant's letter, Kent (pp.6-7) had 
written a report to Nepean from Cork. 
" HRNSW, 2, pp.7-8. Under Secretary, War Office (Lewis) to Under Secretary, Home Office 
(Nepean) of 9 February 1793. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.8. Musgrave to Nepean of 10 February 1793. 
" As a reaction to the execution of Louis XVI on 21 January, Britain expelled France's 
ambassador. In response, France declared war. 
63 HRNSW, 2, pp.16-17. Surgeon-Superintendent Bell to Nepean of February 1793. 
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intention was apparently to have that soldier and another removed from his ship.' 
The sergeant guard commander apparently had little control over his men. With 
no legal power to order a flogging, when the ship moored at either Portsmouth or 
Plymouth, the sergeant should have reported the incident at one of these military 
headquarters, where the soldier could have been severely disciplined. At Plymouth, 
trouble with the guard continued, with four soldiers deserting by stealing the ship's 
boat. In reporting this latest incident to Nepean, Musgrave was 'rather astonished' 
that he had received no reply from Nepean as to what disciplinary measures 'I am 
to proceed with the soldiers'.' At the same time as Musgrave was experiencing 
problems with his ship's guard, Surgeon-Superintendent Kent aboard 
Boddingtons, at Cork, reported to Nepean that a 'soldier has deserted since our 
arrival here ... [and] are a very troublesome sett [sic], and require more looking after 
than the convicts'.' 
After arrival at Port Jackson, Surgeon Kent reported that on Boddingtons: - 
We had constant alarms with mutinys and conspiracys, both among the 
soldiers as well as convicts, and we was obliged to be upon our guard night 
and day; but, by the officers keeping a strict watch, had the look [luck] of 
bringing them all safe [to the colony] 
Collins, referring to this voyage wrote 'The Irish convicts had attempted to take the 
ship; but their design had been frustrated by the vigilance and activity of the master 
and a subaltern's party of the New South Wales corps!' Details of the plot, or 
plots, were revealed after the convicts were landed. It had been planned to put to 
death all officers except 'the first mate and the agent ... for the purpose of 
conducting the ship to a port, where they were likewise to be put to death.' 
Sugar Cane arrived in September 1793, five weeks after Boddingtons, also 
" HRNSW, 2, pp.8-9. Undated, presumed 'written about the middle of February, 1793', 
footnote p.8. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.191, referred to 'a subaltern's [guard] party on Boddingtons, and 
p.194, 'a sergeant's party' on Sugar Cane. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.17. Dated 25 February 1793. 
67 HRNSW, 2, p.7. Dated 6 February 1793. 
" HRNSVV, 2, p.61 and footnote. Addressed 'probably, to Nepean' in September 1793. 
69 D Collins, An Account, p.191. Written as lower case 'c' in 'corps'. 
70 D Collins, An Account, p.194. 
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having experienced a mutiny aboard. She sailed from Cork on 12 April 1793 and 
an informer advised Surgeon-Superintendent Bell on 25 May that some of the 
convicts had sawn off some of their irons, and planned to seize the ship, killing the 
officers except the surgeon and second mate.' There was also a 'probability of 
their [the mutineers] being joined by certain of the sailors and of the guard.' Bell, 
presumably working closely with Musgrave, decided that strong action was 
required 'and ordered that one of the convicts, who was found out of his irons to be 
executed that night; others were punished next morning'.' As a result of this swift 
action, no further problems were experienced during the voyage. Indeed, at Rio de 
Janeiro, the next port of call, in a letter to Nepean, Bell made no reference to the 
mutiny or execution.' To Bell's great credit, of the 110 male and fifty female 
convicts embarked, the only death on the voyage was that of the executed man.' 
A postscript on security was written by Collins in light of Boddingtons' and 
Sugar Cane's passages from Cork. In his opinion;- 
the military guard should never have been less than an officer's command, 
and that guard (especially when embarked ... [on] a ship full of wild 
lawless Irish) ought never to have been composed of either young 
soldiers, or deserters from other corps.' 
While this was self evident to Collins, there is no record that the issue was raised 
by Major Grose, then administering the government of the colony.' In England, 
despite concern expressed by the Commissioner of the Navy and Home Office, the 
War Office, now embroiled in a major war, did not have the manpower resources to 
improve the standard of guards on Surprize, the next transport due to sail after 
Sugar Cane.' 
71 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.146. 
72 D Collins, An Account, p.194. 
73 D Collins, An Account, p.194. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.57. Dated July 1793. 
" C Bateson, Convict Ships, table, p.147. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.194. 
On other occasions Grose had attempted to deflect criticism of the Corps. Therefore, it was 
unlikely that he would have raised such an issue, based on recriminations against his men. 
78 HRNSW, 2, p.123, for Home Office to War Office, for naval concern, and p.124 from War 
Office replying that nothing could be done. 
141 
Because guards performed satisfactorily on the Second and Third Fleets, 
with few reported instances of misbehaviour, the reasons why serious problems 
occurred with guards on Sugar Cane and Boddingtons requires examination. 
These guards were aboard these transports before the French Revolutionary War 
commenced, therefore the argument advanced in Chapter 5, that the standard of 
soldiers dropped after the start of the war, does not apply to these two ill disciplined 
guards. Probably the basic cause lay in the limited troop availability in 1791, when 
virtually all of the 162 officers and men available in barracks in England would 
have been required as guards for the nine transports, which became the Third 
Fleet' Then, to meet the 1792 commitment of guards for four convict transports, 
recruits would have been urgently needed. Collins' criticism in the previous 
paragraph, indicates that significant numbers of rejects from other regiments, 
including military felons, were combined with callow youths to meet these 1792 
commitments. This is borne out by War Office orders to Colonel Fox, at Chatham 
Barracks, that 'the [five] undermentioned Deserters from the Savoy Prison' were to 
be put on board Boddingtons.' The influence of these soldiers on their comrades, 
would have been conducive to dereliction of duty and mutiny, as was rumoured. 
Finally, as referred to by Collins, the apparently somewhat ineffectual sergeant 
guard commander on Sugar Cane should have been replaced by an officer to 
handle the ship's prison full of 'wild lawless Irish'. 
Surprize (on her second trip) was the only transport to reach the colony in 
1794 with a contingent of convicts. A storeship,William, carrying one privileged 
prisoner, also arrived in that year, but as she carried no guard, is outside the scope 
of this chapter. Surprize's guard consisted of an ensign and twenty-one other 
ranks including six deserters from various regiments who were transferred aboard 
C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.132. The fleet comprised three ships from Plymouth, five from 
Portsmouth and one, Queen, from Cork. This was the first transport which carried Irish convicts 
• to the colony. 
" AJCP, reel 1073, Out Letters Secretary-at-War New South Wales Corps, 1789-1803, WO 
4/845, p.37, dated 31 December 1792. The men's names were : 'John Townsend 1st Dn Gds [1st 
Dragoon(?) Guards], Owen Davies 11th Lt. Dns [Light Dragoons(?)], Wm Hughes 2nd Foot, Pat. 
Gill 65 ditto, Jms Watts NSWC'. A notation stated the men were 'Transferred to the N.S.W. 
Corps'. 
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from the Savoy. One of these was Joseph Draper, 'a mutineer from Quebec', who 
had been sentenced to be shot for 'an attempt to raise an insurrection'.' In a 
welter of claim and counter claim, extending for over a year after the ship reached 
Port Jackson, it is hard to determine if a serious mutiny was planned or not, and 
whether TF Palmer and W Skirving, two of the four "Scottish Martyrs", on board 
with the privileged status as gentlemen political prisoners, were involved.' 
Nevertheless, through informers (one of whom was Draper), the master, Captain 
Campbell, and agent, Baker (a former marine sergeant of the First Fleet), believed 
that a 'most diabolical plot ... was laid, and nearly ... put into execution'. This 
was to take place when the convoy, of which Surprize was part, separated. 
Campbell went aboard the commodore's ship to report this and an investigation 
was conducted by the master assisted by a lieutenant detailed by the commodore. 
Independently of the alleged plot instigated by Palmer and Skirving, it is likely that 
the six soldiers from the Savoy had conspired from the time they were escorted on 
board. 'Therefore, it was believable to Campbell when another informer reported 
that he 'had overheard the [army] deserters, in the Irish language ... [discussing] 
measures to seize the ship?' As Campbell was told this only two days before he 
visited the commodore's ship, this information may have confirmed the plot's 
reality in Campbell's mind. Although the truth behind this saga has never been 
established, it illustrates the problems of a transport carrying unreliable troops 
compounded by fears of a convict mutiny. 
Without additional worry over disgruntled soldiers, the convict threat alone 
was very real to masters, agents and guard commanders. Therefore, the reports of 
plots on other transports, such as on Royal Admiral, on her second trip, and 
Hillsborough or Anne, the latter two with hired civilian guards, is not considered 
unusual. There were good grounds for concern on Royal Admiral with 257 male 
" HRNSW, 2, footnote to p.102, for Quebec mutineer; footnote p.863, for 'an attempt to raise 
an insurrection in Quebec'; p.875, for a newspaper report of March 1795, that Draper led a 
'conspiracy against the life of Prince Edward, in Canada'. 
" HRNSW, 2, pp.856-886. This was an involved issue. As there was a perception of mutiny 
involving soldiers, this aspect only is considered. 
" HRNSW, 2, footnote p.858. For 'diabolical plot', p.860. 
84 HRNSW, 2, p.859. This was received from the informer on 31 May 1794. 
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convicts and a guard consisting of only two ensigns, one of whom was William 
Minchin, and seven other ranks - including Sergeant Thomas Hughes, who was 
later court martialled in Sydney and sentenced 'To be reduced & 500 lashes [for] 
Improper Conduct on board of Ship'. Both Minchin and Hughes were survivors 
of a successful mutiny on the transport Lady Shore, by New South Wales Corps 
soldiers.' Apart from Lady Shore, prior to 1803, there were two other mutinies in 
which members of the Corps were directly implicated. These were aboard 
Marquis Cornwallis, which arrived in February 1796, and Barwell which reached 
Sydney Cove in May 1798. 
Several months before Marquis Cornwallis sailed with convicts from Cork, 
difficulty was experienced in obtaining men to provide the military guard. 
Eventually 'volunteers from recruits' from Chatham Barracks were drafted to the 
New South Wales Corps together with two ensigns, J Brabyn and W Moore. 
These two newly appointed officers had been 'active and steady serjeants in the 
Foot Guards' before being posted to the Corps' guard detachment.' The First 
Mate of Marquis Cornwallis, later gave evidence to an enquiry at Sydney, that 
when the detachment came on board at Portsmouth, their escort officer on the 
march from Chatham, reported that the soldiers 'had been excessively mutinous 
and troublesome ... that the serjeant [Ellis] had been the most so, and set a very bad 
example to some of the young soldiers'.' When the ship sailed from Portsmouth, 
as part of a convoy to Plymouth, the strength of the guard was one sergeant, one 
corporal and twenty-four privates. The officers joined later.' After the convicts 
were embarked, one soldier, O'Donnell, received 150 lashes of an 800 lash 
" HRA 	3, p.18, for guard and convicts carried. For Sergeant Hughes, refer: AJCP, reel 2723, 
Judge Advocate General 1796-1825 General Courts Martial - Abroad, WO 90/1, p.14, notation 60. 
The ship on which Hughes travelled is not shown in this summary of his record. As the court 
martial took place on 28 November 1800 he could only have been on Royal Admiral which arrived 
20 November. Only two other transports with guards arrived that year, both of which arrived at 
Sydney Cove, in February. 
86 See below, Chapter 7. 
87 HRNSW, 2, p.299, for 'volunteers' HRNSW emphasis, and p.315 for sergeants from 'Foot 
Guards'. HRNSW, 3, p.103; for names of the ensigns. 
" HRNSW, 3, p.108. 
89 HRNSW, 2, p.300. Master, Marquis Cornwallis to Transport Commissioners of June 1795. 
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sentence of a general court martial for having refused 'being planted centinel while 
at Cork'.' 
Marquis Cornwallis sailed on 9 August 1795, with 163 male and seventy 
female convicts. From the beginning of the voyage, there were indications that 
Sergeant Ellis conspired with the convicts and disaffected members of the guard to 
organise a mutiny. By subterfuge, he obtained four clasp knives from the guard 
commander, Brabyn, which in early September, Ellis claimed he had lost. 
Thereupon, Brabyn gave him two more knives. On 9 September 1795, a month 
after sailing, the master, Captain M Hogan, received a note from two convict 
informers who asked to speak to him. Hogan was told a mutiny was to take place 
and the officers killed. Ellis as ringleader, would pass the knives to the convicts to 
free themselves of their irons prior to them rushing the deck. Simultaneously, Ellis 
and soldiers in the conspiracy would engage any officers on deck, and hand out 
arms to the convicts. Hogan advised Brabyn of this plan and proposed a kit check 
of the guard. This revealed that Ellis had in his possession all six knives issued by 
Brabyn. Surprisingly, Ellis was not restrained. According to the superintending 
surgeon, after 'Hogan received first information on the 9th of September, ... he 
kept [this] secret until he could get clear and satisfactory proof.' Meanwhile, 
Hogan 'cautioned the [ship's] officers and petty officers, with some confidential 
seamen, against any sudden surprize'.' In Bateson's opinion, Brabyn was dilatory 
in that he took no action against Ellis.' 
On the night of 11 September, suspicion of Ellis was further heightened, 
when he was overheard by the ship's gunner talking mutinously to some sentries. 
After Hogan was advised of this, he again warned his officers and reliable crewmen 
to keep a sharp watch and also placed a sailor at the prison door with the sentries. 
9° HRNSW, 3, p.105. Stated by O'Donnell in evidence at a magistrates enquiry at Sydney in 
which he blamed another soldier, Martin, for instigating his disobedience. Martin, on board 
Marquis Cornwallis, was lashed for his part in the mutiny. 
91  HRNSW, 3, P.109. 
" HRNSW, 3, p.110. Statement by Hogan. 
93 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.149, for comment if Brabyn had 'acted with promptitude ... 
tragedy ...might have been avoided'. 
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Hogan received confirmation of the plot from another informer on 13 September, 
including detail that Ellis planned to use female convicts to smuggle knives to the 
males to remove their irons. The females were also to put powdered glass in the 
crew's flour. Further, it was found that Ellis had spiked six muskets, and also 
disabled two pistols belonging to one of his officers. On 15 September 1795, 
Hogan, who would have required Brabyn's concurrence, ordered Ellis and another 
soldier, L Gaffney, to be ironed together and secured on the poop deck. Then, 
rather than Brabyn formally disciplining them, Hogan took an unusual, but sensible 
step, by seeking a consensus of the military and ship's officers and men who 
agreed Ellis and Gaffney should be 'punished' [flogged] and, chained together, 
imprisoned. On the same day, over forty-two males were flogged and six women 
disciplined. Ellis died nine days later, still chained to Gaffney. After Marquis 
Cornwallis reached Sydney, Governor Hunter ordered an official inquiry into the 
attempted mutiny which found that Hogan did what was necessary to secure his 
ship and was correct in his dealings with the Military. There is no record of any of 
the soldier conspirators being charged after arrival in Sydney.' 
Subsequently, several versions were given as to how the mutineers planned 
to break out of their prison to reach the deck. Accounts also varied on the sequence 
of events between 9 September, when Hogan was first informed of the plot, and 15 
September, when he took preventative and disciplinary measures. A supposed 
follow-up mutiny, of dubious authenticity, reportedly occurred on 22 September, 
" HRNSW, 3, pp.102-111. This account is selectively based on evidence, and written 
statements, presented at the Sydney inquiry. For magistrates' comments on Hogan's actions, 
p.102. 
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which was reported in a contemporary press account, and in Bateson's book.' 
Allegedly, one informer was strangled, with seven convicts wounded, all of whom 
subsequently died. There was no reference to such an occurrence in evidence given 
to a Sydney magisterial inquiry into the mutiny, nor was there any reference to any 
wounded convicts subsequently dying. The press report was apparently an over 
dramatised version of the following incident reported in evidence by the ship's 
doctor:- 
That even after their punishment [the flogging of over forty convicts on 15 
September] those who were punished endeavoured to strangle in the night 
those who had given information [up to three informers]. That Capt. 
Hogan was compelled to fire amongst them to suppress their mutiny.' 
Firing into the dark prison, it is conceivable that some convicts may have been 
wounded or killed, but nowhere were casualties reported. As this disturbance was a 
by-product of the main mutiny plot suppressed on 15 September, it probably 
passed virtually unnoticed at the Sydney inquiry. 
The press report of events of 22 September described a considerable volume 
of pistol fire directed at mutineers at almost point blank range as they attempted 'to 
force down the bulkhead'.' This seems an unlikely act against a strong barrier, 
loop-holed so that fire could be directed into the prison with safety to the sentries 
outside. In this case, it seems improbable that not one of seven wounded convicts 
later recovered, or similarly that none were killed outright. With no mention of 
such casualties at the magisterial inquiry, the press reports are discounted. 
" A letter from St. Helena, written a month after the mutiny by an unknown officer was 
published in two separate newspapers (HRNSW, 3, pp.4-5 and HRNSW, 2, pp.819-820). This 
stated that when Hogan conducted his twice weekly inspection of the prison, accompanied by the 
doctor and any other officers, they would be seized and 'put to death with their own swords'. The 
convicts would then rush the deck, where they would be 'assisted by the serjeant, corporal, and 
some of the private soldiers, who were to dispatch the officers upon deck, and also supply the 
convicts with arms.' A different account was given in a statement by Hogan 'at sea' dated 10 
September 1795, but which recorded events up to 15 September (HRNSW, 3, p.110). He wrote 
that 'at daylight ... [the convicts] were to rush the deck ... when the boys were let up to clear the 
buckets.' C Bateson, Convict Ships, pp.148-150, used the press report account which does not 
appear justified in comparison to evidence from the magisterial enquiry (HRNSW, 3, pp.102-111). 
D Collins, An Account, p.267, gives an abridged account of the episode and is the only source 
which confirmed the press reports that the female convicts' task was 'the preparing of pulverised 
glass to mix with flour, of which the seamen were to make their puddings.' 
" HRNSW, 3, p.109. 
" HRNSW, 2, p.819. 
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Additionally, there was nothing in the sensational press reports, nor in evidence at 
the inquiry, to support Bateson's theory that Ellis, shackled to another soldier, died 
nine days later 'possibly having been wounded during the indiscriminate firing.'' 
Unreliable accounts such as the press report, together with outright lies of some 
soldier witnesses, and contradictions in details in ship's officers' evidence 
(probably due to different recollections of events that took place six months 
before), makes piecing together a reliable account of the mutiny on Marquis 
Cornwallis difficult. 
Like Marquis Cornwallis, allegations of a serious plot on Barwell were the 
subject of conflicting evidence as to whether members of the guard were implicated. 
This was asserted to be the second plot to seize Barwell which sailed from 
Portsmouth, with 2% male convicts, on 7 November 1797. The only evidence of 
the first plot is a personal letter written from Cape of Good Hope by Richard Dore, 
Deputy Judge-Advocate Collins' replacement. Dore claimed twenty-five persons, 
presumably convicts, intended to mutiny but the plot was pre-empted after an 
informer passed a warning the night before.' Bateson notes that this incident was 
not recorded in the ship's log.' The second and more serious plot took place after 
the ship left Cape Town. From evidence of a Court of Vice Admiralty held in 
Sydney, dissatisfaction was rife in the guard detachment. The junior of the guards' 
two ensigns, G Bond, gave encouragement if not leadership to the disgruntled 
soldiers.' In turn, the soldiers were allegedly conspiring with some convicts with 
the intention of seizing Barwell and making for Ile de France. On 24 March 1798, 
following a quarrel between two soldiers, there were instances of disobedience by 
98 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.150. Rather than Bateson's theory of a stray shot being the 
cause of Ellis' death, it is considered that he probably died from complications arising from his 
severe flogging. One soldier witness at the Sydney inquiry referred to the imprisoned Ellis being 
abused by other convicts for being the cause of their punishment. He would not have been gently 
treated by the prisoners, nor by the ship's officers he had intended to murder. Hogan intended to 
bring charges of piracy against Ellis in Sydney. If Ellis had been shot and wounded, probably a 
desire to save him for the gallows, or humanity of the ship's doctor, would have resulted in him 
being unshackled from Gaffney to allow treatment to be administered. 
99 HRNSW, 3, p.356. Dated February 1798. Dore did not emphasise, or express concern over 
this plot. 
'°° C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.166. 
101 HRNSW, 3, pp.454-472; for proceedings of court, which provides the basis of this account. 
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soldiers and non commissioned officers, and near mutiny, before the detachment 
agreed to parade on deck without their arms. Bond, with the intent to encourage the 
soldiers' insolence, came up from his quarters, where he had been confined by the 
detachment commander, Ensign Bayly. Further trouble was preempted by the 
master, Captain Cameron and Bayly ordering Ensign Bond be confined in his cabin 
with his legs 'ironed about 2 inches seperate [sic] from each other'.' Several 
soldiers and convicts were flogged and, like Bond, `confin'd on passage' until the 
ship reached Port Jackson on 18 May 1798.'3 
For the Corps' conspirators, the sequel to the mutiny took place in Sydney. 
Bayly brought charges of drunkenness and other offences against Bond.' Major 
Foveaux, administering command of the Corps, sought and gained Governor 
Hunter's approval that Bond be allowed to resign his commission rather than face a 
scheduled court martial.' Presumably Foveaux's motive was to hush up the 
disgraceful conduct of one of the Corps' officers. This was unacceptable to 
Cameron who insisted, in the Court of Vice-Admiralty, on pressing charges of 
mutiny against Bond and five soldiers. As an actual mutiny did not take place, the 
prosecution had to rely on circumstantial evidence to prove a mutiny was planned. 
With contradictory testimony from witnesses, including convicts, who had been 
subjected to inducements by both opposing parties to taint their evidence, all 
defendants were found not guilty.' Despite these findings, there was no doubt in 
the mind of the Home Secretary, the Duke of Portland, that evidence against Bond 
was strong. He wrote bluntly to Hunter that Bond's resignation 'should not have 
been accepted, as it was evidently given in with a view to defeat his being tried by a 
Court-martial.'' Portland's under secretary, in advising Whitehall that Bond's 
1 " HRNSW, 3, p.472. Evidence by a convict who 'was under the necessity of lifting him [Bond] 
in and out of his cot'. 
1 " HRNSW, 3, p.484. Hunter to Portland of September 1798. 
104 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.166. 
1 " HRNSW, 3, p.484. 
1" HRNSW, 3, p.467; for soldiers, and for Bond, p.472, where he was not required to plead, as 
the court decided that 'there is not sufficient evidence to his conviction'. 
107 HRA, I, 2, p.391. To Hunter of November 1799. In his letter he did not specify whether he 
was referring to misconduct or mutiny on Bond's part. 
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resignation had been accepted by Hunter, was more explicit stating that Bond was 
'endeavouring to stir up a mutiny amongst the convicts on board the Barwell'.' 
Compared to the guards' empathy with the convicts on Burwell, a cold 
blooded attitude was shown on Hercules which sailed on 29 November 1801 from 
Cork, with 140 male and twenty-five female convicts. The guard commander, 
Captain Ralph Wilson, reacted erratically, initially losing control and then showing 
misguided zeal in putting down a serious mutiny. The attempt to seize the ship 
took place at 2.15pm on 29 December 1801. According to the master, Captain L 
Betts, the only personnel on deck at that time were the officer of the watch, 
helmsman, two armed sentries and some convicts, exercising. Betts, the guard 
commander Captain Wilson, three ship's officers and two ladies were dining and 
except for the sentries, the guard were relaxing below deck, but with their muskets 
loaded.' With the advantage of surprise in the early afternoon, the convicts on 
deck attacked. Brushing aside the sentries, the watch keeping officer and 
helmsman fled, and the convicts gained the quarterdeck. The officers who were 
dining, rushed out to meet the challenge and a convict using a captured blunderbuss 
aimed at Betts, the weapon misfired and the convict was shot by Wilson. Betts 
claimed that others were shot by the officers, forcing the convicts to flee the quarter 
deck. Hearing the firing, the guard and ship's company hurriedly armed and; 
began to vent their rage upon such of the insurgents as were to be found on 
deck, in beating them with cutlasses and the butt ends of their muskets, until 
at length they forced them down into the prison. 
As a result, Betts claimed that twelve convicts were killed, and ten wounded of 
which two later died.' This was no doubt a sanitised account of an uncontrolled 
slaughter, which reached its finale about an hour after security was restored, when 
Betts personally shot and killed an alleged ringleader, Jeremiah Prendergass, who 
was kneeling pleading for his life. 
1" HRNSW, 3, p.726 
HRNSW, 4, p.817, for evidence by the ship's chief officer. 
110 HRNSW, 4, p.792. This version of the mutiny was from Betts' report to Governor King of 
June 1802, the date Hercules reached Port Jackson. As one of several discrepancies in this report, 
Betts was charged with the murder of thirteen convicts, but not fourteen, which was the number he 
reported as killed or died of their wounds. 
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In Sydney, Betts was brought before a Court of Vice-Admiralty facing two 
charges; murdering thirteen convicts during the mutiny and also Prendergass. He 
was found not guilty on the first count and guilty of manslaughter on the second 
with a fine of £500, deferred by Governor King until Betts' case could be reviewed 
in England." In evidence, the guard sergeant, T Trotter, stated that there were three 
guards on deck (not two as stated by Betts). Two sentries, whose locations were 
not specified (probably on deck forward of the barricade), were armed with 'brass 
blunderbusses' and one on the quarterdeck with a 'cutlass and pistole'. The 
sentries were apparently wearing bayonets, as in evidence Trotter stated he was 
attacked by a mutineer 'coming forward with a bayonet pointed towards him'. 
Trotter claimed he heard only two shots fired by the officers on the quarter deck 
and that only one mutineer was killed before the convicts fled.' With this one man 
shot, the mutiny for practical purposes was foiled,' and like that on Albermarle, it 
remained only for the convicts to be forced below into their prison and security 
would have been restored. Instead, in reply to the courts' question about where the 
convicts were shot, Trotter described the random nature of the killings: 'Some on 
the main deck, others between decks, and others in the hold.' Even an informer, 
who had previously given warning of the mutiny was killed. The court then 
endeavoured to establish whether or not the officers attempted to regain control 
over the crew and soldiers - 'Did you hear Capt. Betts give any orders to leave 
firing on the convicts?' To which Trotter replied that he did not 'but the chief mate, 
as well as dep't [the deponent, Trotter], endeavoured to stop firing.' No evidence 
was produced to challenge this lack of control exhibited by Betts and Wilson, 
which contrasted with efforts of their subordinates to stop the killing.' To 
establish beyond doubt where command responsibility in the ship lay, the court 
HRNSW, 4, p.869. King to Hobart of October 1802. 
1 " HRNSW, 4, pp.813-815, for Trotter's evidence. Referring to the quarter-deck, he stated 'I 
saw none shot there, but believe only one besides J P [Jeremiah Prendergass].' HRA, 
1, 3. p.536, for convicts' names deleted in HRNSW account. 
1 " HRNSW, 4, p.814. Trotter 'considered the ship in safety after the q'r-deck had been cleared'. 
1 " This statement of Trotter's was not challenged by the chief mate, Aikin (elsewhere Aiken), 
who was a witness for the defence. Captain Wilson's evidence was vague, with the obvious intent 
of not showing himself to have lost control of his soldiers, like Aikin, he did not contradict 
Trotter's evidence. 
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asked Trotter under whose command he conceived himself to be. His reply 
indicated where responsibility for the massacre rested - 'Under Capt. Wilson and 
Capt. Betts.' 
The foregoing accounts of mutinies at sea involving the New South Wales 
Corps illustrates deficiencies in the selection, training and discipline of officers, 
weaknesses in the non-commissioned officers, and problems with men pressed into 
service, including those from the Savoy, especially after the commencement of the 
Revolutionary War against France. The highly suspect Ensign Bond on Barwell, 
the lack of control of Captain Wilson on Hercules, the mutiny organised by 
Sergeant Ellis on Marquis Cornwallis, the sergeant who deserted Salamander just 
before sailing, the mutinies and difficulties at sea aboard Boddingtons and Sugar 
Cane involving unreliable guard detachments, problems caused by the six ex-Savoy 
prisoners on Surprize's second trip and the indiscipline of the troops on H.M.S. 
Gorgon provide a litany of woes. This sorry record deteriorates further, with the 
mutiny aboard Lady Shore, which is considered in the next chapter. 
In making the above criticism, a special circumstance applied to the Corps as 
compared to its immediate successor the 73rd Regiment which came out to the 
colony as a complete unit in two naval ships.' A general officer in 1840 wrote 
'The 96th melt away by degrees to New South Wales and they threaten to take the 
20th."6 Like the 96th, the New South Wales Corps `melt[ed] away by degrees' 
to the colony. Commencing with the Second Fleet, this is illustrated by the above 
accounts of many small guard detachments dispatched to the colony. This would 
have presented enormous difficulties for the unit's command and administrative 
staff which remained in England. Theirs was the task of fulfilling Home Office 
demands for guard detachments. This would have necessitated a hurried cycle of 
recruiting, equipping, training and administering those (often unfortunate) men who 
filled the ranks. Even where company sized groups were dispatched, such as the 
" 5 See below, Chapter 12, p.310. For arrival of a detachment preceeding the mainbody. 
1 " JF McMahon, 'The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's 
Land with Particular Reference to the Black Line', Hobart, unpublished MHum Thesis, University 
of Tasmania, 1995, pp.8-9. Letter, General Sir C Napier to Commander 98th Regiment of 1840. 
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troops which sailed on Gorgon, Pin and Lady Shore, the same problems would 
have applied in England. 
The corollary to this was the fractured command and control situation which 
circumstances forced on the unit. There was little opportunity for Grose to exercise 
command and impress his will on his unit. For example, for six months he was out 
of touch with the Corps, apart from the troops accompanying him on Pin. 
Meanwhile his unit was split between England and New South Wales, or on other 
vessels. Within the colony, the Corps were further subdivided in various outlying 
garrison posts. With strong officers administering command on Grose's behalf in 
either England or the colony - a normal military procedure in such cases, unit 
discipline could have been maintained. It appears that this was the case in the 
colony, where earlier Corps arrivals worked side by side with the marines, as 
illustrated by both marines and soldiers taking part in Phillip's punitive expeditions 
against the Botany Bay Aborigines in December 1790, also in garrisoning Norfolk 
Island, where similar to other detachments operating in that very small community, 
there were some friction. Indeed, Phillip's silence on the soldierly behaviour of 
the Corps in the colony, is possibly an indication that the governor was satisfied 
with their performance and discipline under their initially appointed company 
commanders.' By the time Governor Hunter arrived in the colony, it was a 
different story at sea and on shore. Ironically, the concerns of moral and criminal 
contagion, which were often raised about the corruption of convicts, seems to a 
degree to have applied to the New South Wales Corps guard detachments on their 
passages to the colony. 
117 Personal animosity between Ross and Captain Hill on Norfolk Island, and the duel they 
fought the day before Ross sailed for England, are not considered factors to alter the author's 
opinion. See above, Chapter 3, pp.66-67, for Phillip's expedition involving marines and soldiers, 
and Chapter 4, pp.95-96, for their co-existance, with some problems, on Norfolk Island. 
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Chapter 7 
The 'Unfortunate Fate of the Lady Shore' 
On 1 August 1797, elements of the guard detachment on the transport Lady 
Shore executed a successful mutiny, capturing the ship in the name of the Republic 
of France. As a sequel, a naval Transport Office report to the Home Secretary, the 
Duke of Portland, stated:- 
And on Account of the unfortunate Fate of the Lady Shore and the little 
Trust which was found in the military Guard on board that Ship, ... it was 
agreed, under the Sanction of a Communication with Your Grace's Office 
... that the Owners [of Hillsborough] should provide a [civilian] Guard of 
30 Men, over and above the 48 [crew] which formed the Ship's 
Complement' 
This derogatory observation applied to the New South Wales Corps and its guard 
which had embarked on Lady Shore, and was blamed for its loss. Blame should 
have also been directed at the War Office which administered the Corps and 
appointed officers to positions of responsibility in that unit. Wartime stresses and 
shortages of officers and men in the fourth year of Britain's involvement in the 
Revolutionary War with France, contributed to the mutiny. Nevertheless, ultimately 
the ship's fate was decided by the culpable neglect of two officers who failed to 
confront their responsibilities. 
The first officer, Francis Grose, had returned to England from New South 
Wales in 1795, and promoted lieutenant colonel while continuing to command the 
New South Wales Corps. His record in the colony indicated that Grose was 
'indolent by nature, he displayed no desire to follow Phillip's practice of 
AJCP, reel 4400, Admiralty out letters to Navy Board, Pay, War Office, Home Office, Colonial 
Office, ADM 108/20, p.48, dated 11 June 1801. In reply to Governor Hunter regarding high 
mortality on Hillsborough. 
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maintaining a close personal watch over every aspect of the settlement ... a man 
generally believed reluctant to act on his own initiative: 2 The other officer, of 
Anglo-Irish stock with military traditions, was Ensign William Minchin'aged about 
twenty-three in 1797, married, and according to the Australian Dictionary of 
Biography commissioned on 2 March 1797. 4 Military historian, Brigadier M 
Austin, who considered that Minchin had no previous military service in his home 
County of Tipperary, wrote that Minchin was 'appointed Adjutant of the Corps on 8 
November 17%, and gazetted as Ensign on 4 March 1797'. 5 Accepting the minor 
discrepancy on appointment dates, and that it is subject to disputation whether or not 
he had previous artillery training,' Minchin commenced his career in the Corps in 
November as a "gentleman" and completed about four months service before he 
was commissioned.' Therefore, he was not a totally inexperienced officer when he 
assumed command of the guard detachment on the Lady Shore in late March 1797. 8 
Routine contractual matters provided the low key introduction of Lady Shore 
into naval records. On 3 January 1797, the Commissioners for the Transport 
Service advised the Home Office 'that they can immediately engage a Passage for 
50 or more Women to New South Wales at a rate of £22, per Head, and half-price 
2 ADB, 1, p.489. 
• M Austin, 'William Minchin of the New South Wales Corps', JRAHS, Vol. 50, Pt. 6, 
December 1964, p.414. 
4 ADB, 2, p.233. 
• M Austin, 'William Minchin', p.415. Austin (on p.427) quotes authority for this statement as 
'Army Lists from War Office Librarian.' The explanation for Minchin being appointed adjutant 
before he was commissioned lies in an extract of an Army directive relating to the Corps, quoted 
by Austin (p.415) which states that officers 'in their respective ranks ... are to fall into vacancies 
in the establishment as they shall occur.' 
6  In this author's opinion, Minchin probably had artillery training before being appointed to the 
Corps. 
.3 The officers originally gazetted to the Corps, in October 1789, (tabulated list, Chapter 5, 
p.116. included a non commissioned 'gentleman', Thomas Rowley, appointed 'to be adjutant'. In 
turn, Minchin would have been classified as a 'gentleman' on the Corps' headquarters whilst 
serving as adjutant and probably waiting for an officer vacancy on the establishment. That 
Minchin had been so appointed, tends to indicate, that in accordance with R Holmes' comments on 
serving 'gentlemen' , (see above Chapter 5, p.117, footnote 81), Minchin probably had previous 
service as a non-commissioned officer, this may have been with battalion guns or artillery in the 
Irish militia. 
• HRNSW, 3, p.201 and footnote. War Office to Paymaster-General of 25 March 1797: for a 
detachment ordered to embark. 
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for Children ... [on] the Lady Shore of about 300 Tons'. 9 By 17 January, the ship 
was chartered, and it was recommended the 'Female Convicts ... [be received] at 
Galleons near Woolwich, which is ... more convenient for their Reception, on 
account of the Crowd of Persons, which have hitherto attended their Embarkation 
nearer the Town [London], and which have occasioned many Inconveniences.' On 
7 February, the Transport Office advised the Home Office that on completion of 
loading provisions, Lady Shore would shortly be ready to receive convicts." In 
addition to transporting convicts, a wide variety of cargo was loaded for the colony, 
including naval stores required by Governor Hunter 'for the colonial Schooner' .' 2 
On 16 March, the Home Office was advised by the War Office that ten tons of arms 
required shipping to the New South Wales Corps.' Presumably, this included,the 
'hundred stand of arms', which were for 'entrusted' settlers' use against 'a gang or 
two of banditti'.' Amongst other items shipped were a case of medicines,' and a 
large quantity of farming tools together with metal for fabricating nails and other 
items' - a valuable cargo. 
_  
Concurrently with naval transport administration, army authorities had been 
making arrangements regarding the ship. On 7 February 1797, the War Office 
wrote to `Offr Comg [Officer Commanding] H.M's Forces New South Wales' 
that deserters would be held in the Savoy 'until an Opportunity shall offer for 
conveying them to New South Wales, where they are to join Lieut Col. Grose's 
Corps'. 17 The Lady Shore provided that opportunity as indicated by a War Office 
9 AJCP, reel 4400, Admiralty out letters to Navy Board, Pay, War Office, Home Office, Colonial 
Office, ADM 108/19, p.63. To J King Esqr. (John King, then 'Under Secretary in the Home 
Office', HRNSW, 3, footnote to p.481). 
' ADM 108/19, p.66. Transport Office to King. 
" ADM 108/19, p.69. 
" ADM 108/19, p.69. Transport Office to Portland of 15 February 1797. 
' AJCP, reel 1073, Out Letters Secretary-at-War New South Wales Corps, 1790-1802, WO 
4/845, p.67. 
14 HRNSW, 3, p.195. Portland to Hunter of March 1797, for 'banditti'. Portland noted the 
consignment amounted to a 'hundred stand of arms'. 
's WO 4/845, p.77, for one chest of medicines, replacing 'what was sent by the Lady Shore'. 
" HRNSW, 3, p.192, for tools and metal for fabricating. 
17 WO 4/845, p.66. Addressed to the `Offr Comg', as the Commanding Officer, Grose, had 
returned to England and the War Office may have been uncertain who would be administering 
command of the Corps when their letter arrived in the colony. 
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letter to the Home Office on 16 February:- 
There being ... in the Savoy prison six soldiers ... ordered ... to serve for 
life in a regiment stationed in New South Wales, I am directed by the 
Secretary at War to enquire whether these men (with four women and two 
children), together with a proper escort [emphasis added], amounting in all 
to about twenty soldiers, can be received on board the transport which ... is 
on the point of sailing ... 
As there are about fifty more recruits at Chatham for the same destination, it 
will be very desirable that they also should obtain a passage by the same 
conveyance!' 
It is noteworthy that the men from the Savoy were not part of the guard, but that the 
balance of the twenty man detachment was to provide a 'proper escort' for the six 
ex-prisoners and convict women. In response to the War Office request, on the 
following day, the Transport Office advised the Home Office that Lady Shore could 
take both the guard and recruits!' 
In February 1797, the role of troops to be embarked on Lady Shore was 
broadened beyond that of escorting convicts and performing internal security duties 
in New South Wales. By then, with Spain an ally of France, the war had developed 
into a world wide struggle. Like the Seven Years and American War of 
Independence, this conflict involved widespread naval and amphibious operations. 
In a small way, this had been illustrated in July 1796, when the French captured 
Lady Shore whilst homeward bound from the Cape of Good Hope. Her cargo was 
looted, then she was released.' By coincidence, she was back in England and 
under charter to the Transport Office, when in February 1797, a strategic decision 
was taken to strengthen the New South Wales Corps with a view to using part of 
that unit for offensive operations. 
As a result of this decision, additional officers and men were ordered to the 
colony to meet imperial, not colonial, requirements. The Home Secretary advised 
Hunter, these troops were to be part of an augmentation of the Corps to ten 
companies, the purpose being:- 
18 HRNSW, 3, p.193. Under Secretary Lewis to King. 
' 9 ADM 108/19, p.70. To King of 17 February 1797. 
" C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 2nd ed. 1969, p.151. Lady Shore was 
captured by the corvette Le Moineau. 
157 
Four companies ... of eighty-five per company, are to hold themselves in 
readiness for actual [active] service under command of Major Paterson, who 
will receive the necessary directions for that purpose, on the arrival at the 
settlement of a naval force, which will have orders to receive Major 
Paterson and the detachment on board. Seventy recruits and three subaltern 
officers will arrive in the Lady Shore.' 
While Historical Records of New South Wales record 'It is not known on 
what service these four companies were to be employed', Historical Records of 
Australia note that 'it is probable that an expedition was projected against one of the 
Spanish settlements in the Philippine Islands. The matter is clarified by AV 
Fortescue and A Frost. A fleet was to embark 1800 troops at Cape Town, then 
proceed to New South Wales (obviously as a port of refreshment), there collecting 
the four companies of the Corps. It was originally intended that the force attack 
Spanish towns on the Rio de la Plata, but this was changed to the vague objective of 
'the south-west coast of America'.' In the event, the plan was short lived, as on 6 
March 1797, the Secretary at War advised the Home Secretary that the proposed 
expedition should not proceed.' Despite this cancellation, the additional 
reinforcements were still dispatched to the colony. Once embarked, there are 
differing versions on the behaviour of the soldiers and how the ship was captured. 
English language accounts of the mutiny are primarily based on published 
reports by surviving ship's officers, the Second and Third Mates and Purser.' No 
accounts written by military personnel on board, or extracts from military records 
" HRNSW, 3, p.194. Portland to Hunter of February 1797. Of the augmented 850 rank and file, 
510 Will remain in the settlement' - obviously for internal security duties - after the departure of 
Paterson's detachment of '340' other ranks. A total at variance, in the same letter, with the order 
to provide four companies of 85, which equals 260. A third subaltern did not join the other two, 
Ensigns Minchin and Prater. 
22 HRNSW, 3, footnote, also HRA, 1, 2, p.704, Commentary Note 6. 
" JW Fortescue, A History of The British Army, Vol.4, P1.1, 1789-1801, London, 1906, 
pp.527-528. A Frost, Convicts and Empire A Naval Question 1776-1811, Melbourne, 1980, 
pp.164-165. 
" HRNSW, 3, p.196. Dundas to Portland. A Frost, The Global Reach of Empire, Britain's 
maritime expansion in the Indian and Pacific oceans 1764-1815, Carlton, 2003, p.254. The 
expedition was cancelled because of 'reverses in Europe and the emerging expense of the venture'. 
" Respectively; Simon Murchison, Gerald Drummond and John Black. Their joint statement is 
recorded in ADM 108/19, pp.124-138, and as an additional statement, by Murchison, pp.144-150: 
published (with editorial amendments) in HRNSW, 3, pp.392-397 and pp.413-415. 
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concerning the mutiny, are known to have been published. This has resulted in an 
inadequate picture being presented in both primary and secondary accounts, which 
lack a clear explanation of how a minority of mutineers overcame, and then kept in 
subjugation, a larger number of soldiers as well as the crew. Fortunately, an 
unpublished transcript of Minchin's 1799 general court marshal helps correct this 
imbalance. This document is valuable because it contains evidence given by army 
survivors Minchin, Lieutenant (then Ensign) William Prater,' and three New South 
Wales Corps non-commissioned officer? 
Another collection of primary source documents is held in the National 
Archives, Paris, and have been usefully cited in Jean Guillou's description of the 
mutiny on Lady Shore" as well by Charles Bateson, in The Convict Ships.' With 
Guillou's sense of national pride, his treatment of the French wartime seizure of 
Lady Shore presents a patriotic emphasis compared to the British survivors' laconic 
accounts. 
Guillou's account focuses on the Frenchmen enlisted into the New South 
Wales Corps. He claims the two key players were 'Citizen' sailors, Selis 
[elsewhere Dubois], the signalman, and Thierry, the second pilot, both crewmen 
26 Proceedings of a General Court Martial held at Portsmouth on 11th 12th & 13th days of July 
1 799 for the Trail of Ensign & Adjutant William Minchin of the New South Wales Corps, 
(Section or Bundle) 19, WO 71/184, pp.1-29. Obtained by courtesy University of Tasmania from 
PRO London. 
27 WO 71/184, p.17, for Prater's new rank, in the 60th Regiment. 
28 Sergeants Richard Burns and Thomas Hughes, and Corporal George Morrison. Refer: AJCP, 
reel 1075, Lady Shore - Mutiny, Claims of 8 NCOs ... who were taken to Mount Avido South 
America in August 1798, & remained there as prisoners of War until Sept 1801 - thence were sent 
to the Cape & finally home in 1806, from W.O.Unnumbered Papers 1802.B (Bundle B],  WO 
40/16, no pagination, frames 19-21, for a return, listing the names of the detachment, and date and 
place of their embarkation on Lady Shore, 'under the Command of Ensign Minchin'. In the 
nominal roll, Burns is listed as `Serjeant Barnes'. 
29 J Guillou, 'The Capture of the Convict Transport Ship, The Lady Shore, by French Sailors', 
The French Presence in Australia: Sailors, Settlers and Ships, Essays by Jean Guillou, translated 
and edited by M. Kuilboer and M.S.Riviere, Northern Queensland: James Cook University, 1994, 
passim. 
3° C Bateson, Convict Ships, pp.151-157. 
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from the French corvette Bonne Citoyenne.' This warship was part of a fleet 
bound for the West Indies, separated in a storm, dismasted and captured by British 
ships.' As prisoners of war, Selis and Thierry made a break for freedom from 
Portsmouth, escaping by boat, but were apprehended by a coast guard vessel and 
returned to prison. Selis and Thierry were now 'Deemed to be deserters' and 
confined on a hulk waiting transportation to Botany Bay'." There, 'to escape their 
miserable lot, [they] had enlisted in the New South Wales regiment in Australia!' 
Bateson notes from a French report that Delis, also known as Selis and 
Dubois, chief helmsman, and Thierry, second coast-pilot, were two prisoners from 
La Bonne Citoyenne placed aboard the Lady Shore.' WD Edmonds and TG 
Parsons' account agrees with that of Bateson, giving the additional information that 
La Bonne Citoyenne was captured in March 1796, further, they refer to Thierry as 
'alias Corporal Thomeo'.' This links the identity of Thierry and Thomeo with that 
of 'Corporal Thomrie' in the nominal roll of soldiers embarked on Lady Shore.' 
'J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p.89. For identification of individuals, the names used by 
Guillou, Bateson and other sources, often vary. For example, `Selis, the signalman' (p.89) is 
described by Bateson (p.151) as 'Delis, the chief helmsman'. In HRNSW, 3, p.393; Second Officer 
Murchison's account of the mutiny, refers to 'Dubois [alias Deliz]'. This links the names `Selis' 
and `Eliena Dubois', listed in WO 40/16 (20th frame), as a member of the Corps' detachment 
which embarked on Lady Shore. Hereafter, 'Sells', `Delis/Deliz' will be referred to as 'Dubois'. 
Separately, HRNSW, 3, p.394, refers to `Thomeo [alias Thierry]' ; in WO 40/16 (frame 19) the 
name 'Corporal Thomrie' in the embarkation roll is equated with `Thomeo'. In evidence at 
Minchin's court martial, Sergeant Hughes referred to a mutineer named 'Corporal Tominion' (WO 
71/184, p.10) and a question to him by the Court (refer p.16) was Was Corporal Thomo employed 
often by the Captain in the Navigation of the Ship?' This apparently confirms HRNSW's 
identification of Thomeo (also Thomrie"Thorninion' and `Thomo') with Guillou's Thierry, the 
second pilot', who Bateson (p.151) refers to as 'the second coast-pilot'. 
" While Guillou (p.89) wrote that Admiral de Sercey's fleet was bound for the Fast Indies, 
Bateson (p.151) states this fleet was making for the West Indies. With warfare between Britain and 
France having commenced in the West Indies from 1794, including associated naval manoeuvring; 
and also with the route to the East Indies denied to the French with the British occupation of Cape 
of Good Hope from 1795; it is considered that Admiral de Sercey's fleet would have been making 
for the West Indies. 	• 
" J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, pp.89-90. 
" J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p.91. 
" C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.151. 
" WD Edmonds and TG Parsons, lacobinism Afloat The Insurrection on the 'Lady Shore' in 
1797', History Today, Vol.34, No.4, November 1984, p.12. 
37 WO 40/16, frame 19. 
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Guillou's, and the above two accounts, fail to explain how a French sailor 
(probably of petty officer or officer status, being 'second-coast pilot') could have 
been captured as a prisoner of war in March 1796, yet by 27 March 1797, the date 
of embarkation of the Corps' detachment on Lady Shore,' be a corporal in the 
British Army. Guillou, working from French records, notes that Selis and Thierry 
were prisoners for seven months before their unsuccessful escape attempt from 
Portsmouth.' As this was followed by transfer to a hulk, it would be reasonable to 
assume this transfer represented a lapsed time of eight months from when they were 
first captured on the La Bonne Citoyenne. It is scarcely conceivable that within four 
months of time remaining before Thierry embarked as a corporal, he could have 
enlisted (from the hulk), received enough training to show . his aptitude as a non-
commissioned officer and then been promoted. From the embarkation nominal roll 
(other than for three obscured names), it does not appear that there is a possibility of 
mistaken identity between two men with names approximating Thierry and Thomrie. 
Therefore, if Thierry and Thomrie are one and the same, his account published in 
France after his return home following the successful mutiny on Lady Shore, must 
include distorted truths concerning his adventures. Edmonds and Parsons make a 
similar assumption on another aspect of Thieny's story when they write `Thierry's 
letter also seems to have been ambiguous'.' 
A final assumption is made by this writer, based on the War Office 
documentation that Thierry/Thomrie was a corporal at time of embarkation. This is 
that he boarded Lady Shore as a "free" soldier rather than one of six ex-Savoy 
prisoners who were in chains when embarked. Given the insecurity of non-
commissioned rank, Thierry would certainly have been a private soldier if he had 
come from the Savoy. Probably, his fellow crewman from La Bonne Citoyenne, 
Dubois, also came aboard with Thierry rather than with those from the Savoy. If so, 
the two future leaders of the mutineers would have been more readily accepted, 
without obvious hint of suspicion by the English elements of the Corps on Lady 
" WO 40/16, frame 19. 
" J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p.89. 
40 W D Edmonds and TG Parsons, `Jacobinism Afloat' p.14. 
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Shore. The names of the ex-Savoy prisoners are not known, but they were 
described as some British Army deserters who 'principally consisted of a party of 
the 60th regiment, composed of foreigners and Irish'.' 
On 25 March, the War Office confirmed that the total strength of the 
detachment to be embarked was '1 Adjutant 3 Serjeants 67 Private Men'. 42 In fact, 
three sergeants, four corporals, three drummers and sixty-four privates were listed 
as having been embarked at Gravesend on 27 March 1797." This company-sized 
detachment was under command of Ensign Minchin, who had been commissioned 
In consequence of the intended Augmentation'.' It was not until 1 April that the 
War Office requested Home Office approval for a second officer, Ensign Prater, a 
reinforcement for the Corps, to be given passage on the transport.' Minchin 
retained command of the detachment, as in regimental seniority, he was Prater's 
superior officer by one day . 
The troops embarked at Gravesend, with their behaviour attracting several 
adverse reports from the ship's officers before Lady Shore finally departed English 
home waters. When Minchin first came on board, he told Second Mate Murchison 
that 'we must look very sharp after some French and Irish deserters ... one of the 
Frenchmen had told General Fox ... [at] Chatham Barracks, that if they could not 
41 Times, No.4652, London, 28 November 1799, p.3, column 4 (p.3.d). Evidence by Lieutenant 
Prater in an examination of two captured Lady Shore mutineers, at the Public Office, Bow Street. 
" WO 4/845, p.68. 
" WO 40/16, frames 19-21. Other ranks' names were serially numbered, thus it can be 
established that at the bottom of frame 19 one private's name (serial 14) is obscured and two 
privates (serials 44 and 45) are obscured on frame 20. 
" The Corps' company establishment was:- 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 ensign, 3 sergeants, 3 
corporals, 2 drummers and 67 privates. Therefore, Minchin, as an ensign, for a voyage of six 
months, was to command a company sized force. The February 1797 planned size of an augmented 
company was eighty-five other ranks. 
" WO 4/845, p.67. Letter to Grose of 13 March 1797, advised cancellation of the augmentation, 
but that the officers promoted would remain seconded in their ranks until there were vacancies in 
the Corps' establishment. 
" WO 4/845, p.68. The Home Office request to the Transport Office of 2 April 1797. Next day, 
the War Office noted the passage was approved if 'the above Ship has not sailed' (p.69). 
HRNSW, 3, p.526; 'Date of Appointment[sr were Minchin '2 Mar.,1797' and Prater '3 do 
[ditto]'. 
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take the ship they would set her on fire, for to Botany Bay they would not go.'" 
This reported statement is suspect. It is unlikely that an eighteenth century British 
general officer would have placed himself in a position to be spoken to by a French 
escapee or convicted soldier. Therefore, the remark allegedly passed in the presence 
of General Fox was possibly a figure of speech used by Minchin to indicate 
potential dangers associated with this draft. As this comment was included in an 
official report prepared for Captain Campbell, the naval Transport Office's Agent in 
Cape Town, Second Officer Murchison would have been careful to accurately report 
Minchin's Gravesend remark. But, the record of this conversation illustrated early 
tensions caused by the polyglot nature of the guard made up as follows:- 
Sergeants: two English (Barnes and Hughes) and one Irish (Murphy). 
Corporals (4) and Lance Corporals (1): two English, Jones and 
Morrison; one French,Thomrie; two 'German or Dutchmen', Spice and 
Lance Corporal Cripo (presumably also 'Louis Crepon - A Mutineer', listed 
in WO 40/16, frame 20, and probably a Frenchman). 
Privates: about thirty-seven English, twelve or thirteen Irish and fourteen 
or fifteen `foreigners'.' 
The ex-Savoy prisoners were sent on board Lady Shore in irons and under a 
strong guard.' To the 'great astonishment' of Murchison, a few days later they 
were released, armed and placed on sentry duty.' After the full contingent had 
boarded, Purser Black considered:- 
the soldiers are the most disagreeable, mutinous set of villains that ever 
entered into a ship. Two of the serjeants behaved so ill that Captain 
Willcocics [the master] was obliged to insist upon their commanding 
officer confining them in irons ... two of the [soldier] villains [wanted] to 
know if he [Major Semple, a male convict] would head them in an attempt to 
seize the ship after they should get well out to sea, and had left the convoy, 
one of them ... telling him this was the eighth time he had been embarked for 
Botany Bay without reaching it, and he was determined he would not this 
" HRNSW, 3, p.413. Murclunson's report to Captain Campbell of 21 January 1798. 
45 However, the quotation has been accepted as factual in many secondary accounts. For example; 
M Austin, 'William Minchin', p.415; WD Edmonds and TG Parsons, Jacobinism Afloat, p.12; C 
Bateson, Convict Ships, p.151. 
5 ° WO 71/184, p.13. Sergeant Hughes' evidence. He referred to 'Corporals Spice, and Cripo' 
(p.14). As Cripo was the only 'corporal' not listed by that rank in WO 40/16, he must have been 
the lance corporal. 
51 HRNSW, 3, p.397. 
52 HRNSW, 3, p.413. Murchison's report. 
1 6 3 
time' 
When Lady Shore reached Portsmouth, Sergeant Hughes and other non-
commissioned officers refused to leave the quarter deck when so directed by First 
Officer Lambert. Minchin's assistance was requested by Lambert, and coming up 
to the 'top of the ladder' from his `tween deck cabin, Minchin ordered his men 
off the deck. With the exception of Hughes, the men obeyed 'after a deal of 
insolence'. Apparently, after issuing this order Minchin returned to his cabin. 
Meanwhile, Hughes still refused to leave the quarter-deck and threatened violence 
against Lambert, who then called to Second Mate Murchison to arm himself and 
come to his aid. Hughes thereupon started going below to fetch his 'sword' to 
prevent any ship's officer ejecting him by force.' Only the intervention of Major 
Semple, a convict swindler, wielding an axe, and threatening to strike Hughes if he 
harmed any ship's officer, resolved the tense situation. Minchin avoided further 
involvement in the affair by remaining below. When the master, Captain Willcocks, 
came on board that evening, he demanded that a reluctant Minchin take disciplinary 
action against Hughes. Because of Willcocks' insistence, Hughes had one hand 
placed in irons overnight.' While illustrating the lack of discipline within the 
detachment, more significantly, this incident shows Minchin to be without fortitude 
to meet a challenge to his authority and enforce instant obedience. On Hughes' 
first refusal to obey Minchin's order (a serious crime especially in wartime), 
Hughes should have been immediately arrested, and arrangements made with the 
Portsmouth Garrison for him to be court martialled. 
Then, on passage to Torbay, Captain Willcocks was abused by another 
sergeant. On arrival there, Murchison later recalled:- 
" HRNSW, 3, p.205. Black to his father of May 1797, which recorded events after that date. 
" The term " `tween" was used in Lady Shore accounts to indicate the deck between the main deck 
and hold. As a useful nautical term, this has been retained in this chapter. 
" R Holmes, Redcoat The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, Hammersmith, 2001, 
p.5. Infantry sergeants were then armed with plain swords (compared to those carried by officers) 
and talfpikes, whose broad blades tip nine-foot ash hafts.' 
56 HRNSW, 3, p.414. Recorded later by Murchison. 
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While we were in Torbay the ship was in great confusion. The captain, 
finding it impossible to get her into any good order (as Mr. Minchin would 
not, nor could not, take an active part in arranging his men, and bringing 
them under good subordination, who were getting more riotous every day) 
wrote to General Fox, and, I think, to the Duke of Portland, about the 
disorder the troops were in.' 
As a result of this letter, or letters, Lieutenant Colonel Grose was ordered to visit the 
ship and investigate the situation. This introduced the second irresponsible army 
officer involved in the mutiny. 
Murchison claimed that Grose's investigation only lasted 'a few minutes'. 
Presumably Grose was met by Minchin and then spoke to Captain Willcocics. In 
reply to a query by Willcocks, Grose stated that it 'was perfectly right' that the ex-
Savoy soldiers who came on board in irons were now in possession of arms and 
ammunition. Having refuted Willcocks' concern, Grose left the ship promising to 
return in the morning. This second visit did not eventuate, as immediately he went 
ashore, Grose departed for London, where he submitted an adverse report on 
Willcocks as a 'passionate overbearing man'. Grose was dilatory in his duty in 
not investigating the causes of friction between the ship's officers and army 
detachment. Grose ignored, or failed to appreciate, that the matters of which 
Willcocks complained, indicated a low standard of discipline in the detachment and 
the inadequacy of Minchin as an officer. Grose definitely should have reprimanded 
Minchin, demanding he take firm command of his men. There is no suggestion that 
Grose gave either advice or admonition to Minchin. Regarding the ex-Savoy 
prisoners, Grose's response to Willcocics' legitimate concern over security, was 
naive and it appears that Grose wanted to avoid creating an issue with which he 
would have to deal. Grose totally ignored the War Office directive that the 
remainder of the guard were 'a proper escort' for the ex-Savoy men, who were not 
a part of the guard. Arguably, his dereliction of duty, as commanding officer, 
appointed to investigate Willcocks' formal complaint, directly contributed to the 
mutiny and the murder of the complainant. 
" HRNSW, 3, p.414. 
58 HRNSW, 3, p.414. Probably based on Minchin's opinion of Willcocks. 
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Apart from Grose's tendency to avoid responsibility, other factors helped . 
seal the fate of the Lady Shore. Critical wartime manpower shortages in the army 
meant that little interest would have been shown at the War Office had Grose 
demanded that Minchin or indeed some of the non-commissioned officers and men 
be replaced by better troops. A War Office attitude was likely to have been that if 
Grose had a problem with his officers and men, as their commander, he should have 
fixed it - which Grose never attempted. While it would have been administratively 
difficult to isolate the ex-Savoy prisoners from both the convicts and armed soldiers 
for six months in the confined space of a three hundred ton ship, it nevertheless 
should have been attempted. At the very least, Grose and Minchin should have 
devised a plan to deny the ex-prisoners access to weapons. Despite the danger 
apparent to Captain Willcocks, the army officers may have been lulled into a sense 
of false security by the apparent good behaviour of the conspirators. At Minchin's 
general court martial, the following is a transcript of a question put by Minchin to 
Sergeant Bums:- 
Q Was the Conduct of the Men who mutinied prior to the Mutiny such as 
to leave no Grounds for suspicion?- 
A It was; they were chiefly the best behaved and most orderly in the Ship 
except two or three Irishmen who when drunk were wranglesome and Mr 
Minchin always took care to confine them till sober,' 
Sergeant Hughes, in reply to a question by the court, admitted that before the seizure 
of the Lady Shore, the mutineers 'in their Military Duty were pretty steady'.' The 
inference from this evidence is that as a deliberate deception, to diffuse any 
suspicions as to their intentions, the conspirators took care to present themselves as 
dependable soldiers. Not withstanding all excuses that could be offered in defence 
of Grose, had he taken an interest in eliminating the contentious security issue, and 
given firm orders to Minchin, a mutiny attempt would have been pre-empted or had 
little chance of success. 
The last reported instance of the detachment's ill discipline in home waters 
" WO 71/184, p.8. Burns' reply was obviously directed to the court and not to Minchin. 
" WO 71/184, p.15. Hughes did however complain that at the crossing of the equator, these 
men, particularly the Frenchmen, 'were disobedient' in refusing 'ducking'. They 'armed 
themselves, and would not come up'. 
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occurred at Falmouth. First Mate Lambert 'was very grossly insulted by one of the 
corporals and his wife; the former knocked him down twice, and the other knocked 
the dirty clothes she was washing about his face'. Again Minchin preferred to 
overlook the matter and was reluctant to take any disciplinary action until he was 
forced to do so by Willcocks. Second Mate Murchison, in his account, quoted 
Willcocks as saying to Minchin 'if such acts of mutiny were overlooked he and all 
the ship's officers would lose their command very shortly.' Minchin then tried the 
corporal in a regimental-style court martial which was a fiasco. The court's 
sentence was that the corporal 'beg Mr. Lambert's pardon' - which he never did. 
Of particular annoyance to Murchison were reports he received from the army 
officers' two servants that they overheard Minchin saying he 'intended to put the 
captain in irons when he got to sea'. Willcocks ignored this hearsay threat.' With 
such animosities being exhibited, Lady Shore sailed from Falmouth on 8 June 
1797." 
Evidence presented at Minchin's court martial provides an insight into the 
soldiers' routine and duties on a convict transport. In the case of Lady Shore, as a 
female transport, guard duties were relaxed compared to a transport carrying male 
convicts. Due to the large draft of soldiers, seventy-three compared to the usual 
twenty to thirty, and the small number of convicts, sixty-five females and two 
males, (as opposed to usually over two hundred males,) the distribution of 
accommodation aboard Lady Shore differed from most convict transports. The 
soldiers were accommodated midships, normally the main convict prison. They, and 
their dependents, in this `tween deck compartment, were separated by a strong 
6 ' HRNSW 3, p.415. Murchison's report. 
62 J Black, An Authentic Narrative of The Mutiny on board the ship Lady Shore with Particulars 
of a Journey throughout Part of Brazil: in a Letter dated "Rio Janeiro, Jan. 18, 1798" to The Rev. 
John Black, Woodbridge, from Mr. John Black, One of the Surviving Officers of The Ship, 
Ipswich, 1798, p.2, for sailing date. 
" Bonwick Transcripts, Mitchell Library (ML), reel CY679, A2000-2, pp.381-382. Letter R. 
Dore to Sir M le Fleming of 5 February 1798. Male convicts were 'Semple the notorious Major 
and Knowles the pardon vender'. 
64 WO 71/184, p.5. These military and convict figures including Semple and Knowles, were 
listed by Bums in evidence. WO 40/16, frames 19-21, indicate seventy-four other ranks embarked, 
but possibly one may have been withdrawn from the draft, or deserted at the last minute. 
Alternatively, Burns may have been incorrect in his total. 
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bulkhead from the female convicts forward of them, and by a grating from the 
steerage area, aft. This was occupied by the majority of the crew, 'about 30 whites', 
while the balance '17 or 18 Lascars' were probably in the forecastle.' In the stem, 
was the Great Cabin (or cabins), where the army officers and ship's surgeon were 
accommodated. The only access to the main deck for the soldiers was by a ladder 
up through the main hatchway, located midships, while a fore hatch provided access 
to the female convicts. Security grating hatches were available to be laid and 
secured over both these hatchways An after hatch gave access from the `tween deck 
up to the quarter deck. This was used by the Minchin family and Prater and the 
crew in steerage. Significantly, this unusual layout effectively separated the soldiers 
from their officers and crew, all of whom could usually move around freely in the 
after part of the ship, creating 'a small fortress' tween deck, from which they could, 
in event of trouble, debouch onto the quarter deck.' Apart from Surgeon Fyffe in 
the great cabin area, the ship's officers, were housed on the main deck aft of the 
quarter deck. At the forward edge of this deck, a barricade was erected to seal off 
the main deck, where the convicts could be exercised. On Lady Shore, there was a 
total of four four-pounder cannon. Two were mounted forward and two on the 
quarter deck, aft. All could sweep the main deck with grapeshot if necessary. A 
probable layout of the ship is shown as Figure 15." 
For guard duties, the troops were divided into three watches, each in the 
charge of a corporal.' Fatally, Minchin allowed the majority of foreigners to be 
grouped together in one watch for convenience of communicating orders in other 
than English.' Because they were only guarding women, sentries were armed 
solely with bayonets.' They were posted 'One at the Main hatchway, one at the 
" WO 71/184, p.25. Corporal Morrison believed the bulkhead was strong but the grating was 
capable of being pulled down by a number of soldiers. 
" WO 71/184, p.6. 
" GA Mawer, Most Perfectly Safe The convict shipwreck disasters of 1833-42, St. Leonards, 
1997, p.5. Mawer wrote 'In the event of a mutiny, the Admiralty wants all of the armed force of 
the ship concentrated aft and its arrangements there are such as to create a small fortress.' 
" GA Mawer, Most Perfectly Safe, pp.4 and 6, simplified. 
" W071/184 p.5. 
7 ° WO 71/184, p.14. 
" WO 71/184, p.5. 
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written descriptions of the Lady Shore. 
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fore hatchway one at the great cabin [presumably on the `tween deck], and another 
at the Wheel who assisted at the Wheel of the Ship.'' Hughes stated that the 
remainder of the watch, not on sentry duty, stayed on deck, probably during the day, 
but apparently not by night' Off duty soldiers were below, with their muskets in 
an arms rack in the troop compartment or 'clean Men kept them in their Birth'. A 
total of forty stand of arms was available to the troops on board, but some weapons 
were in an 'indifferent' condition.' 
Apart from the ammunition already held by the detachment, ball ammunition 
was issued to the troops when a sail suspected of being French or Spanish was 
sighted, and returned when the approaching ship was identified as non-belligerent. 
The ship's gunner was responsible to issue this ammunition from a ready locker 
and to count the returned rounds to ensure none were missing. Unfortunately, the 
control of this ammunition accounting was apparently poorly executed, as Sergeant 
Hughes later deposed, the gunner told him that ten or twenty rounds were missing 
about six weeks before the mutiny. Hughes also told the court martial that 'no 
search was made for 	In view of this small number of unaccounted rounds, it is 
surprising that after the mutiny started, when Hughes checked amongst the non-
mutineers, they had a total of 'about thirty eight or forty rounds of Ammunition' in 
their possession 'that had been bought [issued?] at Falmouth'.' Before the mutiny, 
the conspirators were in possession of some ammunition as they fired a number of 
shots before they had time to seize ammunition from the ready locker. Purser J. 
Black, afterwards wrote:- 
The soldiers also were permitted ... a considerable quantity of ammunition 
in their possession between decks: the mutineers acknowledged, that had it 
72 WO 71/184, pp.4-5. Bums' evidence. 
73 WO 71/184, p.12. See below, footnote 99, for report of only four sentries and Corporal Spice 
being forced down the hatchway, while apparently the remainder of the watch were resting below. 
With reduced risk from carrying mainly female prisoners on Lady Shore, this would be reasonable. 
Even on a First Fleet transport carrying male convicts, Private Fasty noted, that in the 
tempestuous Southern Ocean, only four sentries were required on deck by day, and when it rained at 
night, this number was reduced to two (see below, Chapter 2, p.43 and footnotes 124-125. 
" W071/184 p.5. 
" WO 71/184, p.13. 
76 WO 71/184, p.10, for the quantity of aimnunition, and p.13 for 'bought at Falmouth'. 
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not been for this circumstance, they never would have attempted the seizure 
of the ship' 
Hughes' statement that ammunition was supplied at Falmouth is contradicted 
in statements by ship's officers. Murchison claimed that 'A days after' the chained 
ex-Savoy prisoners boarded Lady Shore, at Gravesend, they were issued with 
'muskets, bayonets, and cartridge-boxes ... with ammunition in their boxes'. As 
already noted, it was at Torbay that Captain Willcocks was assured by Grose that 'it 
was perfectly right' that the ex-Savoy soldiers were armed and in possession of 
ammunition. Such statements make it hard to understand why Hughes claimed that 
the ammunition was obtained at Falmouth, the ship's final port of call in England. 
Possibly the military, in retrospect, did not wish embarrassing evidence to come out 
at Minchin's court martial about his early and apparently generous ammunition 
issue to the future mutineers. Such an authorisation to issue ammunition to guard 
sixty-five female convicts appears indefensible. 
Shortly after the disappearance of the ship's gunner's ammunition, and four 
to five weeks prior to the mutiny on 1 August 1797, an informer gave warning that 
conspirators 'either ... intended to take the Ship or would run away from her at Rio 
Janeiro'. This warning was passed to Sergeant Burns by Corporal Thomrie's 
(elsewhere called Thierry) convict mistress who had been mistreated by Thomrie. 
Bums reported to Minchin, who questioned him on the reliability of the informer as 
she was a prostitute and drunkard. Burns considered that, as the soldiers were well 
behaved, he had no reason to believe her. Minchin spoke to the woman telling her 
'to go about her Business as he would not believe any thing She Said'. He then 
sent for Thomrie and 'told him to keep her quieter in the Ship than she had been 
before'.' Hughes agreed with Burns that from the men's behaviour there was no 
indication of any likely mutiny, and endorsed Minchin's decision to leave security 
" J Black, An Authentic Narrative, p.3. 
78 HRNSW, 3, p.413. 
" WO 71/184, p.11. 
80 WO 71/184, p.6. Burns' account of Minchin's handling of informer. 
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arrangements unchanged.' While Minchin and his sergeants remained confident 
there was no threat, a later revelation showed that this confidence was sadly 
misplaced. A disillusioned Frenchman, a year after the mutiny, wrote from his 
semi-captivity at Montevideo:- 
Thierry [Thomrie] proved himself a coward at the [earlier preplanned] 
moment of the capture and had revealed to his English concubine the 
intentions of his companions to take over the ship, which led to the plan 
being postponed and prevented us from returning to Bordeaux' 
Had Minchin given cautious credit to the informer, upgraded security and searched 
for the missing rounds, as well as confiscating the 'Falmouth' ammunition, the 
whole sorry saga of mutiny and death would probably have been averted. 
Minchin's moral judgment on the female convict prevented an objective 
consideration of what she had to say. 
Minchin deplored 'human depravity' and his unbending adherence to his 
moral code may have had other unfortunate results. While the Lady Shore was still 
at anchor in Falmouth, civil courtesies were maintained between Minchin and Prater, 
as the army officers and Mrs Minchin messed together.' At some point during the 
voyage, due to Prater spending most of his time forward in the convict women's 
prison,' Minchin cut him off, not only socially,' but also illegally prevented him 
from exercising any military command function. Minchin issued strict orders to 
the other ranks to treat Prater as a 'passenger', and that Prater had no power of 
" WO 71/184, p.15. 
J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p.97. From a letter to the Directoire in France, by Maillot, 
and counter-signed by Le Riche, Mallecotte and Prevost (elsewhere Prevot), of September 1798. In 
WO 40/16, frames 19-21, two of these names, are notated as 'A Mutineer' and identified as 
follows: Maillot as Le Mallio and Mallecotte as Mallicott. Prevost, a sailor joined the ship at 
Falmouth. Le Riche's name was probably one of the three obscured on WO 40/16. 
" WO 71/184, p.28. 
" HRN SW, 3, p.415. Murchison's report. 
" WO 71/184, p.25. Corporal Morrison confirmed that Prater was 'frequently amongst the 
Women'. 
86 WO 71/184, p.26. Morrison stated Prater ate 'In the [his] Cabin'. 
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command over them.' Thereafter Prater was not consulted, or advised on any 
matters affecting the detachment, and was not shown any written 'orders issued for 
the Guards and Centries'. As a result, Prater claimed that an opportunity was lost 
when he could have retaken the ship, except that he had no power of command.' 
The validity of Prater's claim of a lost opportunity was refuted by Minchin, and on 
the weight of evidence, is doubted by this writer.' Nevertheless, the illegal 
restrictions imposed on Prater for moral reasons, were operationally unsound. In 
fact, with Prater close to the convict women, had Minchin acted professionally, and 
dealt with Prater on strictly military matters, Prater may possibly have learned that 
the information given by Thomrie's mistress was correct. 
While the conspirators had to abort the plot which they had hoped would 
take Lady Shore to Bordeaux, they continued scheming. Their later plan was put 
into operation four days out from Rio de Janeiro, in the dead hours before dawn, 
still universally recognised as the best time to surprise an enemy. At 4am on 
Tuesday, 1 August 1797, the mutineers struck in a methodically preplanned 
operation.' This took place following the relief of Corporal Spice's watch by that 
commanded by Corporal Thomrie, in which 'the frenchmen were chiefly in'. 92 As 
Thomrie's watches contained all the foreigners including Lance Corporal Cripo, the 
87 WO 71/184, p.21. Prater's evidence. Minchin's order to the troops was illegal. Prater was 
posted to, and travelling on duty to the New South Wales Corps, in exactly the same way as 
Minchin. Therefore, if Minchin, as senior officer, wished to suspend Prater from duty, it was 
necessary for Minchin to lay a charge against Prater. For example, on Barwell, which sailed from 
England in November 1797 (see above, Chapter 6, p.148 and footnotes 104 for charges). The 
detachment commander, Ensign Bayly, placed his junior, Ensign Bond, in irons for the remainder 
of the voyage for being implicated in a planned mutiny. He was formally charged in Sydney. 
" WO 71/184, p.23. 
89 WO 71/184, pp. 20 and 21. In cross examination by the court, Prater twice made this point. 
" WO 71/184, p.27. Refuted because 'Prater was not brought down into the great Cabin until 
after the Mutineers were in possession of the ... [officers' and soldiers] Arms.' 
91 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.153, for location of Lady Shore at the time of the mutiny, and 
p.154 for 'Documents in French diplomatic archives indicate that the mutiny was carefully 
planned'. Military witnesses agreed on the time as about 4am. The ship's officers gave the time 
as about 4.15am, (HRNSW, 3, p.392). As 4am was the likely time of the change over of the 
watches, which preceded the mutiny, army witnesses would probably have remembered this time, 
whereas the ship's officers may have been more conscious that a little later they became actively 
involved. 
" WO 71/184, p.14. Hughes evidence. As an indication of how animosity against the enemy 
found its way into official documents; in Minchin's court martial, "frenchmen" was often spelt 
with a lower case "f", while "Englishmen" was always spelt with a capital "E". 
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mutineers had no difficulty in concentrating their force on deck, the only mutineers 
remaining below were probably Irish conspirators belonging to other watches. 
As noted in the French archives, Guillou cites twelve key mutineers; eight 
Frenchman who 'conscripted', three Germans and one Spaniard.' Burns, Hughes 
and Morrison all stated in evidence that initially there were seventeen or eighteen 
soldier mutineers, therefore over and above these twelve mutineers, the extra five 
men would have been either 'foreigners' from Spice's watch, who remained on 
deck when relieved, crew members, or Irishmen. Some of the latter, as Bums noted, 
were `wranglesome' when drunk, therefore for security, and because they were in a 
different watch, the twelve key mutineers probably kept the Irishmen on the 
periphery of the plot until the mutiny occurred. 
The preplanned positions taken up by the key twelve mutineers were:- 
• One to guard the prison [presumably fore] hatch, 
• Two to guard the main hatch to prevent non-mutineer soldiers gaining the 
main deck, 
• Two to subdue the helmsman and sailors on deck watch, 
• Two to secure the officer of the watch, 
• Two to secure the officers quarters, 
• Two to 'the captain's cabin', 
• One to break open the ammunition and distribute rounds from the ready 
ammunition locker.' 
It is not known where the other five mutineers were deployed by Dubois, the 
ringleader,' certainly one or more Irishmen were stated to be guarding the main 
hatch.' It is a matter of speculation how the mutineers smuggled their muskets and 
cartridge boxes up from the  troop compartment to the main deck without being 
" J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p.92. 
" WO 71/184, p.6, Burns - 'about seventeen'; p.13, Hughes - 'about 17 or 18 Soldiers'; p.25, 
Morrison - 'about 17'. 
" C Bateson, Convict Ships, pp.154-155, for list, based on French documents. J Guillou, 
Capture Lady Shore, p.92, partially confirms this detail. He notes that Lambert was officer of the 
watch at the time. 
" WO 71/184, p.9. Bums in this reference, amongst several others, confirmed Dubois' 
leadership. HRNSW, 3, p.397, for a manifesto signed by the successful mutineers on 2 August 
1797, in which the following appointments were promulgated:- `Deliz [Dubois], captain of the 
captured vessel, W.G. Thierry [Thomrie], lieut. on board the captured vessel, Le Maillot de 
Provencher, Secretary on board the captured vessel', 
" WO 71/184, p.24. Morrison, for example, stated that Frenchmen and Irishmen were guarding 
the main hatch. 
173 
heard and challenged, either `tween deck, or by Dutchman, Corporal Spice and 
those members of his watch who remained loyal to the British cause. 
An analysis of the often conflicting witnesses' reports, yields the following 
sequence of events. Non-mutineers in Spice's relieved watch would have been 
startled in the predawn gloom by the sound or sight of the oncoming watch armed 
with muskets, but, presumably, would not have immediately raised an alarm in case 
some special orders had been issued for Thomrie's watch. Immediately after 
coming onto the main deck, the bulk of the mutineers would have loaded their 
muskets (within thirty seconds) while some fanned out to critical positions.' The 
most critical would have been the quarter deck, which dominated access from both 
the aft companionway and the ship's officers' cabins on the main deck. The main 
hatch would have been quickly secured by the mutineers even while loading their 
weapons. Four English soldiers, acting as sentries at the time their watch was 
relieved, were forced down the main hatch ladder, with one of these men receiving a 
sword or bayonet wound in his back.' Spice, who probably was already at the foot 
of the ladder, tried to climb up again, but was knocked down by an empty cask, 
injuring his foot.' Morrison stated he was wakened by a 'scuffle' on deck which 
would have been Spice and the four Englishmen being bundled below. 101 
Meanwhile, on the quarter deck, First Mate Lambert, the officer of the watch, 
saw or sensed that a mutiny had broken out, and probably glimpsed figures running 
towards him. He retreated to his cabin and seized his loaded pistols. Later he was 
criticised by the ship's officers, for not raising an alarm before retreating to his 
cabin.' Bearing in mind it would have been less than thirty feet from the head of 
the main hatch ladder to the quarter deck,' it is considered that this criticism is 
" J Black, An Authentic Narrative, p.4. Recorded 'Lambert ... saw the men loading their 
muskets, and making other preparations'. 
" WO 71/184, p.5. Bums stated at the time of the mutiny 'four Englishmen' were sentries. 
1" WO 71/184, p.3. Burns stated Spice 'was wounded in the foot'. 
I" WO 71/184, p.24. 
'" HRNSW, 3, p.392, for ship's officers criticism. 
1 " GA Mawer, Most Perfect Safe, p.6. The measurement on Diagram 15, from the forward edge 
of the main hatch to the centre of the quarter deck is 24-25 feet. 
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unjust Despite the mutineers having to scale the barricade, Lambert would have had 
insufficient time to ring the ship's bell, blow a fog horn, or (as suggested later by 
the ship's officers) wake 'the captain and officers', before the mutineers were on 
him. Further, the statement by the ship's officers that Lambert 'went into his cabin 
and loaded his pistols' is highly improbable.' Such a time delay is not consistent 
with the remainder of the officers' report that 'the mutineers immediately ... 
surrounded the doors and windows. He [Lambert], seeing this, fired his pistols'.' 
These were the first shots fired. Now, with no further need to move stealthily, the 
mutineers shouted their attack signal Vive la Republique'.' From `tween deck, 
Burns heard the sound which:- 
very much surprized [him] by hearing a Musquet Shot, with that I arose and 
heard a great clashing of Arms upon the Decks and the Frenchmen at all 
parts of the Ship crying out Vive La Liberte' 
The loud war cry, combined with much noise following the mutineers' initial silent 
assault, would have been intended to shock and confuse their numerous wakening 
opponents. 
`Tween deck, the non-commissioned officers, Hughes, Bums and Morrison, 
in the confusion, tried to assess the situation. Burns went to the foot of the ladder 
and was warned by a mutineer sentry that if he attempted to resist they would 
instantly blow out his brains.' At the same time, from a dalliance in the women's 
prison, Prater attempted to climb the fore hatch ladder but was ordered below by a 
mutineer. He then called to the sergeants, through the bulkhead, to see 'if there 
were any Means of getting through to assist in retaking the Ship.' As no axe was 
available to hack down the barrier, Prater was trapped in the prison until about 
7.30am, when he was 'ordered upon Deck and escorted to the Companion Ladder 
in the great Cabin where I found Captain Wilcox ... dangerously wounded.'" 
104 C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.153. This comment is repeated by Bateson. J Guillou, Capture 
Lady Shore, p.92; does not substantiate this. He notes Lambert 'rushed to his cabin to seize his 
pistol. Followed by the mutineers, he [Lambert] fired through the doorway'. 
1" HRNSW, 3. p.392. Ship's officers' account of quarter deck happenings. 
1" J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p.92. 
1" W0 71/184 p.3. 
108 WO 71/184, p.3. 
109 WO 71/184, p.18; Prater's evidence. 
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When Lambert fired his pistols, he fatally wounded a mutineer sailor named 
Delahay.' In return, 'several musquets were then fired into his cabin thro' the 
windows, and they immediately charged upon him with their bayonets'. Lambert, 
now wounded, escaped through the interior door of his cabin into that of Purser 
Black, which was adjacent to the captain's. Lambert and Black attempted 
unsuccessfully to gain entry to the captain's cabin, and while doing so Lambert 
received another shot in the back. With this getaway blocked, and fire still being 
delivered into the cabin, Black cut through a canvas screen dividing his cabin from 
the `cuddy' (the central space between the cabins which were on either side of the 
ship). In trying to escape to the cuddy, Lambert was wounded a third time. 
Meanwhile, the captain ran from his cabin and was bayonetted below the heart by a 
sentry at the door leading onto the quarter deck. Willcocks lurched forward 
towards 'the after hatchway, down which he fell, and ... received a[nother bayonet] 
wound in the neck.' A shot fired at Willcocks missed. Lambert, now in the 
captain's cabin, was shot by a mutineer and died a few minutes later. The mutineers 
on the quarter deck moved to position themselves with four men with fixed bayonets 
guarding the after hatch and with one at each of the ship's officers' cabins. After 
this tense and confused few minutes, all effective resistance ceased." 
With at least nine shots being fired on the deck above Minchin's head,' the 
ship's officers later inferred that Minchin remained hidden in his cabin. They wrote 
that the noise of Willcocks' fall down the ladder 'awoke Mr. Minchin ... who called 
out to know what was the matter ... Captain Willcocks, in a faint voice, [said] that he 
was wounded, and his [Minchin's] men had seized the ship."' This account is 
clearly biased, possibly recounted by some of the sailors, now isolated in the 
"° J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, p. 92. Delahay was a sailor. This is apparently confirmed, as 
no similar name, is listed in detachments' nominal roll (WO 40/16, frames 19-21). 
" 1 HRNSW, 3, p.392. Narrative as written by the surviving ship's officers. 
112 The following rounds were reportedly fired: two pistol shots by Lambert, two musket shots 
into Lambert's cabin, one shot when Lambert was again wounded attempting to enter the master's 
cabin, two shots delivered into the purser's cabin, one shot down hatch at already wounded 
Willcocics and one fatal shot which killed Lambert. Probably more than nine shots were fired 
during the melee. 
113 HRNSW, 3, p.392. 
176 
steerage compartment as the only ship's officers `tween deck were the badly 
wounded master who died two days later,' and Surgeon Fyffe. Describing the 
same incident at the Public Office, Bow Street, in December 1799, in evidence 
against a captured mutineer, Minchin stated 'he was awoke by a disturbance ... on 
which he got up, and at the bottom of the ladder saw Capt.Wilcocks lying 
bleeding'.' This is believable, as by the time Minchin awoke and realised 
something was amiss, then reached the foot of the companionway ladder, the 
wounded Willcocks could have just fallen there. Minchin confirmed the 
conversation with the wounded Willcocks, reported by the ship's officers, except 
this took place at the bottom of the ladder, and not with him hanging back in his 
cabin. 
Minchin did not waste time, he 'assisted Capt. Wilcocks to his [Minchin's] 
bed' u'and then hurried forward to make contact, through the dividing grating, with 
his non-commissioned officers. Bums in sworn evidence stated that 'Mr. Minchin 
came to me to the Gratings [and asked questions] ... instantly after the Mutiny took 
place'."7 This timing is not confirmed by Hughes who stated he spoke to Minchin 
at the grating, giving details of arms and ammunition held in the soldiers' 
compartment, and then Minchin ordered him to surrender these armaments.' From 
other evidence by Hughes, cross referenced to timing of events in other non-
commissioned officers' statements, it is considered that Hughes compressed 
together his report to Minchin and the later order to surrender. The ship's officers 
also compressed the time scale of events. Their account inferred that shortly after 
Willcocks' words with Minchin, the latter gave up 'his sword and pistols, and 
[proceeded] to order the soldiers to deliver up their arms, which was immediately 
done."' From army witnesses, it was established that in fact four hours elapsed 
HRNSW, 3, p.393. Willcocks died at about 4am, 3 August 1797, forty eight hours after the 
mutiny. Several witnesses, including Minchin at Bow Street, stated that he was lucid for much of 
this time. 
" 5 Times, No.4658, London, 5 December 1799,.p.3, d. 
1 " Times, No.4658, London, 5 December 1799, p.3, d. 
WO 71/184, p.7. 
WO 71/184, p.10, repeated p.12. 
" 9 HRNS'W, 3, p.393. 
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between the start of the mutiny and this final surrender. 
In the confusion `tween deck with the sounds of the mutiny above, the non-
commissioned officers struggled to clarify the existing situation, finally ascertaining 
that about seventeen men were missing, who should have been below.' On hand in 
the troop compartment were twenty-eight stand of arms and thirty-eight to forty 
rounds of ammunition. Therefore, the mutineers were in possession of twelve 
muskets, plus bayonets and ammunition boxes.' As well as the mutineers on deck, 
both Hughes and Burns believed that there were some 'Suspicious People 
[Irishmen]', still in the troop compartment awaiting the opportunity to join their 
comrades on deck, and that these men acted as 'spies all around us'.' The 
sergeants were proved correct and when the Irishmen were freed, they joined the 
mutineers. Now, with the addition of some sailors, the mutineers final strength was 
twenty-five. Hughes appealed to Burns to help retake the ship but the latter 
'refused, as he thought it was of no use as the ablest Men were on Deck amongst 
the Mutineers'.' Hughes believed he could have been successful except that the 
recruits in the troop compartment were 'chiefly Boys[.] I could have shot all the 
Centries myself at the hatchway, but the Men [Irish conspirators] below would have 
killed me'.' Morrison, in reply to a question by the court, whether he believed it 
would have been possible to retake the ship stated:- 
It might at first if the Men below had all been willing the Question was put 
by Serjeant Hughes, and I did not hear any of them offer their Service, a 
great Quantity of them appeared to be very glad that the Ship was taken' 
Morale among the defenders, must have been low at this moment, as 
militarily this would have been the best time to have launched a successful counter- 
1 " WO 71/184, pp.3-4. 
121 WO 71/184, p.10. As already established (by Bums' evidence, p.5) a total of forty stand were 
available on board for the guard of which the mutineers seized twelve stand. 
1 " WO 71/184, p.10, for Hughes's 'Suspicious People' and p.7 for Burns"spies'. 
1" WO 71/184, pp.6, 13, 20 and 25. All witnesses at Minchin's court martial agreed on this 
number. 
1 " W071/184 p.10. 
1 " WO 71/184, p.13. 
126 WO 71/184, p.25. 
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attack, before the mutineers stabilised their hold on the main deck. It is considered 
that had Prater been aft in his cabin, he could have quickly responded to the 
emergency by firing at mutineers, as Lambert did. This would have galvanised the 
loyal soldiers to support the pugnacious Sergeant Hughes in organising resistance 
in the troop compartment, including breaking out of that area into the steerage 
section of the `tween deck. 
Despite pessimism and confusion `tween deck, equal confusion and doubts 
would have reigned on the main deck, as the mutineers tried to consolidate their 
position, wondering what counter strikes were about to be launched against them, 
and whether their comrades, still below, had been seized. One mutineer was dead or 
dying, seven armed men were involved in the quarter deck area, leaving four armed 
men, and the Irishmen probably still with only knives or cudgels, to support them in 
defending the main and fore hatches. Not all the mutineers' muskets would have 
been reloaded following the melee in the officers' cabins, temporarily limiting their 
firepower.' Excluding any pistols issued to non-commissioned officers,' the 
loyal soldiers had an overwhelming advantage of twenty-eight muskets to twelve, 
and also superior numbers to serve these weapons. More ammunition and arms 
bound for New South Wales were available in the hold as soon as the troops broke 
out of their compartment. A measure of the mutineers confusion is that it was not 
until 5am that the gratings over the main and fore hatches were battened down and 
four four-pounder cannon were loaded with shrapnel and trained on the main 
127 JF McMahon, 'The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's 
Land with Particular Reference to the Black Line', Hobart, unpublished MHum Thesis, University 
of Tasmania, 1995, p.15. A trained soldier in battle could reload and fire his musket two to three 
times per minute. It is considered that in the first confusion of the mutineers securing the main 
deck, and having fired at least seven shots, it was probably some minutes before all their muskets 
were reloaded. Then or later, had the soldiers engaged in a fire fight with the mutineers, every time 
the latter fired a shot they would have been temporarily denied one twelfth of their firepower. The 
soldiers had an additional advantage, they could have sniped at the silhouetted mutineers at the top 
of the hatch from the concealment of the darkness surrounding the bottom of the ladder. This 
sniping could have provided protective fire while other soldiers broke down the grating through to 
the aft compartment. Thereafter, with the 'small fortress' now opened up, rations, bulk water and 
the magazine in their possession, the soldiers would have been well placed to defeat the mutineers. 
1 " Times, 28 November 1799, p.3, b. Prater stated that he was prevented from climbing the fore 
hatch ladder by 'one Cripon [Lance Corporal Cripo] ... who presented a pistol'. 
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hatch.' In Burns' opinion, 'from that time it was never in our power to resist.' 
But, with determined leadership until 'Day light in the Morning about 6 
O'Clock', 131 the loyal soldiers had the advantage of darkness, plus the grating over 
the hatch obscuring the mutineers view, to help shield them from aimed fire from the 
skylighted mutineers, while organising an assault up the aft ladder. Deprived of 
leadership from their detachment commander, the soldiers, lacking morale and a will 
to fight, allowed the mutineers to hold Lady Shore in the face of superior numbers. 
Theoretically, the numbers available to Minchin to organise a counter-attack, 
should have included the majority of the crew, now isolated with Minchin in what 
should have been the "aft fortress". They could have been harnessed to break 
down the grating partition while the soldiers provided covering fire directed upwards 
towards the main hatch. Other crew could have guarded the aft ladder, initially 
using Minchin's and probably the absent Prater's weapons, until arms could be 
loaded and passed to the crew as they opened the grating. Instead, the crew made 
no move to help - demonstrating a natural prudence, justified by the soldiers failure 
to organise a defence. There was a further reason why the crew did not support 
Minchin. Murchison stated that Minchin had been 'offended' by the convict 
women passing his cabin to visit the sailors in steerage. Minchin, by threatening the 
master that the labour of his troops would be withdrawn from ship board tasks, had 
had the women banned and the master agreed to a sentry being placed over their 
prison to prevent access to sailors except 'only on duty'. This action did not endear 
Minchin to the crew, and in retaliation, in Murchison's opinion, this influenced the 
crew's apathetic attitude to the mutiny going on around them. To complete the 
damming of Minchin, Murchison reported:- 
It would have been impossible for the Frenchmen to have kept the ship 
many hours had not Mr. Minchin ... called out to his men to make no 
resistance, and give up their arms, which was done before daylight.' 
This statement as to time of surrender, and the possibility of retaking the ship, was 
1 " WO 71/184 , p.20. 
1" WO 71/184, p.4. 
13 ` WO 71/184, p.24. 
132 HRNSW, 3, p.415. 
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contradicted (as discussed below) in evidence during Minchin's court martial. 
After the gratings were secured over the other hatches, the mutineers still did 
not attempt to force their way below, via the aft ladder. This was guarded by 
Minchin armed with his pistols and sword, and no doubt Prater's pistols as well. 
Through the grating at daylight, Morrison confirmed he saw Minchin 'standing by 
his Cabin Door with his sword in his hand by the foot of the [aft] Ladder'.'" His 
presence may also have dissuaded any mutinously inclined sailors in steerage from 
slipping up to join the conspirators. From 5am until about 8am, there was a stand-
off, then Minchin, presumably in response to mutineers' threats and demands, 
surrendered his weapons and ordered the soldiers to do the same. Thereafter, apart 
from the main hatch grating being lifted to collect the troops' weapons, and allow 
the four mutineers below to join their comrades, the soldiers' compartment was now 
their prison.' The soldiers, with the exception of the non-commissioned officers, 
who on 15 August, were cast adrift with others in a long boat, remained imprisoned 
below until Lady Shore reached Montevideo on 28 August 17972" 
The actual time, and the circumstances, of Minchin ordering the soldiers to 
surrender their weapons are subject to conflicting evidence. Prater claimed that, at 
7.30am under guard, he was escorted by the mutineers from the women's prison to 
the great cabin. Then 'About 8 O'Clock the Mutineers came down into the great 
Cabin and demanded our Arms which were given them'. Prater stated Minchin then 
gave orders to Hughes to surrender the troops' arms and 'not to make any 
resistance'.'" Up to the time of the surrender of the arms, Prater somewhat 
reasonably considered that resistance was possible because 'we had Possession of 
WO 71/184, pp.24-25. 
134 WO 71/184, p.10. Hughes stated 'the Mutineers were joined by four of the People whom I 
thought were suspicious'. Barnes (p.4) and Hughes (p.11) both stated they 'remained' imprisoned 
below until ordered into the long boat. To maintain maximum security, the mutineers would have 
kept the remaining soldiers below, allowing minimum deck exercise. One or two of the officers at 
a time had 'Liberty to walk the Quarter Deck' (p.19, Prater). 
1" WO 40/16, frame 20. As one soldier, William Batt, not a mutineer, 'Fell overboard & 
drowned, 8th Augt. 1797', apparently a few soldiers had been allowed on deck for exercise. J 
Gaillou, Capture lady Shore, p.96, for arrival date. 
136 WO 71/184, p.18. 
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the Magazine and were a stronger force'.' Conversely, Minchin asserted that it 
was only after he surrendered that Prater was escorted aft by the mutineers. It is 
considered that Minchin's version is probably correct as it is unlikely that the 
mutineers would have allowed Minchin the benefit of a reinforcement in his isolated 
situation before he surrendered. Prater in fact confirmed this in cross examination. 
In reply to the court's question, 'In what Situation was Mr. Minchin when you first 
saw him after the Ship was taken?', Prater replied 'He was in the great Cabin a 
Prisoner'.' 
It is not known whether external pressure, or simply the council of his own 
fears, finally led Minchin to surrender his weapons. Given the frightening charade, 
from 10am until noon that day, inflicted on a now ironed Hughes, waiting to be 
hanged, for 'attempting to retake the Ship',' it is possible that psychological 
pressure may have been applied to induce Minchin to let the mutineers descend the 
aft ladder, making him their prisoner. It was then inevitable that the soldiers would 
in turn be ordered by Minchin to surrender. To support the suggestion of the 
mutineers' use of psychological pressure, the ship's officers recorded that the 
mutineers 'informed all those who were between decks that if any person attempted 
to make the least resistance a general massacre would take place'.' Also, later in 
their captivity, an overnight charade was played out, with Prater being told he would 
be hanged in the morning, for talking to some of the crew about retaking the ship.' 
There is no doubt that after Lady Shore was seized, the mutineers relied on 
fear as well as force to keep control over the soldiers and crew. This state of affairs 
lasted until the evening of Monday 14 August 1797. Then, of those who remained 
loyal to the crown, twenty-nine persons, including the ship's and military officers, 
British non-commissioned officers, some soldiers, their respective wives and 
"7 WO 71/184, p.19. 
1" W071/184 p.21. 
" 9 WO 71/184, p.11. 
HRNSW, 3, p.393. 
141 WO 71/184, p.19. 
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children, and the convict Major Semple, were cast off in the ship's long boat.' In 
bad weather, they were fortunate in making landfall at the Rio Grande after forty-six 
hours. Then they traversed a long and complicated route to Rio de Janeiro,' and 
ultimately to England. Here, Minchin was court martialled in July 1799 and found 
not guilty.' Lieutenant Prater, now of the 60th Regiment, was found by the court 
'to have been actuated by a considerable degree of Malice towards ... Minchin'.' 
While Prater never reached New South Wales, somehow Purser John Black arrived 
in the colony with enough promptitude to receive, from Governor Hunter, a lease in 
Sydney Town in March 1799.' Ensign Minchin and Sergeant Hughes arrived in 
the colony in Royal Admiral, on 20 November 1800. During this voyage, the still 
pugnacious Hughes remained intractable, and as noted in Chapter 6, was court 
martialled in Sydney, reduced to the ranks and sentenced to five hundred lashes.' 
While the survivors in the long boat headed for friendly Portuguese Brazil, 
Lady Shore, flying the French tricolour, proceeded southward towards a supposedly 
safe haven in the South American colonies of Spain, then France's ally. In addition 
to the few crew who had joined the mutineers, the remainder appeared unconcerned 
142 J Black, An Authentic Narrative, p.19. The same date is accepted by Bateson (p.156) and 
Guillou (p.95). In evidence, Prater (p.19) stated the long boat was cast off on 15 August. The 
mutineers would not allow the ship's surgeon to leave in the long boat. Why Corporal Spice did 
not accompany this group is not stated. 
C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.156. J Black, An Authentic Narrative, pp.19-23, for dangerous 
voyage in the long boat to shore, and pp.30-49 for adventures of various survivors who reached 
Rio de Janeiro by land and sea. Black arrived there on 19 November 1797, p.49. 
1" WO 4/845, p.79. Letter of 18 June 1799, to Military Secretary to HRH, Commander-in-
Chief, that 'a warrant will be prepared & laid before the King ... for the trial of Ensign & Adjutant 
Minchin'. WO 71/184, p.28, for not guilty. 
1" WO 71/184, p.29, for court's rebuke of Prater. 
1" HRNSW, 4, p.44, from a tabulated list of grants. 
' 47 WO 4/845, p.83. Letter to Commissioner of Transport, of 1 March 1800, requesting passage 
for Minchin and his wife on Royal Admiral. As Hughes was not a completely friendly witness at 
Minchin's court martial, it is speculated whether animosity between the two, on board Royal 
Admiral, contributed to Hughes' court martial on arrival in Sydney. 
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as to who gave them orders and continued to work the ship,' no doubt encouraged 
by the incentive offered that 'they should receive a gratuity according to their 
behaviour on their arrival at Rio de la Plata'." However, on arrival at Montevideo, 
Uruguay, the hopes of both the mutineers and crew were dashed, for the provincial 
governor, despite his nation's alliance, seized the ship for personal gain. Only 
Citizens Dubois and Thierry, who had forgotten their republican principles, 
managed to avoid punitive treatment and lived comfortably on loot stolen from Lady 
Shore. The other mutineers 'were placed under [harsh] house arrest'. It took 
considerable diplomatic manoeuvring from Paris to finally get the ill-treated 
mutineers released by their allies and returned to France.' While at Rio de Janeiro, 
Black noted that a letter was received from the Spanish Governor at Montevideo, 
advising 'the men found on board were in confinement'. He also learnt later, that of 
the female convicts 'only the pretty girls [his emphasis] are in burghers' houses, 
the rest are in prison!' 
Of the mutineers who returned to France, at least two, Jean Prevot and Jean-
Baptiste Eseula or Deseala,' returned to sea in a French corvette, and were later 
captured in the West Indies by a British frigate.' They were recognised and 
charged. Thanks to Prater's evidence, Eseula was found to have been 'forced into 
the mutiny' and subsequently gave evidence against Prevot." The latter was 
HRNSVV, 3, p.394. The ship's officers wrote 'the sailors ... seemed to obey all orders given 
by the ringleaders of the mutiny with much more alacrity than they formerly did those of the 
captain and officers'. WO 71/184, p.15; for Hughes' comment that the seamen obeyed the 
mutineer officers, Dubois and Thomrie, as 'they made them do it, they kept Liquor from them'. 
Burns agreed that `the Sailors were disaffected and glad of the Mutiny'. He said that afterwards, 
they were 'as chearful [sic] as ever' (p.9). He also noted (p.6) that two Frenchmen in the crew 
joined the mutineers, probably Prevot and Delahay (shot by lambert), with others under pressure 
to join later. 
149 HRNSW, 3, p.393. 
15° J Guillou, Capture Lady Shore, pp.96-98. 
" 1 J Black, An authentic Narrative, p.35, and footnote for females. 
1" Times, London, of 28 November 1799, p.3, d, for names of French prisoners, 'Jean Provot 
[also Prevot] and Baptiste Eseula' (Times italics) and report of their examination at the 'Public 
Office, Bow Street', including evidence by Prater. Times, 5 December 1799, p.3; for Jean Baptiste 
Deseala. No name in the Corps' detachment approximates that of 'Eseula' or `Deseala [WO 
40/16, frames 19-21). As he, like Prevot, returned to sea, he was probably a sailor. 
153 Times, 28 November 1799, p.3, d, for recapture. 
'" Times, 28 November 1799, p.3. d. Prater's evidence regarding Eseula. Times, 5 December 
1799, p.3. Deseala [Eseula] `corroborated' evidence against Prevot.' 
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convicted of the 'wilful murder of William Wilcox on the high seas ... and [was] 
adjudged to be hung by the neck until he should be dead, and his body afterwards 
dissected and anatomised'.' Prevot was executed on 23 December 1799.' Even 
as late as 1805, correspondence to and from Whitehall was being carried on 
concerning 'four men who were taken onboard the [unnamed] Spanish Frigate and 
were part of the the Crew of the Lady Shore'. They were later cleared of the 
accusation, but this demonstrates that British memory was long when it came to 
apprehending maritime mutineers.' 
The remainder of the soldiers and crew of Lady Shore continued as 
prisoners of war in `Bunos Ayres' [Buenos Aires, Argentina] until advice of the 
signing of Peace of Amiens of March 1802 was received, and acted on in Spanish 
South America,' after which, the survivors made their way back to England.' 
Surprisingly, after flying the Spanish flag, Lady Shore also made her way back to 
England, with the press reporting in July 1801, that she was 'recaptured, and carried 
" 5 HO 77/7, Newgate Calendar December 4 1799, for examined. HO 77/7, Middlesex Prisoners 
upon Orders, Number 143, for sentence. Microfilm supplied by Mr RW O'Hara, from PRO Kew, 
courtesy University of Tasmania. 
'Times, No.4672, of 21 December 1799, p.3, d, for an account of the trial, at the Admiralty 
Session of the Old Bailey on 20 December 1799. Justice was swift, on Friday, 'Sir Wm. Scott 
then passed sentence on the prisoner; that he be hanged on Monday next' - 23 December 1799. In 
Minchin's reexamination, he indicated Prevot was a sailor and not a soldier of the New South 
Wales Corps. Minchin stated 'the prisoner had voluntarily entered on board the ship at Falmouth, 
previous to her sailing'. This is the only time that it was asserted that Prevot was not a soldier. 
Care must be exercised with this article as either the Times reporting, or Minchin's evidence, was 
erratic. For example, it was recorded that the mutiny took place 'on the coast of Africa [emphasis 
added]' and also 'when he [Minchin} got up to see what was the matter he found the hatchway 
battened down [emphasis added], and at the same moment saw Captain Wilcox ... lying wounded at 
the bottom of the ladder'. 
AJCP, reel 1164, Admiralty - Entry Books General 1803-1810, HO 29/5, pp.102-103. Letters 
by Home Office Secretary J. King of 1 January 1805, and of 15 February 1805, for suspected men 
not implicated. 
1 " WO 40/16, frame 32. Recorded in a letter from 'Army Depot Isle of Wight' of 10 October 
1802, that Corporal Spice and seven men had been held 'in South America where they remained 
Prisoners of War 'till Sept 1801'. Why these eight men were released before the Peace of Amiens 
is not recorded. The purpose in raising the file 'WO. Umuunbered Papers 1802 (B), designated 
WO 40/16, was to firstly establish whether these men had been mutineers, and secondly, if not, to 
process their claims for back pay. 
1 " WO 40/16, frames 19-21, against individual names of men was notated those who died in 
`Bunos Ayres'. Totals were:- one died in 1798, three in 1799, three in 1804 including two 
mutineers, and another 'Died on Passage home from Bunos Ayres . . . . 1804'. 
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into the Cape of Good Hope, by His Majesty's ship Tremendous'.' 
Histories of early Australia tend to look inwards and ignore the wider 
imperial picture which was a constant colonial backdrop. The mutiny on Lady Shore 
is a reminder of the diversity of imperial factors which impacted on the colony. 
That the incident was singular, and hence atypical of convict transports on passage 
to the colony, does not negate the value of studying this mutiny. In comparison, 
much ink has been devoted to other atypical mutinies such as the Castle Hill 
uprising of 1804, the New South Wales Corps' insurrection of 1808 and the 
Eureka Stockade. 
The mutiny on Lady Shore illustrated recurring weaknesses in the New 
South Wales Corps, where officers lacked resolute leadership in controlling unruly, 
and at times unreliable, soldiers sent to the colony during wartime. This mutiny 
showed how a determined minority of insurgents could achieve success when faced 
by a commander who lacked, what Field Marshal Montgomery described some 
centuries later as 'that moral courage, that resolution, and that determination which 
will enable him [the leader] to stand firm when the issue hangs in the balance'. 161 
Minchin failed to either prevent or quash the mutiny, yet he still managed to 
exonerate himself at his court martial, which at the same time censured Prater who 
was not on trial. Finally, as Minchin occupied a key colonial posting as adjutant of 
the New South Wales Corps, his apparently evasive nature should be borne in mind 
in considering his central role in other questionable activities by officers of the 
Corps, particularly the rebellion against Bligh in 18082' 
1 " HRNSW, 4, p.443 and footnote. That Lady Shore was twice captured by the French, then 
sailed under Spanish colours, yet finally returned to England, appears an extraordinary chain of 
events. 
1 " Montgomery of Alamein, A Concise History of Warfare, London, 1972, p.13. An extract of 
his views on leadership, which equally applied in the 18th as well as the 20th centuries. 
1 " At Johnston's court martial (see below, Chapter 11, pp.287-288 including footnote 87), 
Minchin's evidence is more than evasive, it is shifty, including deliberate lying under oath. 
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Chapter 8 
The Corps in the Colony 
Reference has been made in previous chapters to administrative problems 
which impacted upon the New South Wales Corps, such as recruiting, discipline and 
leadership. This chapter will consider several colonial incidents in which members 
of the Corps were involved, and analyse the relationship between the military power 
and the naval governors representing the civil power, who ultimately relied on the 
military for their authority and survival. The question arises whether this often 
uneasy relationship in any way weakened external or internal security in the colony. 
Tensions between naval governors and senior military commanders, who were 
also appointed lieutenant-governors, commenced early in the colony's history. In 
October 1792, disregarding Phillip's disapproval, Major Grose arranged for a 
returning convict transport, Britannia, to be hired by the civil and military officers in 
the colony to obtain 'necessities of my soldiers ... [that] will assist us to escape the 
miseries of that precarious existence we have hitherto been so constantly exposed 
to.' Grose's rationale that the soldiers 'had scarcely shoes to their feet ... [and had] 
reduced and unwholesome rations' was a thinly disguised excuse to mount a trading 
venture.' Phillip's response exposed the falsity of this excuse. He wrote to Grose, 
there was 'no necessity for taking up the Britannia, nor can I form any judgment 
how far that ship's going to the Cape will do away all the distresses you have 
mentioned'. Nevertheless, Phillip did not order the abandonment of this project as 
HRNSW, 1, P1.2, p.652. Grose to Phillip of October 1792, requesting the governor 'will 
interest yourself in our favour'. Two days before, Grose had verbally raised the proposal with 
Phillip, who opposed the idea. 
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the actions of the ship's master 'did not by any means depend on me'. 2 On this 
note of strong disapproval from his superior officer, Grose took the initial step in 
organised trading by the civil and military officers.' This was the genesis of 
commercial ventures by officers, whose increasing wealth from land grants, led to the 
formation of powerful trading cliques after Phillip returned to England. 4 Grose and 
the military then controlled the colony, and Phillip's unique style of civil 
government, with no concessions made to any groups, including the military, ceased. 
Between Phillip's departure and Hunter's arrival, the military administered 
the colony for three years. Lieutenant Governor Grose took over from Phillip in 
December 1791 and administered the colony until his own departure in December 
1794. After Grose's departure, the duties of governor devolved onto the next most 
senior military officer, Captain William Paterson, who remained in that post until 
Governor Hunter's arrival in September 1795. These three years overlapped with 
the first years of Britain's involvement in the French Revolutionary Wars, from 
February 1793, and the subsequent disastrous performance of British arms on the 
continent of Europe.' The Secretary of State for War (and later, the Colonies) had 
little time, or inclination, to closely oversee how a relatively junior officer, 
commanding a small garrison in a penal colony, carried out his duties. As there was 
no obvious threat to its external or internal security, there was no reason for the 
Secretary to be concerned over "Botany Bay". The war and geographic isolation of 
• HRNSW, 1, P1.2, pp.652-653. Phillip to Grose of same date. 
• D Collins, An Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, 
p.157. Eleven shares each of £200 were subscribed by officers to mount the venture. 
• BH Fletcher, Landed Enterprise and Penal Society A History of Farming and Grazing in New 
South Wales Before 1821, Sydney, 1976, pp.62-64. Grants applicable to both civil and military 
officers, p.62. 
• C Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, A Military, Political and Social Survey, 
Hannondsworth, Pelican 1974, pp.234-238, for campaign in Flanders and Holland. Contributing 
problems being: 80,000 men died, killed or disabled in the West Indies from 1793-1796, p.234, and 
poor officer quality due to purchase system, pp.236-237. RE and TN Dupuy, The Collins 
Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present, London, 4th ed. 1993, pp.742- 
744, for execution of Louis XVI in 1793 and failure of Monarchist forces, supported by British and 
Spanish navies, to withstand a Republican army at siege of Toulon; British Army's withdrawal 
from Europe in 1794 and abortive landing at Quiberon, 1795, failure of Vendee rising, p.745-746. 
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the colony, ensured the Corps a free hand.' 
Immediately upon becoming Administrator, Grose ordered that military 
officers instead of magistrates would dispense justice.' This concerned Deputy 
Judge-Advocate Collins who recorded:- 
substituting the military for the civil officer, which before this period had 
never been the case; the military power having hitherto been ... 
[responsible] for the protection of the stores, and ... such duties as 
belonged to their profession, without any share in the direction of the 
colony; ... [T]he necessity or cause for these alterations was not directly 
obvious; and could not be accounted for from any other motive, than that 
preference which a military man might be supposed to give to carrying on 
the service by means of his own officers, rather than by any other.' 
This one order placed the colony, except Norfolk Island, under direct military rule. 
The island's naval lieutenant-governor, then Commander King, in this appointment, 
remained the head of both the local civil and military power. Later, as a result of 
disturbances (discussed below), King's rightful disciplinary powers over the 
island's military detachment were curtailed by Grose as acting governor. Once this 
happened, with the military conducting the magistrates' and criminal courts, their 
power over the whole colony was absolute. This was compounded by the fact that 
for both criminal courts and courts martial, Grose was the confirming authority. 
Despite the displacement of the civil power, the convicts' lot remained unchanged, 
with no apparent difference to the prevailing internal security situation. 
Grose rapidly introduced a system of free enterprise favouring the small 
official elite, supported by government largess. Within a month of the arrival of the 
dispatch approving land grants to military and civil officers, he granted eight 
6 R Holmes, Redcoat The British Soldier in the Age of Horse and Musket, Hammersmith, 2001, 
p.89. In 1794, Prime Minister Pitt created the appointment of Secretary of State for War, with 
added responsibility for the colonies in 1798. The importance of the Secretary at War declined. C 
Barnett, Britain and Her Army, pp.238-239. The Secretary for War and the Colonies was 
'responsible for military affairs', while the Secretary at War 'remained the executive head of military 
administration'. The first Secretary for War (Henry Dundas) also held the offices of 'Home 
Secretary, Treasurer of the Navy and President of the Indian Board of Control'. As Home Secretary, 
he would have had little time to consider New South Wales and the transportation of convicts, nor 
as Secretary for War, would he be concerned about an insignificant Corps. 
HRNSW, 2, Introduction, p.xxiv. There is no written record of this, with the presumption that 
it may have been either a Military Order or given verbally. 
D Collins, An Account, pp.165-166. 
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individuals a total of 700 acres.' Grose ultimately granted 10,674 acres in the two 
years of his administration, while his military successor, Captain Paterson, dispensed 
4965 acres in nine months. Both officers authorised grants to those 'who had 
incurred favour amongst the military'.' A generous labour force of convicts, clothed 
and fed at government expense, was allocated to work the officers' land. Also, no 
hindrance was placed in the way of officers who formed cartels to trade in goods 
entering the colony. These officers had the financial capability to monopolise trade 
with transient ships' masters. Until emancipated convicts developed a merchant 
community, the officers were the only group in the colony with access to the 
desirable sterling drafts drawn on London. Not only could military officers draw 
against their own meagre pay credits, but through the regimental paymaster, also 
draw on their soldiers' consolidated earnings. For example, Lieutenant William 
Cox, who succeeded John Macarthur as the Corps' paymaster, was ordered back to 
England by the War Office, to face disciplinary action for having 'an excessive 
Balance that has been accumulated in the Hands of the Paymaster', with a balance 
overdrawn on 24 February 1802 of £7,898/16/41/2." After three comfortable years 
of laissez faire colonial government, the officers were thereafter prepared to frustrate 
attempts by naval governors to curtail their enterprises. Later, Hunter expressed the 
'strongest astonishment' that military officers had entered into trade of any kind 
despite some of them holding considerable tracts of land.' 
The naval governors, under orders from London to stop these activities, 
especially the use of spirits as a trading medium, came into direct conflict with 
vested interests which included serving, and later, retired military officers. This was 
the major cause of friction between those defending their perquisites, and successive 
HRA, 1, 1, p.365. Dundas to Phillip of July 1792, for approval of grants, with provisos. 
Commentary Note No.176, pp.758-759, for background, and receipt of Dundas' dispatch on 15 
January 1793. Eight grants (not seven as stated in Note 176) were authorised on 12 February 1793, 
p.438. Unaccountably, Grose approved a grant of twenty-five acres to Ensign Cummings on 31 
December 1792, after Phillip's departure and before approval was received from London. 
1 ° HRA, 1, 1, p.783, Commentary Note 319. 
" AJCP, reel 1073, Out Letters Secretary-at-War New South Wales Corps, 1803-1810, WO 4/846, 
pp.9-10. T Moore (for Secretary at War) to Colonel Clinton (Commander-in-Chiefs' staff) of 
December 1803. 
12 HRA, 1, 1, p.670. Hunter to Portland of November 1796. 
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naval governors, Hunter, King and Bligh. The point of contention was which 
interests were to exert economic control over the colony; the entrepreneurial 
groupings, or the governor and his regulated market. This was not a monolithic 
struggle between two bases of power, but rather a loose coalition of individuals 
manoeuvring to gain personal advantage or prestige to strengthen their own position 
in a penal colony where, because of its isolation and small size of its ruling elite, 
tensions tended to be magnified. To picture this confrontation as a power play 
resulting from inter-service jealousies distorts reality. Even so, the form that the 
strife took was primarily that of the New South Wales Corps officers defending 
their "honour" against the naval governors. A simplistic depiction of this inter-
service rivalry should more accurately be seen as a conflict between the military 
power, sponsored by powerful cliques, which included civilian officials, against the 
civil power, exercised autocratically by the succession of naval governors. 
By the time Hunter assumed office, the Corps had evolved a firmly 
entrenched system of power and privilege. It is little wonder that Hunter, in a 
dispatch, of November 17%, wrote of the military and civil officers,that :- 
every means was practis'd to frustrate the endeavours I saw it was 
necessary to use for correcting various tricks, and to remove customs which 
had been long establish'd, and for want of timely attention consider'd as 
licens'd. Continually thwarted ... worthless characters [were] encourag'd 
almost into a state of resistance by those whose schemes might have been in 
some degree effected by the changes I was about to make' 
Hunter advised London that a central problem in the colony was that the 
administration of justice was in the hands of the military. To correct this, he 
appointed the Reverend Richard Johnson and William Balmain, the surgeon, as 
acting magistrates 'in the district of the town of Sydney'." He hoped that this 
would reduce the 'power and influence [of the military] over the civil concerns of the 
colony'. The degree of Hunter's concern is indicated by his comment that this 
action could thwart the military in their attempts to 'overthrow ... the civil power ... 
" HRNSW, 3, pp.170-171. Hunter to Portland. 
' 4 HRNSW, 3, p.137. Government and General Order of September 1796. 
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and to continue that disorder, confusion, and disobedience' which had resulted from 
his attempts to curb the licence the military had enjoyed after Phillip's departure!' 
King later extended this system of civilian magistrates, in naming eight magistrates 
in 1806, of which only four were military or naval officers. 16 
In the same vein, Governor-designate King, based on his previous experiences 
with the Corps as lieutenant-governor of Norfolk Island (discussed later), bitterly 
wrote:- 
I am here enduring the cold indifference of one [presumably Macarthud, 
and the approaching hate of all ... I shall need much support at Home, for 
here I can expect little or none. '7 
Likewise, the Colonial Office was concerned by reports of officers engaged in 
trading activities, and resisting the naval governors. They passed on complaints of 
this prohibited military practice, which in turn raised the ire of the British 
Commander-in-Chief. 
In March 1799, before Paterson, now promoted to lieutenant colonel, returned 
to the colony from a visit to England, he received written orders emanating from the 
Commander-in-Chief. These were to stop New South Wales Corps officers 
conducting any form of trading. Paterson was to ensure that:- 
no means should be neglected which ... check in future abuses of so 
infamous a nature, and in every respect so pernicious to his Majesty's 
service and so injurious to the character of a British officer, that he [the 
Commander-in-Chiefl is under the necessity of desiring that you will ... 
materially contribute in some measure to restore the credit ... to the character 
of a British officer, but which has in this instance been sullied!' 
But despite increasing competition from civil traders, often emancipists,' and 
continued efforts to curb the officers from abusing their commissions, this illegal 
activity was so entrenched, it was still flourishing when the Corps rose in 
' 5 HRNSW, 3, pp. 171-172. 
16 HRNSW, 6, pp.140-141. Present state of the colony, by King (no addressee shown), of August 
1806. This informative document, pp.135-160, is not duplicated in Historic Records of Australia. 
' 7 HRNSW, 4, p.110. King to Under Secretary King of June 1800, written before Hunter's 
departure from the colony. King became governor in September 1800. 
HRNSW, 3, p.640. Horse Guards directive of March 1799. 
19 BR Fletcher, Landed Enterprise, pp.67-68, for increasing competition with officers. 
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insurrection against Bligh in 1808. 
Tension between the civil and military powers was long standing, and well 
understood by Governors Hunter and King, both of whom had previously served in 
the infant colony. Prior to Phillip's return to England, King, as lieutenant-governor 
of Norfolk Island, had shared equal civil status with Grose who arrived in the colony 
in February 1792 as lieutenant-governor of New South Wales. But this situation 
changed on Phillip's departure, with Grose assuming the duties of governor. On 
Norfolk Island, a series of incidents in 1793-1794 resulted in King ordering ten 
soldiers be dispatched to Sydney Town to face charges of mutiny. Following a 
military court of inquiry, the soldiers were acquitted with Grose reprimanding King 
for bringing discredit to the honour of the regiment. 2° King also received stern 
orders from Grose which resulted in the civil power on Norfolk Island being 
severely curtailed, with King prohibited from exercising command or discipline over 
the soldiers on the island. This order by Grose, limiting King's power, was 'to be 
made public' on Norfolk Island. Its concluding paragraph summarised the 
supremacy of the military over the civil power.- _ 
The [military] officers being fully equal to correct any crimes committed by 
the soldiers, there exists no necessity for taking a soldier before a Justice of 
the Peace. In case, therefore, of complaint, the commanding officer of the 
detachment is to be referred to, who will never suffer the soldier to be given 
to the custody of a convict constable.' 
This was a delicate situation for King who represented the civil power, which, 
by his commission, was superior to the military. King had to wait two years until 
the report of the incident had been considered in London, with the consequence that 
" D Collins, An Account, pp.214-215, for a concise account of this incident. HRNSW, 2, 
pp.125-131, for reprimand of King by Grose, and court of enquiry of February 1794; pp.135-171, 
for King's report to London and pp.173-191, for reply to Grose, of March 1794. 
21 HRNSW, 2, p.131. 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.32, for King's original commission from Phillip of February 1788, appointed 
him`Superintendent and Commandant of Norfolk Island'. HRNSW, 2, p.452. On return to 
England, from a comment in a letter by King, it is established that King, on 28 January 1790, was 
commissioned 'by his Majesty' as `Lieutenant-Governor of Norfolk Island, in the Pacific Ocean'. 
The wording of this commission is not published. But it is reasonable to presume that, in the 
normal practice, King was appointed commandant over troops on the island. 
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Grose was reprimanded for issuing illegal orders. Thereafter, the New South Wales 
Corps had little love for King when subsequently he returned to the colony as 
governor with strict orders to curtail the officers' commercial activities. King knew 
he was likened to 'the obnoxious character of a reformer [who] is not calculated to 
appear often on the theatre of this world'.' 
While King was still lieutenant-governor of Norfolk Island, Governor Hunter, 
who had taken over from the military administration, had his own problems with the 
Corps. One involved an ex-convict John Baughan, a master carpenter who had built 
a neat and well furnished home at Dawes Point (Figure 16). 24 In February 1796, 
following an argument between Baughan and a soldier, the soldier when 
subsequently acting as a sentry, irregularly left his post to go and insult Baughan. 
Unfortunately for the soldier, he left his musket at his post, which Baughan, 
unobserved, took and handed to the guard sergeant. Next morning, off duty soldiers 
forcefully disarmed Baughan, who attempted to defend his home and family, and 
then the troops 'completely demolished' Baughan's house and furniture. While 
this was taking place, Baughan was thrown to the ground, then 'one [soldier] held an 
axe over his neck, and swore if he offered to stir he would chop the head from his 
body.' After this the soldiers 'went off cheering ... and marched in a body cross the 
parade before the commanding officer's [Paterson's] house' s (Figure 17 2 ). 
On the same day, Hunter issued a Government and General Order deploring 
this incident which he defined as 'mutiny when the military assemble in such 
numbers unknown to their officers'. The order concluded:- 
if the soldiers ... consider them[selves] hereafter meriting the honorable 
appellation of British troops, it must be by their bringing forward the 
23 HRNSW, 4, p.846. Letter King to Banks of October 1802. 
" D Chapman, 1788 The People of the First Fleet, North Ryde, 1981, pp.41-42. Baughan was 
transported in the First Fleet (Friendship). Because of his skill in building flour mills, he was 
granted half an acre at Dawes Point in December 1794, where he built his home. Chapman notes 
Collins described Baughan as 'a man of sullen and vindictive disposition'. HRNSW, 5, p.838, for 
Figure 16. 
" URA, 1, 1, pp.575-576. Hunter to Portland of August 17%, Enclosure 1. 
" HRNSW, 5, opposite p.1. From Figure 16 measurements, it was approximately 760 yards 
from Baughan's to Paterson's house along the western shore of Sydney Cove. 
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ringleaders or advisers of this disgraceful conduct, in order that the stigma 
may be wiped away by such worthless characters being brought to trial for 
this shameful conduct.' 
Two days later, on 7 February, in a letter to the acting commanding officer, Captain 
Paterson, Hunter indicated the likely punishment for the four identified ringleaders, 
who 'in due time [will be] obliged to answer for it, most probably with their lives!' 
From this letter it is clear Hunter feared a threat to internal security was posed by 
such lack of discipline amongst the soldiers. He wrote 'I shall consider every step 
they [the culprits] may go furthering aggravation as rebellion against his Majesty's 
government and authority'.' Next day, to tighten discipline, Hunter had the 
following Government and General Order issued 'Soldiers [are] to sleep in barracks, 
not in Hutts [sic] at a distance ... By this means they will be more immediately under 
the Eye of their Officers'.' After Hunter's extreme warnings of capital charges 
against the culprits, and a Government and General Order of 13 February, naming 
the officers who were to constitute the general court martial to try the accused', what 
happened next was an anticlimax, prejudicial to all discipline. 
Incredibly, on 14 February, Hunter issued a further Government and General 
Order which included the statement:- 
A warrant having been issued for the apprehension of four of these men 
concerned ... he [Hunter] was prevailed on at the instance of the officers to 
suspend for a short time the execution of the warrant, in order that the men 
might be paraded and spoken to by their officers. ... [Further as] A message 
was then brought to the Governor by Captain McArthur ... expressive of 
their [the Corps] contrition, their sincere concern for what had happened ... 
also [that they] agreed to indemnify the sufferer for his loss. Upon 
receiving this message ... and by the personal petition of the sufferer, John 
Baughan ... the Governor ordered it [the warrant] to be withdrawn; the 
consequences would otherwise most probably have been fatal to some." 
Apparently lacking the determination necessary to see this matter through, 
" HRA, 1, 1, Enclosure 2, p.577. 
" HRA, 1, 1, Enclosure 3, pp.577-578. Enclosure 4, p.578 for 'four ... men concerned'. 
" HRA, 1, 1, p.578. 
" Governmeni and General Orders, Mitchell Library (ML), reel 6037, ML 1/18b, no page number. 
Order of 8 February 1796. 
" HRNSW, 3, p.18. 
32 HRA, 1, 1, Enclosure 4, pp.578-579. 
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Hunter did not enforce any disciplinary action at all. Normally, the ringleaders 
would at least have been tried and severely flogged. On this occasion drastic 
punishment was justified to preserve military discipline. Phillip, unlike Hunter, did 
not shrink from acting sternly in the practice of that era, such as in March 1789, 
when he had six marines executed for a grave breach of military discipline.' 
Significantly, it was Macarthur, not Paterson, who presented the Corps' plea 
to the governor. Macarthur, described by Irish rebel, "General" Joseph Holt, as 
being 'as far from honour as my nose is from silver', was a man who developed a 
reputation of allowing nothing to stand in the way of his chosen path. It is 
reasonable to surmise that as well as pleading with Hunter for the culprits' lives, he 
may have given hints of dire consequences in the colony if the governor continued 
with disciplinary action. Similarly, it is likely that the soldiers threatened Baughan, 
should he press ahead with charges. This is not a baseless assumption. Hunter 
recorded (in an undated memorandum) a conversation with Surgeon William 
Balmain, in which Balmain, in his capacity as examining magistrate, reported that 
Baughan's wife appeared apprehensive that the soldiers would murder her 
husband.' There is no reference in historical records to indicate the Corps took any 
internal disciplinary action against any soldier over the Baughan riot. This state of 
affairs reflected no credit on Hunter. 
But the saga continued. In the course of his duties, Magistrate Balmain 
examined Baughan (but, correctly, not the soldiers) after the riot. As a result, 
Macarthur being 'instructed by his brother-officers', wrote a brash letter demanding 
to know whether Balmain had instructed Baughan to prosecute the soldiers, and 
further, did Balmain threaten Baughan with prosecution if he withdrew his 
complaint. Balmain's reasoned reply to Macarthur, drew forth the retort that the 
Corps' officers 'should be wanting in justice to themselves if they omitted to 
" See above, Chapter 4, pp.88-89. 
" J Holt, A Rum Story, The Adventures of Joseph Holt Thirteen Years in New South Wales 
(1800-12), ed. P O'Shauglmessy, Kenthurst, 1988, p.57. 
35 HRNSW, 3, pp.19-22. This document was prepared about June 1798 from Hunter's 
recollections. It was 'attested by Balmain' as being correct, p.432 and footnote. 
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express their indignation at his [Balmain's] shamefully malevolent interference in 
the affairs of their corps', Letters between Balmain and Macarthur became 
increasing heated, and on 11 February, culminated in Balmain being presented with a 
proposal that he fight a duel with an officer 'the corps will point out ... for this 
purpose'26 Tempers cooled and no duel was fought. 
The above incident is instructive, demonstrating that the officers, led by 
Macarthur, felt powerful enough to interfere in the process of civil law if they 
considered that either they or their interests were threatened. It also indicates that 
Macarthur had supplanted the acting commander of the Corps, Paterson, as the 
leader in conducting negotiations with the governor as well as with a civil 
magistrate.' What is more, as Hunter was the writer of the memorandum, it is clear 
that, at the time of the incident, he was fully aware of this interference with one of his 
magistrates, but took no action to defend the authority of the civil power. Another 
instance of Hunter's weakness in failing to enforce punishment following criminal 
proceedings, occurred when five men were found guilty of murdering two Aboriginal 
boys. Having decried that due to the court's finding, the men were still living 'at 
their ease' on their own farms, Hunter then claimed that because there was a 
difference of opinion between the court and himself as 'executive authoritys fsicf , 
he did not act, as he did not wish to show `the smallest degree inconsistent with 
lenity'. Such an approach to governing a harsh penal colony, could only be taken 
as a sign of indecision, or weakness by those who opposed him, such as the Corps' 
officers.' Professor Fletcher's description of Hunter as 'the weakest and least 
effectual of the early governors', appears vindicated by these examples of Hunter's 
failure to take firm disciplinary action.' 
" HRNSW, 3, pp.20, 21 and 22 respectively. 
" HRA, I, 3, p.246, supports this contention of the author. King, when governor, described 
Paterson as 'a weak, honest man ... like many other men, "made a knave's tool of."' 
" HRA, 1, 2, p.402. Hunter to Portland of January 1800, with attached trial proceedings pp.403- 
422. 
" DD Mann, The Present Picture of New South Wales 1811, Sydney, 1979, p.viii, BH Fletcher's 
Introduction. 
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Only five months before the incident involving Baughan, Hunter had been 
sworn in as 'Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief' over 'all towns, garrisons 
[authors emphasis], castles, forts, and all other fortifications or other military 
works'.' Therefore, his failure to counter the Corps' challenge created a dangerous 
precedent. This trial of strength, and victory for the New South Wales Corps, 
boosted the Corps' self-aggrandisement and determination to counter any future 
moves against their entrenched position of privilege. The Baughan affair is 
considered a significant benchmark in the long running civil/military power 
confrontation which involved the Corps and the naval governors Hunter, King and 
Bligh. London's view on this breach of military discipline was enunciated in the 
Duke of Portland's dispatch of August 1797:- 
The conduct of the military ... is of so flagrant a nature, and so directly 
tending to endanger the safety of your Government [author's emphasis], 
that I cannot well imagine anything like a justifiable excuse for not bringing 
the four soldiers ... to a Court-martial, and punishing them with the utmost 
severity.' 
This was a clear warning to Hunter of a threat to internal security, by the forces he 
was commissioned to command. 
The sentiment in Portland's dispatch, was echoed a few months later in a 
letter by Reverend Samuel Marsden:- 
Since Governor Hunter's arrival there has been a great struggle between the 
civil and military power. 
[Hunter]had little prospect from the officers in general of obtaining aid 
and assistance from them to enable him to reduce the Colony to any kind of 
order and subordination' 
Marsden's comment about the conflicting civil and military powers, while referring 
to Hunter, is relevant in regard to all governors under consideration in this thesis. 
The intensity of disputation that developed between the civil power and a military 
clique, is evident in a connected series of incidents, between August and early 
October 1801, which involved Governor King who took office in September 1800. 
" HIM, 1, 1, p.513. From the opening paragraph of Hunter's commission. 
4 ' HRNSW, 3, p.294. 
42 S Marsden, The Letters and Journals of Samuel Marsden 1765-1838 Senior Chaplain in the 
Colony of New South Wales and Superintendent of the Church Missionary Society in New Zealand, 
ed. JR Elder, Dunedin, 1932, pp.31-32. Letter of September 1796. 
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This chain of events commenced with the trial of Lieutenant Marshall RN, leading to 
King being sent 'to Coventry' at Macarthur's instigation. This resulted in a duel 
between Paterson and Macarthur, and Macarthur's period of close arrest. During 
this time, Macarthur was ordered to return to England to stand trial. Finally, before 
he left the colony, Macarthur's actions led to an incident of riotous behaviour by 
soldiers he had previously commanded. 
This sorry sequence of events may have taken a different course, had the 
Corps' commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paterson, not been temporarily 
absent, with command devolved onto Captain Macarthur the next senior officer in 
Sydney. In this capacity, Macarthur advised King of an alleged fraudulent action 
regarding a dead Corps' officer's possessions, implicating Lieutenant James 
Marshall RN, the naval agent on the newly arrived convict transport Cornwallis. On 
King's orders, this complaint was investigated by magistrates, who considered there 
were insufficient grounds for Marshall to be charged in a criminal court.' 
Animosity between Macarthur and Marshall intensified resulting in a challenge 
being issued for a duel. This did not proceed as Macarthur's second, Captain 
Abbott, refused to have dealing with Marshall's second, who Abbott considered 
below his social status. Next day Marshall publicly struck Abbott and was 
forcefully prevented from striking Macarthur. As a result, Marshall was tried in the 
criminal court, which consisted of Paterson, four other Corps officers, one naval 
officer and the judge-advocate. He was convicted, and sentenced to a £50 fine and 
one years imprisonment.' 
During his trial, Marshall had raised objections to the composition of the 
court and apparent bias against himself. King took up this question once the trial 
was completed. As a result, a series of acrimonious letters were exchanged between 
" HRNSW, 4, p.550. Judge-Advocate Atkins to King of 20 August 1801. 
HRNSVV, 4, pp.524-525. King to Portland of September 1801. For details in this paragraph. 
King gave Marshall a 'conditional remission' (p.526) so that a question of law, raised by the 
defendant, could be resolved in England. 
" HRNSW, 4, pp.535-537. 
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King and some officers, with Macarthur being the main correspondent. Because 
of 'the proceeding in Lt. Marshall's trial', coupled with earlier reforms enforced on 
the officers by King, Macarthur took it upon himself to 'send me [King] to 
Coventry'." 
In a dispatch, the governor advised London that Toll Paterson informed me 
that Capt'n McArthur felt so much offended with him [Paterson] for not agreeing to 
withhold his visits to me, that he threatened him to divulge all their private and public 
conversations, correspondence, and transactions.' Macarthur carried out his threat 
(which was little short of blackmail) by having it 'rumoured by some of the officers' 
that uncomplimentary letters concerning King, had been drafted by Paterson for 
dispatch to Banks and also the Horse Guards. While King and Paterson reconciled 
this difference, Adjutant Minchin 'no sooner heard that Coll Paterson and myself 
intended to dine together, than notice thereof was sent to Capt'n McArthur ... [who 
made] an exposure of much private correspondence ... very hurtful to Col/ 
Paterson's feelings'.' Paterson later wrote to King that Macarthur, with the 
intention of creating ill feeling between the officers and their superior, even publicly 
quoted from personal letters written by Mrs Paterson to Mrs Macarthur. As a result, 
Paterson felt obliged to 'call upon him [Macarthur] for that satisfaction I, as an 
injured man, had a right to expect'.' 
In challenging Macarthur to a duel, Paterson was conscious he was 'deviating 
from the exact line of military discipline', but from 'the particular situation I was 
placed in with some of the officers, I had no other mode of obtaining 
[satisfaction]'.' At this time, it was well known that under English law, if a duelist 
was killed, the other principal and both seconds would be tried for murder. In May 
1801, this had occurred in India, where a Lieutenant Bellasis killed his duelling 
46 HRNSW, 4, pp.540-558. 
" HRNSW, 4, p. 498. Private letter, King to Under-Secretary King of 21 August 1801. 
48 HRNSW, 4, p.527. King to Portland of 25 September 1801. For Paterson's letters; extract to 
Sir Joseph Banks, undated, p.547, and to General Browtuigg of 24 August 1801, pp.507-512. 
HRNSW, 4, pp.580-581. Paterson to King of 29 September 1801. 
50 HRNSW, 4, p.581. 
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opponent, and both Bellasis and his second, Captain Byne, were convicted of 
murder. The situation of the other second, presumably a civilian, is not known. 
Bellasis was sentenced to fourteen years transportation. Despite this, Paterson's 
duel was not unique for officers of his rank, as a petition on behalf of Captain Byne 
refers to `Lieuet-Colonel Robinson', of the 16th Regiment, going 'to the field on a 
similar occasion'. 51 Despite duelling being unlawful, its practice permeated the 
officer class and higher levels of English society. For example, years later the Duke 
of Wellington, when prime minister, challenged and duelled with Lord Winchilsea 
over a perceived matter of honour. Later that day, when Wellington advised the king 
of the duel, the latter expressed his approval over the incident.' 
Paterson's challenge to Macarthur was, however, not a desperate last throw by 
Paterson to retain his standing as commanding officer. Instead, it was at the time, an 
accepted, if illegal way in which a "gentleman" could maintain his self-esteem in an 
abnormal situation. Indeed, amongst the troops, Paterson's "manly defence of his 
honour", possibly won their respect, rather than disillusioning them with a very 
public example of dissension amongst their officers. Nevertheless, it is a safe 
assumption, that the soldiers and convicts would have followed the developing saga 
with intense interest The distracting dissent amongst their superiors, would have 
done little for enforcement of military discipline and the efficient conduct of the 
Corps' internal security duties. 
In his duel with Macarthur on 14 September 1801, Paterson was seriously 
wounded in the right shoulder. As a result, Macarthur and both seconds were 
placed in close arrest under a Government and General Order of 15 September 
1801. In the same order, it was directed that Macarthur hold himself in readiness for 
reposting to Norfolk Island. He disputed this reposting, and as events transpired, 
51 HRNSW, 4, pp.456-459 and 460 for Robinson. 
" P Guedalla, The Duke, London, reprinted December 1931, pp.382-383. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.532. For King's summary of events, in this and next paragraph, pp.528-533. 
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remained in Sydney under close arrest. Under military law, arrested officers could 
only be held for eight days without charges being laid. Should Paterson have died 
of his wound during this period, or later, it would have been 'necessary to deliver the 
parties over to the civil power' to face murder charges. 55 
As Paterson was still alive after the eight days, a further order was issued 
releasing Macarthur and the two seconds from arrest, subject to 'their giving bail and 
proper security for their appearance before a Court of Criminal Judicature [if] ... 
Paterson dies ... of that wound'. Additionally, the officers, including Paterson (when 
recovered) were to 'enter in recognizances for keeping the peace towards each other' 
while resident in the colony. Macarthur would not accept these conditions, and 
demanded he remain in close arrest pending a general court martial to clear his name 
of perceived injustices.' His attitude during this period, was indicated in his private 
correspondence, which makes no attempt to disguise the fact that he considered 
Governor King as 'my game' and 'I am now so deeply in that the game begins to be 
amusing'? 7 King, exasperated with Macarthur, and with the functions of governor 
and prosecutor being incompatible, decided to send him to England, under the close 
arrest Macarthur did 'not choose to quit'. King considered, that in England, 
Macarthur should stand trial before a general court martial, on the basis of 
'endeavouring to create a dissension between me and Lieut't-Colonel Paterson, 
commanding His Majesty's troops in this territory and Acting Lieut't-Governor, 
whereby His Majesty's service has been much injured'.' But this decision by 
King, was not the end of the sequence of events involving Macarthur before his 
forced departure from the colony. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.559, for order, and pp.561-562, for Macarthur's reply to King of 16 September. 
This reposting would have been effected once Paterson's life was no longer in danger, or after the 
stipulated eight days. For delivery to civil power, p.564. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.564. 
56 HRNSW, 4, p.566. Government and General Order of 21 September 1801 and Macarthur to 
Adjutant Minchin of same date, pp.567-568. 
" MB Eldershaw, The Life and Times of Captain John Piper, Sydney, 1973, p.41. Letter John 
Macarthur to John Piper of 16 September 1801. Eldershaw's editorial comment indicates to whom 
Macarthur was referring. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.532. King also wrote that most of the officers who would have made up a court 
in the colony 'could not be considered impartial judges'. 
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While Macarthur was under close arrest at his home, MB Eldershaw refers to 
a 'minor incident' initiated by Macarthur which was 'In pursuance of his game 
[refer previous paragraph] ... an act of defiance which bore a sinister complexion'.' 
In this instance, Macarthur gave a 'present' of liquor to soldiers of his former 
command, the Corps' Parramatta Detachment. This was collected by a Sergeant 
Bayless, who ignored the requirement to first obtain a permit to transfer liquor from 
one house to another. He was apprehended by a civilian constable and the liquor 
confiscated. Bayless immediately complained to the new Detachment Commander, 
Lieutenant Hobby, who, in turn, established the legality of the constable's actions. 
Five minutes after Bayless was dismissed by Hobby, the latter and another officer, 
saw a 'number of men running up the street, some ... armed with large sticks' to 
retrieve the cask, by force if necessary. They were intercepted by the two officers, 
who broke up the mob before any violence was perpetuated.' Afterwards, King 
directed Paterson to rebuke Macarthur over that officer's involvement. The governor 
wrote that if this not had not been prevented, it would have `throw[n] this colony into 
the greatest confusion'.' 
This further instance of military mob rule, like that associated with the 
destruction of Baughan's house, demonstrates the scant regard some soldiers and 
their officers held for the civil power. It also indicates how Macarthur maintained 
control over his former detachment The soldiers appear to have reacted as though 
Macarthur was still in command, apparently feeling confident that they could thrust 
aside civic obstructions to local military supremacy. Finally, as Macarthur as a 
civilian, later provided soldiers with cheap spirits after the rebellion against Bligh in 
1808,6' it appears that over an extended period, Macarthur used 'presents' of spirits 
to soldiers for his own ends; possibly to gain or retain their personal loyalty to him, 
as opposed to regimental loyalty. It is little wonder that King, in August 1801, wrote 
" MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, p.41. 
" HRA, 1, 3, pp.299. Report Hobby to King of 5 October 1801. 
HRA, 1, 3, p.300. 
62 See below, Chapter 11, p.281. 
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that Macarthur 'will one day or other sett [sic] this colony in a flame."' 
Smouldering discontent amongst some of the military officers was to burst into 
flames in the insurrection against Bligh of 1808. 
Even after Macarthur was sent back to England under arrest in November 
1801,64 antagonism continued between King and the military officers. This was 
inevitable, as emphasised by ACV Melbourne, quoting from the 1812 Committee of 
Inquiry, 
The manner in which these extensive powers [of the governor] have been 
used ... has not always been such as to give satisfaction to the colony ... 
where so much authority and responsibility are thrown into the hands of one 
man, his will, however just, and his administration however wise, will ... 
create opposition and discontent amongst men unused, in their own 
country, to see so great a monopoly of power.' 
This particularly applied when the governor was ordered to impose unwanted 
restrictions on influential monopolistic elements in the small colonial society. For 
example Captain Kemp, assisted by Adjutant Minchin, caused trouble during a visit 
of French ships, under command of Commodore Baudin to Port Jackson. Kemp 
very publicly retailed the unfounded rumour that French officers had sold spirits 
ashore. This caused King and Baudin considerable trouble in investigating and 
resolving the matter. An unexpected by-product of this incident was a rupturing of 
relations between the governor and Lieutenant-Governor Paterson.' An indication of 
Paterson's feelings was reflected in a letter to the War Office 'there are few troops 
that would have bore, with equal steadiness, the repeated insults that both officers 
and men have met with of late from His Excellency Governor King'.' 
" HRA, 1, 3, p.246. King to Under Secretary King of August 1801. 
64 HRA, 1, 3, p.331. King to Portland of November 1801, and p.690 for Regimental Monthly 
Return. 
65 ACV Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development in Australia, New South Wales 1788- 
1856, Queensland 1859-1922 (with Notes to 1963 by the Editor), ed. RB Joyce, St. Lucia, second 
ed. 1963, pp.49-50. 
66 For visit, see below, Chapter 10, p.253 and footnote 52. 
67 HRA, I, 3, pp.657-661. Letter King to Paterson of October 1802, for crux of the issue; last 
paragraph p.660 for accusations regarding Kemp. Also p.652, for King to Hobart of November 
1802, describing Kemp's misbehaviour. 
68 HRNSW, 4, p.903. Paterson in a private letter to Secretary Sullivan of November 1802. 
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Meantime, opposition to the 'high hand[ed]' and 'fiery temper[ed]' 
Governor King' often took the form of scurrilous scandal sheets being circulated in 
the community. This led to a series of general courts martial which had something 
of a farcical air as the disaffected officers were the only ones available to provide 
members for the court.' The February 1803 court martial of Captain Kemp, on a 
related charge, is considered by this author to have later impacted on internal security 
in the colony. There is a distinct similarity between this trial and Macarthur's later 
criminal court trial of January 1808, which precipitated the Corps's rebellion against 
Bligh. The particular link being Kemp himself, who in 1808 was the senior officer 
presiding at Macarthur's trial and who applied similar court tactics in 1808 to those 
used successfully on his behalf in 1803. 71 HV Evatt's Rum Rebellion considers both 
trials, but with his focus directed towards Macarthur rather than the Corps' officers, 
he does not comment on the repetition, in 1808, of the court tactics used to 
manipulate the 1803 trial. A development resulting from the 1803 trial is 
emphasised by Evatt; this was the correspondence by Sir HB Hayes to Hobart, 
blackening King's reputation - part of a campaign which ultimately resulted in King 
being recalled to England.' 
The manipulation of Kemp's court martial was most effective, and occurred 
after Surgeon Harris of the Corps, acting as deputy judge-advocate, completed his 
case for the prosecution. Kemp then requested and was granted a three day halt in 
proceeding to allow him to prepare his defence. On the third day, 23 February 1803, 
Johnston (acting commanding officer) charged Harris with a court martial offence 
" I Lee, The Coming Of The British To Australia 1788 to 1829, London, 1906, pp.65-66. 
" For criminal court trials, naval officers sat as members with Corps officers, for example 
Lieutenant Grant RN sat on the trial of Lieutenant Marshall RN. But for courts martial, members 
came from the same armed service as the defendant. 
" See below, Chapter 11, p.271 and footnote 17. 
" HV Evatt, Rum Rebellion A Study of the Overthrow of Governor Bligh by John Macarthur and 
the New South Wales Corps, Sydney, 2nd ed. 1939, pp.79-82 for 1803. For 1808; pp.193-206. 
Kemp only gets a brief mention on p.20'7, as the senior member of the court who threatened Atkins. 
73 HV Evatt, Rum Rebellion, p.82. HRNSW, 5, p.104. Hayes to Hobart of May 1803. In this 
partisan letter, Hayes refers to King as 'a man ... mistaking arrogance for dignity, and caprice for 
wisdom'. Hayes was an 'intimate friend' of Captain Colnett, HMS Glatton, one of King's fiercest 
critics. 
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and wrote to King requesting a general court martial be convened to try Harris. He 
also pointed out the charge against Harris 'has occasioned the present Court-Martial 
[of Kemp] to be adjourned until such time as Your Excellency shall be pleased to 
appoint some other Person to sit as Judge-Advocate thereof.' This bore a striking 
resemblance to the later court proceedings against Macarthur of January 1808, when 
Kemp demanded Bligh replace Judge-Advocate Richard Atkins.' 
Thereafter, for Kemp's 1803 court martial, Johnston declared that the officers 
nominated as members of the court were not available for any other duty until they 
were discharged on completion of this court martial. As Harris was not available to 
continue with the trial due to his own pending court martial, Johnston asserted that 
Kemp's court martial could not be completed until King appointed a fresh judge-
advocate to the court. This, King consistently refused to do. Additionally, Johnston 
maintained that until the completion of Kemp's court martial, there were insufficient 
uncommitted officers available to form a court martial on Harris, or indeed to form a 
criminal court. As Johnston would not shift from this circular argument, on 4 March 
1803 King capitulated, appointing another judge-advocate (Atkins) for Kemp's 
trial.' King had little choice as he urgently needed officers available to form a 
criminal court to try fourteen Irish prisoners, who had gone on a rampage of 
attempted murder, violence and rape.' 
Kemp, in 1808, employed similar tactics at Macarthur's trial, that of 
prohibiting the judge-advocate from officiating. It is a reasonable supposition that 
Kemp, and Macarthur's supporters, considered the tactics used in successfully 
replacing the prosecuting officer at the 1803 court martial, could again be applied to 
humble another governor, who had proved to be implacably opposed to the officers' 
commercial interests. But Kemp failed to budge Bligh, thus precipitating the 
" HRA, 1, 4, p.177. Johnston to King of February 1803. 
" See above, footnote 71. 
76 HRA, 1, 4, pp.160-163 and 177-210 for details. 
77 See below, Chapter 9, p.219 and footnote 56, for this incident. 
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insurrection. Both Kemp's 1803 court martial and Macarthur's 1808 trial were 
struggles for supremacy between the civil and military powers. A further parallel 
between the trials in 1803 and 1808 is that on each occasion, the command of the 
Corps in Sydney was exercised by Major George Johnston, with Adjutant Minchin 
providing administrative continuity at the Corps' headquarters.' 
This chapter has presented the soldiers, and especially their officers, in an 
unfavourable light. But King also had good words for the Corps. Regarding the 
troops, in 1802, he commented that 'justice to the soldiers requires my saying that 
since I have been in the command, their conduct has been regular and good, and, in 
many instances, very praiseworthy'.' Despite problems with the officers, he was 
astute enough to assess how they would act in an emergency. In August 1803, he 
wrote 'I have felt myself ill-treated by the officers of the Corps as Governor, but that 
they, as well as every soldier, would be as forward as any troops in His Majesty's 
service in doing their duty.'" The Castle Hill Rebellion the following year was to 
vindicate, if somewhat brutally, this opinion of the Corps. Johnston who had been 
sent to England under close arrest in 1800, for selling spirits to one of his company 
sergeants, was the officer publicly lauded by King in 1804 for putting down the 
rebels.' Nevertheless, like the recall of Hunter, the Corps' officers including 
Macarthur (in and out of uniform), helped tarnish King's reputation as governor, 
leading to his being replaced by Bligh.' 
From this chapter, it is argued that grave weakness was shown in maintenance 
of discipline over the troops, such as when they embarked on mob rule. Even 
" See below, Chapter 11, p.272, footnote 18, for correspondence and p.282. 
" In 1803, Lieutenant Colonel Paterson was on sick leave, and in 1808 he was in command at 
Port Dalrymple in Van Diemen's Land. 
" HRNSVV, 4, p.781. Letter King to Under Secretary King of June 1802. 
HRA, 1, 4, p.358. King to Hobart. 
" HRNSW, 4, pp.84-85. King to Under Secretary King of May 1800. Captain Johnston, who 
was Hunter's ADC, was placed under arrest by Paterson. Hunter, while still governor, refused to 
allow a court martial for Johnston. King later stated that as Johnston 'declined' to be court 
tnartialled in the colony, King sent him back under arrest to England, p.196. For Johnston's service 
during the 1804 rebellion, see below, Chapter 9, pp.224-225 and 230-237. 
" HV Evatt, Rum Rebellion, pp.77-78 and 103. 
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London commented on the adverse effect that mob rule had on Hunter's 
government, and by inference, on internal security. His failure to discipline the main 
culprits in the Baughan affair was possibly a turning point in the struggle by the 
military power to gain supremacy over the civil power. In such a disturbed 
atmosphere, with many regimental officers involved in personal vendettas, their farms 
or trading profits, the unit's efficiency in its internal security duties suffered from a 
slackening of discipline. In 1811, prior to Johnston's court martial for the 1808 
rebellion, two experienced sergeants, Bremlow and Champion (the latter reduced to 
the ranks for displaying pro-Bligh sentiments) gave pre-trial statements for the 
prosecution, which referred to discipline in the unit. Bremlow said, he was 'well 
informed of the bad decipline [sic] of the Corps, while Champion reported 'bad 
decipline [sic] and abuces [sic] in the Corps Generally'. Nevertheless, in the one 
emergency faced by the Corps, during the rebellion of 1804, the soldiers and those 
officers involved, especially Johnston, performed the duties expected of them. 
Against this, there was developing a less than attractive aspect of the Corps, 
particularly amongst its officers. Due to the overwhelming determination of the 
military to defend their financial interests against the naval governors, there was 
constant conflict between the military and civil powers. In the small colonial society 
this created stress and hostility, leading to incidents such as the duel between 
Macarthur and Paterson, and the many courts martial of officers in which the 
governor was involved. This undoubtedly added to dissent in the ranks, where 
soldiers appear to have been influenced by their officers against the authority of the 
governor. Such an attitude would have been heightened where, because of 
insufficient barracks to house all the troops, they lived in 'a multiplicity of scattered 
huts' where the soldier 'might ... think of himself more as an independent citizen 
than as a subordinate soldier."' 
Finally, within the record of Kemp's court martial in 1803, is a traceable 
" A Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens', The Push from the Bush, No.25, October 1987, 
pp.75 and 90. 
" D Collins, An Account, p.196. 
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connection between it and the Corps's insurrection against Bligh. Similarly, 
Johnston, Kemp and Minchin who were linked with the 1803 trial, again appeared as 
active participants in the revolt against Bligh. When joined by Macarthur, the day 
came in 1808 when the colony was 'sett ... in a flame'. 
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Chapter 9 
The Convict Rebellion of 1804 
Towards the end of the 18th century, the Irish people's nationalistic pride and 
resistance to English rule was bolstered by the success of the French revolution. 
Reminders of injustices imposed by the English found fertile ground amongst some 
educated townsmen and country gentry', as well as the poor peasantry in Ireland. The 
protestant Anglo-Irish ruling elite, fearful of an uprising supported by a French 
invasion, imposed martial law. These fears were not without foundation, for on 23 
May 1798, an insurrection 'broke out prematurely ... forcing the rank and file into the 
field without their French allies'. 2 This confrontation, which finally degenerated into 
a struggle between Catholics and Protestants, was uncoordinated, but mobs armed 
with fearsome pikes, created panic amongst the Protestant community (Figure 18 3). 
The rebels were opposed by volunteer militias and the British Army, who 
responded savagely, putting down a series of uprisings. A month after the 
insurrection commenced, the rebel stronghold at Vinegar Hill in County Wexford was 
captured. But this did not stop the hatred and Willing. In July 1798, a British soldier 
' Such men included Theobald Wolfe Tone, a Protestant lawyer of English descent and "General" 
Joseph Holt, a Protestant country gentleman. On philosophic grounds, both were leaders of the 1798 
revolution. R O'Donnell, 'Michael Dwyer: 'The Wicklow Chief", Irish Convict Lives, ed. B Reece, 
Sydney, 1993, p.19. Holt's rebel rank of 'general ... was a genuine battlefield promotion reflecting his 
military acumen and seniority in the pre-Rebellion organisation.' 
R O'Donnell, 'Michael Dwyer', p.21. Notes 'All hope ... was lost when the Dublin yeomanry 
turned out at short notice and prevented the mobilisation of the city rebels.' 
S Rigge, 'Ireland The Tortured Colony', The British Empire, BBC tv Time-Life Books No.58, 
1973, front cover. 
Figure 18: The pikes, Ireland 1798 
Possible images such as this contributed to fears in the colony of an Irish 
uprising. 
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wrote of his first experience of the horrors of civil war; at Arklow, a town attacked by 
a 'large body of rebels a few days before':- 
the ground where the rebels had stood during the action ... was disgusting. 
Numbers of bodies were still unburied, some of them lying in ditches, and 
the swine feeding on them. There was a number of prisoners in the place 
... whom they were trying to court-martial and hanging' 
Arriving too late, and with too little to assist the rebels, a small force of 1100 
Frenchmen landed in Connaught in northwestern Ireland in August 1798. After an 
ineffectual march inland, they were defeated, together with the hopes of the Irish, with 
remaining pockets of dissension ruthlessly destroyed. JW Fortescue in his History 
of the British Army noted 'the unhappy peasants were pursued with a ferocity which 
even to the present day [1906] has never been forgiven'. 5 Amongst the many Irish 
prisoners transported to New South Wales, the spirit of rebellion remained strong. 
They brought a legacy of hate to the colony, where, easily manufactured and hidden 
pikes were to be a weapon of retribution. To the English, the pike conjured up 
threatening visions of the rebellious Irish emulating the worst excesses of the French 
revolution. For the governor and colonial society, the New South Wales Corps, 
despite its weaknesses and possibly disloyal elements (such as Irish and prison 
conscripts)6, were the only protection against any possible uprising.' 
The first convicts from Ireland were transported to the colony in Queen, 
GB, 'The horrors of the Irish Rising, 1798', Rank And File, The Common Soldier at Peace and War 
1642-1914, TH McGuffie compiler, London, 1964, pp.260-261. 
JW Fortescue, A History of The British Army, Vol.4, Pt.1, 1789-1801, London, 1906, p.594. 
This comment anticipated the Faster Uprising in Dublin by ten years. 
6 For example, in 1800, there were thirty-eight ex-Savoy soldiers in the Corps (Figure 13). From: 
CJ Smee, New South Wales Corps, Description and Succession Book 1808-1810, A3 sized, non 
paginated (summary of WO 25/642), NLA reference Nf 356.109944 N532, sixth page. In 1808, a total 
of 790 other ranks' names were recorded, with the place of birth available for 722. Of these, 
presumably a loyal majority would be amongst those born as follows:- 411 Englishmen, 42 Scots, 15 
Welshmen, 2 Channel Islanders, 6 born at sea and 11 locally born; with the possibility of disloyal 
elements amongst 196 Irishmen and 39 foreigners. This assumption does not take into account the 
questionable loyalty of 21 ex-Savoy soldiers in the unit in 1808 (Figure 13). 
' The raising by Hunter of a loyal militia, in September 1800, is referred to later. But these two 
companies supplemented, rather than replaced, members of the Corps. 
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arriving in September 1791, seven years before the Irish rebellion. Despite a search 
revealing that 'upwards of 200 convicts had saws found on them' on embarkation at 
Cork, no major security threats were recorded as the Irish settled into the convict 
community.' Indeed, following the arrival of a further two shiploads of Irish convicts 
in 1793,9 Collins' journal only records instances of the Irish tendency to escape by 
small boat or attempt to walk to China. Despite them 'constantly whispering their 
own discontents amongst the other convicts', Collins gives no indication that up to 
this time there was any suspicion of insurrection being planned.' Therefore, it would 
appear that prior to the 1798 rebellion in Ireland, the majority of Irish convicts was not 
radically motivated. With Collins' departure for England in September 17%, his 
Account from then to 1800, is based on material supplied by ex-Governor Hunter.' 
This being so, after 1796, the increasing note of apprehension concerning Irish 
behaviour, reflected the contents of Hunter's dispatches, not Collins' observations. 
Hunter's initial concern with the Irish centred on the Irish government's 
failure to forward details of court sentences. This failure created friction, as the 
governor was not prepared to accept a convict's word that he, or she, had served their 
term of imprisonment. Such a rejection embittered convicts, when not released in 
accordance with their claim of having completed their sentence.' Hunter expressed 
concern that 'some seditious and ill-dispos'd persons had been tampering with 
the[se] refractory people'.' By January 1798, he had come to consider the Irish as a 
'lawless and turbulent people', but still in his dispatches did not suggest there was 
any plotting which threatened internal security. As late as October 1799, Hunter's 
• HRNSW, 2, p.772. Spring saws were concealed in their hair or soles of their shoes. 
• Boddingtons and Sugar Cane. 
'`) D Collins, An Account of the English Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, p.195, 
for a boat stolen and spearing, in 1793, of 'two bad characters' who arrived in Boddingtons. In 1794 
(p.223), the Irish at Toongabbe and Parramatta making for China and small boat escape attempts; of 
whispering discontents (p.226). 
" D Collins, An Account, p.xv, Introduction by J Collier. 
12 HRA, 1, 2, p.366. Government and General Order of 10 May 1799, advising records of 
imprisonment terms for Irish convicts who arrived in Queen in September 1791 had now been received. 
13 HRNSW, 3, p.175. Hunter to Portland of November 1796. 
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major concerns, as expressed in a Government and General Order, still centred on 
runaways and escapees on board outward bound ships, rather than the Irish.' 
A different emphasis is apparent in Hunter's dispatches following the arrival 
of the first transport which left Ireland after the 1798 rebellion. This ship carried:- 
A number of Irish rebels, having been summarily tried by court-martial and 
sentenced to death, but reprieved on agreeing to leave the country, were 
shipped ... in the Minerva. They included General Joseph Holt, [and] 
Father James Harold' 
Exactly three weeks after Minerva reached Sydney, Hunter expressed concern over 
the security of the powder magazine in Sydney. He ordered the building of a new 
magazine, because 'With such discription [sic] of persons as we have lately receiv'd 
from Ireland ... The present [magazine] might with little trouble be readily destroy'd 
... which would dreadfully reduce our power over so numerous a body of that 
turbulent description'." Pending construction of this installation 'at the back of 
Windmill Hill', the powder was relocated aboard a hulk to 'prevent its being seized 
by the seditious'. 18 This was the first indication to London that the Irish were seen as 
a serious threat to internal security within the colony. 
With concern about Irish convicts intensifying amongst the settlers, by April 
1800, the Irish rebel Father Harold, complained that some people 'consider it unsafe 
to hold communication with me'.' In his History of the Catholic Church in 
Australasia, Cardinal Morgan described the condition of Catholics during this period 
" HRNSW, 3, p.725. Order of 9 October 1799. 
" C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 1969, p.158. Minerva sailed from Cork on 
24 August 1799, with 165 male and twenty-six female convicts. She arrived Port Jackson on 11 
January 1800 (pp.157-159). 
16 HRNSW, 4, p.36. To Portland of February 1800. Hunter would have been aware that Friendship 
which left at the same time as Minerva, also carrying Irish convicts, was expected shortly. She arrived 
two weeks later. 
M Austin, 'The Early Defences of Australia', JRAHS, Vol.49, Pt.3, November 1963, p.195. 
" HRA, 1, 2, p.618. Comment No.5, by King, on public building constructions proposed by 
Hunter. 
' 9 HRNSW, 4, p.81. Harold letter to Hunter of April 1800. 
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as one of 'open persecution, [which] corresponds to that of the catacombs'.' He 
claimed 'Catholic convicts were particularly grieved by determined efforts ... to rob 
their children of their faith'. This was the result of two provisos placed on an 
'Orphan School ... [established] by King in 1801 ... [for] improving the condition of 
the children'. These provisos were 'the children of convicts were included in the 
category of the orphan children ... [and] all such orphan children were to be brought 
up Protestants'.' Against this assertion, it could be argued, that in 1801, King's 
intentions to help 'one thousand and seven ... neglected children' were commendable, 
and, in some cases, some form of religious education was better than none. Further, 
by 1806, there were three additional schools in Sydney, 'one of which is for Catholic 
children? Nevertheless, prejudice against Catholics was clearly widespread, as 
illustrated in a letter by Reverend Marsden, referring to Father Dixon. The latter had 
been banished to the colony as a result of the 1798 rebellion, but was given approval 
by King, to exercise his priestly functions. In 1803, Marsden wrote 'Satan has still 
his friends ... and maintains his cause in every quarter. I did not expect to see his 
kingdom strengthened amongst us by the addition of the Roman religion.' 
In September 1800, as suspicions of rebellion deepened, an inquiry was 
ordered by Hunter because 'certain seditious assemblies ... have been held ... to the 
great danger of His Majesty's Government and the public peace'.' Without waiting 
• PF Morgan, Cardinal, History of the Catholic Church in Australasia, Sydney, undated (but from 
text, published in the 1890's), p.24. 
• PF Morgan, History of the Catholic Church, p.12. While the accuracy of these comments is not 
doubted, no formal regulations, referring to these provisos, are noted in either Historical Records of 
Australia, or Historical Records of New South Wales. However, by King's direction, Reverend 
Marsden was appointed treasurer to the school's committee, and was apparently the main coordinator 
for the project, HRN SW, 4, pp.135-136. He would have ensured that the Protestant religion prevailed. 
• HRA, 1, 3, p.425. King to Portland of March 1802. 
• HRNSW, 6, p.152. Present state of the colony, by King (no addressee shown), of August 1806. 
24 Some Private Correspondence of the Rev. Samuel Marsden and Family, ed. G Mackaness, Dubbo, 
1976, p.31, and note p.30. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.119. Hunter's directive to 'Officers' of September 1800: pp.120-130 for The 
Summary of Proceedings, edited by deletion of convicts' full names. Duplicated in HRA, 1, 2, 
pp.575-583 with names given. 
214 
for the results of this inquiry, Hunter issued a Government and General Order 
embodying two companies of volunteers, each of fifty men, with one to be based in 
Sydney and the other at Parramatta. This is of historical interest, as these were the 
first of a long line of militia units raised in Australia. 
The inquiry ordered by Hunter was the first of two extensive investigations in 
one month, sparked by separate, but linked, Irish plots. In an inquiry, from 4 to 12 
September 1800, it was established that there was 'a Spirit of Discontent which was 
fast ripening to a serious Revolt and Consequences the most dreadful'!" From 
witnesses' statements, it is clear that this plot embraced a degree of wishful thinking 
by the principal plotters, who had a series of expectations rather than clear aims. In 
outline, some three hundred rebels were to rise at Parramatta, and armed with pikes, 
staves, and firearms taken from settlers or soldiers, march on Sydney. There, they 
planned to kill Hunter, King and those who opposed them. Assistance was 
anticipated from 'disaffected' sailors on HMS Buffalo, and the rebel planners 
believed some sympathetic soldiers from the Sydney garrison would take cannon to 
establish a secure area for them around South Head. If the government was not 
overturned, the rebels intended to withdraw to this secure area. There they would live 
on the produce of settlers' farms 'until they heard from France whither the Insurgents 
meant to dispatch a ship'. 
While this plan appears impracticable, if launched, it could have led to a great 
effusion of blood before order was restored. To discourage rebellious plotting, the 
inquiring officers recommended that five rebel leaders each receive 500 lashes and 
they and a number of others including "General" Holt and Father Harold be 'sent to 
" HRA, 1, 2, pp.595-596. General Order of 6 September 1800. As 'free men' (former convicts) 
were enlisted in the Association, as well as into the Corps, probably this would have improved the 
civic status of emancipists. This order also tightened the requirement for passes to be carried by a non-
settler, when travelling from 'where he is stationed or resides'; pp.636-637 for Hunter's orders of 7 
September for arming and training volunteers. Commentary Note 261, pp.750-751, Australia's first 
volunteer force. 
27 HRA, 1, 2, p.582. For details in this paragraph, pp.575-583. 
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a distant and remote part of the Territory by the most speedy Conveyance', namely to 
Norfolk Island. In fact only Harold was sent,' as Holt's 'complicity in the 
proposed insurrection was not proven'2 0 Holt later recounted that of 'nineteen men 
brought from the jail before the Governor to be examined, and eighteen of them 
turned informer ... some of them was so good as to bring Doctor Harold, the priest, in 
by their information."' 
These measures did not smother the smouldering spirit of rebellion, as a 
further uprising was planned for Sunday, 28 September 1800, the day Hunter 
embarked on Buffalo for return to England, and King assumed the duties of governor. 
This was thwarted by the arrest of suspected ringleaders at Parramatta.' A runaway, 
John Lewis, told Reverend Marsden's shepherd of the plot and it is presumed the 
latter was the informer. Equally the plot could have been betrayed in Sydney, as 
Marsden, the magistrate who worked closely with King, wrote he was unable to arrest 
'some of the people named in your [King's] 	From the informer, and 
statements quickly collected, Marsden's intelligence, passed to King, was that the 
insurgents, armed with pikes, had planned to attack and overcome the soldiers while 
they attended church on Sunday. Then swelled by numbers from other outlying 
centres, as soon as the 'Conquest of Parramatta' was completed, the rebels would 
march on Sydney. Further, this was preplanned as a 'second attempt in case their 
28 HRA, 1, 2, p.583. 'The Sense of the Meeting' (Summary); p.614, for King to Portland of 28 
September 1800. 
29 HIM, 1, 2, p.740. Commentary Note 196. 
" HIM, 1, 2, p.746. Commentary Note 232. J Holt, A Rum Story, The Adventures of Joseph 
Holt Thirteen Years in New South Wales (1800-12), ed. P O'Shaughnessy, Kenthurst, 1988, pp.58-62, 
for Holt's account from his arrest on 5 September 1800. 
31 HIM, 1, 2, p.61. 
" HIM, 1, 2, p.614. King in reporting this to Portland, inadvertently wrote that the plot 'was to 
have been put in execution on the 28th ult'o ['ultimo' - that is the 28 August]'. From King's 
instructions of 30 September to officers conducting the second inquiry that month (p.642), it is clear 
that the plot was planned for 28 September, not August. 
33 HIM, 1, 2, p.638. Marsden to King, 30 September 1800, and Memorandum of Suspected Persons, 
including mention of Lewis. 
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first [plan - prevented earlier by Hunter] should fair.' 
Based on the above intelligence, and with the latest group of ringleaders 
secured by 30 September, King issued orders to four magistrates, headed by 
Lieutenant Colonel Paterson, the acting lieutenant-governor, to conduct an inquiry. 
The inquiry's aim was 'to restore good Order amongst the misguided, and 
Tranquility [sic] to His Majesty's peaceable subjects in the Colony.' 35 The 
magistrates wasted little time. By the following day they had collected a considerable 
number of statements and submitted their recommendations to King which included; 
five men receive 1000 lashes, four 500 and seven 200 lashes.' In advising the Duke 
of Portland of the proceedings, King pointed out that the insurgents could not be 
capitally tried, as they did everything 'but striking the blow'. Therefore, he ordered 
the punishments recommended by the inquiring officers be carried out, and that the 
principals be kept at hard labour, and lodged in irons on the hulk Supply, until 'they 
shew a peaceable disposition'. He concluded his report with 'Our local situation, and 
the description of the people, I hope, will be sufficient reason for any supposed 
severity I have been obliged to use with these misguided people.' 
These severe floggings approved by King, appeared to bring the Irish convict 
elements under control. Additional defensive measures such as erecting palisades 
around the barracks and embodying the Loyal Associations were necessary.' Six 
months later, King advised London that although the 'Irish republicans' who had 
recently arrived in the colony caused much trouble'', with 'the good conduct of the 
New South Wales Corps, the Association [militia], and English inhabitants, I see no 
cause for real alarm'. King qualified this statement by adding 'but it will still be 
34 HRA, 1, 2, pp.640 and 638 respectively. 
35 HRA, 1, 2, p.642. 
36 HRA, I, 2, p.651. 
37 HRA, 1, 2, p.615. This being a postscript to his letter of 28 September 1800. 
38 HRA, 1, 2, p.614. 
39 King was referring to rebels who arrived in Anne on 21 February 1801. 
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highly necessary to be on our guard'.' DD Mann in giving numerous extracts from 
'General Orders', illustrated the type of measures enforced to ensure internal security 
was maintained. For example; 'Persons passing the barracks [at Parramatta] to give a 
satisfactory account of themselves ... no person to carry a musket without permission 
of a magistrate'; 'Persons using seditious words or actions to receive exemplary 
punishment; All persons knowing but concealing such offence, to be treated as 
accomplices; Any house in which seditious meetings are held, to be demolished.'" 
A partial easing of tension was reflected in King's dispatches until well into 
1802. In July 1801, he issued a proclamation disbanding the Loyal Associations, 
praising them for their good conduct and discipline. He also wrote several appeals to 
London seeking concessions for many of 'the Irish ... concerned in the late rebellion 
... [who] are real deserving characters'.' But in May 1802, King again sounded a 
cautious note that 'the same restless and diabolical spirit still pervades' the Irish 
transported for sedition.' This feeling of unease was reflected in a private letter by 
Lieutenant Rowley of the New South Wales Corps, who wrote:- 
The Colony is on very short allowance ... the croppies are troublesome - a great 
many of the ringleaders is [sic] now in Gaol under orders to go on board the 
Porpois [sic]. Supposed to be sent to Lord Howe Island or some bad 
[location] to shift for themselves." 
Such concerns resulted from the increased transportation of Irish convicts, including 
rebels, to the colony; 127 males in February 1801, and an extra 284 between July and 
" HRNSW, 4, p.330. King to Portland of March 1801. 
41 DD Mann, The Present Picture of New South Wales 1811, Sydney, 1979, pp.24 and 26 
respectively. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.444, for Government and General Order of 27 July 1801 disbanding the volunteers; 
pp.463 and 499, letters to Portland, both of 21 August 1801, for concessions; p.624, for further letter 
of November 1801, recommending 'His Majesty's mercy'. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.765. King to Portland. 
" Bonwick Transcripts, Mitchell Library (ML), CY679, A2000-4, p.1093. To Captain Waterhouse, 
RN, of 14 May 1802. 
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October 1802. 45 On 30 October 1802, King wrote to London of the United Irish, with 
their wild schemes, and stated he would ensure every precaution would be used to 
'counteract their ridiculous plans'. It is significant that on the same day King wrote 
this dispatch, the convict transport Atlas arrived, bringing another 188 Irishmen to the 
colony. 
In December 1802, there were adequate troops to counter an increasing Irish 
threat to security with the distribution of the New South Wales Corps around Sydney 
as follows' 
'Sydney and outposts'- 14 officers and staff and 416 other ranks (OR's). 
Parramatta and outposts' - 3 officers and 102 OR's. 
Ilawkesbury' - 12 OR's. 
A total security force of 547 all ranks (excluding Norfolk Island's garrison) which, 
even without the Loyal Associations, disbanded in 1801, provided a reasonable armed 
force to crush any insurrection. But following the Peace of Amiens, from 1803, there 
was a reduction in the strength of the Corps', with troops who wished to return to 
England departing in HMS Glatton. Additionally, the establishment of a settlement at 
Risdon Cove, Van Diemen's Land, caused a further modest decrease in troop 
availability at Sydney.' 
By the time the Irish insurrection actually occurred in March 1804, the 
"C Bateson, Convict Ships, p.171 (Irish arrivals 1800) and p.381 (Irish arrivals 1801-1802). Details 
are:- 
Minerva arrived 11 January 1800 landing 162 male and 26 female convicts. 
Friendship 
Anne 
" 
" 
16 February 1800 
21 February 1801 
" 
" 
114 
127 
" 
" 
" 
" 
- 
24 
" 
" 64 
Hercules " 26 July 	1802 " 96 " " 25 if 
Atlas (II) " 30 October 1802 " 188 " if 
46  HRNSW, 4, pp.871-872. King to Portland. 
" HRNSVV, 4, p.937. 110 all ranks were on duty at Norfolk Island, and 22 OR's on board 'sundry 
vessels'. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.832. Hobart to King of August 1802. 
" HRNSW, 5, p.80. Government and General Order of 29 March 1803, for naval Lieutenant 
Bowen's appointment as commandant. An officer of the Corps (Lieutenant Moore), a corporal and 
eight soldiers made up this detachment, HRA, I, 4, p.342, order of 15 June 1803. 
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garrison's strength had been reduced to:-' 
'Sydney and outposts' -9 officers and staff and 317 OR's. 
`Parramatta and outposts' - 2 officers and 63 OR's. 
`Hawkesbury' - 8 OR's. 
A total troop availability of 399 all ranks on the mainland of the colony, compared to 
547 in 1802. this was a reduction of 27 per cent. In the outlying detachments at 
Parramatta and Hawkesbury, it represented a cut of 38 per cent. This is significant 
considering that between December 1802 and the March 1804 insurrection, an 
additional 119 male Irish prisoners arrived by Rolla, prompting King to note in a 
dispatch 'we have so great a proportion' of Irish.' It is claimed by Irish writer Con 
Costello that with this arrival 'the number of Irish convicts in New South Wales was 
estimated to be a quarter of the inhabitants and they were again causing trouble.'' It 
is reasonable to speculate that the reduction in garrison strength encouraged the Irish 
leaders to have hopes of a successful rebellion. To give weight to such a proposition, 
George Suttor, in his Memoirs expressed surprise, that at Castle Hill, where there 
were 'fifteen hundred or more prisoners ... strange to say there was no military 
guard' at the time of the rebellion. In Holt's opinion, 'the army lay in such a[n] 
awkward state that any one of skill would adapt a plan to take arms, magazine and all 
in one hour'.' 
The percentage of troops in Sydney compared to outlying posts was not 
constant. For example, in February 1803, King directed that because of 'the daring 
behaviour of the convicts ... a captain, subaltern, and fifteen non-commissioned 
officers and privates from headquarters [in Sydney] are to be added to the guard at 
" HRNSW, 5, p.350. 
s' C Bateson, Convict Ships, pp.338-339, for ship arrivals over this period, Rolla arrived in May 
1803; p.381 for convicts disembarked. HRNSW, 5, p.221. King to Hobart of September 1803, for 
proportion of Irish, 
" C Costello, Botany Bay, The Story of the Convicts transported from Ireland to Australia, 1791- 
1853, Cork and Dublin, 1987, p.63. 
" Memoirs of George Suitor FLS Banksian Collector (1774-1859), ed. G Mackaness, Sydney: 
Australian Historical Monographs, Vol. XIII (New Series), 1948, p.47. 
" J Holt, A Rum Story, p.79. 
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Castle Hi 	At the same time other minor troop deployments were ordered. Soon 
after, King directed that officers were not to be released from outpost duty to sit as 
members of general courts martial because escalating problems including the 
circumstance that 'a number of Irish convicts had left those [outpost] places, and were 
committing great excesses'.' 
The centre of this trouble was at Castle Hill, from where fifteen Irish had 
absconded, who robbed, committed a rape and attempted murder, before making for 
rough country on the Hawkesbury. There they were located by Aboriginal trackers 
and arrested by troops. King's concern over the Irish convicts at Castle Hill is 
understandable, with the majority not dispersed as assigned servants but retained as a 
concentrated group working as 'public labour'.' BH Fletcher points out that before 
King left England, he had been directed to 'promote the public cultivation' of land.' 
In response, in 1801, King advised London that he had selected Castle Hill as a site 
where 'the soil ... [is] of the best and most productive kind'.' Here he concentrated 
public agriculture which was more centrally located than the Hawkesbury and 
contained ample lands. In 1802, King also set aside 34,539 acres at Castle Hill as 
grazing land.' 
" HRNSVV, 5, p. 22. Government and General Order of 16 February 1803. 
" HRNSW, 5, p.51 and footnote quotation. King to Johnston of 25 February 1803. Johnston, 
administering command, considered such directives interfered 'with the internal management of the 
Corps' (ibid, Johnson to King of same date). This exchange was part of an ongoing battle of wills 
between King and Johnston, regarding Johnston's determination to have Surgeon Harris replaced as 
judge-advocate at Kemp's court martial (see above, Chapter 8, pp.204-205). 
" HRNSW, 5, footnote to p.58, for fifteen runaways, who in February 1803 caused this disturbance 
at Castle Hill, of which fourteen were sentenced to death (p.117) and two hanged (pp.74-75); p.300 for 
account of a rape, attempted murder, and use of Aboriginal trackers to capture the runaways. 
" HRNSW, 5, p.323. King to Hobart of March 1804. 
" BH Fletcher, Landed Enterprise and Penal Society A History of Farming and Grazing in New South 
Wales Before 1821, Sydney, 19'76, p.30. 
6° HRNSW, 4, p.462. King to Portland of August 1801. 
61 BH Fletcher, Landed Enterprise, p.31, for 'public agriculture', and p.3'7, for 34,539 acres. 
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Despite fifteen convicts absconding in February 1803, by September of that 
year King reported to London that the Irish were generally well behaved, which he 
attributed to them being given freedom to worship with their own priest, Father James 
Dixon.' With this calmer atmosphere, and having the capability to quickly mobilise 
the Loyal Associations', King apparently accepted (although he had no other option) 
that a garrison strength of about 400 regulars was adequate. Yet, Holt recorded in 
February 1804:- 
the Devil was busy in New South Wales as ever he was in Ireland. Both 
Irish and English men, seeing the torment increasing, they formed an 
opinion that they could conquer the army and get out of that country.' 
Despite the gathering storm, in two separate dispatches to Lord Hobart, of 1 
March 1804, King reaffirmed the 'salutary effects' of religious tolerance practised 
towards the Irish. Then, indicating he had no informer warning of any rebellion being 
planned, King was almost apologetic that not all the troops could attend church each 
Sunday with the 'necessity for leaving a certain number in care of the barracks'. In 
his second letter, King was 'happy to confirm ... the general quiet and orderly 
behaviour of the Irish convicts'.' This illustrates the very tight security maintained by 
the insurgents up to the eve of the uprising. From the two planned and failed attempts 
at insurrection of September 1800, the conspirators had learnt the bitter lesson to 
avoid being foiled by informers. After the rebellion, King in a Government and 
General Order referred to this lack of intelligence:- 
The shortness of the time (only one day) between the first suspicion of such 
" HRNSW, 5, p.221. Dixon, a priest from County Wexford was sentenced to death in 1798. He was 
granted £60 per annum by King in 1803 because of his work with the Irish. Dixon was responsible for 
the behaviour of his congregation at Mass and their movement to and from the place of worship and 
also that there was no seditious conversation. C Costello, Transported from Ireland, pp.49-50; for 
Dixon's background. After the 1804 insurrection, the £60 was cancelled by King due to allegations 
that Dixon failed 'to prevent seditious meetings', HRA, 1, 5, p.99. 
" HRA, 1, 4, p.323. Government and General Order of 22 October 1802. For volunteers' nominal 
rolls kept updated, arms and equipment held ready, and provision made for exercising the militia. 
" J Holt, A Rum Story, p.79. 
" HRNSW, 5, p.324. 
66 HRNSW, 5, p.331. 
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an extensive conspiracy going forward and its breaking out into actual 
outrage and rebellion, the discovery of the insurgents' intentions and 
proceedings, [limited] the consequent preparations of defence' 
Despite, as claimed by King, the possibility that this particular warning was a false 
alarm which 'so often occurred preventing any other than common precautions being 
used'," military counter-measures were implemented. But these statements of limited 
warning and false alarms were a quibble, a case of wisdom after the event. As 
opposed to September 1800, where early intelligence allowed pre-emptive actions to 
be implemented, now, by the time King received the warning, an insurrection had 
commenced. 
The first warning of a planned rebellion came to the notice of the authorities on 
Saturday, 3 March. This was given to Captain Abbott, Commandant at Panamatta, by 
his overseer; the information coining from an Irishman named Keo, who had been 
approached, on the previous Thursday, to join the rebels. Keo was told the rising 
would take place on the Saturday or Sunday. This information was borne out on 
Sunday, 4 March, when two reports obtained by Captain Abbott, the detachment 
commander at Parramatta, and Reverend Marsden, magistrate at Parramatta, reached 
Sydney" 
At half past eleven o'clock on Sunday night, [when] an express was received 
by His Excellency, from Captain Abbot (sic), Commanding Officer at 
Parramatta, with intelligence that the Prisoners at Public Labour at Castle 
Hill, and the Settlers men, were in a state of Insurrection, and had already 
committed many daring Outrages' 
Therefore, there was not 'twenty hours' or one day's warning received in Sydney as 
stated by King, rather he was forced to react to circumstances. But this was done with 
" HRNSW, 5, p.347. Government and General Order of 9 March 1804. 
" HRNSW, 5, p.355. 
" HRA, 1, 4, pp.566-567, for the three warnings, and footnote p.567 for this information reaching 
King at midnight. It appears surprising that Abbott's and Marsden's intelligence had not reached King 
earlier. 
70 Sydney Gazette, And New South Wales Advertiser, Vol. 2, No. 54, p.2, first column (54, p.2, a.) 
of 11 March 1804. 
7 ` HRNSW, 5, p.355. 
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commendable speed and precision, indicating the implementation of a practised 
contingency plan.' 
As somewhat improbably reported in the Sydney Gazette, immediately 
Abbott's report of the insurrection was received, the alarm was sounded and within 
ten minutes 'the Military and Inhabitants [mainly, but not exclusively, the Sydney 
Loyal Association] were under Arms, and the Captain, Officers, Marines, and Ships 
Company of His Majesty's Ship Calcutta came on shore ... all Horses throughout the 
Town were held in requisition' and a company of the Corps dispatched to 
Parramatta.' At 00.15am, further intelligence was reported by Lieutenant Hobby, who 
reported 'the Insurgents to be in great force and advancing towards Parramatta in 
different directions'.' 
On receipt of this news, King handed over coordination of the defence of • 
Sydney to Lieutenant-Governor Paterson and, mounted, 'proceeded unattended 
towards Parramatta', which suggests an impetuous, almost irrational, reaction under 
the stress of events.' Apparently Paterson, or another officer, realising the ill-
advisedness of this action, corrected it when 'the Provost Marshall, four Troopers, and 
several confidential Persons mounted' caught up with King near Major Johnston's 
home, on the outskirts at Petersham. Now King showed sound judgment, dispatching 
one of the troopers to call on Johnston and order him 'to take Command of a 
Company of the New South Wales Corps then on their march from Sydney'.' At 
" HRA, 1, 3, p.47. Government and General Order of January 1801, being a critique of the colony's 
'first practice alarm', to improve assembly procedures. 
7 ' More likely, orders for these actions were issued within ten minutes of the warning being 
received. HRA, I, 4, p.569; the company's strength, before being joined by Johnston, was two 
officers (Lieutenant Davies and Quartermaster Laycock) and fifty-four other ranks. 
74 Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, a. of 11 March 1804. 
" JW Fortescue, The British Army, passim. Fortescue is often scathing in his condemnation of 
naval officers directing land operations. Here, King's actions as a governor-in-chief, support this view. 
" Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, a. of 11 March 1804. For King's departure from Sydney and his orders to 
Johnston at Petersham. 
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Petersham, Johnston assumed command of the men at 1.30am, and being a sound 
officer 'ascertained that they [the troops' muskets] were all loaded and good flints in 
their Pieces'.' Meanwhile, King, now properly escorted, reached Parramatta at 4am 
on Monday, 5 March 1804. 
On arrival, King was told by Abbott that huts had been burned at outposts and 
'a great body of the Insurgents all armed, were at Park Gate, at the West Entrance of 
Parramatta'.' This latest information, together with the dispositions and strengths of 
his own forces, and local knowledge of the country, was the intelligence on which 
King based his counter-insurgency planning. From his later orders, it would appear 
that King's concept of operations was that the tired Sydney troops were to probe for, 
locate, and pin down the main force of insurgents. Then the fresh troops of the 
Parramatta garrison (presumably less a small security force holding the town) would 
be deployed to where the main concentration of rebels was located and overwhelm 
them. This may explain the apparently surprising decision to order tired troops to 
continue following up the rebels, while the bulk of the fresh forces, including the 
majority of the Parramatta Association, were retained at Parramatta. 
From Petersham, the Sydney company covered the thirteen and a half miles to 
Parramatta at a steady infantry pace of three miles per hour, arriving at 5am. Johnston 
halted at the barracks for twenty minutes to refresh his party, then marched to 
Government House, Parramatta, for his orders. Here his troops rested until they were 
" HRA,I, 4, p.569. The distance from Sydney Cove to the turn off to Johnston's property was just 
under four miles, a distance that the troops could be expected to march in slightly over one hour, 
therefore the company departed at about 00.30am, having been assembled, armed and issued 
ammunition in the hour from when the alarm bell rang at 11.30pm, a reasonable response time. 
HRNSW, 3, frontispiece map of 1796 for distances. 
78 MB Eldershaw, The Life and Times of Captain John Piper, Sydney,1973, p.55. Johnston to Piper 
(on duty Norfolk Island) of 12 April 1804. 
79 Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, a. MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, p.56: for what Johnston was told 
on arrival at Parramatta, including the strength of the rebels at the 'Park Gate' numbered '5 or 600'. 
225 
paraded prior to moving out at 6.30am. Johnston recorded that at Government 
House, King 'gave me his Orders in writing' . 81 Johnston's emphasis on the word 
'writing', underscores the unusual situation of a naval officer, even though he was 
'Governor and Commander-in-Chief', who, without any prior consultation with his 
senior army commander, Major Johnston, planned and committed to paper a directive 
for an army operation. Regarding these orders, Johnston later told Piper 'I cou'd not 
read it ... he [King] might as well have given me Greek, he then read it himself'. King 
directed, that Johnston 'with half the Detachment [of the Sydney company of 54 other 
ranks] ... was to go in quest of the Rebels' numbering '5 or 600' who had been at 
the Park Gate. Then, 'if! did not meet them there to proceed to Toongabbe, and then 
wheel in to the right and go to Castle Hill, where I was to wait for further orders'. 
Johnston later wrote that Lieutenant Davies, commanding the other half of the 
company, 'had different [unspecified] instructions'.' But, if accurate, a later report 
in the Sydney Gazette, may explain what occurred. This stated that Davies' task was 
to proceed 'along the Castle Hill Road, that place being appointed for the Rendezvous, 
in case nothing should occur to make those Officers [Johnston or Davies] alter the 
directions they were under'.' Johnston could have justifiably been concerned about 
this order, which split his company up into "penny packets", with the risk that one of 
these could have been defeated by the reported '5 or 600' rebels. 
Johnston's attitude to these orders is evident in his comment to Piper that 
when King `desir'd me to fire upon any person that attempted to run away when 
" HRA, 1, 4, p.569. Johnston to Paterson of 9 March 1804. Sydney Gazette, 54, 2, a, of 11 March, 
for departure time from Parramatta. 
" MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, pp.55, for the orders in writing. 
" MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, p.56. Johnston referred to only two detachments going in 
pursuit of the rebels, however, he noted Davies' detachment had with them `Lieut't Brabyn and his 
party `, HRA, 1, 4, pp.568-569. Johnston to King of 6 March. The Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, b, of 11 
March, mentions a third party under command of Lieutenant Brabyn, presumably from the Parramatta 
garrison. Possibly Brabyn commanded a party which reinforced Davies detachment in the same way as 
Johnston had armed civilians added to his detachment. 
" Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, a, of 11 March 1804. King's orders allowed the detachment commanders 
a degree of flexibility should they establish contact with the rebels. 
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call'd to [halt] ... I told him [that] was all I wanted.' This would refer to King 
advising Johnston (that in accordance with military law when insurrection threatens 
the state') he had declared martial law in Parramatta and outlying districts; a powerful 
weapon allowing the authorities to take harsh action with the suspension of civil law. 
In this proclamation, King held out an olive branch to the rebels (and a potentially 
useful bargaining point for the military) that 'every person ... in a state of rebellious 
opposition' had twenty four hours to give themselves up, otherwise they would 'be 
tried by a Court-Martial and suffer the sentence passed upon him or them'.' While 
King was briefing Johnston regarding counter-measures, the rebels had enjoyed a full 
night of undisturbed freedom of action to continue with their preplanned campaign. 
Details from later interrogations of prisoners were reported in the Sydney 
Gazette, including the rebels' plan for the insurrection. 	Strict security was 
maintained until Thursday 1 March, when disaffected elements at Hawkesbury were 
given warning to be ready to rise during the coming weekend. This was the 
" Manual of Military Law (MML), London, 1914, pp.3-4. In a legal sense, the term "martial law" is 
to a degree misleading as per the following quotation:- 
in the arbitrary times of our [British] history attempts were made to apply military law to 
the civil population, such attempts have long been recognised to be illegal. Martial law, in 
the proper sense of the term, can be established ... only by Act of Parliament or of the local 
legislature (a). 
Footnote (a) reading:- 
In a British possession under the direct legislative authority of the Crown a proclamation of 
martial law by the Crown would be as effective as a Statute in the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, King in 1804 had the power to declare martial law. He could also have justified his actions 
in the other sense in which the term is used, as explained below:- 
In time of invasion or rebellion ... exceptional powers are often assumed by the Crown, 
acting usually ... through its military forces ... and the expression "martial law" is 
sometimes employed as a name for this common law right of the Crown and its servants to 
repel force by force. 
See below, Chapter 3, footnote 33 and Chapter 4, footnote 36, for this author arguing that 
principles and practices which governed military law in the early Australian colonial period are 
closely linked with those practised when the Manual was published in 1914. MML, Chapter 2, 
'History of Military Law', pp.6-14, passim, for numerous examples to verify this argument. For 
example; Note (c), p.7, states 'It is easy to trace in the Articles of Richard II, the germ of the 
Articles [of War] of 1878, and having regard to the changes in custom and manners, the difference 
in the character of the regulations is less than might have been expected.' 
" HIM, 1, 4, pp.570-571, for Proclamation of 5 March 1804. 
86  Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, b-c, of 11 March 1804, for details of plot. 
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information which reached Abbott on Saturday. The rising, planned to begin at 8pm, 
Sunday, 4 March 1804, was signalled by rebels ringing bells and burning one of their 
own huts at both Castle Hill and Toongabbe (Figure 1988) 'in order to excite tumult 
and alarm'.' The password was 'Saint Peter'. 
Answering the call to arms, some 200 rebels gathered at Castle Hill, and, 
presumably to strengthen their resolve, or in misplaced over-confidence, were told that 
Parramatta and Sydney were already overcome. Confirming this later press report, 
Holt's book recorded what John McGowan, a rebel witness, afterwards stated before 
a board of magistrates. McGowan alleged Holt told him that:- 
I [Holt] had more than half the soldiers on my side, ... the moment they [the 
rebels] was to come to Parramatta, the soldiers was to do the rest, ... I was to 
have ammunition for the whole party, and that I was to go to Sydney and 
take Dawes Point and the Magazine and put the Governor to death' 
Such rumours circulated amongst the convicts would rally supporters to the rebel 
cause. Certainly, McGowan used this as his excuse for joining. 
Under direction of Philip Cunningham,' a former soldier,' groups of rebels 
" R Clancy and A Richardson, So Came They South, Silverwater, 1988, p.161, map by de 
Freycinet, published 1809. From measurements made on this and other contemporary maps, 
approximate road/track distances from Parramatta were:- 
to Sydney Cove - 17 miles; 
to Castle Hill - 6 miles (but one contemporary account gives the distance as 8 miles); 
to Toongabbe - 3 miles 
to Hawkesbury, via Toongabbe - 15 miles. 
Note the central location of Toongabbe, as an ideal rendezvous for rebels from outlying settlements to 
gather before marching on Parrarnatta. 
" Sydney Gazette, 55,p.2, b, of 18 March 1804. John Cavenah's house at Castle Hill and Bryan 
Spaldon's at Toongabbe being burnt. 
" J Holt, A Rum Story, pp.85-86. Evidence by John McGowan of 24 March 1804. He was proved 
an unreliable witness during cross examination by Holt. No reference to this is in HRA or HRNSW. 
Holt's self justifying writing is also suspect. 
" Sydney Gazette, 55, p.2, b. Cunningham, (from County Kerry: refer; C Costello, Transported 
from Ireland, p.51) was involved in the mutiny on Anne (refer Chapter 6 for Anne). After being sent 
to Castle Hill, he was appointed overseer of the government stonemasons and was erecting for himself 
'a stone building of considerable value' at the time of the insurrection. By virtue of his appointment, 
Cunningham, also Humes (see below, footnote 92) was ideally placed to move around and conspire, or 
send messages, with a minimum chance of creating suspicion. 
9 ' J Holt, A Rum Story, p.199. Note 104. 
Figure 19: Routes to and from Parramatta 
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were dispatched in different directions to plunder arms and ammunition from settlers' 
huts. As a result of this part of the plan, Samuel Humes, commanding a group of 
seventy, failed to later meet up with the main body, and was therefore not present to 
add this weight of numbers when the rebels and military clashed. In conformity with 
their plan, according to the Sydney Gazette, the Castle Hill and Toongabbe rebels 
linked up, and commenced the march to Hawkesbury, where they hoped to increase 
their force to about 1100 insurgents. The rebels then planned to return to Castle Hill, 
presumably during Monday night, before marching on Parramatta on Tuesday 
morning. If this is so, this was apparently the weakest point in their planning, as with 
the loss of surprise they threw away any hope of overrunning Parramatta. 
Neither the Gazette's report of the rebel plan, nor any accounts of their 
subsequent actions, offered any explanation why the massed insurgents noisily 
demonstrated at Parramatta's western gate in the early hours of Monday. This was 
the closest the insurgents came to the town, and as they made no offensive move, this 
marked the passing of any momentary advantage they enjoyed before moving north to 
Hawkesbury. Earlier in the evening they would have had the benefit of surprise and 
darkness, compounding the defenders' sense of confusion and uncertainty as to 
where the rebels would strike. Additionally, government troop reinforcements from 
Sydney could not have arrived in Parramatta on that first night. The seizure of 
Parramatta, and additional arms and ammunition available there, were critical, as a 
preliminary to marching on Sydney, from whence the insurgents planned to embark 
on ships 'ready to receive them'. By withdrawing through Toongabbe towards the 
Hawkesbury, rather than advancing, the rebels' hopes were almost guaranteed 
doomed before a shot was fired by the government forces. 
Had the rebels quietly gathered in Toongabbe, stealthily approached and 
" Sydney Gazette, 55, p.2, b. Humes at the time of the insurrection was overseer of carpenters and 
'had a convenient house, and received also many indulgences'. 
" Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, c. 
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attacked Parramatta, they could conceivably have overrun the town. As previously 
noted, in Holt's opinion a skilfully laid plan (presumably using surprise) to attack the 
barracks, could have resulted in the capture of 'arms, magazine and all in one hour'. 
Against this supposition, the barracks guard, if alerted by Abbott on the basis of the 
information received earlier, probably had the capability to repel attacks on that 
palisaded installation. But, after their noisy uprising at Toongabbe, and vociferous 
demonstration on the outskirts of Parramatta, the rebels forfeited any reasonable hope 
of success against the already marshalled garrison of over sixty regulars supported by 
up to thirty six volunteers of the Parramatta Loyal Association. This disciplined 
force, with more fire power than their attackers,would have easily held the barracks, 
thus containing the situation, until the arrival of reinforcements from Sydney, allowing 
King to launch a daylight counter stroke. 
In retrospect, it is easy to fault the weakness of the rebel plan in not launching 
an immediate strike against Parramatta, but their problems in coordinating movements 
of scattered groups of declared insurgents, and also enticing, or forcing, others to 
enlist in their cause, were difficult. More warning time to ensure coordinated 
movements of scattered supporters would have further compromised security. It 
would appear that the rebel leaders considered it was safer to concentrate first at 
Hawkesbury, sacrificing surprise, in favour of getting the maximum number of 
supporters to join their ranks. While this tactic had a certain logic, the rebel cause 
may have been better served if the more ardent revolutionaries from Hawkesbury had 
been instructed to also rendezvous at Toongabbe on Sunday evening, accepting that 
others may later join their cause. 
A different version of why the rebels did not attack Parramatta on Sunday 
night, or early Monday, was given by Mrs Elizabeth Macarthur. She believed that an 
important detail in their plan went astray. Later she recorded:- 
91 HRA, 1, 4, p.580, for strength of regulars and p.578 for Loyal Association. 
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The Irishmen ... were at the Park Gate making hideous shouts and waiting 
as was afterwards found out only for the signal of Two Fires in the Town to 
make their descent ... One of these fires was to have been my House or 
some part of the Premises. This ... was artfully contrived to catch the 
attention of the soldiery. The Rebels saw that the consideration of my 
lonely situation and the attachment the soldiers had to my family would 
induce them upon seeing the Fire to repair instantly to my relief and the 
Barracks would be easily secured to themselves. The other fire was to be a 
thatched hut in the Town. Thank God all was happily prevented?' 
Mrs Macarthur did not specify how or why she believed the rebel signal failed to 
eventuate. But, it is suggested by one historian that from the time the alarm was 
sounded about 9pm, until the rebels reached the town's outskirts some hours later, the 
Parramatta garrison had time to prepare their defences. This could account for the 
insurgents drawing back to Toongabbe rather than attacking? Irrespective of whether 
the Macarthur or Sydney Gazette account, was more correct, the rebels, massed at the 
western edges of Parramatta, lost their one possible chance of overrunning that town. 
Based on King's orders of early Monday morning, Johnston wrote 'I directly 
divided the Detachment ... taking Mr. Laycock and the other half with me I march'd 
fat 6.30am] as quick as possible to Toongabbe.' In addition to the soldiers, Johnston, 
who was mounted, was accompanied by a mounted trooper, Handlesack of King's 
bodyguard, Father Dixon probably mounted, and about twenty `arm'd Inhabitants' of 
Parramatta.' At Toongabbe, Johnston learned that about 400 rebels were 'laying on 
Sugar loaf Hill, all well arm'd'. Most likely this is the prominent feature, shown on 
" MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, pp.59-60. At this time Captain Macarthur had been sent to 
England under arrest and Mrs Macarthur had to cope on her own. This being the reason why the rebels 
expected the soldiers to come to her aid. No other primary sources have been noted which refer to the 
rebels' proposal to bum a Macarthur building as the attack signal. 
" C Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought, The Encyclopaedia of Australia's Battles, St. 
Leonards, 1998, p.2. 
" HRA, 1, 4, p.574. Shown in proceedings against rebels as 'Thos. Andlesack one of H.E. Body 
Guard'. 
" These `arm'd Inhabitants' were probably members of the Parramatta Loyal Association, detailed to 
support Johnston's detachment. Johnston does not clarify this point. In fact, his report to King of 5 
March 1804 (HRA, 1, 4, p.568) adds to uncertainty as to who accompanied him. Johnston wrote 'my 
thanks are due to the two Troopers, the activity of Mr. Smyth, the Constables, and other men that 
accompanied us from Parramatta.' 
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Figure 19, about two miles north-north-west of the village. Johnston immediately 
deployed his force to clear the hill. He sent a corporal, four soldiers and 'about 6 or 8 
Inhabitants (arin'd with muskets)' to work up the Hawkesbury Road (see Figure 19) 
to take the rebels in the flank while the remainder of his troops and armed civilians 
ascended the face of the hill." But on reaching the top, the insurgents had already 
departed northward along the Hawkesbury Road. The detachment, after reforming, 
continued its march, most likely with Johnston and the mounted trooper riding ahead 
of the marching column, commanded by Laycock.' 
Here, it should be noted that a false mythology has grown up, and been 
perpetuated, that the troops continued their pursuit from Toongabbe at the run. This 
appears to has been accepted by some historians.' It originated with two statements, 
considered suspect, in authoritative contemporary documents quoted below. Firstly, a 
General Order, of 9 March 1804, which included praise of the Sydney company's 
pursuit of the insurgents, noted:- 
Their active perseverance and zeal, notwithstanding the fatigue they had 
undergone in running after a body of 266 armed rebels upwards of seven 
miles [emphasis added] from the place [Toongabbe] where certain 
information was received of them" 
This was followed, on 11 March, by the Sydney Gazette's account of the rebellion. It 
referred to Johnston at Toongabbe, where he:- 
received information that a considerable Body were on their way to the 
Hawkesbury: Not withstanding the fatigue of his small Detachment ... they 
immediately ran in good Order [emphasis added] with their followers, and 
after a pursuit of Seven Miles farther, Major Johnston and a Trooper, who 
99  From the map, the road comes up onto the top of the feature on its western side, this being the 
detachments' left flank. 
MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, p.56: for detail in this paragraph. 
See above, Chapter 5, quotations from: I Grant, A Dictionary of Australian Military History, 
Milsons Point,1992, p.263 also G Odgers, Army Australia an Illustrated History, Frenchs Forest, 
1988, p.13, for laudatory comment on the role played by the Corps, which by inference accepts that 
the "valiant" soldiers ran the seven miles. M Austin, The Australian Army ... A Brief History, 
Canberra, reprinted June 1985, p.1, provides an example of how the myth of the Corps great stamina 
had expanded. Austin wrote 'the Corps ... military efficiency was such that during the Castle Hill 
rebellion in 1804 the troops marched from Sydney Cove to Parramatta in three hours'. 
102 HRA, 1, 4, p.572. 
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proceeded the Detachment came up with the rear of the Insurgents at 11 
o'clock, whose numbers have since been ascertained to be 233 men' 
While there is a minor discrepancy concerning the number of rebels being pursued, 
both separate primary sources agree on the distance run by Johnston's detachment. 
That the tired, but determined soldiers ran all the way following the rebels is 
now firmly enshrined in the mythology of the uprising. However, this does not make 
military sense. No reasonable commander would "double march" fresh, let alone 
fired battle equipped soldiers, for an indefinite distance in an endeavour to catch up 
with a larger fleeing enemy force.' Particularly not, if there was an expectation that 
on contact, they immediately go into action. This mythology supported by claims in 
the General Order and Sydney Gazette, may be tested by simple time and distance 
Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, a, of 11 March 1804. There is a minor time discrepancy here as 
Johnston, in a field report to King of 5 March, stated that the detachment at 'about half an hour before 
eleven ... came up with the Runaways [rebelsr (HRA, I, 4, p.567). However, in his later detailed 
report to Paterson (pp.569-570) Johnston makes clear that he and Trooper Handlesack first contacted the 
rebels, and then deliberately dragged out negotiations until the detachment just then appeared in sight' 
(p.570). Therefore, it is probable that it was about 1 lam by the time the soldiers deployed and opened 
fire. 
1 " Some Early Records of the Macarthurs of Camden, ed. S MacArthur Onslow, Sydney, 1914, 
pp.47-48. In 1795, Mrs Macarthur described the Sydney to Parramatta road as a 'very good carriage 
road'. She then went on to describe how she once travelled by horseback to Hawkesbury: 'The road is 
through uninterrupted wood, with the exception of the village of Toongabie ... and one or two' other 
places. From this it is deduced that the "road", compared to that to Sydney, was a track, suitable for 
riding or marching. It passed through some hilly country. 
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calculations, to determine the likelihood of whether the troops ran or marched.' 
Based on this, it is asserted that the soldiers' speed over the ground indicates they 
marched rather than ran (even if they had been physically capable of doing so) from 
Toongabbe towards the Hawkesbuiy. This then raises the question, why did two 
authoritative colonial documents state that the soldiers ran seven miles? 
The tendency, especially after a military success, to portray the victors in the 
best possible light, is not uncommon. As both the General Order and Sydney Gazette 
stated the soldiers ran, this writer accepts that they did run at some stage, but not for 
the whole seven miles. The Gazette's comment that the soldiers 'ran in good Order, 
with their [civilian armed] followers', can be construed to mean the running soldiers 
were in good order when they came up to confront the rebels. A reasonable 
explanation to explain this would be that when Laycock realised the need for speed, to 
support Johnston in a dangerous predicament, Laycock ordered the troops to "double 
march" into their firing positions. 
While it may appear inconsequential to consider this detail at length, it is 
suggested that this examination of two accepted contemporary records is justified. 
This episode emphasises a weakness which can develop in historical research. 
'" The detachment left Parramatta at 6.30am, moved three miles to Toongabbe, then a further seven 
miles (according to the primary sources quoted above) up the Hawkesbury Road, where the rebels were 
contacted at 1 lam - a total of ten miles from Parramatta, covered in four and a half hours. This 
represents an an average speed of 2.2 miles per hour. But this does not make allowance for time lost 
when the troops deployed at Sugar Loaf Hill. Allowing a maximum possible time of an hour for this 
delay at Toongabbe, the average time over the ground from Parramatta would then have been at a rate 
of 2.86 miles per hour - a steady and unhurried marching pace, suited to uneven terrain, tired soldiers 
and the accompanying armed civilians. 
Calculated in a different way, if a generous one and a half hours is allowed for the detachment's forced 
march to Toongabbe (MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, p.56; for 'marched as quick as possible' - no 
reference to running) and subsequent deployment at Sugar Loaf, the troops would have departed from 
Toongabbe at about 8am. As contact was made with the rebels at llam, it took them approximately 
three hours to cover the seven miles, that is they moved at an average speed of 2.33 miles per hour. 
But, Johnston in his report to his commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Paterson, stated he pursued 
the insurgents for ten (not seven) miles from Toongabbe to where contact was made (HRA, 1, 4, 
p.569) If this was so, the time over the ground has to be accordingly adjusted from 2.33 to 3.33 miles 
per hour, which is still only .33 miles per hour in excess of what is considered, from military 
. experience, a normal route march pace. 
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Namely, if reputable primary sources are not subjected to rigorous questioning 
regarding minor details in a document, significant errors of fact may be overlooked. 
Further, although these two separate authoritative primary source documents 
corroborate each other, this does not necessarily prove that either, or both, were correct 
regarding the matter being probed. In none of Johnston's military reports, nor in his 
letter to Piper, does he refer to the detachment running.' Nevertheless, Johnston 
mentioned to Piper that after first contacting the rebels, he then returned to the 
marching column and ordered Laycock to 'push forward with the soldiers (10 file our 
only front)' indicating that the troops were to quickly deploy for action, probably at 
"the double".' This could have led the Sydney Gazette, misreporting that the 
soldiers ran the whole seven miles.' 
In any event, action was at last initiated when Johnston and Handlesack first 
saw the tail end of the rebel mass moving northward along the track. Apparently, at the 
time the rebels were first sighted, Johnston and Handlesack were riding in close 
proximity to the marching soldiers. Johnston instructed Handlesack to ride ahead 
waving a white handkerchief 'as a flag of truce and acquaint them the Governor was 
coming, as I thought that might delay them'. Handlesack must have been a brave man 
riding right up to the insurgents, and trying to convince them to surrender. 'Although 
they `wou'd hear no terms', the rebels allowed Handlesack to return to Johnston 
having removed the flints from both his pistols. 
1 " HRA, 1, 4, pp.567-568, for Johnston's field report to King of 5 March. For his after action 
report of 9 March 1804, to Paterson, pp.569-570. For letter to Piper, MB Eldershaw, Captain 
John Piper, pp.56-57. 
107 MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, pp.57-58. The term '10 file our only front' is taken to mean 
that Johnston ordered the troops to be deployed in two ranks (lines) which had a limited frontage of 
only ten soldiers. The cartoon, Figure 20 (refer following paragraph) shows the troops lined up in two 
ranks of twelve or more, plus three armed civilians on a flank and to the rear. 
HRA, 1, 4, p.563. King to Hobart of 12 March 1804. King advised that as he was fully occupied 
dealing with the aftermath of the insurrection, he enclosed a copy of the Sydney Gazette's account to 
provide Hobart with a detailed report. King stated that this was 'collected and arranged by those who 
were less occupied than myself, and is a tolerable accurate account'. Therefore, it is possible that rather 
than the Gazette repeating details in King's order of 9 March, describing the seven mile run, King may 
have obtained this information from a draft copy of the Gazette's account, later published on 11 March. 
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Johnston now requested Father Dixon to go forward and offer King's 
amnesty terms to the rebels. Dixon too was unsuccessful, 'in (as described in a 
contemporary account) bringing back the insurgents to a proper sense of their 
duty.'' About this time, a rebel separated from his compatriots was captured, and 
said that the main group was about half a mile ahead. Ordering Laycock to continue 
advancing, Johnston and Handlesack spurred forward, and found the rebels now 
occupying an open feature, Rouse Hill, sometimes called "Vinegar Hill". Coming 
within pistol range, and expecting 'to be riddled every minute', Johnston called on the 
rebels to surrender. The insurgents unsuccessfully attempted to entice Johnston into 
their ranks, he in turn, succeeded in taunting two of their 'Captains', Philip 
Cunningham and William Johnston, to move out from their position and negotiate 
with him. Major Johnston 'reasoned with them ... to stop the effusion of blood' 
offering to bring forward Father Dixon 'to convince them they were wrong'. He 
returned to the marching column to 'bring up the Priest' and while this stratagem 
further delayed the rebels from moving away, Johnston seized the opportunity to 
order Laycock to push forward in a tactical fighting formation. 
Johnston and Handlesack, now accompanied by Dixon, returned to within 
pistol range of the main rebel body. 'With some reluctance' Cunningham and 
William Johnston were again enticed out from the rebel ranks to speak with Major 
Johnston and Father Dixon. The rebel leaders again refused to surrender and 
'prevent Bloodshed'. Major Johnston later wrote that 'at last I asked Cunningham 
what he wanted? his reply was Death or Liberty'. Thereupon, observing that 
Laycock's men had come up ready to engage the rebels, Johnston drew his pistol 
from his sash, and with the action cocked held it at Cunningham's head, taking him 
prisoner. With presence of mind, Handlesack (who presumably had replaced his 
DD Mann, Picture of New South Wales, p.14.. Mann describes Dixon's conduct during the 
rebellion as 'exemplary'. 
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confiscated flints) followed suit, and captured William Johnston." ° A well known 
cartoon depicts this incident (Figure 20 111 ), with the two rebels armed with swords, no 
match against pistols. This cartoon also shows Dixon, some distance away, on foot, 
possibly a representation of when the priest first spoke to the rebels rather than his 
location at the time the captures were made. Johnston and Handlesack smartly 'drove 
them [the two prisoners] into the Detachment.' 
At the time Cunningham was being escorted either towards, or into, the 
detachment lines, he must have made some move, or uttered some oath, which 
Laycock took to be hostile or offensive. The result was Cunningham received a severe 
sword wound to the head (depicted in Figure 20), and to all appearances left dead on 
the road.' With his troops now lined up in two ranks facing up the slope towards the 
rebels, this minor diversion did not distract Laycock, when he received Johnston's 
orders `to advance and fire and instantly charge'. A murderous exchange followed, in 
which none of the soldiers were hit, but the rebel casualties were '12 killed, 6 
wounded, and ... 26 prisoners',' an abnormal ratio in land warfare where wounded 
usually exceed those killed.' For the untrained and leaderless insurgents, it was a 
slaughter as they fled in all directions from the trained soldiers. The killed to 
wounded ratio (2:1), indicates the soldiers served out rough illegal "justice", without 
being called to stop by their officers. The 'only fault' that Johnston could later find 
''' C Coulthard-Clark, Where Australians Fought, p.3, states 'Johnston and the trooper quite 
dishonourably drew pistols'. Johnston's actions compared unfavourably with the rebels who releasing 
Handlesack, and twice did not fire when Johnston and Handlesack were negotiating within pistol range. 
No contemporary criticism of Johnston's action has been noted, which was probably considered a 
legitimate tactic, concluding the deliberate time wasting negotiations. 
R & T Rienits, A Pictorial History Of Australia, Middlesex,1969, p.70. 
Liz HRA, 1, 4, p.567. 
1 " Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2,b, of 11 March 1804. 
"4 HRA, 1, 4, p.570. 
" 5 B Harvey, The Rifle Brigade, London, 1975, p.43. For example, the Rifle Brigade, in the thick of 
the fighting at Waterloo, had 60 killed and 27 missing (presumably a total of 87 dead) against 370 
wounded, a ratio of 1 killed : 4.25 wounded. Again, a subaltern, who was wounded three times in 
World War I, noted that 'fortunately, the chances of getting wounded [in that war] rather than killed 
were about four to one', HEL Mellersh, Schoolboy into War, London, 1978, p.169. 
Figure 20: Cartoon of Major Johnston and the rebel leaders at "Vinegar Hill" 
237 
with his men 'was their being too fond of Blood"' This comment about his troops' 
uncontrolled behaviour, reflects poorly on the mounted Johnston, whose mobility 
would have enabled him to exercise restraint over his troops. No accolades can be 
given to the officers and men of the Corps for this inglorious skirmish, sometimes 
grandly referred to as the "Battle of Vinegar Hill", a name recalling the rebel defeat 
in Ireland of June 1798. 
Included amongst the total of Vinegar Hill prisoners were William Johnston 
and the badly wounded Cunningham, who had to be carried when Johnston continued 
his march to Hawkesbtuy. There, 'to make an immediate example of, by virtue of 
Martial Law ... [Cunningham was] publicly executed on the Stair Case of the Public 
Store'. 117 Possibly this was done to prevent him dying of his wound before he could 
be court martialled. Holt's version was' Cunningham was ... hanged, though he was 
dead, to show example:"' 
Following the uprising, ten rebels 'were selected from upwards of 200 taken 
with arms in their hands', to be tried by court martial under the provisions of martial 
law. They were all sentenced to death, with eight being executed, including Samuel 
Humes and William Johnston, the only two to be 'hung in chains'. The rebels were 
not exclusively Irishmen, or Roman Catholics, and JE Gallagher noted that 'at least 
two' of the men hanged were convicted in England, and of the nine executed including 
Cunningham 'that [4?]' were Protestants.' This supports Holt's statement that 'The 
English got as much attached to the business as the Irish." 20 Seven other rebels were 
sentenced by magistrates to be lashed, also two other men were punished 'for 
concealing the rebellious proceedings of the Insurgents assembled on the 4th and 5th 
1 " MB Eldershaw, Captain John Piper, pp.56-58: for Johnston's narrative in this and the preceding 
paragraph. 
Sydney Gazette, 54, p.2, b. 
118 J Holt, A Rum Story, p.81. 
" 9 JE Gallagher, 'The Revolutionary Irish', The Push From The Bush, No.19, April 1985, p.5. 
120 J Holt, A Rum Story, p.79. 
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March 1804'. Additionally, '50 of the worse description of Insurgents' were sent to 
reopen the coal mines at Coal River, now Newcastle. Finally, suspected instigators of 
the rebellion were sent to Norfolk Island.' 
In King's dispatch to Hobart giving details of the rebellion, he also requested 
an increase to the colonial garrison's strength.' This increase was intended to boost 
external security 'should we be attacked by a foreign enemy', and internal security 
against 'a repetition of any future attempts from the deluded' Irish. King's concern 
was understandable in the wake of the March 1804 uprising, coupled with the 
reduction in the Corps' strength the previous year. King made two other specific 
requests. That his five man mounted trooper bodyguard, recruited from 'well-
behaved English convicts who have been light horsemen' be expanded to a total of 
thirty, because of their proven value during the uprising. The other request was that 
two artillery officers and three non-commissioned officers be sent out to train selected 
privates from the New South Wales Corps. The intention was to form an artillery 
detachment to man the 'four travelling six-pounders besides the batteries' then in the 
colony. In amplifying remarks on this last point, King noted that as an interim 
measure, the Corps' Adjutant, Ensign Minchin, 'who has formerly been in the 
artillery, ... will train a certain number of the volunteer housekeepers to the use of the 
field-pieces'.' This last statement would appear to contradict the opinion of military 
historian Brigadier Austin, referred to in Chapter 7, that prior to joining the Corps, 
121 HRA, 1, 4, pp.564-565, for selection of rebels, Commentary Note 199, p.694, for 'worse 
description of the Insurgents'. For courts martial and punishments, pp.573-577. 
1 " HRA, 1, 4, p.565. 
1 " HRNSVV, 5, pp.356-357. King to Hobart of 12 March 1804. See third footnote, p.356 for loss of 
details of King's request for the Corps' increased strength. All quotations in this paragraph, unless 
otherwise stated, are taken from these pages. 
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Minchin had no previous military training. Whatever Minchin's capabilities, 
King's requests to strengthen the colonial garrison appear reasonable and were 
probably formulated in discussions with Paterson. The only response to this was 
from the incoming Secretary of War and Colonies, Viscount Castlereagh, who gave 
approval for Minchin 'to instruct the Volunteers in the use of the Great Guns, 
provided it does not interfere with his [adjutant's] Duties.' As Britain had 'called 
Napoleon's bluff' by terminating the Treaty of Amiens, 'suddenly' declaring war on 
France in May 1803, it is understandable that this was the sole response to King's 
appeal.' 
The insurrection of March 1804 was an atypical occurrence, as never before, 
nor after, did a convict uprising seriously threaten the fabric of colonial government. 
Despite the republican influence of the American and French Revolutions, all 
contemporary accounts of the insurrection suggest that it was Irish nationalism rather 
than Jacobinism which inspired the convicts. As noted by Costello, the rebel shout 
'they would be free or die' was a link to 17982' In the view of another author:- 
Because of its timing, and links with France, it has been assumed that the 
1798 Irish rebellion was in the tradition of the then new and modern popular 
demand for liberty, equality and fraternity, a radical nationalist demand for 
freedom. In reality it was an anachronism, a harking back to the desperate 
and primitive uprisings of seventeenth-century Ireland, riddled with localism, 
sectarianism, and sheer savagery: essentially it was an outbreak ... of 
M Austin, 'William Minchin of the New South Wales Corps', JRAHS, Vol. 50, Pt. 6, December 
1964, p.414. Austin brushes aside the suggestion, based on King's comment, that Minchin had 
military service in artillery before he joined the Corps, because Minchin 'did not have to be in the 
artillery to receive artillery training. Battalion guns were issued to infantry regiments as late as 1803.' 
This writer agrees with Austin that Minchin had no time to be artillery trained while being on strength 
of the Corps, as adjutant. He joining the Corps in November 1797, then embarking on Lady Shore in 
March 1798. See above, Chapter 7, p.154, footnotes 6-7, for author's comment that Minchin 
probably had some military experience, possibly with the artillery, before being appointed adjutant of 
the Corps. 
'" HRA, 1, 5, p.489. Letter of July 1805. Castlereagh replaced Earl Camden that month. Any 
reinforcements to New South Wales were of low priority. The Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805, 
removed a French threat of invasion to England or the West Indies. 
D Johnson, 'Amiens 1802: The Phoney Peace', History Today, Vol.52(9), September 2002, p.26. 
127 C Costello, Transported from Ireland, p.51. 
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barbarous rural anarchy.' 
Nevertheless, the twin concepts, of Irish freedom from England, and republican 
liberty as espoused by Jacobins, were interwoven as both sought the same end. This 
was illustrated in King's comments on the confiscated private papers of Scottish 
martyr Margarot, a suspected instigator of the rebellion. These were found to contain 
'many republic sentiments ... [also] against the executive authority in England' which 
made Margarot 'a most dangerous character to any society'.' Irrespective of 
whether "liberty" was the catchword of the Irish nationals or republican Jacobins, its 
connotation in the early colonial period was one of concern to the conservative 
authorities. The Sydney Gazette of 18 March 1804 wrote of rebels who had:- 
The notion instilled in their minds that Liberty was the object of their 
unhappy centest [contest] ... The profligate ... is not here at liberty to 
prosecute his abandoned courses; and the welfare of Society qeruires 
[requires] that he should be restricted: But to encourage Amendment is the 
most distinguishing feature of our happy Goverment' 
The message to dissidents was clear, improved conditions were to be gained by 
evolution under the British crown, not by revolutionaries seeking liberty. As J Ritchie 
points out, apart from such exhortations, a dread of further rebellion haunted the 
authorities, which led to the infliction of savage punishments on convicts, even in 
cases of unproven suspicion.' Even after King was replaced by Governor Bligh, 
suspicion was rife. In February 1807, 546 persons living in the hinterland from 
Hawkesbtuy to the Nepean, addressed Bligh as having 'enrolled our names for the 
Defence of the Country'. Their concern was not a possible French threat, but rather:- 
the real and presumptive proofs exhibited ... now and for many years past 
by those disaffected People, of their relentless and incorrigible spirit of 
1 " P O'Farrell, The Irish In Australia, Kensington, 1987, pp.32-33. 
1 " HRNSW, 5, p.451. King to Banks for 'republic sentiments'; p.447, to Under Secretary Sullivan, 
for 'dangerous character'; both letters of August 1804. 
Sydney Gazette, 55, p.3, a-b, of 18 March 1804. 
1 " A Charge of Mutiny, The Court Martial of Lieutenant Colonel George Johnston for deposing 
Governor William Bligh in the Rebellion of 26 January 1808, introduced by I Ritchie, Canberra, 1988, 
Introduction, pp.xvii-xviii. 
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Rebellion, Murder, and Atrocity, keeping liege Subjects in constant alarm' 
An Englishman and settler, George Suttor, wrote understandingly of the rebels 
of the March 1804 uprising. Suttor, despite having 'three muscats placed to my 
breast, and myself and [my] wife narrowly escaped being shot',' considered that the 
rebels 'were very much oppressed by the task masters and badly fed ... [but] being 
mostly Irish, a spirit of liberty and insubordination was amongst them.' Reinforced 
by denial of religious freedom until 1820,' such an emotive anti-English attitude 
could be expected to be handed on by many of these ethnic Irish to their children, and 
then to their children's children, as a lingering cultural trait. Over a century later, and 
in the wake of the Easter Uprising in Dublin, this still influenced many Irish 
descendants to support Archbishop Mannix in successfully opposing the October 
1916 and December 1917 referenda on conscription. In his study of Australia's 
Irish Republican Brotherhood, G O'Keeffe wrote:- 
From 1788 until recently, British and Irish-Australians were antagonists, 
imbued with old-world hatreds. Such enmity was manifest in the final years of 
the Great War when large elements of the two communities were at 
loggerheads over conscription and the 'Irish question'." 36 
The 1804 insurrection had a deeper historical significant than simply a clash 
between the military and some Irish convicts. Also the rebellion showed that, despite 
their many faults, soldiers of the New South Wales Corps had the ability to carry out 
their duty in maintaining internal security under a challenging circumstance. 
" 2 HRA, 1, 6, pp.578-579. 
HRNSW, 5, p.351. Suttor to Banks of 10 March 1804; pp.350-352, for Suttor's account of the 
rebellion. 
1 " Memoirs of George Suitor, p.47. 
1 " M. Hogan, The Sectarian Strand Religion in Australian History, Ringwood, 1987, p.24. After 
"Vinegar Hill", King cancelled his approval for Dixon to minister to Catholics. It was not until 1820 
that two Catholic priests were allowed to again minister to colonists of that faith. 
1 " G O'Keeffe, 'Australia's Irish Republican Brotherhood', JRAHS, Vol.83, Pt.2, December 1997, 
p.136. 
242 
Chapter 10 
External Security in the Era of the Naval Governors 
after Philip 
External security of New South Wales, at the time of the First Beet and early 
settlement, was considered in Chapter 1. Potential Dutch hostility had been 
assuaged by limiting the colony's western boundary to east of 135th meridian of 
longitude with any foreseeable French or Spanish moves checked by the occupation 
of Norfolk Island. But this was not a static situation. This chapter considers the 
effects within the colony of uneasy peace in the aftermath of the War of American 
Independence, and the renewal of wide ranging hostilities up to 1808, in the period 
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. 1808 marked the start of insurrection 
against the French in Spain, and commencement of the Peninsula War, which saw 
Britain and Spain allied.' This removed any mutually antagonistic transpacific 
external threat. The period also corresponded with the era during which naval 
officers were governors of New South Wales. 2 
The fluctuations in strength of the colonial garrison which resulted from 
British Empire needs in war or peace, is considered in chapters dealing with internal 
security' and demonstrates the close interrelationship between colonial internal 
J Hicks and D Howarth, 'Mistress of the Seas', Part IV, Chapter 2, The Horizon History of the 
British Empire, ed. SW Sears, Nederland: American Heritage Publishing Co., Inc., 1973, p.87, for 
post-1783, William Pitt's efforts to restore Britain's power by encouraging trade also troubles with 
Dutch and Spanish: pp.88-95, for Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars to Trafalgar, 1805. 
Montgomery of Alamein, A Concise History of Warfare, London, 1972, p.222, for Third 
Coalition (1805-1807), and p.228 for events leading to the Peninsula War. 
The temporary administrations of the colony under Grose and Paterson are not treated as a 
separate period. 
See above, Chapter 7, pp.156-157, for the New South Wales Corps augmented for offensive 
operations against the Spanish; see above, Chapter 9, pp.218-219, for reductions in the Corps' 
strength, due to the Peace of Amiens, limiting troop availability prior to the rebellion of 1804. 
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security and external demands of imperial defence. Similarly, lack of attention in 
London to defensive requirements of a distant and relatively unthreatened colony 
was understandable, especially after 1798 when the War and Colonial Offices were 
combined under one Secretary of State who had far reaching responsibilities and 
only a small departmental staff.4 Banks, in a letter to Hunter wrote of that 
department, and the Revolutionary War 'which stand foremost in their minds, and 
[therefore] colonies of all kinds ... are now put into the background: 5 
Tench's journal offers an understanding of how officers serving in the 
colony believed external factors could impinge on New South Wales' security. In 
the public reading of Phillip's commission on 7 February 1788 6, Tench noted that 
by siting the western border of the colony to the east of the 135th meridian of 
longitude, 'future litigation between the Dutch and us will be forever cut off.' 
Also, from the earliest days in the colony, there was a consciousness amongst the 
officers that the present peace was fragile, especially with the French Kingdom 
wishing to re-establish naval parity, if not superiority, over Great Britain. The 
French aim was to regain their colonial possessions lost in India, and probe new 
regions for trade and colonial expansion. 8 As part of this process, a new French 
East India Company was formed in 1785. Knowledge of these moves was verified 
from British diplomatic and clandestine sources, including Captain Arthur Phillip 
himself whilst acting as a spy in France during the mid-1780's. 9 
As well as an ill defined French threat, naval interdiction of the new colony 
by the Spanish, could not be completely ruled out In December 1790, a letter 
written in Dutch, was received at Sydney Town, and translated with difficulty. 
• See above, Chapter 8, p.188, footnote 6, for War and Colonial Offices. 
HRNSW, 3, p.532. Letter of February 1799. Also, see below, Chapter 12, for similar 
observations by Edward Macarthur after arriving in England in September 1808. 
• See above, Chapter 3, pp.48-49 and footnote 22. 
' W Tench, 1788, Comprising A Narrative of the Expedition to Botany Bay and A Complete 
Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson, Melbourne, 1996, p.47. 
• G Callender, The Naval Side of British History, London, reprinted 1925, pp.181-182. Britain 
gained naval superiority late in the War of American Independence, at the Battle of the Saints, in 
April 1782. H Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, Oxford, 1946, p.163, for post-war period. 
9 See above, Chapter 2, p.19 and footnote 10. 
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According to Tench, this advised that war had commenced between England and 
Spain. He continued:- 
Placed out of the reach of attack, both by remoteness and insignificancy, 
our only dread lay lest those supplies intended for our consumption should 
be captured. Not, however, to be found totally unprovided in case of an 
enemy should appear, a battery was planned near the entrance of Sydney 
Cove' 
While building a defensive battery was an appropriate action, in the event it 
was not essential as war was not declared on Spain. Indeed, after the execution of 
Louis XVI in January 1793, France declared war on England, the Netherlands and 
Spain. Nevertheless, tensions between Britain and Spain could have led to war in 
1789 over conflicting claims to Nootka Sound on the north-western Pacific coast of 
North America. This was a serious issue for Spain as it challenged her claim to the 
"Pacific Lake", but without French support, she could not risk war with Britain." 
As an indication of British determination to press the Nootka claim, between April 
and October 1790 Pitt's administration 'readied some forty-three line-of-
battleships and ... its fleet of frigates for sea, increased the number of its enlisted 
seamen from 17,300 to 55,000, and of its marines ... to 5,300. 12 in making 
preparations to claim British sovereignty over the Sound, an expedition, commanded 
by Captain Vancouver RN, was ordered 'to form a settlement on the no.-west coast 
of America'.' Phillip was directed to give limited logistical support to Vancouver's 
ships.' For the first time, the colony's geographic position was recognised by the 
British as having some strategic value in international affairs. 
1° W Tench, Narrative of the Expedition, p.179. Apparently this is a reference to the first battery 
erected in the colony, on what is now Bennelong Point, see above, Chapter 3, p.47 and Figure 6. 
11 OHK Spate, The Spanish Lake, The Pacific since Magellan, Volume 1, Canberra, 1979, p.59. 
Spate considers that Spain's hold on the Pacific 'in a territorial sense' was not disputed until the 
Nootka crisis. A Frost, The Global Reach of Empire, Britain's maritime expansion in the Indian 
and Pacific oceans 1764-1815, Carlton, 2003, p.226, for Spain's lack of allies. 
" A Frost, 'Botany Bay, Nootka Sound, and The Beginnings of Britain's Imperialism of Free 
Trade', Bulletin of The Centre for Tasmanian Historical Studies IBCTHSJ, Vol.3, No.2, 1991- 
1992, p.4. 
" HRNSW 1, Part 2, p.312. 
14 HRNSW, 1, Pt. 2, pp.312-313. Grenville (Secretary of State, Home Office) to Phillip of 
March 1790. Footnote to p.312, for a changed role for Vancouver, to one of discovery, which 
still included the north western Pacific coast of North America: p.668, Vancouver to Phillip of 
October 1792, Vancouver discovered and named 'King George the Third's Sound', the future site of 
Albany. 
245 
While the officers in New South Wales visualised a possible threat from the 
Spanish, the opposite also applied. In September 1788, a Spanish naval captain, 
Munoz, reported to Madrid that Botany Bay posed two threats to the Spanish 
Empire. An immediate threat was that British aggressive trade practices could foster 
a contraband trade with the Americas leading to destruction of Spanish commerce in 
the Pacific. Secondly, in time of war, Munoz considered:- 
The [British] settlers will be able to fit out lucrative privateers, so as to cut 
all communication between the Philippines and both Americas; they will 
think perhaps of extending their possessions, or they may influence some 
revolution which would diminish ours." 
This was not unreasonable speculation about a possible enemy, whose forces 
had occupied Manila in October 1762, and with whom, from 1778 to 1783, they had 
recently been at war.' Despite this suspicion, Spain could have gained some 
temporary reassurance regarding British intentions in the Pacific from that part of 
Philip's and Hunter's Instructions which directed that no colonial maritime trade 
be allowed on the Chinese coast or Pacific islands where 'intercourse has been 
established by any European nation'." But such a view could have been offset by a 
reading of the governors' commissions, which failed to proscribe an eastern 
boundary for the new colony which stretched indeterminably to 'islands adjacent in 
the Pacific Ocean'. 18 This concerned Captain Alexandro Malaspina, commanding 
two Spanish naval corvettes, which visited Sydney Town in March-April 1793. 
Regarding this indefinite boundary, he wrote that this embraced:- 
Eastward all the Islands of the Pacific discovered by National [British] 
Ships. 
Here begins to be discovered the true idea of the British Government. In 
15 R.J. King, The Secret History of the Convict Colony Alexandro Malaspina 's report on the 
British settlement of New South Wales, North Sydney, 1990, p.4. 
16 A Frost, Global Reach of Empire, p.35, for Manila and p.89 for France and Spain at war with 
Britain during the American War of Independence. 
17 HIM, 1, 1, pp.15 and 524 respectively. 
18 HRA, 1, 1, p.711, Commentary Note No. 1, Governor King interpreted this wording to 
include Tahiti, likewise Macquarie regarded New Zealand to be under his jurisdiction. DD Mann, 
The Present Picture of New South Wales 1811, Sydney, 1979, p.24, for contemporary 
confirmation. HIM, 1, 7, p.5. Foveaux to Castlereagh of February 1809, claiming the same for 
'the Fejee Islands'. Such interpretations do not appear to have been contradicted by London. See 
above, Introduction, p.xiii, for presumed intention of those who framed the original commissions. 
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the first place, was it merely Geographic Position which, in preference to 
all, invited the establishment of a colony in Botany Bay; i9 
This unpleasant realisation, reported by Malaspina, would have been confirmed by 
the early occupation of Norfolk Island, as directed in Phillip's Instructions. 
Additionally, the Nootka Sound claim, which preceded Malaspina's visit to Port 
Jackson, demonstrated Britain's determination to resist the Spanish claim to the 
Pacific. 
Officially the purpose of the Spanish visit was to conduct a scientific and 
political expedition through the Southern Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.' RI King 
writes that while in Port Jackson, the Spaniards carried out 'astronomical, 
meteorological and tidal observations collected botanical, animal and avian 
specimens, studying the geology ... the Aborigines, and making a pictorial record'. 21 
But, he believes:- 
The visit to Sydney Cove had a deeper purpose. ... Included in the secret 
tasks of the expedition were the preparation of comprehensive political 
reports on the new Russian and English settlements in the North and South 
Pacific: Alaska, Nootka Sound, and Botany Bay.' 
The Spanish government's political interest in approving Malaspina's 
voyage is understandable. To Major Grose, administering the colony, and to 
Malaspina, it was not known at the time of the visit that the British and Spaniards 
were allied against France (from February 1793). But such knowledge would have 
made no difference to Malaspina in carrying out his secret orders. Historically, the 
Spanish requirement for such intelligence was justified as the alliance with Britain 
lasted only until 1795. By 1796, Britain and Spain were at war, and the British and 
Spanish colonial governors would have had a mutual concern about possible 
RI King, The Secret History, p.95. 
" RJ King, The Secret History, p.2, for visit outline and also that Governor Phillip had been 
given prior warning of the visit by a letter from the Colonial Office of June 1790, including 
instructions to pay the Spaniards 'every attention'. 
" RJ King, The Secret History, p.2. 
" RI King, The Secret History, p.3. RJ. King does not quote a primary source to support this 
statement. However, in a dispatch of April 1793 (HRA, 1, 1, p.427) Grose reported to London 
that the Spanish 'seemed to evade any questions put to them respecting their future intentions.' 
King's assertion appears reasonable, based on Malaspina's quotation given in the next paragraph. 
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transpacific raids. Reporting on his visit, Malaspina considered that the Port 
Jackson settlement presented a major threat to colonial Spain. He wrote:- 
from whence with the greatest ease a crossing of two or three months 
through healthy Climates and secure navigation could bring to our 
defenceless coasts [of South America] two or three thousand cast-away 
bandits to serve interpolated with an excellent body of regular Troops.' 
Malaspina's strategic analysis was sound. It will be recalled from Chapter 7, 
that in February 1797 the Home Secretary advised Governor Hunter that the New 
South Wales Corps was to be augmented. This was in preparation for deploying 
four companies on offensive operations against Spanish possessions.' A further 
illustration is noted in Collins' journal, and in Hunter's dispatch to London of May • 
1799, that a Spanish prize was sailed to Port Jackson. This prize had been captured 
by two letter of marque whalers, off the coast of Peru. One of these whalers had 
been refitted at Port Jackson before sailing for South America. The conclusion 
Hunter drew from this incident was that 'this colony may prove at some future 
period, from its situation [Hunter's emphasis], a settlement of much importance in 
case of either a Dutch or Spanish war.'" 
In January 1800, Hunter reported that another Spanish prize had been sailed 
into Port Jackson. He commented 'we cannot be supriz'd ... if it shou'd provoke a 
visit from some of the ships of war from the Spanish settlements on that coast'. In 
an endeavour to be prepared for such a visit, Hunter then described defensive works 
undertaken, within the limitations of conflicting priorities of agriculture and 
essential building in the colony.' 
" JW Fortescue, A History of The British Army, Vol.4, P1.2, 1789-1801, London, 1906, p.799, 
for Britain at war with Spain, as a result of a Franco-Spanish alliance under the Treaty of San 
Ilefondo of August 1796. 
" RJ King, The Secret History, p.6. 
" This operation never eventuated, for details, see above, Chapter 7, pp.156-157. 
" HRNSW 3, p.670. Hunter to Portland of May 1799. D Collins, An Account of the English 
Colony in New South Wales, Christchurch, undated, p.411. 
" HRNSW, 4, pp.7-8. Hunter to Portland. In May 1803 (HRA, 1, 4, p.148) King echoed 
Hunter's warning that Spanish warships on the South American Pacific coast could be a 'hazard' to 
British commercial vessels. 
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Historically, New South Wales did not suffer from any direct offensive 
Spanish action. Nevertheless, as appreciated by both Captains Munoz and 
Malaspina, Port Jackson could be used as a forward base to threaten Spanish 
America. New South Wales had already been assigned a minor role in the Nootka 
Sound affair and, as mentioned in Chapter 7, the secret operation (later cancelled) 
involving four companies of the New South Wales Corps. However, the Spanish 
authorities were probably only aware that Port Jackson had been used by successful 
privateers. Presumably, being defensively orientated, the Spanish colonial 
authorities, did not use their naval capability to raid British Pacific outposts. They 
would have been more concerned with inshore patrols for protection against raiding 
privateers, while countering any unauthorised coastal movements. Meanwhile on 
land, the emphasis would probably have been on garrisoning defended forts and 
posts, policing native populations, and being ready to counter internal threats of 
rebellion. The two botched British operations against Buenos Aires in 1806 and 
1807, mounted respectively from the Cape of Good Hope and England, showed the 
Spanish defensive policy, while not generally considered good tactics, was 
realistic.' While these land operations were disastrous, they did demonstrate the 
flexibility bestowed by Britain's sea superiority. The failure of the French, before 
Trafalgar, to make use of similar opportunities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, is 
considered later in this chapter. This French lack of initiative, combined with 
Spain's failure, or inability, to mount naval operations in the Pacific, negated any 
risk arising from inadequate naval protection for New South Wales.' 
" HRA, 1, 4, p.148. King to Hobart of May 1803. About early 1803, the Spanish warships on 
the South American Pacific coast consisted of; 'Two frigates, a ship of 50 guns (that sails very ill 
- built in Peru), two armed whalers, a cutter-brig, and a lugger.' There would have been little hope 
of Spanish reinforcements on the Pacific coast as the main priorities of the Spanish Admiralty 
would have been joint operations with the French in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, where the 
critical battle for naval superiority against the British was being fought. 
" J.W. Fortescue, History of the British Army, Vol.5, London, 1910, pp.310-317 and 369-437, 
for details of British operations. As colonial militias in both cases were responsible for the British 
defeats, this in turn encouraged insurrections, which from 1807 commenced spreading throughout 
the Spanish colonies. 
" HRA, 1, 3, p.327. King to Portland of November 1801. King's concern was that naval ships 
were not available to fetch supplies, rather than for defence requirements. E Scott, Terre Napoleon, 
A History of French Explorations and Projects in Australia, London, 2nd. ed.1911, footnote, p.14. 
Sununarises references from Historical Records of New South Wales, in which a lack of naval 
support was criticised. 
249 
While there was no Spanish action against New South Wales, there were 
instances where Spanish warships tried to intercept convict transports in southern 
Atlantic waters after their departure from Rio de Janeiro. In November 1799, the 
transport Minerva twice narrowly avoided capture. On the first occasion, after 
being signalled by a Spanish frigate to 'heave to'', Minerva after a two day close 
chase finally out sailed her pursuer. Some days later, the second contact was 
initiated by the British ship against two Spanish vessels 'One was a "galleon", and 
the other looked like a "prison ship". They were a tempting bait' . 32 Captain 
Salkerd on Minerva, ordered the guns ready and decks cleared for action. 
"General" Holt, with a knowledge of cannon, was asked by the First Mate 'would 
I fight I answered 'Yes". Holt was allowed to select his own gun crew of 'six 
proper resolute' Irishmen, whose gun was charged with grape shot." Minerva did 
not get the opportunity to open fire as the prison ship was a decoy frigate which 
ineffectually fired its first (and only) broadside as Minerva quickly tacked about. 
Holt later admitted to the First Mate:- 
had we come to action, ... the very first gun I should have fired should 
have taken the poop cabin and steerage away. Which would be quite a 
prevention of my seeing Botany Bay. 
With 'Captain Cox ... on the poop at the head of his 24 marines or soldiers', such a 
shot disabling both his own ship's steerage and her defenders would have 
guaranteed Holt either freedom or (as happened with the mutineers and crew of 
Lady Shore) a Spanish prison. Cox confirms Holt's account, but, probably 
mistakenly, Bateson in a brief reference to the incident states 'The Minerva [was] ... 
chased and fired on by two ships flying Portuguese colours'." Bateson gives the 
date of this contact as 1 October 1799, before the ship reached Rio de Janeiro. 
" W Cox, Memoirs of William Cox, J.P., Lieutenant and Paymaster of N.S.W. Corps, Sydney, 
1901, p.25. 
" W Cox, Memoirs, pp.26-27. 
" J Holt, A Rum Story, The Adventures of Joseph Holt Thirteen Years in New South Wales 
(1800-12), ed. P O'Shaughnessy, Kenthurst, 1988, p.43. 
" J Holt, A Rum Story, pp. 44 and 43, for respective quotations. See above, Chapter 7, 
pp.183-184, for Lady Shore. 
" W Cox, Memoirs, pp. 26-28. C Bateson, The Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 2nd ed., 
1969, p.159. 
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With Spain at war with Britain, while Portugal was a friendly neutral, Bateson's 
unreferenced account is suspect. Nevertheless, the two Minerva incidents 
demonstrate the double threat to transports en route to the colony - from Spanish as 
well as French ships. 
It has been noted that Hunter considered Sydney Town to be a settlement of 
importance in case of either a Dutch or Spanish war. Collins agreed with this 
opinion, and added 'in event of a Dutch war ... [Sydney offered] a reception to the 
prizes of our cruizers, a [Vice-Admiralty] court whereat they could be condemned, 
and a market for their cargoes'.' What then was the relationship between the 
colonial authorities in the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) and New South 
Wales, when, from 1795, their home governments were in a state of war against 
each other? 
Following the French invasion and occupation of the Netherlands in March 
1795, Holland was retitled the "Batavian Republic" and became a satellite ally of 
France. However the Prince of Orange fled to England, authorising governors of 
Dutch overseas possessions to hand over their authority and security to the British 
during the war.' Therefore, virtual neutrality existed between the British and Dutch 
colonial possessions with no call for privateers based in Sydney to raid the Dutch 
East Indies or vice versa. Nevertheless, there was at least one recorded instance 
where a British whaler 'bearing a letter of marque' captured a Dutch vessel in the 
East Indies and sailed it to Port Jackson to be disposed of through the Court of 
Vice-Admiralty.' Further, the British occupation of Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and 
especially the Cape of Good Hope, helped remove threats to communications 
between England and New South Wales. This was a period of relatively benign 
" D Collins, An Account, p.411. 
" J Hicks and D Howarth, 'Mistress of the Seas', p.89. For Prince of Orange's instruction, and 
Cape of Good Hope resisting and its later capture. RE and TN Dupuy, The Collins Encyclopedia 
of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present, London, 4th ed., 1993 p.745. Note is made 
of an unusual action, the Dutch fleet, immobilised by ice, was captured by French cavalry in 1795. 
HRA, 1, 4, p.678, Commentary Note 107, for period 1795 to 1806. In 1806 Napoleon installed 
his brother on the throne of Holland. 
" HIM, 1, 5, p.172. King to Hobart of December 1804; pp.812-813, Commentary Note No. 
54, for details. 
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neutrality, which lasted until Napoleon's brother, Louis Bonaparte, was installed on 
the throne of Holland in 1806. In that year, a Dutch squadron, sent out to the Indies 
during the Peace of Amiens, was destroyed by a British fleet in the 'roadstead of 
Batavia'. 39 
In 1808, Louis appointed a new governor-general, Marshal Herman 
Daendels, to the Dutch East Indies. Daendels was ordered to sacrificed the 
economic wellbeing of that colony to prepare to defend Java and other key islands 
against attack. In response, a British force from India, in a short colonial campaign, 
took over Dutch possessions in the East Indies in 1811." From 1808 until 1811, 
during the period of Daendels' governorship, because the colonial Dutch were more 
concerned with defensive rather than offensive operations, their hostile status had no 
effect on the security of New South Wales.' 
The attitude of the French towards the British differed to that of the Dutch. 
Whether under a monarchy, republican government, or Napoleon himself, there 
were successive French voyages of exploration in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, all 
of which Britain viewed as a threat to their present or future interests. This rivalry 
applied to exploration and possible colonisation of the fabled Terra Australis 
Incognita. In 1768, de Bougainville, had been deflected northward by the Great 
Barrier Reef. It is a matter of speculation what may have been the French course of 
action had de Bougainville discovered the lush coast of today's Queensland and 
claimed that region for France. In the courts of Europe, a claim by de Bougainville 
would have been considered legitimate by right of discovery, as this was two years 
before Cook discovered and annexed the continent's east coast.' 
39 DGE Hall, A History of South-East Asia, London, second ed. 1966, p.444. For benign 
neutrality before the arrival of Daendels, Hall writes 'The one aim of the Dutch authorities ... was 
to avoid giving any support to the French and thereby force the British to invade Java.' (p.444). 
" DGE Hall, A History of South-East Asia, pp.450-451. 
41 For Dutch East Indies: CP Fitzgerald, A Concise History of East Asia, Kowloon, 1966, 
pp.243-244; DGE Hall, A History of South-East Asia, pp.443-453, and p.449, for General JW 
Janssens replacing Daendels before the British attack. 
42 H Roseman, 'But for Cook? France Atistrale? Terre Napoleon? French Navigators and the 
Great South Land', Symposium paper: The French-Australian Cultural Connection, 1983, p.46. 
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It will be recalled from Chapter 1 that during the ancien regime (of Louis 
XV 1715-1774 and Louis XVI 1774-1792), French expeditions by Keruelen-
Tremarec and la Perouse probed the coasts of Australia, and in 1772, a claim of 
doubtful authenticity was made by Saint Allouam over part of the western coast of 
New Holland. Then, following the disappearance of La Perouse's ships, Bruny 
d'Entrecasteaux was dispatched in 1791 to find the missing expedition. In 1792, 
d'Entrecasteaux spent considerable time making scientific observations in southern 
Van Diemen's Land, as did the later expedition of Nicolas Baudin. From these 
voyages, the French authorities were aware of the excellent fleet anchorage provided 
by what is now the River Derwent Had the French mounted an expedition against 
Sydney, or established a settlement elsewhere, this harbour would have made Van 
Diemen's Land an island of strategic significance, particularly after the British 
discovered the important maritime route through Bass Strait.' Both 
d'Entrecasteaux and Baudin explored parts of the mainland coast Despite France 
and England being in a state of war, Baudin's expedition, which took place during 
Napoleon's term as First Consul, was sanctioned by Great Britain as being of a 
scientific nature, and the French ships carried a British Admiralty Passport. 
In 1802, Baudin's naval vessels were the first French ships to visit Port 
Jackson since the commencement of the Revolutionary War with Britain in 1793. 
This continuity of French scientific expeditions gave Governor King reasonable 
cause for concern.' Such expeditions by Britain's traditional enemy, were seen by 
King as evoking 'the probability of the French having it in contemplation to make a 
settlement on the NW coast (of [the] straits)'.' After Baudin's arrival in Sydney in 
June 1802, he did his best to dispel King's suspicions by allowing the latter to 
" See above, Chapter 1, pp.5-6. 
" Bass's whaleboat exploration of 1797, led him to surmise a strait existed. This was confirmed 
in 1798, when he and Hinders circumnavigated Van Diemen's Land. 
" H Rosemnan, 'But for Cook?', p.49. 
46 HRA, 1, 3, p.490. King to Portland of 21 May 1802. King could be expected to be concerned, 
as Lieutenant Murray, in Lady Nelson, had only discovered Port Philip in January 1802 and 
surveyed the bay in February 1802 (p.795, Commentary Note 191). Meanwhile, King was alerted 
to Baudin's expedition being in Bass Strait waters by the arrival of Naturaliste at Port Jackson in 
April 1802 (p.509). 
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examine, at his leisure, both the French ships' orders, journals, and charts.' The 
contentious issue of Baudin naming a lengthy section of the mainland's southern 
coastline Terre Napoleon (Figure 21 8) did not arise, as this name was apparently 
bestowed by Baudin, after he left Sydney and returned to Australia's southern 
waters.' Nevertheless, despite generalised suspicions of French intentions, 
heightened by the recent state of war,' the British Admiralty Passport was honoured 
when Baudin's ships reached Port Jackson. 
King gave every assistance possible to Baudin's ships. Without help from 
British sailors, the scurvy racked crew of Geographe could not have worked their 
ship into Port Jackson.' Except for unfounded allegations by New South Wales 
Corps officers regarding French illicit sales of rum, cordial relations were preserved 
during the five month visit.' But although King conceded that the French had done 
outstanding work 'in every branch of Natural History'; even before they departed 
Port Jackson, he reiterated in a dispatch to London a previously stated opinion:- 
I am inclined to think ... that collecting alone is not the principal object of 
his [Baudin's] Mission, ... that they have an intention of looking for a place 
... [for a penal settlement] on the W. or N.W. Coast [of Australia, also] ... 
they may have some intention of laying claim to Van Diemen's Land 
How far either or both of these conjectures may be probable I cannot says 
H Roseman comments that it was not quite the case that the French intended to 
establish a settlement, as Napoleon's real motive in authorising Baudin's expedition 
was to 'ingratiate himself with the French scientific community'.' 
Only hours after the  departure of the French ships, King was informed by 
E Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.206. Also, HRNSW, 5, p.133. King to Banks of May 1802. 
" R Clancy and A Richardson, So Came They South, Silverwater, 1988, pp.164-165. From 
1812 French map by P Lapie. Note 'G. Bonaparte' (Spencer Gulf), as another name which would 
add to British concern. 
" R Clancy and A Richardson, So Came They South, p.162. 
s° HIM, 1, 3, p.627. The Peace of Amiens was announced in Sydney on 14 June 1802. Baudin's 
ship, Geographe, arrived off Sydney Heads on 22 June 1802 (p.697). 
s' HRA, 1, 3, p.509. Naturaliste put into Port Jackson for needed supplies and water, for twenty-
three days in April/May 1802. Subsequently, refer p.697, Geographe, was assisted into port in 
June 1802 (see also E Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.186) She was later joined by Naturaliste, forced 
back by bad weather. 
" See above, Chapter 8, p.203. Captain Kemp and Adjutant Minchen, being the main offenders. 
" 
 
HIM, 1, 3, p.698. King to Hobart on 9 November 1802. 
" H Roseman, 'But for Cook?' p.48. 
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Lieutenant Colonel Paterson of casual comments by some French officers that it 
was the intention of the French to make a settlement, in what was then called by the 
British, Storm Bay Passage on south-eastern Van Diemen's Land:" When pressed 
for details of these conversations, Paterson advised King that this was common-
place conversation of which he presumed King was aware. King, who had not 
heard of such French comments, acted immediately. 
In the same dispatch reporting the French conversations, King advised 
London he was dispatching naval acting lieutenant, Robbins, in an armed colonial 
vessel, to ensure 'His Majesty's Claim to that part of this Territory [Van Diemen's 
Land and adjacent islands] cannot be disputed'. Further, King stated that as soon 
as HMS Porpoise returned to Sydney, he would 'despatch her with a small 
Establishment to the most Eligible place at "Storm Bay Passage" and one at Port 
Phillip or King's Island'. The following year, in September 1803, the settlement at 
Risdon Cove on the River Derwent, under command of Lieutenant John Bowen, RN 
was established.' Meanwhile, to meet the immediate problem, Robbins, was 
instructed that if he met the French, he was to inform Baudin of Britain's claim to 
sovereignty by handing him a letter from King stating the British position.' This 
Robbins did, carrying out his duties forcefully, if somewhat crudely. He 
demonstrated sovereignty at King Island by placing an armed sentry and hoisting 
the British ensign (the French claimed this was raised upside down) over Baudin's 
camp. 
" HIM, 1, 3, p.737. King to Hobart of 23 November 1802. 
" HIM, 1, 3, p.740. That Paterson withheld giving this information until the French had sailed, 
appears strange. Possibly a sign of the disrupted working relationship between King and Paterson 
in the aftermath of accusations by Corps officers that the French had illegally sold spirits ashore; 
see above, footnote 52. 
' HIM, 1, 3, p.737. King to Hobart of 23 November 1802. Also pp.738-739 for King's 
instructions to Robbins regarding a detailed study of the area. 
" HIM, 3, 1, p.132. Log of Lady Nelson which arrived at Risdon Cove five days before Albion 
(p.197). Porpoise returned from Otaheite (Hawaii) in December 1802 (HRA, 1, 3, p.747), but 
needed a a complete refit to her rigging before being ready for sea again (p.754). Also HIM, 1, 4, 
p.250 for report of May 1803 on poor condition of ship's hull. With adverse weather (p.359), this 
led to delays in establishing the settlement at Risdon Cove. Ultimately, Lady Nelson and Albion 
were employed to establish this outpost. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.1007. King to Baudin of 23 November 1802. HRNSW, 5, pp.133-134, for 
King's detailed account to Banks of May 1803. 
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In reply to King's letter, Baudin responded with two, one formal, and the 
other personal to 'Mr. King, my friend, for whom I shall always have a peculiar 
regard' .60 Baudin's formal reply pointed out that Robbins had arrived and hoisted 
the British flag 'too late, as ... we had left in prominent parts of the island ... proofs 
of the period at which we visited it.' In response to this, King made a marginal note 
on Baudin's letter, listing the 1798 British discovery of King Island and a survey 
conducted in February 1802. Baudin also denied Paterson's 'story' that French 
officials had spoken of the formation of a French settlement in Bass Strait or Van 
Diemen's Land, suggesting instead that Captain Kemp had been 'the author' of 
these rumours." 
In Baudin's personal letter to King, he denounced colonisation of lands 
peopled by indigenous natives, forcing their removal and loss of their heritage. He 
also referred to King's 'erroneous pretensions about Van Diemen's Land', and 
although Baudin was unaware of the French government's intentions regarding a 
settlement there, any French title 'will not be any better grounded than yours.'' In 
respect to this comment on Britain's claim to sovereignty over Van Diemen's Land, 
Baudin's views can be supported. Cook took possession of the coast which he 
explored on the Australian mainland from 38 degrees south latitude - Point Hicks 
(Figure 22), near the south-eastern tip of the continent - thence northward to Cape 
York.' This claim was recognised under European conventions of discovery and 
did not clash with recognition of the Dutch discovery of Van Diemen's Land. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.1009-1010, translation of Baudin's formal reply of 23 December 1802. For 
translation of the personal letter, of same date: RW Giblin, The Early History of Tasmania, The 
Geographic Era 1642-1804, London, 1928, pp.294-298. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.1009 and footnote quoting King's notation. Bragging by the French naturalist 
Peron is popularly considered as the source of the rumour reported by Paterson. Yet, in neither 
Paterson's, King's nor Baudin's letters on the French settlement claim, is any reference made to 
this person. H Rosenman, 'But for Cook?', pp.48-49, considers Peron's 'chatter and the 
suspicions he aroused' caused this incident. 
" RW Giblin, Early History Tasmania, p.295. In this letter, Baudin (p.296) referred to Robbins' 
'childish ceremony' made more 'ridiculous ... from the manner in which the flag was placed'. 
" A Sharp, The Discovery of Australia, Oxford, 1963, map facing p.98. 
" HRA, 1, 12, p.838, Commentary Note 150. Thirty-eight degrees of latitude was the southern 
limit of Cook's claim. 
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Further, viewed from a European perspective, acceptance of Cook's claim avoided 
controversy over any possible French claims to parts of the island arising from 
detailed surveys by d'Entrecasteaux and subsequently Baudin. A century later, 
Scott devoted Chapter IX of his book on Terre Napoleon in arguing that King's 
fear of Baudin's involvement in the planning of a French settlement was 
groundless. Nevertheless, Scott considered the French could have made out 
stronger claims to sovereignty on moral grounds, due to their greater contribution 
than other Europeans to a knowledge of Tasmania.' 
Cook's claim assumed a land bridge, where in fact the still undiscovered 
Bass Strait lay, with Van Diemen's Land, claimed by the Dutch, to the south. In 
Phillip's commissions, New South Wales' 'southern extremity' was defined as 
'South Cape in the latitude of forty-three degrees thirty-nine minutes south', being 
the southern most tip of Van Diemen's Land. Here lay the ambiguity in Britain's 
territorial rights, in the difference between Cook's claim by discovery, and the 
presumption of sovereignty in Philip's and subsequent commissions. King may 
well have appreciated this legal weakness in Britain's territorial claim, which could 
explain his urgent measures to secure Britain's sovereignty by flag raising and 
settlement. 
British sovereignty, initially demonstrated forcefully by Robbins, was 
reinforced the following year by the establishment (without prior approval from 
London) of a settlement at Risdon Cove in Van Diemen's Land under Lieutenant 
Bowen. Confidential orders from King to Bowen, made clear the motive for this 
establishment. King wrote:- 
In case any French ships, or ships of any other nation, should attempt to 
form an establishment anywhere in the neighbourhood of where you are 
settled, you will inform the Commanding Officer of His Majesty's right to 
the whole of Van Diemen's Land ... If they persevere after this, you will 
endeavour to prevent them carrying their intention into effect, but without 
any act of hostility if it can be avoided; nor will you on any account suffer 
65 E Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.175 and pp.189-221 for Baudin's scientific accomplishments. 
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his Majesty's flag to be insulted.' 
The measure of King's determination to block the French was shown by his 
authorising Bowen to use force as a final option in securing British sovereignty. It 
is noteworthy that King did this on his own initiative, despite Baudin holding a 
British Admiralty Passport of safe conduct. 
Preceding the above events, and before Robbins' hurried dispatch to King 
Island in November 1802, the previous May, King had recommended to London 
that a settlement be established at the newly discovered Port Phillip on the northern 
shore of Bass Strait. Writing of the natural advantages of that area, King also 
suggested two other reasons justifying such a settlement. One was an internal 
security factor and the other concerned external security. Firstly, he was concerned 
about the number of Irish convicted of sedition and republican practices being 
transported to the colony and considered that sending some to Port Phillip would 
do 'much for separation [of] the numbers'. King's other security problem 
concerned the possibility of the French making a settlement in the same area.' 
During the shaky Peace of Amiens, the War and Colonial Office favourably 
responded to King's recommendation. Hobart decided to settle Port Phillip, and 
with government approval, dispatched an expedition under Lieutenant Colonel 
David Collins for this purpose. In Hobart's advice to King, of February 1803, 
that a new settlement was to be formed, 'subordinate to ... the Government of New 
South Wales', he noted:- 
the sea abounds with the seal and the sea elephant, and the attempts that 
have already been made to fish there have been sufficiently successful to 
afford encouragement to prosecute that pursuit. 
It is also evident that the attention of other European powers has been drawn 
to that part of the world, and it need scarcely be observed that the 
establishment of any foreign power on that part of the coast might, in the 
" HRNSW, 5, p.100. Confidential directive of 1 May 1803. The Peace of Amiens came into 
effect on 27 March 1803. But when King drafted this order he would not yet have been aware of 
this cessation of hostilities. 
67 HRA, 1, 3, pp.489-490. King to Duke of Portland of May 1802. 
" HRA, 1, 4, p.653, Commentary Note No. 1. By December 1802, planning was well advanced 
with Collins submitting a long list of stores required for use at the future settlement, HRNSW, 4, 
pp.921-924, Collins to Under Secretary Sullivan. 
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event of hostilities, greatly interrupt the communications with Port Jackson, 
and materially endanger the tranquility [sic] and security of our possessions 
there.' 
Meanwhile, Hobart was not aware that King had already decided to establish an 
outpost at Risdon Cove on the Derwent River, Van Diemen's Land.' 
With the deployment of Lieutenant-Governor Collins' expedition to Port 
Phillip,' the problem of protecting the external security of Bass Strait became 
interwoven with internal security within Collins' inhospitable camp. He grew 
concerned about slackness, and the number of sick, in his marine detachment, also 
the number of convicts who took to the bush. To counter this, Collins "borrowed" 
from HMS Calcutta, a sergeant and ten marines to increase his security. This was 
only a short term expedient, and when advice was received that hostilities had again 
broken out with France, to Collins' dismay, Calcutta's captain and his ship, with a 
full complement of marines, speedily departed Port Phillip.' With discontent 
growing amongst the convicts and marine detachment, on 29 December 1803, 
Collins referred to the problem in discussion with the expedition's chaplain, 
Reverend Robert Knopwood. Knopwood noted in his diary, that Collins expressed 
the 'necessity that the civil establishment should form themselves into a patrol of a 
night in case of an insurrection.' This 'night watch' commenced operating on 2 
" HRA, 1, 4, pp.8-9. Hobart to King of February 1803. Also HRA, 3, 1, pp.1-4, for an 
undated London departmental memorandum, believed to be of late November/early December 1802; 
p.781, Commentary Note No.1, which provides more detail on the establishment of the Port 
Phillip settlement. 
• HRA, 1, 3, p.737. King to Hobart of 23 November 1802. Hobart did not acknowledge this 
dispatch until June 1803. 
'' In HMS Calcutta accompanied by the storeship Ocean. HIM, 3, 1, p.33. The civil officers, 
including Collins, numbered thirteen, with marine detachment consisting of three subalterns 
(enabling Collins to order a regimental court martial), three sergeants and corporals, two dnunmers 
and thirty-nine privates. Also, p.26, for 299 male convicts and sixteen married women, with the 
number of children unspecified. 
• HIM, 3, 1, p.781, Conunentary Note 8. Hobart intended the detachment's strength to be one 
hundred and six all ranks, in fact only fifty-one, including Collins, embarked. Records of the Port 
Phillip Expedition Volume I Correspondence October 1801-February 1803, ed. J Currey, 
Melbourne, 1990, pp.33-34. First Lord of the Admiralty, St. Vincent, to Hobart of 28 December 
1802. This explains the above limited number of marines, as St. Vincent had 'numberless 
objections' to providing this detachment. 
• J. Currey, David Collins A Colonial Life, Melbourne, 2000, pp.206-209, for problems with 
convicts deserting. For Collins' concern over his marine detachment; p.212, for the marines 
"borrowed" from Calcutta, and the ship's sudden departure on 18 December 1803 (while Collins 
was planning removal of camp to the Derwent), p.212. 
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January 1804, with the 'gentlemen ... provided with a brace of pistols [and] ... other 
persons ... furnished with a short staff' . 74 Possibly the final events that precipitated 
Collins into activating the night watch were that a convict deserter shot at a soldier at 
the signal tent on 30 December 1803, and next day two marines were arrested and 
`accus'd of mutany [sic]'.' They were court martiallod and both sentenced to 900 
lashes. Collins personally watched this punishment administered, which was only 
stopped when the doctor considered that the men's lives were at stake.' 
In addition to his misgivings over Port Phillip as a location for a settlement, 
Collins wrote to Governor King regarding the punishment of the two marines:- 
on duly weighing the whole Circumstance, together with the weakness of 
my Party in point of Numbers, I thought I could not do better than repair to 
the Derwent, where, by being joined by a Detachment of the New South 
Wales Corps, a Spirit of Emulation would be excited and a check given to 
that discontent which has manifested itself amongst my own People. 
By this addition of strength I should, moreover, never have much 
apprehension from a large Sick-List, which indeed was once so great after 
the departure of the Calcutta Marines that I was obliged to reduce the 
number of my Centinels by day, mounting a Picquet in the Evening. [Also] 
... if I should lose an Officer I could not hold a Court-Martial upon 
Offenders ... which would be obviated by the Services of Lieu't Moore 
[already stationed at Risdon Cove]' 
Collins' decision to use Bowen's military detachment to reinforce his own, because 
of an internal security problem at Port Phillip - unconnected with external concerns 
- resulted in an unplanned strengthening of the Derwent settlement, which itself had 
been founded for strategic reasons. This settlement, with its fine port of refuge, 
74 The Diary of The Reverend Robert Knopwood 1803-1838, ed. M Nicholls, Hobart, 1977, p.34. 
Entry for 29 December 1803. For night watch, pp.35-36. Amongst the 'other persons' of the 
watch were '6 soldiers mutiners [sic] from Giberalter [sic]' (p.37). 
" Diary of The Reverend Robert Knopwood, pp.34 and 35. 
76 HRA, 3, 1, p.217, for marine discontent. One marine received 700, and the other 500 lashes. 
" HRA, 3, 1, pp.217-218. 
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known and admired by the French, strengthened the British grip on the approaches 
to Bass Strait and firmly secured Van Diemen's Land as a part of colonial New 
South Wales. 
Meanwhile, Hobart's concern that the commercial and strategic importance 
of Bass Strait and adjacent coasts could attract other powers was well founded. In 
September 1802, a French vessel 'bound on a sealing voyage' to Bass Strait, was 
forced to put into Port Jackson for repairs,' and while King approved these repairs, 
and allowed the vessel to proceed as a special case, he warned the French captain:- 
an exclusive priviledge [sic] to some members of this colony [has been 
given] to seal on Cape Barren and the islands adjacent thereunto; and ... has 
[been] given [to] other English vessels and companies permission to seal on 
King's Island ... which will necessarily preclude your undertaking to catch 
seals on these places.' 
By November 1802, increasing international interest in Bass Strait fisheries 
resulted in King requesting London's advice, 'particularly respecting French and 
American vessels' sealing in the strait.' Less than two years later, he was still 
asking London what was to be the official position regarding 'this intrusion and 
intercourse with the Americans, which is not only pernicious to the public interest, 
but highly disadvantageous to the adventuring colonists'.' Some Americans, such 
as Delgano, became notorious for their aggressive operations around, and on the 
Bass Strait islands. They semi-permanently occupied some islands, built ships, and 
in that violent period of sealing history, brutally treated British sealers who intruded 
'a B Flomley and J Piard-Bernier, The General, The visits of the expedition led by Bruny 
d'Entrecasteaux to Tasmanian waters in 1792 and 1793, Launceston, 1993, p.209. In 1793, 
d'Entrecasteaux described the channel (now d'Entrecasteaux Channel) immediately south of the 
Derwent, between Bruny Island and the coast, with its many safe inlets, as follows 'I do not 
believe that there is, in the whole extent of the globe, so large a number of excellent anchorages 
united in so small a space'. He possibly had included the Derwent River in this assessment. , 
Willaumez and Beautemps-Beaure, at this time, explored and charted (for chart, see p.260) the 
navigable stretches of the Derwent River. Willaumez recorded 'On all sides appeared ports, coves 
and creeks with every convenience for ships (p.212). Additionally, Baudin's expedition in 1802, 
conducted further surveys of the d'Entrecasteaux Channel and Derwent River. 
" HRNSW, 4, p.837. French captain (Le Care) to Naval Officer at Port Jackson. 
8° HRNSW, 4, p.841. Naval Officer to French captain of September 1802. 
8I HRNSW, 4, p.891. King to Hobart. 
82 HRA, 1, 5, pp.7-8. King to Hobart of August 1804. 
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onto "their" domain. Collins' temporary camp at Port Philip, then its transfer to 
Hobart, and the establishment of a military settlement at Port Dalrymple, would have 
forestalled any possibility of disputation over sovereignty with France or the United 
States!' Port Dalrymple's location on Bass Strait, was particularly well sited to 
frustrate foreign intentions, demonstrating Britain's determination to uphold its 
sovereignty in that strategic area. But, irrespective of this, King continued with his 
resolve to prevent American sealers from setting up a base of operations on any of 
the strait's islands. 
While vessels from neutral America represented an annoyance to King's 
administration, there was no claim by King that they presented a security threat. In 
comparison, before the Peace of Amiens, King appears to have exaggerated concern 
over First Consul, Napoleon Bonaparte's intention to establish a settlement in 
Australia.' However, during the Peace of Amiens from March 1802, a French 
squadron of five ships, under command of Rear Admiral Durant Linois, was 
dispatched to the Indian Ocean. Had word of this French initiative reached King, he 
would have had grounds to be concerned, due to Britain's naval weakness in both 
the Indian and Pacific Oceans. On the resumption of hostilities in May 1803, 
Britain in her struggle to maintain sea-power parity against the combined French 
and Spanish navies, had concentrated her warships in the Mediterranean and 
Atlantic. Therefore, until the British naval victory of Trafalgar, in October 1805, 
Linois' squadron faced little opposition in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. 
Additionally, this force was favoured by the Treaty of Amiens, as the Cape of Good 
Hope had been returned to the Dutch and was unavailable to the British as a naval 
" HRA, 1, 5, pp.  173-176, Enclosure No.2. King to Hobart of December 1804. For Delgano 
incident and how the British (supposed) victim was told he 'ought to have kept away from Cape 
Barren and the rest of those islands' (p.174): p.813 Commentary Note No. 55, for a contradictory 
account of this incident, later published by Depano in 1817. He blamed the Britisher for initiating 
the violence. For report of ship building, p.7. Collins reported on a third vessel built by 
Americans in the last twelve months at 'Kent's Bay on Furneatut's Island'. 
" CH Grattan, The United States and the Southwest Pacific, Melbourne, 1961, p.81. Although 
unlikely, a claim of sovereignty (which would have been vigorously disputed) was a remote 
possibility. For example, Grattan notes that the captain of the American frigate Essex (see below 
Chapter 14, p.369-370, for capture of the British whaler Seringapatam) 'formally proclaimed 
United States sovereignty' over the Marquesas Islands in November 1813. 
" By coup d'etat, Napoleon became First Consul in November 1799. For example of King's 
warning to London, before the Peace of Amiens, HRA, 1, 3, p.490, dispatch of May 1802. 
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base until recaptured in January 1806." With He de France remaining a French 
colonial possession, Linois' squadron had the opportunity to wreak havoc on 
British trade routes in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The lightly defended Sydney 
Town, could have been a tempting target for a resourceful naval commander. In 
this eventuality, many convicts, especially the Irish, may have risen in revolt to 
support any French landing party. 
Fortunately for the British, Linois was unenterprising and failed dismally in 
adopting aggressive and flexible naval tactics in a favourable operational 
environment.' The threat his ships posed diminished with the British recapture of 
the Cape in 1806 and ended when he surrendered with two warships to a British 
squadron in March 1806." Thereafter, for the remaining period of the naval 
governors, and indeed up to 1815 in the Macquarie era, there was little likelihood of 
an attack on the colony. Nevertheless, there remained the possibility that privateers 
could interdict shipping destined for the colony. 
Later, Napoleon issued a grandiose order in 1810, that a French naval 
squadron was to be dispatched to the Indian Ocean, and that it should 'take the 
English colony of Port Jackson'. This order revealed his failure to understand the 
realities of post-Trafalgar sea power.' Despite the breadth of his power in Europe, 
no French Indian Ocean squadron eventuated. The British capture of Ile de France 
and Reunion Island in December 1810, finally put an end to this Napoleonic dream. 
Possibly Napoleon was subject to unrealistic concern over British plans for the 
Pacific, in exactly the same way that Bathurst and King were worried over their 
" A Frost, Global Reach of Empire, p.260. 
a' E Scott, Terre Napoleon, pp. 15-20, for details of Linois' operations. His original squadron of 
five ships may not have been all warships as he was ferrying troops to reoccupy former French 
possessions in India, which had been captured by the British prior to the peace, and were to be 
returned to French control. On Hobart's instructions, the governor-general in India refused to 
honour this handover (p.25). 
" E Scott, Terre Napoleon, pp.20-21, for generalised statement and pp.16-19 for an example of 
Linois' excessive caution, losing, through British bluff, an opportunity of achieving a noteworthy 
success with minimal risk. 
" RE and TN Dupuy, Military History From 3500 B.C. p.838 for Linois' surrender. 
90 E Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.21 and footnote for primary source. 
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enemy's expected intentions to establish settlements in Australia. For example, on 
return of Baudin's expedition to Ile de France, E Scott wrote that naturalist Pierre-
Francois Peron advised the Captain-General, General Decaen:- 
The British Government, by extending their military posts and trading 
stations across the [Pacific] ocean would sooner or later establish 
themselves within striking distance of Chili and Peru. Peron pointed to the 
political insecurity of the Spanish-American colonies, and predicted that the 
outbreak of revolution in them, possibly with the connivance of the English, 
would further the deep designs of that absorbent and dominating nation.' 
While Scott does not assert that Peron's report reached and influenced Napoleon, 
concerns about coexisting threats and counter threats were significant, and did 
influence colonial and international affairs, such as when Bathurst ordered Collins 
to settle Port Phillip. 
Returning to the British assessment of French threats of settlement, it is 
argued that it would have been impossible for the French in wartime, to have 
established and then logistically supported an infant settlement, particularly in the 
strategic Bass Strait region. Intelligence gathered within France, and with 
surveillance by an increasing number of British ships transiting through the strait, 
London or colonial authorities would have been alerted to take counter measures. 
One British frigate, or several whalers, commissioned and fitted as privateers, based 
on Port Jackson, could have closely blockaded and fatally interdicted French 
shipping trying to establish, or support, any new settlement on the coasts or islands 
claimed by the British as a part of New South Wales. Yet, at the time, such a 
sanguine view was apparently not considered by King. His persistent warnings, 
and his precipitate action in dispatching Robbins, and later Bowen's expedition to 
the River Derwent, show that he had possibly over estimated France's capabilities. 
Notwithstanding King's apparent excessive concern over Baudin, London, 
presumably based on their own assessment of the situation, reacted by dispatching 
Collins to form a settlement at Port Phillip. This decision by the British 
government, is examined below. 
A convergence of several factors apparently led to the government 
91 E Scott, Terre Napoleon, pp.114-115. 
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dispatching Collins' expedition. By April 1800, London, now aware of the 
existence of Bass Strait, had ordered Lieutenant James Grant RN, outward bound in 
Lady Nelson, to survey this region. The Duke of Portland stressed that such a 
survey was of 'most immediate importance ... [because of] probable benefits of the 
whale fishery, and the shortening [of] the passage [to Port Jackson] through the 
straits'. He also drew attention to 'an excellent harbour, [which] is worthy of 
particular attention' in Van Diemen's Land.' This information on the strait, and 
surrounding waters, had been passed to Portland by Lieutenant Matthew Hinders 
RN, who, after he and Bass had circumnavigated Van Diemen's Land in 1798- 
1799, returned to England on HMS Reliance.' Information on fisheries from 
Enderby & Sons, who were influential in the whaling industry, and acted as a 
successful pressure group on government, would have been considered. As Roe 
points out, they had close but informal links with King, who had assisted them 
when he was on Norfolk Island, in England, and as governor in Sydney.' 
Meanwhile, Portland probably had intelligence of the proposed Baudin 
expedition, adding urgency to his orders to Grant, which included directions to take 
possession of suitable `shelter[s] for shipping' or locations with likely productive 
soil.' That Portland was aware of the French plans, is a reasonable assumption, for 
only two months after Grant received his orders, Baudin's British Admiralty 
Passport was approved. Having appreciated the importance of Bass Strait, 
probably Portland, as well as Banks, followed the French moves with interest. 
Banks sponsored Hinders, and by January 1801, the latter had been appointed 
HEM, 1, 2, p.498. Portland to King of April 1800, concerning discovery of strait and the 
'lieutenant of the Reliance' (Hinders). Enclosure 1, p.499, Portland's directions to King for 
employment of Grant. 
"HIM, 1, 2, p. 501. Portland to Grant of April 1800. Directing Grant to explore the strait on 
passage to Port Jackson. 
" M Roe, 'Australia's Place in 'The Swing to the East',1788-1810', Historical Studies Australia 
and New Zealand, Vol.8, No.30, May 1958, pp.202-204. Indeed, based on King's assistance in 
England, he had 'a one-third share in the first cargo' authorised to be carried by a whaler to Port 
Jackson. 
95 HRA, 1, 2, p.500. 
" E Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.161. Approved, in June 1800, by Earl Spencer, then First Lord of 
the Admiralty (p.160). Baudin sailed from France in October 1800 (p.167). 
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captain of HMS Investigator, under orders to survey Australia's coastline. Such 
concern over Baudin's expedition, which had earlier sailed, was emphasised in June 
1801, in a letter from Hinders to Banks, in which Hinders expressed concern that 
'the French are gaining time upon us'.' 
Meanwhile, in 1800, Collins had put himself forward as an 'Under Secretary 
of State for the Colonies', and in 1801, Portland wrote a testimonial to Hobart on 
Collins' behalf. Thereby, while promoting his interests in London, this probably 
commenced the process by which Collins was ultimately appointed to command the 
Port Phillip expedition.' 
A further factor which likely influenced the decision on the Port Phillip 
expedition was the unstable Peace of Amiens, of March 1802. AGL Shaw notes 
that 'during the peace the government had decided to reform the transportation 
system by sending to Sydney two shiploads of convicts every year in govemment 
[naval] ships.'' HMS Glatton and Calcutta were detailed for this task, with 
Calcutta, accompanied by a storeship, Ocean, later diverted to Port Phillip. This 
use of warships was opposed by the First Lord of the Admiralty, who wrote to 
Hobart, that if the scheme was 'carried to a greater extent, [this would] cut deep into 
the Sum granted for the Navy, the expense being very much heavier than when they 
[convicts] were conveyed by Contract'.' 
During the Peace of Amiens, the British government was concerned by 
France's aggressive preparations for war. While Britain reduced the strength of her 
army and navy,' France did the opposite. An example of this being Napoleon's 
97 HRNSW, 4, p.291. HRA, 1, 3, p.110, King was advised of this appointment in June 1801. 
98 HRNSW, 4, p.381. Second footnote to p.381, noted Baudin had gained nine months start. E 
Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.168, Hinders did not sail until July 1801. 
99 HRNSW, 4, pp.138-139. Collins to Under Secretary Sullivan of September 1800, and p.626, 
Portland to Hobart of November 1801. 
1 " AGL Shaw, A History of The Port Phillip District Victoria Before Separation, Carlton, 1996, 
p.7. 
Records of the Port Phillip Expedition, p.34. St. Vincent to Hobart of December 1802. 
1 " See above, Chapter 9, pp.218-219, for army economies attributed to precipitating the 1804 
rebellion. H Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, p.214, for naval economies. 
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move to make Antwerp 'a spearhead levelled at the heart of England ... [and] the 
biggest naval base in the world'.' Hobart's concern over such developments is 
evident in his secret directive of 17 October 1802, ordering the governor-general of 
India, Lord Wellesley, to ignore the terms of the peace, and not return France's 
former possessions.' It was against this background that King's warning 
dispatches (referred to earlier) were received by Hobart and his staff. As these 
dispatches paralleled London's suspicions over France's world-wide ambitions, 
they obviously received close and favourable consideration. 
The basis for the government's decision on the Port Phillip expedition is 
indicated by an unsigned memorandum, of late November or early December 
1802.' This suggests that the final factor which led to the Port Phillip expedition, 
was receipt of a series of dispatches from King, particularly that of 29 March 
18022' The memorandum stated:- 
The attention of the French Government has recently been directed 
to New Holland ... 
By the accounts, ... from Govr. King ...there is reason to believe 
[quite correctly] that the French Navigators had not discovered ... Port 
Phillip, nor [incorrectly] ... King's Island ... 
Governor King represents each of these objects as deserving the 
attention of Government, but especially Port Phillip, where he urgently 
recommends that an establishment should be immediately formed ... 
The reasons, adduced by Governor King ... are principally ... the 
advantages which the possession of such a Port naturally suggests from the 
valuable fishery ... and from the policy of anticipating the French, to whom 
our discover[ies] ... must soon be known, and who may take early 
measures for establishing themselves in position so favourable for 
interrupting in any future war the communications between the United 
Kingdom and New South Wales ...' 
Here, the deciding factor for the Port Phillip expedition was the strategic importance 
of Bass Strait, supported by  the desire to protect British fisheries in the region. 
1 " G Callender, The Naval Side of British History, London, reprinted 1925, p.205. 
1 " E Scott, Terre Napoleon, p.15. 
HRA, 3, 1, pp.1-3, for memorandum, and p.781, Commentary Note 1, for its approximate 
date. The memorandum was apparently a War and Colonies inter-departmental document. 
1 " HRA, 1, 3, p.436-437. Dispatches of 1 March 1802 (recommendation for a settlement at 
either Port Dalrymple or Western Port). Dispatch of 29 March 1802, p.482, (discovery of Port 
Phillip, and p.795, Commentary Note 191, for details of its survey). Dispatch 21 May 1802, 
p.490, (as detailed in the above memorandum quotation). Later dispatches by King would have 
arrived in London too late to have influenced the decision on Collins' expedition. 
107 HRA, 3, 1, pp.1-2. 
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Once the decision on the Port Phillip expedition was made, planning 
advanced quickly. Collins wrote to Under Secretary Sullivan, on 24 December 
1802, commenting on needs, and listing stores required for the future settlement!' 
Significantly, this level of detailed planning was being conducted even before the 
First Lord of the Admiralty, on 28 December 1802, favourably commented on the 
suitability of Collins, a marine officer officially under his command, for the position 
of lieutenant-governor!' During January 1803, royal assent was given for convicts 
'now in this kingdom' to be transported to Port Phillip." ° The expedition sailed 
from Spithead on 24 April, and by 9 October 1803, Calcutta and Ocean had 
rendezvoused together in Port Phillip!" 
From this examination of the circumstances leading to the British 
government's decision to mount the Port Phillip expedition, it would appear that 
London was not "dragged" into this venture by King's agitations. Rather, a series 
of diverse factors, over two years, came together at the time King's dispatches were 
received in London. This led to approval being given for the expedition, and 
involved interwoven imperial and colonial external security factors, together with 
concern over British commercial fisheries interests. 
The resumption of hostilities in Europe in 1803, led H Rosenman to 
comment that 'After the Baudin expedition and the ten turbulent years that followed, 
there was no further [French] government sponsored voyages to the Pacific until the 
Bourbon restoration'." 2 Following British supremacy at sea after the Battle of 
Trafalgar, any fear of a French seizure and occupation of a settlement site was no 
longer realistic. This factor, together with the formation of settlements in Van 
Diemen's Land, eliminated the possibility that the critical Bass Strait passage could 
'" HRNSW, 4, pp.921-924. 
1 " Records of the Port Phillip Expedition, p.33. St. Vincent to Hobart. 
HRNSW, 5, p.4. Hobart to Admiralty of 15 January 1803. This also authorised Collins to 
command the expedition, nominated vessels to be employed, and gave the king's approval for a 
force of '100 private marines, with a suitable number of officers and non-commissioned officers'. 
HRA, 3, 1, p.26. Collins to King of November 1803. 
112 H Rosenman, 'But for Cook?', p.49. 
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becomedominated by the French. In this politico-strategic situation, the issue of a 
French threat was never again raised by the colonial naval governors. Nevertheless, 
as discussed in Chapter 14, Macquarie did express a concern over French 
intervention during his term as governor. 
The other external security threat, the Spanish interception of British 
shipping, or maritime raids across the Pacific, was also put to rest when that country 
and Britain became allies following the French invasion of Spain in March 1808. 
By this time, because of perceived French threat, British settlement was firmly 
established in the region covering Bass Strait. Consequently, threats of war, rather 
than peaceful expansion, led to significant parts of the continent's eastern seaboard 
coming under British sovereignty. 
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Chapter 11 
Insurrection Against Bligh, 1808 
In August 1804, Governor King urged that his replacement in the colony be 
carefully selected as he 'will require abilities, [of] firmness, and decision to manage 
the people of which this colony is composed'.' Sir Joseph Banks, the acknowledged 
expert on New South Wales, was a patron of Captain William Bligh, whose name he 
put forward as King's replacement. Subsequently, Earl Camden' wrote 
'empowering me [Banks] to offer the Government of N.S.Wales to Capt. Bligh'. 3 
Viscount Castlereagh later replied to Governor King's letter, that 'a proper person 
should be selected to relieve you ... the King has been pleased to appoint Captain 
Bligh, of the Royal Navy, as your successor' . 4 The new governor certainly had the 
qualities recommended by Governor King, but he also had an 'extremely hot 
temper', and was subjected to much publicised criticism for his role as captain of 
Bounty, aboard which some crew members successfully mutinied in April 1788. 5 In 
his appointment as governor, Bligh as a 'martinet ... [was] sent out to curb ... the 
HRNSW, 5, p.446. King to Under-Secretary King of August 1804. 
HRNSW, 5, p.465, footnote. Earl Camden succeeded Hobart at the War and Colonial Office in 
May 1804. Viscount Castlereagh took over from Camden in July 1805, p.654. 
HRNSW, 5, p.590. Letter (addressee not recorded) of April 1805. HRA, I, 6, p.VI, for Banks 
also acting as Bligh's patron in securing his earlier appointment to command HMS Bounty, tasked 
with collecting bread-fruit from Otaheite. 
4 HRNSW, 5, p.655. Letter of July 1805. Banks to Bligh of September 1805, expressing 
concern that the colony was not to be 'under a naval government', but that Bligh was appointed 'as 
a civil Governor', p.692. 
ADB, 1, p.119, for temper. HRA, 1, 6, pp.V1:1, IX-X1. Despite his mercurial nature, Bligh's 
naval achievements included: brilliantly navigating an open boat about 3600 miles to safety after the 
Bounty mutiny; receiving a Society of Arts gold medal for a later expedition which successfully 
collected bread-fruit from Otaheite; and, during the French Revolutionary Wars, serving with 
distinction as a ship's captain at the Battle of Camperdown, and at the action off Copenhagen after 
which he was personally thanked by Lord Nelson. 
270 
disturbing elements of the New South Wales Corps and its partisans,' His 
selection could well have been considered by the government as a risky but 
necessary measure. Bligh assumed office as governor in August 1806, and his zeal 
in enforcing London's orders was bitterly resented by vested colonial interests. He 
was removed from office by an insurrection in January 1808. This rebellion was 
carried out by the New South Wales Corps, the unit responsible for maintaining 
order in the colony. As a result, from 26 January 1808, until Lieutenant Colonel 
Macquarie assumed the appointment of governor on 1 January 1810, the colony was 
ruled in the name of the civil power by the senior military officer, who at the time, 
commanded the garrison in Sydney.' 
As foretold by Governor King, John Macarthur did 'one day sett [sic] this 
colony in a flame',8 with this prophesy becoming fact at Macarthur's criminal trial 
on 25 January 1808. Matters leading to this trial were complicated, involving; the 
importation of a still, the schooner Parramatta, and a controversial challenge to 
Judge-Advocate Atkins, which threw the judicial process into chaos, precipitating the 
rebellion. The first charge that led Macarthur to the criminal court related to his 
unlawful importation of a sixty gallon still to make spirituous liquor. This he 
illegally removed from the ship which had been ordered to take the still back to 
England. It was recovered from Macarthur's Sydney home.' He compounded this 
offence at a public gathering on 24 October 1807, being charged with using 
language, intended to 'seditiously ... inflame ... people against the Governor and 
[his] Government.' The next charges involved the schooner Parramatta, of which 
Macarthur was part owner. After a convict escaped from the colony on Parramatta, 
in November 1807 Macarthur disputed the forfeiting of the bond entered into by 
ships' owners as a deterrent to such happenings. While this argument continued, the 
HRA, 1, 6, p.XII. 
' These officers were: Major George Johnston from January to July 1808, Lieutenant Colonel 
Joseph Foveaux from July 1808 to January 1809, Lieutenant Colonel William Paterson from 
January to December 1809. HRNSW, 6, p.817, for War Office on 7 May 1808 promoted Paterson 
to colonel and Johnston to lieutenant colonel 'in the Army'. 
8 See above, Chapter 8, p.203 and footnote 63. 
9 HIM, 1, 6, p.292. 
10 HRA, 1, 6, p.294. 
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matter was further complicated when Macarthur refused to pay or provision the crew 
of the now impounded Parramatta." The crew then breached colonial regulations 
by coming ashore as a group." As a result of this breach, the Chief Constable of 
Parramatta attempted twice to serve Macarthur with a warrant to appear before a 
bench of magistrates.' In each instance, speaking to the constable, Macarthur used 
insulting language in reference to Bligh and his government. Consequently, 
Macarthur was again charged with seditious language in addition to the original 
charges relating to Parramatta 's crew. He finally appeared before the bench on 17 
December 1807, and was placed on bail pending a hearing before the criminal 
court." It is significant that amongst the four magistrates, were two military officers, 
Major Johnston and Captain Abbott, both of whom became embroiled in the Corps' 
rebellion on 26 January 1808: 5 As a prelude to his trial, Macarthur demanded 
payment from the judge advocate, Richard Atkins, of a controversial and long 
standing debt. Atkins failed to make any repayment in response: 6 
When Macarthur's trial opened 011 25 January 1808, the assembled court 
consisted of Judge-Advocate Atkins and six New South Wales Corps officers, of 
whom the senior, and spokesman, was Captain AF Kemp. Atkins, having sworn-in 
the six officers, should himself have then been sworn-in by Kemp. However, 
Macarthur objected to Atkins being a member of the court owing to the latter's 
indebtedness and claimed doubts of receiving a fair trial." The officers, without legal 
precedent, accepted Macarthur's plea, and Kemp, refusing to swear-in Atkins, 
submitted a request to Bligh that another judge-advocate be assigned for the trial. 
This was refused, and in increasingly acrimonious correspondence, the rapidly 
H HRA 1, 6, p.345, fot evidence by Ship's thicstct, John Glen. The conviet'S name was Joliti 
Hoare. As at April 1808 (after the Corps' rebellion) this matter was still unresolved. 
' 2 HRA, 1, 6. pp. 307-308, for circumstances. Apparently, prior to this, no difficulties had been 
experienced when individual sailors came ashore. 
13 HIM, 1, 6, pp. 312 and 314, for evidence by Atkins and Chief Constable 14 Oakes respectively. 
HRA, 1, 6, p.315. 
HRA, 1, 6, p.315, for names of magistrates, civilian magistrates being Atkins and John Palmer 
Not listed is Robert Campbell, who stood aside after an objection by Macarthur. 
16 ADB, 1, p.39, for Atkins being well known in the colony for not repaying his debts. HRA, 1, 
6, p.423, for Bligh's comments on the promissory note in Atkins' name. 
HRA, 1, 6, p.221, for initial proceedings and pp.225-227, for Macarhur's, address to the court. 
272 
developing crisis which culminated in the rebellion can be traced.' 
Preceding this incident, there had been a long-running background of 
discontent and friction between the Corps and Bligh's predecessors Hunter and 
King. This was exacerbated by some military and civil officers' relentless struggle 
to protect their trading "rights". Concerning King, the officers were supported by 
influential settlers, such as Captain Macarthur. Now a civilian, he accused the 
governor of favouring particular merchants,' while Lieutenant Colonel Patterson 
thought there would be 'better times ... if Gov'r King was not so hasty and 
unguarded' 20  Also Captain Colnett of HMS Glatton wrote a stinging criticism of 
virtually every aspect of King's administration.' Such a barrage of complaints 
forced Hobart to replace King. In doing so, he referred King to 'the unfortunate 
differences ... between you and the military officers ... latterly extended to the 
commander of ... Glatton'. Therefore, Hobart had decided to replace King with a 
governor 'free from ... the spirit of party which has reached alarming heights, and 
which might ... be of material prejudice to His Majesty's service.' n 
While all these disagreements led to intrigue, they did not spark a rebellion. 
Similarly, after his arrival, Bligh's strict enforcement of mercantile regulations, lack 
of finesse in handling the military and settlers, together with his studied insults and 
intemperate crudity in speaking in front of soldiers, was infuriating. Yet, these 
issues were not the decisive factors which ultimately caused the rebellion. The 
question probed in this chapter is what impelled an entire regiment to mutiny. 
18 HRA, 1, 6, pp.221-225, for correspondence. 
19 HRNSW, 5, p.465. Macarthur to Under Secretary Sullivan of September 1804. Written while 
Macarthur was in England, after returning under arrest, then resigning from the army. 
" HRNSW, 5, p.141. Paterson to Banks of May 1803. 
21 HRNSW, 5, pp.207-219. Colnett to Nepean, Secretary of the Admiralty of September 1803. 
Footnote, p.4.44, notes `Colnett dined with William Pitt ... upon return of Glatton. What a 
character [reference] the irascible captain would give King!' 
" HRNSW, 5, p.273. Hobart to King of November 1803. 
" HRNSW, 6, pp.587-589. Statements by Whittle, Minchin, Bramwell and Johns. For 
Johnston's complaint to the Commander-in-Chief's Military Secretary of October 1807, pp.652- 
654. The Commander-in-Chief drew Castlereagh's attention to this in June 1808, p.651. 
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Major George Johnston, the putative leader of the mutiny, in his first dispatch 
to London, almost three months after assuming the government of the colony, 
explained why he had arrested Bligh. He claimed the mutiny was unavoidable to 
'prevent an insurrection of the inhabitants, ... secure [Bligh] ... from being massacred 
by the incensed multitude; or if the Governor had escaped ... and retained his 
authority, to see His Majesty's ... government [not] dishonour'd by cruelties and 
merciless executions.' This dispatch, actually written by Macarthur, amplified 
these reasons with the accusation that Bligh 'acted upon a predetermined plan to 
subvert the laws ... terrify and influence the courts of justice, and bereave those 
persons ... obnoxious to him of their fortunes, their liberty, and their lives.' Further, 
'Several inhabitants were dispossessed of their houses [or] ...threatened with the 
Governor's resentment if they presumed to build upon or alienate their own lands.' 25 
Apart from problems associated with 'Several inhabitants' homes and lands, these 
accusations attributed the causes of the rebellion to short term matters. Reference 
was avoided to longer term economic factors, such as restrictions placed on officers' 
trading. Significantly, there was no reference to the New South Wales Corps, or its 
six officers 'charged with treasonable practices' being connected in any way with the 
Corps' mutiny. The whole emphasis centred on the 'very awful impression ... made 
upon the minds of the inhabitants' which caused Johnston 'to adopt decisive 
measures for the[ir] safety'!' 
Before considering the mutiny in detail, the accusations in Johnston's 
dispatch require evaluation to establish their accuracy. He first stated that action by 
the military was necessary 'to prevent an insurrection by the inhabitants'!" In 
justifying this statement, Johnston, when urgently called from his home to the 
21 A Charge of Mutiny, The Court Martial of Lieutenant Colonel George Johnston for deposing 
Governor William Bligh in the Rebellion of 26 January 1808, introduced by J Ritchie, Canberra, 
1988, pp.207 and 211. Macarthur, in evidence, twice admitted to the court that he wrote 
Johnston's dispatch of 11 April 1808. 
25 HRNSW, 6, p.576. 
26 HRNSW, 6, p.578 for 'awful impression' and p.579 for 'treasonable practices' and 'decisive 
measures'. 
" Presumably, Johnston is referring to the 'common people' of Sydney, whose social strata was 
beneath that of the 'gentlemen', referred to as the 'more respectable inhabitants' (HRNSW, 6, 
p.579). 
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barracks, claims to have observed; 'The common people were ... seen in various 
groups in every street murmuring and loudly complaining while others were 
watching the movements of [Bligh's legal advisers] ... to [and from] Government 
House'. 
In 1811, at Johnston's court martial, at Chelsea Military Hospital, London, 
Macarthur supported the proposition that 'an insurrection would have broken out in 
the town if the Governor had not been put under arrest'. " Under questioning by the 
court, he modified this answer. Referring to six military officers (Captain Kemp, 
Lieutenants Brabyn, Moore, Laycock, Minchin (Adjutant) and Lawson) who, on 25 
January 1808, had refused Bligh's directive to form a Criminal Court with Judge-
Advocate Atkins to try him, Macarthur stated:- 
I believe, that if he [Bligh] had not been put in arrest, the six officers would 
have been put in gaol, and the soldiers and inhabitants would have united 
together, and they would probably have committed some excesses upon the 
Governor's person ... [Bligh's arrest ensured] the preservation of the peace 
of the colony, and the desire of preventing bloodshed.' 
Johnston, in his evidence, confirmed that 'the arrest of the six officers, and dread of 
what measures might ensue, would occasion considerable uneasiness.' 30 Thus the 
claim in Johnston's dispatch to London that the Corps saved the colony from 
insurrection by the 'common people' was a fabrication. What the mutiny by the 
Corps did do, was to prevent Bligh taking action against the six officers. Therefore, 
the second point in Johnston's dispatch that the Corps arrested Bligh to 'secure 
[him] from being massacred by the incensed multitude' is incorrect. 
Johnston's next point was that the coup prevented His Majesty's government 
from being `dishonour'd by cruelties and merciless executions'. This serious 
allegation presumably arose from threatened disciplinary action against the six 
military officers who defied Bligh in refusing to accept Atkins as the judge-advocate 
for Macarthur's trial. Amongst other issues, they accepted Macarthur's plea that his 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.197. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.197. 
30 A Charge of Mutiny, p.151. 
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actions were 'a piece of justice I owed to the community to protest'. Further, that 
'judicial authority' (of the six officers not to accept Atkins) should not be overridden 
by 'His Excellency's own power [which] must be the executive'.' Atkinson notes 
that Macarthur's views and advocacy were influenced by Jeremy Bentham's 1803 
Plea For Constitution for New South Wales.' This work included comment such 
as 'the subversion of English liberties having been the very object and final cause of 
the foundation of this English colony'. Also Bentham decried 'Exercising 
legislative power by the ... Governor [and] ... an habitual and positive [Bentham's 
emphasis] exercise of an illegal power of [his] legislation'." From Macarthur's 
actions after the rebellion, when he was appointed Colonial Secretary by Johnston, 
his noble cries for the colonial inhabitants' safety of their property, their liberty and 
their lives', if influenced by Bentham, was rhetorical and had little relation to reality. 
Macarthur's plea, while it was accepted by the six officers on the court, predictably 
was scorned by Bligh who was legally correct in asserting that the officers' refusal 
to serve with Judge-Advocate Atkins, appointed by the Crown, was illegal. Without 
Atkins they were not a legally constituted court, and as a defendant, Macarthur's 
appeal against being judged by Atkins was invalid in law.' 
Indicating their acceptance of Macarthur's arguments, the six officers 
continued to defy Bligh throughout 25 January. On the afternoon of 26 January, 
Bligh wrote to each that 'you are charged with certain crimes, you are ... required to 
appear before me, at Government House, at nine o'clock, to-morrow [27 January 
" HRNSVV, 6, p.423. 
" A Atkinson, 'Jeremy Bentham and the Rum Rebellion', JRAHS, Vol.64, Pt.1, June 1978, p.6, 
for argument that Bentham's political ideas influenced Macarthur 'through violence [to achieve] a 
better social order'. Such an opinion sits ill at ease with the petition of April 1808 to Lieutenant-
Governor Paterson, at Port Dalrymple,which refers to Macarthur as 'a turbulent and troublesome 
Character ... we believe him to be the principal agitator and promoter of the present alarming and 
calamitous state of the Colony', HRA, 1, 6, pp.573-574. 
33 HRA, 4, 1, pp.883-900, quotations p.898. 
34 HRNSW, 6, pp.430-433. Judge-Advocate Atkins' Memorial to Bligh of 26 January. This 
contained the legal arguments accepted by Bligh in charging the officers `with certain crimes'. A 
Charge of Mutiny, pp.36-37, for Judge-Advocate General Sutton, at Johnston's court martial, argued 
for the legality of Bligh's actions in remaining firm that no protest could be lodged or upheld 
against Atkins's presence as judge-advocate at Macarthur's trial. 
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18081. 35 Earlier on 25 January, when the officers first refused to accept Atkins as a 
member of the court, Bligh had sent a message to Johnston, at his Petersham home, 
requesting Johnston call on him. Johnston replied verbally, that as he was injured 
from a fall 'out of his chaise' he could neither write a reply, nor attend Bligh.' At 
the height of the crisis, after Bligh ordered the officers next morning to appear at 
Government House, he dispatched a second request to Johnston for 'your 
assistance'. In this letter, for the first time, the accusation of treason was applied to 
the six officers, and further, that Bligh intended to take legal proceedings against 
them.' This was a charge of utmost gravity which could carry a capital punishment. 
When Johnston asserted in his dispatch that the insurrection had been to 
prevent the government being `dishonour'd by cruelties and merciless executions', 
this, if it meant anything, implied what might have happened if legal action had been 
taken against his six officers. Additionally, in writing Johnston's dispatch, 
Macarthur considered that if Bligh was successful in assembling a criminal court, 
who were prepared to try him, he too would be a victim of Bligh's merciless 
'cruelties'. Johnston explained this at his court martial:- 
the lower class in New South Wales looked up to the few independent and 
respectable inhabitants, as their only protectors against violence, and the 
tyranny with which they were threatened. ... But when it became known 
that of this class of society seven individuals [the six officers and 
Macarthur] were at once to be imprisoned and sentenced to death or 
banishment, every hope seemed at once to vanish, and despair with all its 
attendant feelings seemed to take possession of every mind.'" 
Bligh's alleged misuse of the legal system was the next issue raised by 
Johnston in justifying the insurrection. He alleged Bligh 'acted upon a 
predetermined plan to subvert the laws ... terrify and influence the courts of justice, 
and bereave those persons ... obnoxious to him of their fortunes, their liberty, and 
their lives.' Here Johnston was raising the issue of the former convict George 
" HRNSW, 6, p.433. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.615. Bligh to Viscount Castlereagh of April 1808, being Bligh's account of his 
arrest. This was smuggled out to London (for smuggling, second footnote p.607). 
" HRNSW, 6, p.433. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.148. 
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Crossley, a lawyer, who was transported for perjury and emancipated by Governor 
King." Unfortunately for the legal system in the colony, neither the judge-advocate 
nor any free settlers were qualified lawyers. Therefore, in more complex questions 
of law, Crossley's skills proved useful. Judge-Advocate Atkins admitted in evidence 
'I did apply to Gov. Bligh to allow me to consult him [Crossley] ... being ignorant at 
that time of the forms of law'.' But Crossley did not enjoy the confidence of the 
Corps, and in 1807, the military members of a criminal court, trying the Provost 
Marshall William Gore, had prevented Crossley, who had Bligh's approval, acting 
for Gore.' Deputy Commissary Fitz in a letter to England stated 'The extraordinary 
methods Gov. B. took to extricate him [Gore] from this predicament has been the 
cause of great misunderstanding between the Commanding Officer [Johnston] and 
the Governor'.' So it was not surprising that the military objected to Crossley 
advising both Atkins and Bligh on legal procedures arising from Macarthur's 
postponed trial on 25 January. But despite these objections, during the developing 
crisis, while the six officers maintained their defiance of Bligh, Crossley was 
constantly at Govemment House as legal adviser. For example, he drafted Atkins' 
memorial which led to Bligh warning the officers they would be charged with 
'certain crimes'.' The word specifically used when Bligh wrote in vain, requesting 
Johnston's 'assistance' on the afternoon of 26 January was 'treason'. 
The link between Crossley and the allegation that Bligh 'had a predetermined 
plan to subvert the laws' was explained in Johnston's first dispatch to London. He 
claimed Bligh 'suffered himself to be guided by a wretch like that man, Crossley, to 
persecute and oppress His Majesty's subjects.' Even so, the allegation that Bligh 
39 A Charge of Mutiny, p.166. Atkins in evidence stated Crossley was ernancipated so that he 
could be sued for debt. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.165. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.218. For the parliamentary clause which was cited by the military 
officers to prevent Crossley practising in court (Appendix, No. XL, p.471). The counter view taken 
by Bligh was that as Crossley was now a free man, by emancipation, this clause did not apply. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.305. Fitz to Under-Secretary Chapman of October 1807. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.445. Admitted by Atkins on 27 January, when he was interrogated under oath by 
magistrates appointed by Johnston. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.581. 
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was perverting justice by heeding Crossley's advice was an inadequate claim on 
which to justify insurrection. As pointed out by HV Evatt, the exact opposite 
applied. He noted:- 
the key places on the Criminal Court ... were occupied by the military 
officers. Through the adroit if unscrupulous handling both of the Criminal 
Court and the military Courts Martial, Macarthur, whilst an officer of the 
Corps, had succeeded in discrediting both Hunter and King. He had not 
lost his skilfulness in employing such instruments... the Courts were the 
true forum of the little colony. ... On one hand there was the legal 
dictatorship of the Governor as the sole legislative and executive authority 
... this dictatorship was being exercised by Bligh in favour of the 
agriculturists and poor settlers ... On the other hand, the military officers 
had real control of the criminal judicature' 
It was a hollow claim that Bligh planned to 'subvert the laws'. 
The one specific allegation by Johnston against Bligh that 'several inhabitants 
were dispossessed of their houses [or] ... threatened with the Governor's resentment 
if they presumed to build upon or alienate their own lands' did have a basis of fact. 
In July 1807, Bligh published a Government and General Order giving three 
months notice for removal of private homes within an area originally marked out by 
Governor Phillip as a reserve (Figure 23, note 'Ditch marked out by Governor 
Phillip')." This involved the residences of seven named individuals 'and others, 
within the said limits' probably built with the approval of Governors Hunter and 
King, both of whom served under Phillip and supposedly would have been aware of 
Phillip's planned reservation. Bligh's tough approach is exampled by his 
nominating for destruction the house of the former secretary to Governor King, 
David Mann (Figure 23, Lot 66). This was built immediately behind Government 
House, on a lease given to Mann by Governor King, so that he would be 
conveniently on call.' 
± 5 HV Evan, Rum Rebellion A Study of the Overthrow of Governor Bligh by John Macarthur and 
the New South Wales Corps, Sydney, 1939, pp.121-122. 
" HRNSW, 6, for Figure 23 map facing p.366. From 'Plan of the Town Of Sydney' dated 31 
October 1807. This area marked out by Phillip, now forms part of Sydney Domain. For Bligh's 
order; A Charge of Mutiny, pp.459-460. As compensation, Bligh did offer the dispossessed home 
owners the choice of other unoccupied town blocks. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.366. Mann's evidence. In: D.D.Mann, The Present Picture of New 
South Wales 1811, Sydney, 1979, passim, he did not write on any aspect of the mutiny. 
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Apart from the removal of these houses built in a restricted zone, a few other 
homes, for various reasons were subjected to Bligh's ire. He ordered unauthorised 
additions on a Chief Constable John Redmond's house (Lot 91) be removed 
because 'it would interfere with plans which I had formed for the improvement of the 
town'. Also, there was a statement by Sergeant Major Thomas Whittle attached to 
Johnston's dispatch of April 1808, in which Whittle claimed that for no good reason, 
an enraged Bligh ordered that he 'remove the materials of the house'(Lot 54). To 
save his home, Whittle 'made my house and ground over to my Commanding 
Officer.' 
But the most notorious argument over property rights involved a large 
undeveloped block on lease to Macarthur (Lot 77), which in Bligh's opinion was too 
close to the church.' It was the fate of this particular block which was behind the 
generalised accusation in Johnston's dispatch that land holders would be 'threatened 
with the Governor's resentment if they presumed to build upon or alienate their own 
lands'. From correspondence, it appears that Macarthur did have cause for 
grievance, as it was only on 13 January 1808, after the altercation with the 
government regarding a summons for his trial, that Bligh insisted this property be 
resumed.' After refusing to accept what, in his opinion, were inferior alternative 
sites, Macarthur, in defiance, commenced fencing his block. Thereupon, the fence 
was dismantled by a convict gang. This dispute was still unresolved when the 
insurrection took place on 26 January.' While Bligh showed little subtlety in the 
removal of these homes, with 'several inhabitants... [being] dispossessed of their 
houses', and particularly in his confrontations with Whittle and Macarthur, these acts 
did not justify the overthrow of the governor. Rather they were all part of the 
constant power struggle between Macarthur and many officers of the Corps against 
Bligh. 
" A Charge of Muliny, p.58. Bligh's evidence. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.588. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, pp.463-464, for lease granted by Governor King on 1 January 1806. 
HRNSW, 6, pp.413-414 and 416-417, for correspondence. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, pp.180-185, for Macarthur's evidence. 
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The various accusations made in Johnston's dispatch to justify the 
insurrection, do not appear to present convincing reasons why Johnston, supported 
by his officers, risked their commissions, and possibly their lives, by rebelling. All 
the officers involved faced the likelihood of severe disciplinary punishments under 
the Army Act. Notwithstanding the tensions which existed in the colony before the 
mutiny, the imperative which finally impelled this drastic action, needs further 
analysis. 
The role of Macarthur, as a major player in the insurrection drama, is 
considered first. The attempt to bring him to trial on 25 January, with Atkins in his 
legal role of judge.advocate, was the issue which led the six officers to defy Bligh. 
This defiance was the culmination of the ongoing struggle between successive 
governors, who, at London's directive, were attempting to stamp out trading abuses, 
and those officers who felt threatened by these reforms. These officers, military and 
civil, had been instrumental in forcing Hunter and King from office. They now felt 
threatened by the abrasive and inflexible Bligh and were ready to exploit issues with 
which they could confront him. Two months after the insurrection, Robert Campbell, 
a government supporter, expressed his view on their situation under Bligh, 'in 
General Grose's time ... the Officers [who traded] could live, cultivate their Farms, 
and make money, but [under Bligh] ... they could do nothing but barely exist.' 
Macarthur's deliberate defiance and baiting of Bligh was the catalyst, but not 
necessarily the spark which caused the mutiny.' 
As considered in Chapter 8, Macarthur was a major player in events 
surrounding disputations with Hunter and King. As a former officer of the Corps, 
Macarthur retained links with the officers. He contrived to be popular with the other 
53 HRA, 1, 6, p.553. Campbell's report on spirit traffic of 31 March 1808. 
" Some Early Records of the Macarthurs of Camden, ed. S Macarthur Onslow, Sydney, 1914, 
footnote p.147. A comment, purporting to have been made by Macarthur's son, James, was 'His 
[John Macarthur's] object was to drive the Governor [Hugh] into violent and precipitate measures'. 
As the editor of this book was a descendant of Macarthur's, this statement is unlikely to have been 
deliberately inserted to denigrate John Macarthur. 
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ranks and was prepared to buy this favour by generous distributions of eagerly 
sought spirits. For example in 1801, while under arrest at Parramatta, Macarthur 
supplied spirits as a 'present' to soldiers he formerly commanded at that town.' 
Again in January 1808 before the insurrection, he used Sergeant Major Whittle, the 
senior soldier in the Corps, as his agent in arranging a supply of cheap liquor for the 
other ranks and their families. Gore was to record: 'On the nights of the 25, 26, 
and 27 Jamiary, liquor was liberally, and indeed profusely, served to the soldiers'.' 
Macarthur used his wealth and sharp intellect to dominate and manipulate people. 
His position of influence was reinforced by his links with the military. It was 
inevitable that there would be a clash of interests between Bligh, insisting on tighter 
government controls, and Macarthur, determined to retain his economic freedom of 
action. 
Nevertheless, Macarthur's wealth and influence in the small colonial elite did 
not guarantee that the military would protect him against the processes of the law. 
On the contrary, in December 1807, Johnston, and his senior captain, Edward Abbott, 
were two of the four magistrates who found `Mr. Macarthur stands committed for a 
Criminal Court', which he subsequently faced on 25 January 1808." That being so, 
why did the six officers ordered to try Macarthur, defy Bligh in face of their 
temporary commanding officer's committal decision?' That Johnston led the coup, 
was a reversal of his own legal position as one of the Bench of Magistrates, who 
ordered Macarthur for trial. Additionally, Abbott's finding against Macarthur, also 
casts doubt on later accusations that he was part of a conspiracy which planned 
Bligh's downfall before the trial of 25 January 1808. 
At Macarthur's trial, Captain Kemp was the senior of the six officers, and as 
" see above, Chapter 8, p.202. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p371. Admitted by Whittle under cross-examination. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.560. 
58 HRNSW, 6, p.477. Proceedings of Bench of Magistrates of 17th December 1807. The other 
magistrates were Richard Atkins and John Palmer. 
At this time Paterson was lieutenant governor at Port Dalrymple, Van Diemen's Land, and 
Foveaux was on sick leave in England. 
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such, it was he who refused to swear Atkins in as judge-advocate. His stated reason 
for this refusal was that the court had listened to Macarthur's appeal and considered 
that 'the prisoner's protest[s] are good and lawful objections to Richard Atkins, 
Esq., sitting on his vie.' What is not clear, and can not be established, is the 
motivation for Kemp's actions. Was he; defending the honour of a former officer; 
acting from conviction of justice due to Atkins's past disputations with Macarthur; 
using Macarthur's trial to attack Bligh or Crossley; or a combination of these and 
other motives? Presumably, Kemp acted with the foreknowledge of his five brother 
officers. The record of proceedings of 25 January does not indicate any division of 
opinion amongst the six officers in deciding that Macarthur could present his 
objection against Atkins, and then in agreeing the protest was 'good and lawful'. 
Lieutenant Minchin, a member of the court, later claimed the members 'were 
unanimous' in refusing to accept Atkins on the court." In his memorial to Bligh of 
26 January, Atkins pointed to the mess dinner of 24 January, attended by all the 
officers in Sydney and partisans of Macarthur, including his son Edward, as an 
opportunity for the six officers to plot their tactics of obstruction. It was as he 
returned home from this mess dinner that Johnston was injured when his gig 
overturned.' 
With Johnston injured and home at Petersham, and Captain Abbott on duty at 
Panumatta, Kemp, as senior officer in Sydney, and also on the court, had sole 
responsibility for guiding the other five army officers in defiance of Bligh's 
demands. Doubtless Macarthur, prior to his arrest at 9am on 26 January, had 
exhorted the "court" of six officers to stand firm against Bligh, and also agitated 
amongst his contacts in the town, including the soldiers, to support his claim for the 
replacement of Atkins. But notwithstanding any involvement of Macarthur, it was 
" HRNSW, 6, p.422. Proceeding of court on 25 January 1808. Kemp made the Siuile claim in 
evidence at Johnston's court martial, A Charge of Mutiny, p.219. 
" A Charge of Mutiny p.240. Minchin's evidence. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.432, and footnote, regarding Edward, not his father John, attending. At 
Johnston's court martial, officers denied that there they had had conversations concerning 
Macanhur's trial next day. 
63 A Charge of Mutiny, p.149, for Johnston's accident. 
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Kemp (later described by Lieutenant-Governor Sore!! as 'well known ... for 
turbulence and Malevolence ... [sparing] none in ... slander') who must bear the 
responsibility for the exchange of correspondence initiated with Bligh at 11.25am on 
25 January. By the afternoon of 26 January, this exchange had resulted in a 
stalemate, with the illegally constituted "court" recording they would bring Provost 
Marshal Gore 'to justice' for his 'false and ill founded' arrest of Macarthur. Bligh 
now had virtually no alternative but to charge the six officers. It was unthinkable that 
his authority could be publicly disputed by Kemp and five subalterns. Possibly 
Macarthur and many officers underestimated Bligh's determination not to buckle 
under to pressure, as in the past they had been successful in manipulating Governors 
Hunter and King; for example, in February 1803, where at Kemp's court martial, 
Johnston successfully forced King to replace Surgeon Harris as judge-advocate.' A 
tactic repeated, with far different results, at Macarthur's trial in January 1808. 
Up to 4pm on 26 January, when the above events were unfolding, Johnston 
avoided being embroiled in the crisis. Nevertheless, in less than three hours, he had 
placed himself outside the law by leading an armed rebellion. This was a dramatic 
deviation for a man who had apparently followed the path of duty since he was first 
commissioned at the age of twelve. Bligh said in his concluding remarks at 
Johnston's court martial that he was 'not anxious to fix upon Col. Johnston the 
charge of corruption, or lawless ambition'. But, he continued, 'what share he had in 
the formation of the plot I know nor.' Therefore even at the end of thirteen days' 
evidence and cross-examination, Johnston's degree of complicity in planning the 
rebellion, as opposed to well publicised details of what he said and did, remained 
unclear. Only supposition can offer a probable explanation of the motives which 
actuated Johnston. 
" HRA, 3, 2, p.330. Sore11 to Macquarie of June 1818. By this time Kemp was out of the army. 
Also in Hobart Town, a man (George Guest), in a property dispute with Kemp, 'complained much 
of the violence and intemperance of Mr. Kemp' (p.361, Sorell to Macquarie of November 1818). 
" See above, Chapter 8, pp.204-205. 
66 A Charge of Mutiny, p.142. Johnston was almost 44 years old in 1808, being born in March, 
1764, ADB, 2, p.20. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.406. This statement by Bligh was read to the court by the judge-
advocate. 
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To help understand Johnston's motives, it is necessary to examine his 
character as revealed by his earlier actions and what others said about him. While he 
conscientiously performed his duty in the public domain, he led a very private and 
peaceful domestic life. Johnston's professionalism as a soldier was evidenced by 
his actions as the commander who stamped out the Castle Hill rebellion in 1804. 
During this operation, he exhibited personal bravery in twice negotiating within the 
rebels' pistol range, quickness of decision in capturing the two rebel leaders (but see 
adverse comments below), and determination in pressing on hard with tired troops 
against a vastly superior number of rebels.' 
As well as performing his military duties professionally, Johnston was 
respected by his men. This was illustrated during Philip's governorship, when the 
marines who volunteered to join the New South Wales Corps, would only do so 'on 
condition of their serving with the officer [Johnston] under whose command they 
had been left when the rest of the detachment was embarked for England'.' After 
the 1808 mutiny, in a letter published in which he criticised Johnston, the botanist, 
George Caley, also gave him credit:- 
I always understood you to be a well-disposed, good-natured man - a 
cheerful companion, and an idol of the soldiers and the lower order of 
society' 
Nevertheless, Johnston had exhibited failings during his colonial service. In 
1800, Governor King ordered him into arrest for illegally selling liquor and he was 
returned to England for disciplinary action, which for lack of colonial witnesses, was 
aborted.' His professional conduct, under a truce, at Vinegar (Rouse) Hill, was of a 
dubious nature, as was his failure to prevent excessive killing of rebels after the main 
" see above, Chapter 9, pp.235-236 and footnotes 105 - 106. 
" See above, Chapter 5, p.104 and footnote 24. Quotation from HRA, 1, 1, p.392. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.691. Open letter of 7 July 1808. Before and after this praise, alley is scathing 
in his criticism of Johnston. For example, Johnston was 'void of prudence, and by his general 
behaviour I must reckon him only a bravado', p.693. Caley diligently collected botanical specimens 
on behalf of Banks, but was of an irascible nature as indicated in Bank's letter to him of August 
1808 (HRNSW,6, pp.704-705). 
HRA, 1, 3, pp.269-272. Hobart to King of August 1801, and attachments. 
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action. Again, Johnston obviously lied at his court martial in 1811, which was 
inconsistent with his honour as an officer.' 
The evidence at Johnston's court martial indicated he and Macarthur were not 
close friends or trading partners. Johnston's principal witnesses for the defence, 
Macarthur, Kemp and Minchin all agreed on this point in their testimony. Typical 
was Kemp's comment that 'I do not know an officer who was in the habits of 
intimacy with him [Macarthur]; Col. Johnston was not so'. 73 Such a uniformity of 
evidence, especially by Kemp, who as senior officer and spokesman strongly 
promoted Macarthur's interests at the court hearing on 25 January, raises a 
suspicion as to its veracity. It was certainly in Johnston's interests to distance 
himself from Macarthur. Nevertheless, in primary sources covering the New South 
Wales Corps' service in the colony, there is no indication of Johnston and 
Macarthur cooperating in any clique. As already noted, Johnston was one of the 
four magistrates who, on 17 December 1807, committed Macarthur for trial, 
indicating he was prepared to impartially dispense justice irrespective of any past or 
present association with Macarthur. This judicial impartiality was confirmed by a 
prosecution witness at Johnston's court martial, merchant Robert Campbell, who had 
no cause to feel warmth for Johnston after the rebellion.' In evidence, Campbell 
agreed that 'Col. Johnston acted with perfect impartiality in Mr. M'Arthur's affair 
on the 16th and 17th December'.' Apparently, had Macarthur's trial gone ahead on 
25 January 1808 with due legal process, Johnston would not have rebelled on 26 
January. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.151. Lying for example, in evidence, that on 26th January 1808, he 
`was driven to town by aid of my family' to cloak the fact that Minchin drove him to the barracks. 
Again, (p.154), Johnston stated that if Bligh had not hidden from the four officers sent to arrest him, 
Johnston could have organised 'a conference or arrangement with Gov. Bligh' - an outright lie as at 
that time Johnston was leading the Corps marching on Government House. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.221. Macarthur said he was on 'merely distant terms of civility 'with 
Johnston, p.197. For a similar comment by Minchin, p.245. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.453. Government and General Order of 27 January 1808, cancelled the civil 
appointments of Bligh supporters, including Campbell as a magistrate and 'the office of treasurer to 
public funds, Naval Officer, and Collector of Taxes', all lucrative positions. As Naval Officer, 
Campbell was responsible for approving or delaying the inwards clearances of his rivals cargoes, a 
useful commercial advantage in a small market. 
75 A Charge of Mutiny, p.86. 
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Domestically, Johnston maintained a consistent relationship with a 
transported convict, Esther Abrahams, alias Julian. She bore him seven children 
before they married in 1814. It was a happy thirty-five year union, and together they 
developed their home "Annandale", into a substantial property.' Probably because 
of Esther's convict origins, Johnston is not mentioned in primary sources as being 
part of the social scene which revolved around Government House. In some ways 
this could have been to Johnston's advantage as he was less involved in the bickering 
as factions boycotted functions held there.' He guarded his privacy. In reply to the 
question 'Were his [Johnston's] habits of life very retired?', witness for the 
prosecution Campbell replied 'they were; he lived in the country, four miles ... from 
Sydney.'" There appears to be no evidence to indicate any particular social links 
between the Macarthur family and Johnston. 
As there were no obvious links of obligation, which indebted Johnston to 
Macarthur, it is strange that Johnston's first act of insubordination against Bligh's 
government was to illegally order Macarthur's release from gaol on the afternoon of 
26 January.' There is no record of the time of this release, and other associated 
events on the late afternoon of 26 January. But a reconstruction based on a few 
known times, aids an understanding of the rapidly developing power crisis. 
The first key timing was that Minchin, as a member of the six officer "court" 
was in Sydney until they adjourned at 3pm on 26 January. Next, Harris visited 
Johnston at Petersham at 4pm, and according to Johnston's dispatch to London, 
Harris advised him 'an ... insurrection was to be feared'. Bligh's mounted trooper 
arrived at Johnston's home shortly after. He delivered Bligh's second letter 
" D Chapman, 1788 The People of the First Fleet, North Ryde, 1981, pp.23-25, for Abrahams, 
who also had another daughter `Roseanna' while in Newgate Gaol. This child was accepted as a part 
of Johnston's family. ADB, 2, p.21, for number of Johnston's children and 'thirty-five' years. 
" See above, Chapter 8, passim. 
78 A Charge of Mutiny, p. 86. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.433. 
80 HRNSW, 6, p.578. Johnston to Castlereagh of April 1808. 
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accusing six of Johnston's officers of treason, and that they were to be summoned 
'before me, and all the magistrates'.' This letter, in the wake of Harris's account of 
events in Sydney, would have confirmed Johnston's concern over the crisis. Also at 
an indeterminate time, possibly about 4pm, Adjutant Minchin reported to Johnston, 
presumably to advise him of the plight of the six officers including himself. As 
Minchin knew a grave charge (he could have guessed by then it would be treason) 
was pending against him, the intelligence he passed to Johnston could hardly have 
been unbiased. The suspicious ambiguity of the various statements as to whether 
Minchin even saw Johnston before he arrived in the barracks late in the afternoon, 
suggests that he did, and probably influenced Johnston's decision, playing a 
significant role in precipitating the rebellion. 	Atkinson also draws attention to 'the 
central role played by Lieutenant William Minchin, adjutant of the Corps, and 
Thomas Whittle, regimental sergeant-major'. A role which Minchin as the 
sanctimonious but ineffectual commander of the guard aboard Lady Shore, had 
played in 1797.'3 Abbott stated Minchin was sent to England with Johnston's 
dispatches, because 'many are of the same opinion ... [that Minchin is] obnoxious', 
while Macarthur wrote that `Minchin [was] sent [Macarthur's emphasis] home with 
the Despatches [sic] not from any confidence placed in him'." 
When Minchin first gave evidence at Johnston's court martial, he was led by 
questions from Johnston. In reply to a question as to where he was when Johnston 
'was requested' to arrest Bligh, he replied 'At his barrack'.' There was no 
suggestion then, or in his answer to a following question, that Minchin was directly 
involved in any discussions prior to Bligh's arrest. Later, under cross-examination 
by the court, in reply to a question 'Did you go to Col. Johnston's house ... on the 
26th of January?', Minchin replied:- 
No ... I dined at Dr. Harris's house, which is about a mile from the town, 
and during dinner, or immediately after, Col. Johnston was driven there by 
" HRNSW, 6, p.433 for wording of Bligh's letter. 
" A Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens', The Push from the Bush, No.25, October 1987, p.73. 
" See above, Chapter 7, passim. 
84 MB Eldershaw, The Life and Times of Captain John Piper, Sydney, 1973, pp.80 and 81. 
85 A Charge of Mutiny, p.242. 
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one of his servants ... he asked me if I would drive him into town; I did 
drive him from Mr. Harris's house.' 
A strange dinner, as Minchin left the court when it adjourned at 3pm, and went to 
"dine" with his host, Harris, who almost simultaneously, was a further three miles 
out of town calling on Johnston.' The admission under cross-examination, that he 
had driven Johnston on the final mile from Harris's home into town, indicates he 
probably drove Johnston all the way. Ambiguous evidence by Chief Constable 
Francis Oakes does not clarify this assumption, he said he saw Johnston 'driven by 
Adj. Minchin from towards his [Johnston's] country seat to the military barracks'.' 
Quite incredibly, as Johnston or his counsel would have heard Oakes' evidence on 
the fourth sitting day, on the seventh day, Johnston told a blatant lie in sworn 
evidence that he 'was driven to town by aid of my family'.' 
Shortly after 4pm on 26 January 1808, Johnston also lied to Bligh, when he 
told Bligh's messenger to advise the governor that Johnston 'was so ill as to be 
unable to write, but that he would get a person to write an answer in the evening 
p3ligh's emphasis]'.' This deception implies Johnston had an intent to counter 
Bligh's "threat" to bring his six officers before the magistrates on 27 January, by 
methods other than negotiation. He could have been discussing this with Harris and 
Minchin when Bligh's messenger called. 
As Johnston was still at his home shortly after 4pm, the earliest he could have 
reached the barracks would have been about 4.30pm. There he claimed he 'saw all 
the civil and military officers collected, and most responsible inhabitants',' - a 
'wretched assembly of four or five persons' as counter claimed by Bligh. n This 
group must have discussed their planning options for a short period before Johnston 
" A Charge of Mutiny, pp.267-268. 
87 HRNSW, 6, p.430 for court adjourning. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.93. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.151. 
90 HRNSW, 6, p.616. Bligh to Castlereagh of 30 April 1808. 
9 ' HRNSW, 6, p.579. From Johnston's first dispatch to London. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.401. Apart from the military officers, Bligh, from evidence, listed the 
following civilians as being present; Blaxcell, Bayly, Lord and D'Arcy Wentworth. 
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took the irrevocable step to defy Bligh. With no legal claim, or excuse under law, 
Johnston assumed the title of lieutenant-governor.' This enabled him to order the 
release of Macarthur from gaol, after which a petition was drawn up requesting that 
Johnston arrest Bligh. This happened at about 5.30pm or soon after as it was 'A 
little after six o'clock' that Provost Marshal Gore was informed of Macarthur's 
release and, with the jailer, went to inform Bligh.' 
By the time Gore had made his report and was departing from Government 
House, he saw Captain Kemp and Lieutenants Minchin, Lawson and Draffen 
approaching. Supported by the Main, or Governors Guard,' their task was to arrest 
Bligh. Gore was arrested as he was departing and was 'proceeding in the custody of 
the two soldiers ... when about thirty yards outside the gate [of Government House] I 
passed the battalion ... advancing ...with colours flying and drums beating ... Major 
Johnston was at their head'?" According to Minchin, the Corps under Johnston's 
command, arrived at Government House at 'about half-past six o'clock'.' For the 
Corps of some 300 soldiers to be paraded and formed up prior to marching to 
Government House, some 700 yards away, it would presuppose that the troops were 
called onto parade at about 6pm. 99 So from the above approximate timings, events 
unfolded as follows; between 4.30 and 5pm (or a little after), Johnston consulted at 
" Paterson held the formal commission for this appointment. At the time of the rebellion he was 
stationed at Port Dalrymple, Van Diemen's Land, with the dual appointments of lieutenant-governor 
of New South Wales and of this new settlement. The senior military officer in the colony could 
only assume the office of lieutenant-governor in the absence of the governor and his deputy. For 
example, Paterson first assumed the office when Major Francis Grose, the commissioned lieutenant-
governor, decided to return to England before Phillip's replacement, Hunter, arrived. Because Bligh 
was exercising his civil appointments within New South Wales, it was illegal for Johnston to act as 
lieutenant-governor. HRNSW, 6, footnote p.584, discounts the suggestion that Johnston would 
have been unaware that Paterson held a commission as lieutenant-governor of the colony, a point 
Johnston apparently used to remain "lieutenant-governor", by not pressing Paterson to return to 
Sydney Town and therefore resume his civic title. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.579, for Johnston's account of events that afternoon, including Macarthur's 
release. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.557. 
96 A Charge of Mutiny, p.273. The guard consisted of a subaltern and twenty-six other ranks 
including two sergeants. 
" HRNSW, 6, pp.557-558 for Gore's account. Draffen elsewhere spelt `Draffin'. 
" A Charge of Mutiny, p.249. 
99 A Charge of Mutiny, p.272, for 'About 300 [soldiers] at head-quarters' in January 1808. 
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the barracks, assumed the title of lieutenant-governor and then had prepared and 
signed a release document for Macarthur.' From approximately 5.30 to 6pm, with 
Macarthur present, the proposal to arrest Bligh, was presumably discussed, a petition 
prepared for that arrest, a letter also prepared to be handed to Bligh by the four 
officers detailed to arrest him, and the troops called onto parade' - a busy half hour. 
It is difficult to determine whether these timings indicate that the arrest of 
Bligh resulted from either a plot hatched over some days - for example at the 
regimental dinner on 24 January, or from a sudden decision made sometime on 26 
January. The possibility of the latter was posed by a question to Minchin at 
Johnston's court martial; 
[Question] Then did you not say to him [Lieutenant Laycock, another of the 
six officers ] 'If you are afraid, I am not; we will find a way to cool the 
Governor, by arresting him before he arrests us?' 
This accusation was denied by Minchin, who disingenuously claimed he knew 
nothing of the proposed arrest 'until the very moment it took place. '° 
But, historical events do not occur in isolation. Bligh's arrest formed a 
continuum with the history of the Corps' opposition to the succession of naval 
governors after Phillip, and then particular issues and events involving Bligh, the 
officers, soldiers and Macarthur. These built up to a climate in which the major 
preoccupation of the military officers, and some civilians, was to destroy Bligh's 
credibility and have him, like King, recalled to England. Similarly, Bligh did not 
disguise his poor opinion of the Corps. This was evidenced by the pre-mutiny letter 
of complaint, of October 1807, which Johnston wrote to the Commander-in-Chief, 
quoting examples of Bligh's inappropriate behaviour.' Yet, there is a vast difference 
between an overt act of mutiny and covert conspiracy intended to cause Bligh's 
eventual downfall - or his humiliation, as would have been the case had Bligh backed 
down to Kemp's insistent demand that Judge-Advocate Atkins be replaced in the six 
1" HRNSW, 6, p.433. Johnston to 'Keeper of His Majesty's Gaol at Sydney'. 
101 HRNSW, 6, p.434, for both the petition and letter of arrest to be handed to Bligh. 
1 " A Charge of Mutiny, pp.268-269. 
103 HRNSW, 6, pp.652-655. 
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officers' "court". 
Prior to the opening of Macarthur's trial on 25 January 1808, there had been 
loose talk against Bligh, including how he could be brought down and replaced,' 
but apart from one comment in a letter by Captain Abbott,' there is no evidence of 
discussion amongst the officers that the Corps should resort to mutiny. Such a 
concept, to the military of any time, is only considered as a last resort. However, in 
Atkinson's 'William Bligh's Chickens', pretrial statements from three other rank 
potential witnesses for the prosecution for Johnston's court martial, could be 
construed as indicating the mutiny was preplaimed. Officer of the guard, Lieutenant 
Bell on the afternoon of 26th January, told guard ex-Sergeant Hall 'he would see 
something the matter with the Governor before night'. Likewise, Sergeant Able 
stated in note 1; that he 'kept watch over McArthers [sic] House on the 25th day of 
Jany' and in note 2; 'Knew of the Conspiracy and Escape of McArther.' Again, ex-
Sergeant Champion reported in note 1; that on 26 January, he 'saw Abbots [sic] ... at 
Parramatta ... with several of Mcarthers [sic] Family, and heard Abbot say he would 
drink another Glass of Wine to its success'. In note 2, Champion said he 'Was 
ordered to post some out Picquets that night and where'.' As commander of the 
detachment at Parramatta, Abbott published the following proclamation;- 
Major Johnston having arrested His Excellency Governor Bligh and having 
taken upon himself the charge of the Government, no orders are to be obeyed, 
1 " HRNSW, 6, p.344. Surgeon Harris to Mrs King, in England, of October 1807, wrote 
'Caligula himself never reigned with more despotic sway than he [Bligh] does'. From two letters 
she wrote, Mrs Bligh, in England, was conscious of moves against her husband; pp.461-462. In the 
letter published on p.462 she refers to prejudicial naval influences at work in Portsmouth and 
London. A Atkinson, The British Whigs and the Ruin Rebellion, JRAHS, Vol. 66, P1.2, 
September 1980, pp.74-76 gives details of anti-Bligh sentiment in the navy prior to the January 
1808 insurrection. 
1" HRNSW, 6, pp.831-832. Abbott to ex-Governor King of 13 February 1808. He wrote `(some 
days before it had been resolved to arrest him [Bligh]) on the 27th'. This statement can not be 
reconciled with all others made after the mutiny, on which this writer bases his argument. It 
remains a matter of opinion whether weight should be given to Abbott's statement. Whilst 
stationed at Parramatta, Abbott would be aware of the strained situation in Sydney Town during late 
January 1808. It is speculated that he may have been involved in loose talk of a wishful nature, 
such as generated by the mess dinner on 24 January. Alternatively, he could have been involved in 
discussions as to what may happen if Macarthur was convicted at his trial. Abbott does not appear 
to have been involved in serious plotting for a prearranged coup. 
106 A Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens', pp.77, 85 and 88 respectively. 
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unless they come from him 
By order of Major Johnston (signed by Abbott) 
Martial Law is proclaimed.' 
From this it would appear that Abbott, as the next senior officer in Sydney after 
Johnston, had no compunction in immediately and openly supporting the rebel 
cause. But this does not indicate whether or not there was a plot which existed 
before or at the time of the mess dinner 011 24 January 1808 and whether Abbott was 
privy to it.. 
Regarding the question of whether artillery pieces played any part in the 
insurrection, several statements make it clear that guns at the barracks were loaded 
and trained on Government House after the decision to mutiny was taken. But 
Private Gillard's sworn evidence in court, replying to a question regarding 'the guns 
before the Government House?', was that 'the elevating screws were taken off, and 
the guns pointed to Government House, a few days before [the mutiny] ... by the 
order of Mr. Minchin'." A statement that apparently proved beyond doubt, the 
mutiny was preplanned. As these statements were taken in 1811, they must be 
treated with some reserve as they concern events which had occurred three years 
before. Lapses in memory due to this time delay, and probable tampering with 
witnesses, are evident in differences between individuals' pretrial statements and 
evidence they later gave on oath. This is illustrated by both ex-Sergeant Hall's and 
Private Davis' comments on whether orders were given to the guard to load their 
muskets.' Davis changed his evidence on this point between his pretrial and court 
martial statements. 
Lieutenant Bell's reported comment to ex-Sergeant Hall could represent the 
Corps' officers view as the climax neared its inevitable finale, but this hardly 
indicated a long term plan to mutiny. The 'Conspiracy and Escape' in Able's 
memory could well relate to the events of 25 January, especially Macarthur's attack 
1 " Banks Papers, Mitchell Library (ML), reel FM4-1753, A85, page number obscured or missing. 
'o 	Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens' p.87. 
i" A Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens' pp.77 and 93 respectively. 
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on Atkins and possible stratagems planned to release Macarthur on 26 January, of 
which Able may have been aware. As it was on 26 January that Sergeant Champion 
heard Abbott expressing his hopes for 'success' to a member of the Macarthur 
family, he was probably then referred to the events of 25 January and hoping for 
success for the now imprisoned John Macarthur, in his detemunation to stand up to, 
and humiliate Bligh. Against that supposition, Abbott's orders to Champion for 
positioning specifically located picquets on the night of 26 January, would appear to 
confirm that Abbott was making preparations as part of a planned conspiracy to 
mutiny. This gives added authenticity to his letter that 'some days before it had been 
resolved to arrest' Bligh. However, it is equally likely that late in the afternoon, 
Abbott received a warning from Sydney that mutiny had been decided upon, which 
caused him to issue special orders to Champion about that night's picquets. 
Regarding the two guns at Government House, which Bligh asserted in 
evidence at Johnston's court martial, 'the screws were taken out of the breeches ... 
and taken away without ... [Bligh's] knowledge'; the following extract from the 
cross examination of Bligh at Johnston's court martial is considered pertinent:- 
Was not one of those guns ... a small brass ship six -pounder, which never 
had an elevating screw; and did not Lieut. Minchin remove the screw of the 
other gun in your presence, three months before, in consequence of some 
defects in the working of the gun? - I really cannot recollect that; but when I 
arrived all the guns were in extreme disorder, and I desired Lieut. Minchin 
... to get one pair put in repair'." ° 
It is apparent from this evidence that Bligh was using the alleged prior removal of the 
guns' screws to prove that the mutiny was the result of a preplanned plot But, by 
his own admission, conspiratorial removal of these was highly unlikely. 
A statement by Private Colonan, a sentry at the barracks on the 26 January, 
refutes the conspiracy theory. He claims he heard a member of the "court", 
Lieutenant Laycock, expressing concern that arresting Bligh 'was mutiny and 
thought it better to go and hear what he wanted' on the morning of 27 January. To 
which Minchin replied 'be damnd if [he] would not go to Major Johnston and have 
H° A Charge of Mutiny, p.72. 
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him [Bligh] arrested first, which was applauded by the rest particularly Lawson'." 
From a consideration of the primary sources, the evidence suggests that the mutiny 
was not planned some days before. Nevertheless, the catalyst for the mutiny was 
clearly the consequence of the six officers accepting Macarthur's plea against 
Atkins, and their subsequent refusal to bend to Bligh's instructions to accept Atkins 
as judge-advocate. This piece of deliberate mischief intended to embarrass Bligh, 
could well have been planned at the mess dinner on 24 January or earlier. But while 
this catalyst set the scene, it is unlikely the instigators intended to precipitate a 
mutiny. 
Had Johnston not been injured, or had he been inclined to respond to the 
governor's first letter of 5.30pm, 25 January, to 'see him [Bligh] without delay', 
some compromise in the deepening crisis may have been reached."' It is noteworthy 
from the correspondence, that up to this time, Bligh was still attempting to negotiate 
an end to the defiance from the six officer "court". Next morning, with Macarthur 
arrested, and the first letters that day by the six officers to Bligh, adopting a more 
defiant tone, the hope of compromise was gone, and Bligh chose not to reply to their 
letters.' Instead, Atkins and Crossley commenced work on a Memorial concerning 
the six officers. This concluded by stating that the named officers' actions 'amount 
to a usurpation of His Majesty's Government, and tend to incite or create rebellion 
or other outrageous treason in the people of this territory'." 4 The crisis was coming 
to a head with this legal advice that the six had committed a capital crime. It only 
remained for this accusation to be aired outside Government House for the 
subsequent explosive situation to develop. 
Sometime about mid-afternoon on the 26 January, Bligh circularised the six 
officers:- 
you are charged with  certain crimes, you are therefore hereby required to 
A Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens', p.80. 
1 " HRNSW, 6, p.427, for letter and marginal note added by Bligh, after receiving Johnston's verbal 
refusal. 
1 " HRNSW, 6, pp.428-429. 
" 4 HRNSW, 6, pp.430-433. 
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appear before me, at Government House, at nine o'clock to-morrow 
morning, to answer in the premises.' 
In other words they were not called to discuss the matter with Bligh, but were to face 
a board of magistrates to answer civil, not military charges, yet to be specified.' 
This utilisation of civil magistrates by Bligh, was a continuation of Hunter and 
King's concept, that the appointment of civilians to the bench, would, as described by 
Hunter, help break the power of the military 'over civil concerns in the colony."' 
For Bligh, this would have avoided the farce of the remaining Corps officers being 
insufficient to form a general court martial on the six officers,' who would have 
been aware that one of the charges against them could be treason.' Knowledge of 
such a charge spreading amongst the soldiers, whose loyalty would be towards their 
officers rather than to an abusive Royal Navy governor, would have created turmoil. 
Macarthur's popularity with the soldiers propped up by his sale to them of cheap 
liquor, was no doubt a factor in their support for Macarthur against Bligh. Probably, 
this was the situation as explained to Johnston by Surgeon Harris at Johnston's 
home at 4pm on 26 January 1808. Then, as already noted, Johnston claimed Harris 
advised him 'that an insurrection of the inhabitants was to be feared'.' 2° 
From evidence, it was not an insurrection of the civilian inhabitants that was 
imminent, but rather the six officers and Macarthur's clique were inflaming the other 
four officers stationed at Sydney, and the troops, to take drastic and direct action - 
mutiny. For example, Captain Abbott, writing in February 1808 to ex-Governor 
King, supported this view, claiming 'Had the Governor not been put under an arrest 
"5 HRNSW, 6, p.433. 
116 HRNSW, 6, pp.428 and 429. Civil magistrates present at Government House were `Rich'd 
Atkins Thos. Arndell Robt. Campbell [and] Jno. Palmer'. 
" 7 See above, Chapter 8, pp.190-191 and footnote 15. 
118 Thirteen officers being required. 
If criminal charges of treason had been preferred on 27 January, presumably with the criminal 
court made up of officers, and with their lack of impartiality and numbers, Bligh would probably 
have referred the case to London. Meanwhile the six officers would have had to have been placed in 
some form of arrest. 
120 HRNSW, 6, p.578. 
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there would have been a mutiny'. 121 Again, at Johnston's court martial, the following 
exchange took place:- 
[Question to Atkins, examined as a defence witness] If six out of the ten 
officers had been arrested and sent to prison at that time, do you think that 
would have induced the soldiers to join in an insurrection? [Answer] - I do 
think that under those circumstances they would.' 
A civilian witness, George Suttor, a Bligh supporter, made clear civilians were not 
involved :- 
[Question] Would there have been any danger of tumult or insurrection, at 
the end of January 1808, if the military had remained firm to the Governor? 
[Answer] -None, I apprehend; I never saw the colony more tranquil.' 
These comments support Surgeon Harris' advice to Johnston that grave military (not 
civil) disturbances would rapidly develop if Bligh took disciplinary action against the 
six officers. Johnston thus faced a dilemma; was he prepared to accept the 
possibility of six of his officers being gaoled, and all the ramifications that could 
flow from that situation, or should he oppose Bligh, and if so how? 
Shortly after Harris, and probably Minchin, arrived at Petersham, Bligh's 
dragoon arrived with another letter. This included the ominous statement that:- 
the Judge-Advocate having laid a memorial before me against six of your 
officers for practices which he conceives treasonable, I am under the 
necessity of summoning them before me, and all the magistrates have 
directions to attend at nine o'clock to-morrow morning.' 
This confirmed all the fears expressed by Harris. Because of Johnston's 
intransigence in refusing to go to Government House (he had not spoken to Bligh 
since the start of the crisis), he would not have known what disciplinary options 
Bligh may have considered against the six officers. Fearing the worst, Johnston may 
have believed, possibly correctly, that his six officers would be gaoled on the 27 
January. 
1 " HRNSW, 6, p.834. Abbott mentions 'Irish Croppies [convicts]' whose employment by Gore 
'highly incensed' the soldiers. From Phillip's government onwards, little love was lost between the 
soldiers and constables. 
1 " A Charge of Mutiny, p.175. For a similar type statement by Minchin, pp.241-242. 
1 " A Charge of Mutiny, p.119. 
124 HRNSW, 6, p.433. 
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Conceivably this was the moment of decision for Johnston. He was faced 
with the prospect of elements of his unit breaking out into open defiance of Bligh, 
and a possibility of a small pro-Bligh clique causing dissension within the Corps.' 
Should he wish, Bligh had the option of ordering the crew of HMS Porpoise to be 
landed to help preserve the King's peace, using an internal security situation to 
justify his actions.' Alternatively, if Bligh was forced to flee, both the military and 
Bligh knew that outside Sydney Town there was support for the governor 
particularly amongst the Hawkesbury settlers.' Less than a year previously, in 
February 1807, a testimonial to Bligh, signed by the impressive number of 546 
settlers in that area, stated:- 
under a just, equitable, and gracious Government [by Bligh], which we, 
impress with the strongest desire to support with our Lives, as [is] also a 
bounden duty in all loyal Subjects, have willingly, accorded to Your 
Excellency's Order, enrolled our names for the Defence of the Country, in 
which we will readily participate at all times of need' 
This willingness by many settlers to participate in a prospective Loyal Association 
militia within the Hawkesbury region, and to be prepared to take up arms to defend 
their homes and values against rebellious elements, (admittedly seen at the time as 
being 'those disaffected [Irish] People') was a sentiment upon which the locally 
popular Bligh would certainly have attempted to capitalise. Whilst an article by BH 
Fletcher casts doubt on the degree of support Bligh may, or may not, have had from 
settlers in the Hawkesbury, he nevertheless concludes the work by stating 'a balance 
of probability ... seems weighted in favour ... that there was strong support for Bligh 
at the Hawkesbury.'" Therefore, the Corps was presented with the prospect of a 
civil disturbance, even an armed clash, if Bligh escaped into that area - an unwelcome 
prospect. Some Hawkesbury settlers' views after the coup were definitely pro-Bligh, 
1 " A Atkinson, 'William Bligh's Chickens', passim. Statements by twelve other ranks (excluding 
Able's somewhat neutral statement), expressed disapproval of Bligh's arrest at the time of the 
mutiny or later. 
126 HRNSW, 6, pp.818-819. Porpoise entered Port Jackson at some time prior to 14 January 1808 
and, apart from voyages to Norfolk Island and Van Diemen's Land, remained based in Sydney. 
1 " HRA, 1, 6, pp.577-579. Two testimonials to Bligh by Hawkesbury settlers of January and 
February 1807. They appreciated Bligh's concern at the time of the 1806 Hawkesbury flood and his 
later efforts to oppose the monopolists. 
1 " HRA, I, 6, p.578. 
1 " BH Fletcher, 'The Hawkesbury Settlers and the Rum Rebellion', JRAHS, Vol.54, Pt.3, 
September 1968, p.234. 
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as evidenced by their address of strong protest, sent to Paterson at Port Dalrymple, in 
May 18082' 
Limited mutiny short of deposing Bligh, military riots, or other exhibitions of 
insubordination by part of the Corps would not have caused a change of heart within 
Bligh's government, nor have toppled it. In such circumstances, should Bligh have 
taken action against discontented military elements, his known aversion to soldiers 
would have inflamed the situation and provided an opportunity for dissatisfied 
convict groups, such as the Irish, to rise. Such strands of thought were conceivably 
in Johnston's mind, when at his court martial, he described his immediate impression 
when the Corps arrived at Government House:- 
I learnt [from the officer he had sent ahead to demand Bligh's resignation] 
... that the Governor had concealed himself. This intelligence was truly 
alarming, for I had everything to fear from the agitation it was likely to 
produce.' 
Johnston was correct to be concerned when Bligh was not immediately 
detained. Bligh confirmed this in his opening speech at Johnston's court martial. 
He stated that in the first confusing minutes of the coup 'I had just time to call my 
orderly serjeant [sic] to have my horses ready while I went upstairs to put on my 
uniform'. Then, after seeing soldiers searching for him, he hid in:- 
a back room, to defeat their object, and to deliberate on the means to be 
adopted for the restoration of my authority, which in such a critical situation 
could only be accomplished by my getting into the interior of the country 
adjacent to the Hawkesbury, where I knew the whole body of the people 
would flock to my standard.' 
In other words Bligh was prepared to risk a form of civil conflict by raising a militia 
to oppose the military. Tactically, Johnston was wise to block Bligh's line of escape. 
As soon as he knew the governor was missing, he 'immediately drew the soldiers in 
a line before the Government House, and between it and the people'. This effectively 
isolated Bligh within. It was only then that Johnston 'directed a small number [of 
HRA, 1, 6, p.576. Address datelined Ilawkesbury, 1st May 1808'. A brave act in defiance of 
the Corps' tight control. Signed by twelve persons. 
A Charge of Mutiny, p.152. 
132 A Charge of Mutiny, p.9. 
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soldiers] to proceed in search of the Governor'.' 
It is argued that the only means available to Johnston to maintain the integrity 
of the Corps, and at the same time, prevent a breakdown of order, especially amongst 
the convicts, was a full scale overwhelming mutiny. If speedily and decisively 
mounted, it would ensure the arrest of Bligh and his executive officers, avoiding 
potential civil disturbances in the interior. Additionally, Johnston probably felt he 
had no option but to take note of the emotive sentiments now being stirred up in the 
regiment by vocal officers and men, such as Kemp, Minchin and Sergeant Major 
Whittle. Having avoided calling on Bligh in an attempt to resolve the impasse, 
Johnston's alternatives were to ignore this sentiment and support Bligh against his 
own officers, or place himself at the head of his regiment and march. This was a 
military insurrection to protect the Corps' regimental interests. 
It is acknowledged that the coup also served the purposes of other interested 
parties. Atkinson, for example, writes of Macarthur seeing 'the Rebellion as an event 
of great significance in the history of the colony'.' Also Atkinson considers the 
'interweaving of three [British] patronage networks' provide the background to 'the 
events leading up to the Rebellion'.' These were Bank's pro-Bligh group, naval 
elements opposed to Bligh, and the 'political influence of the Whigs, ... patrons of 
Bligh's [colonial] enemies'. On the other hand, AGL Shaw depicts the rebellion as 
'a personal quarrel' between Bligh and Macarthur 'with disaffected military officers 
[acting with Macarthur] against constituted authority'.' Supporting this view, J 
Ritchie writes that 'if Bligh could break Macarthur, he would succeed in imposing 
his authority on every inhabitant; if Macarthur could resist the governor, he would 
reduce him to a figurehead.' Nevertheless Ritchie also notes that the soldiers were 
'spoiling for a showdown' because they were alarmed by rumours of Bligh's 
1 " A Charge of Mutiny, p.153. 
1 " A Atkinson, 'The British Whigs', p.84. 
1 " A Atkinson, 'The British Whigs', p.74. 
AGL Shaw, 'Some Aspects of the History of New South Wales 1788-1810', JRAHS, 
Vol.57,Pt.2, June 1971,p.108. 
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intention to charge the six officers.' Like Shaw, CMH Clark sees Bligh and, to a 
lesser extent, Macarthur as the villains of the incident, but while he gives an account 
of the rebellion, he does not explain why it took place.' Evatt considered that social 
and economic issues were the underlying causes the rebellion. He wrote that Bligh 
became the idol of the small agriculturists. Against him the trading monopolists, 
including the officers of the regiment, were opposed on the grounds of self-
interest.' Based on Abbott's letter to ex-Governor King, Evatt argues that the 
mutiny was preplanned by Johnston and Macarthur, rather than a spontaneous 
event' This short selection of widely diverse views, illustrates the multiplicity of 
factors which had a bearing on the mutiny. While each of these varied opinions are 
relevant, it is argued that none adequately explain why a whole regiment mutinied. 
Even Macquarie, after he assumed the office of governor, found it 'extremely 
difficult to form a Judgment on this delicate and mysterious subject'. But he wrote, 
'injustice to Governor Bligh, ... I have not been able to discover any Act of his 
which could in any degree form an excuse for ... the violence and Mutinous 
Proceedings against him'. Nevertheless, while Macquarie defended Bligh over the 
mutiny, he did not respect him. He noted that Bligh's government was 'extremely 
unpopular, particularly amongst the higher orders' and in Macquarie's opinion, 
Bligh was a 'most unsatisfactory Man to transact business with'.' So, even in 
contemporary times, Macquarie, an experienced senior officer, could not arrive at a 
rational explanation for the mutiny even though he took 'particular pains to discover 
the cause'. 
It is argued that Johnston did not mutiny because of objections to Bligh's 
method of governing, nor to aggrandise personal power as lieutenant-governor. The 
1" J Ritchie, The Wentwonhs Father and Son, Carlton, reprinted 1999, p.111. 
1 " CMH Clark, A History of Australia, I, From the Earliest Times to the Age of Macquarie, 
Canton, reprinted 1974, pp.214-227. In this conclusion, Bligh is described as 'the man who was 
angry without cause [who] bequeathed no monument of achievement to posterity (p.234). 
1 " HV Evatt, Rum Rebellion, p.350. 
HV Evatt, Rum Rebellion, p.234. 
"` URA, 1, 7, p.331. Private letter to Castlereagh of 10 May 1810. 
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officers as a group would not have risked facing a capital punishment charge to 
protect their own, or Macarthur's, trading interests. Neither would Bentham's 
philosophy of civil processes have been a rallying cry inspiring the regiment as they 
marched on Government House. Soldiers had little sympathy with such issues. 
Only a conviction of great concern, shared by a considerable majority of all ranks, 
can explain this insurrection. Johnston would have known that when he gave his 
order to march, apart from ingrained obedience to orders, the officers and men would 
obey this mutinous order because that was their inclination. The majority were not 
prepared to see their regiment torn apart by what may well have happened if six of 
their officers were imprisoned for a capital offence. Bligh's comment, which directly 
contradicts this writers argument, was the 'subversion of His Majesty's Government 
was effected in consequence of a settled plan of McArthur's, and not by a mere 
accident arising from the business of his Trial.' There is no doubt Macarthur set 
the scene by his consistent actions up to and during his trial in January 1808. 
Nevertheless, the officers would not have mutinied simply to support Macarthur as 
Bligh asserted. Rather, the six officers were already so implicated by their 
anticipation of being charged with treason, they stood to gain by a mutiny which they 
hoped could be justified. The remaining officers and soldiers mutinied because the 
collective wellbeing of the Corps was under great threat should Bligh's disciplinary 
actions not be forcefully stopped. 
Bligh later reported to London, that on the afternoon of 26th January 'The 
Civil power appeared to be in a precarious state'.' In longer term historical 
perspective, this mutiny can be seen as a continuation of struggle for dominance of 
the military over the civil power which commenced during Phillip's government. 
But, the soldiers who marched on the evening of 26 January, were not concerned in 
perpetuating-such a drawn out power play. They believed that the insurrection was 
necessary to protect vital regimental interests. 
'" HRA, I, 6, p.433. Bligh to Castlereagh of April 1808. 
'" HRNSW, 6, p.614. Secret dispatch, dated April 1808. 
Chapter 12 
The Struggle to Restore Order: Macquarie and the 
73rd Regiment 
Despite the overthrow of the civil power by the military in their successful 
rebellion against Bligh, the civil power was responsible for supervising the 
withdrawal of the New South Wales Corps from the colony after twenty years 
garrison duty. It was also the end of an era, as Bligh was the last naval officer to 
be appointed Captain-General and Governor-in-Chief in the colony. His 
replacement was Lieutenant Colonel, afterwards Major General, Lachlan 
Macquarie, the first army officer to hold the same civil title as the naval governors.' 
Before his appointment as governor, Macquarie had commanded the 73rd 
Regiment of Foot which later accompanied him to New South Wales. Because of 
this close association with the 73rd, it could be presumed that, compared to the 
relationship of the New South Wales Corps with the naval governors, Macquarie 
would have no particular problems with his troops. This chapter examines internal 
security in the colony, with Macquarie's government representing the civil power, 
and the 73rd Regiment, the military power. 
The first two ships to depart Port Jackson for England, after Bligh was 
deposed, were Dart, sailing on 20 April, and Brothers on 2 May 1808. Both ships 
together with the China Fleet arrived in southern England on 12 September 1808, 
302 
' HRA, 1, 7, p.183. For Macquarie's title, the same as Bligh's. 
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bringing the first tidings of the insurrection.' Edward Macarthur noted that the 
colonial rebellion made 'little impression on the public mind, and excite[d] still less 
at the offices [presumably the War and Colonial Officer due to concern with the 
current war and particularly the Peninsula campaign.' A reading of The Times 
from September to December 1808, makes Edward Macarthur's comment 
understandable with the Peninsula War dominating. In this three month period 
there were only two published references to New South Wales, both of which were 
inspired by Macarthur. The first of 15 September 1808, reported the arrival of 
Dart and that in New South Wales there was 'some disturbance' of which 
particulars were not known except that Governor Bligh has been arrested and 
would probably be sent home in confinement. The item concluded with the 
verbatim text of Johnston's proclamation of 27 January 1808 advising the 
cessation of martial law. The second, of 17 September 1808, is shown as Figure 
24.4 Despite the lack of information in The Times, and Edward Macarthur's 
opinion that the insurrection excited little official interest, there was a quick 
government reaction to news of the rebellion. By 11 October 1808, the Secretary 
of State for War and the Colonies, Viscount Castlereagh, had discussed the matter 
with King George III, and on that date wrote to the Commander-in-Chief:- 
it is His Majesty's pleasure that a regiment should proceed without delay 
to New South Wales, and that the regiment there stationed should be 
brought back, and that an arrangement should be made for relieving at 
proper intervals the troops which may be necessary for the protection of 
the colony.' 
Not only did this direct that the Corps be relieved, but also, no longer would troops 
remain in the colony long enough to risk their becoming integrated into the local 
community. 
Some Early Records of the Macarthurs of Camden, ed. S MacArthur Onslow, Sydney, 1914, 
p.167. Edward Macarthur's letter of 30 September 1808. 
Some Early Records, p.167. 
Times, London, No.7467 of Thursday 15 September 1808, p.4, first column (p.4, a), and No.7479 
of 17 September 1808, p.3, d, respectively. 
HRNSW, 6, p.779. 
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Edward Macarther's account of the insurrection against Bl igh  
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Another important decision, was the replacement of Bligh by an army 
officer. Castlereagh first offered the governorship to Brigadier General Miles 
Nightingall, informing him:- 
the Government of that colony should be placed on a more respectable 
footing than it had hitherto been, and that for this purpose a general 
officer, with a regiment of the line, should be sent there, to whom shall be 
entrusted the administration of the colony. Considering you as qualified 
to reestablish tranquillity and correct abuses in a settlement which 
appears ... to have fallen into a state of great disorder and 
insubordination, I am ready to submit ... your name to His Majesty' 
Banks gave a more colloquial explanation to Mrs Bligh for the change of service; 
'The present unfortunate affair [the insurrection] has proved that soldiers do not 
like to pay the obedience they owe to a sailor, tho' it is probable they would not 
have refus'd it to an officer of their own cloth.' So ended the reign of naval 
captains-general in New South Wales. To accompany Nightingall, should he take 
up the appointment, the 73rd (Highland) Regiment of Foot' s was approved by the 
War and Colonial Office to replace the New South Wales Corps, with that Corps 
being redesignated the 102nd Regiment.' 
Associated with the introduction of the 73rd into the colonial history of 
Australia was the name of Lachlan Macquarie. This officer, as a brevet lieutenant 
colonel had sailed from England and joined the 86th Regiment in India in August 
1805. Meanwhile, from 30 May 1805 (unknown to him till late in 1805) he had 
been promoted lieutenant colonel and appointed to command the 73rd, which in 
September 1805 returned to Scotland from India. On his arrival in India, 
Macquarie was in no hurry to join his new command. Instead, after some active 
• HRNSW, 6, p.813. Letter of 14 December 1808. 
' HRNSW, 6, p.816. Letter of 24 December 1808. 
• Army List 1809, no other bibliography, (courtesy of Black Watch Museum, Perth, Scotland), 
p.265, for regimental title. The 73rd was raised in 1779 as a second battalion of 42nd (Royal 
Highland) Regiment, better known as the "Black Watch". In 1786, the battalion was renumbered the 
73rd and in 1881 was redesignated the 2nd Battalion, 42nd Regiment, P Howard, The Black Watch, 
London, 1968, pp.33, 69-72. 
• HRNSW, 6, pp.782-783, nomination by Commander-in-Chief, of October 1808 and Castlereagh's 
reply of December 1808, p.813. Castlereagh was not in favour of the Corps being retitled the 102nd 
Regiment. 
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campaigning in Gujarat, he rejoined the staff of his Scottish friend Governor 
Jonathan Duncan in Bombay, and served a year as his Military Secretary. Looking 
ahead to when Macquarie was governor of New South Wales, Ritchie notes:- 
Though on the periphery of civil administration, Macquarie gained 
knowledge in the area that provided him with the only model of 
government he had experienced intimately ... he watched, listened and 
absorbed the Duncan style [of governorship], its strengths as well as its 
weaknesses.' 
After this exposure to civilian government, Macquarie finally joined his regiment at 
Perthshire, Scotland, in early 1808." 
On arrival at Perthshire, Macquarie found the 73rd reduced to skeletal 
proportions with 512 soldiers transferred to other regiments before the unit left 
India.' In December 1808, Macquarie received orders that the 73rd was to 
proceed to England, prior to embarking for New South Wales.' At this time, 
despite a year of strenuous recruiting, there were still only 400 other ranks on 
strength of the battalion. With only limited numbers of recruits enlisted from 
Scottish militia regiments, the majority of volunteers were from the Irish militia, 
together with thirty-three men from the Staffordshire militia (the only English 
corps in which the 73rd were allowed to recruit), 'a circumstance totally 
unexpected, from the dislike English soldiers were known to entertain to the 
Highland uniform'.' 
As experienced by the 73rd, there was now a paucity of Scotsmen being 
enlisted in Scottish regiments. This led to the Horse Guards issuing a 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie A Biography, Carlton, 1986, p.78. For Duncan and this period of 
Macquarie's life, pp.74-81. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie p.83-86. For departing India, in March 1807, and returning overland 
through Persia and Russia. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.90, for arrival Perthshire, 
" R Cannon, Historical Record of The Seventy-Third Regiment, London, 1851, (courtesy of Black 
Watch Museum), p.22. The regiment commenced its march from Perth on 26 December to embark at 
Leith for England. 
" R Cannon,The Seventy-Third, p.22. 
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memorandum,' on 7 April 1809, ordering that six of the fifteen numbered Scottish 
Regiments of Foot were to 'lay aside their distinguishing dress which is 
objectionable to the natives of South Britain'. These were the 72nd, 73rd, 74th, 
75th, 91st, and 94th, which regiments 'should no longer be considered as on that 
{Scottish] establislunent.' 16 With this change coming shortly after the 73rd 
marched into its temporary barracks on the Isle of Wight, in March 1809, the 
battalion, now a standard line regiment, had a wider selection of English militia 
units from whom volunteers could be called. In a second round of recruiting, there 
was a considerable increase in numbers, particularly from the Stafford, West 
Middlesex, and Durham militia regiments. With these men and sixty volunteers 
from veteran battalions, the 73rd was 'upwards of eight hundred strong' prior to 
sailing from England. This still represented a shortfall in soldiers as the 
regiment's establishment strength was 54 sergeants, 22 drummers and 1000 other 
ranks, divided into ten companies:7 
As well as the 73rd changing its status in April 1809, so too did that of its 
commanding officer, who had previously been nominated lieutenant-governor 
designate. Illness prevented Nightingall going to New South Wales as governor, 
and others, including General Francis Grose, Colonel of the 102nd Regiment, 
notable if not notorious as a former lieutenant-governor of the colony, applied for 
that appointment:8 Another applicant was Macquarie, who referring to his thirty-
two years' service naming Arthur Wellesley and the Duke of York as his 
t 5 The Horse Guards being the office of the Commander-in-Chief, London. 
16 R Cannon, The Seventy-Third, footnote to pp.23-24, for Horse Guards Memorandum. Refer: WY 
Carman, Richard Simkin's Uniforms of the British Army, Infantry, Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers 
and other Corps, Exeter, 1985, pp.98,99 and 144, for five of the six later reverted to being Scottish 
regiments. These were the 72nd in 1829, 73rd in 1862, 74th in 1845, 75th in 1862 and 91st in 1863. 
The 94th never regained status as a Scottish unit. It was linked with the 88th in 1881 to become the 
Connaught Rangers. 
' 7 R Cannon, The Seventy-Third, pp.23-24. The regiment was accompanied by 100 wives and 60 
children, HRNSW, 7, pp.99-100. 
18 HRNSW, 7, p.99. Request to Under Secretary Cooke of the Colonial Office, of April 1805. 
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supporters.' With 'a dearth of applicants', apart from Grose and Macquarie, and 
with the 73rd awaiting embarkation, in late April, Castlereagh apparently had little 
option other than to appoint Macquarie as governor.' Although his commission as 
governor was dated 24 May 1809, 21 official correspondence of 29 April 1809 
refers to 'Lachlan Macquarie, Esq're, who is appointed Captain-General and 
Governor-in-Chief of New South Wales.' 
With Macquarie's appointment as governor, the command of the 73rd 
passed to Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Charles O'Connell, who as a distinguished 
brevet-major was appointed to the 73rd, in the rank of major on 15 October 1806. 
He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on 4 May 1809, 2' shortly before the 
regiment embarked on 8 May to sail on 25 May 1809. 24 Presumably O'Connell 
assumed command of the 73rd before the regiment sailed, as would have also been 
the case with his civil appointment as lieutenant-governor designate. It is 
sometimes mistakenly stated that Macquarie commanded the 73rd in New South 
Wales. But in Ensign Huey's journal, it appears certain that when he refers to 'the 
Governor', this is a different officer to the one he identifies as 'the Commanding 
Officer'. For example, when the governor embarked on 21 May 1809, he was 
19 J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, pp.94-95. ADB,2, p.190, has a slightly different version of 
Macquarie's quest for office. In that he wrote to Dundas, the commander-in-chief, mentioning his 
thirty-two years' service, as a basis for promotion to colonel. Separately, he wrote to Castlereagh, 
'with the support of' York and Wellesley, for the appointment of lieutenant-governor. Later, he 
'boldly wrote to Castlereagh again, offering his services as governor'. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.95, for 'dearth'. 
21 HRA, 1, 7, p.183. 
22  HRNSW, 7, p.110. Admiralty to Cooke. 
23  Army List 1809 and 1810, (courtesy Black Watch Museum), pp.265 and 270 respectively. 
Unnumbered Appendix to R Cannon, The Seventy-Third, pp.70-71, for career of Lieutenant General 
Sir Maurice Charles O'Connell, KCH. 
24 R Cannon, The Seventy-Third, p.24. O'Connell's appointment to a former Scottish regiment 
appears unusual, as he was born in County Kerry, Ireland and originally training for the priesthood, 
p.114. In New South Wales, he married Mary Putland, Captain Bligh's widowed daughter, who 
remained in Australia, not returning to England with Bligh, p.122. As O'Connell was promoted only 
four days before embarkation, it can be presumed that this was to command the 73rd in place of 
Macquarie, now appointed governor. 
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'attended by Colonel O'Connell'. 25 Again Huey noted in his entry of 24 February 
1810, that 'Colonel O'Connell returned from Colonial duty [as lieutenant-
governor] and resumed the command of the regiment.'' An ultimate authority as 
to who commanded the 73rd was given by Macquarie, who directed O'Connell to 
'make the contents of this letter known to the officers of the 73rd Reg't under 
your command'.' 
To clarify this command structure in the colony, Macquarie as 'Captain-
General and Governor-in-Chief had command over 'garrisons, castles, forts, and 
all other fortifications or other military works' in the colony. In this regard, he 
had absolute command over the 73rd Regiment, but under the recognised military 
chain of command, this was exercised through the Commanding Officer and 
Regimental Headquarters of the 73rd. Therefore, in a military sense, Macquarie 
was the superior commander in the colony, but not the commanding officer of the 
73rd. This was the same situation as when naval officers were the colonial 
governors. 
Before he left England, Macquarie was given instructions' regarding re-
establishing security and the dominance of the civil power over the military in the 
colony. This included directions about actions to be taken against particular 
individuals. The complete range of these instructions and orders is contained in 
several documents, commencing with the Colonial Office's requirement stated to 
" A Huey (Ensign), The Voyage of the 73rd of Foot, photocopy of typed manuscript. By courtesy 
Black Watch Museum, reference `BW Arch 0415. Typescript', p.2. 
" A Huey (Ensign), The Voyage of the 73rd, p.24. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.472. Letter of December 1810. Other references to O'Connell commanding the 
73rd are scattered in Historical Records of Australia, for example HRA, 1, 7, p.631. O'Connell to 
Macquarie of November 1812, refers to 'my Regt.' 
28 HRN SW, 7, p.127; being extracts from Macquarie's commission. 
29 HRA, 1, 7, pp.I90-197, and Commentary Note 61 (p.803) for Macquarie's formal Instructions 
and comment thereon. These make no reference to actions Macquarie was to take in the wake of the 
insurrection against Bligh. Castlereagh's directive on this is contained in Dispatch No.2 of 14 May 
1809, passed to Macquarie before he departed from England, pp.80-83. 
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the Admiralty that 102nd Regiment be returned to England." Two instructions 
which related to the officers of the 102nd, directed that Johnston be returned to 
England in close arrest and specifically, Colonel Paterson and Lieutenant Colonel 
Foveaux were also to return, 31 additionally:- 
all officers of the New South Wales Corps should return to Europe with 
the regiment, with exception to such officers who, having been at Port 
Dalrymple, or any other out settlements during the time of the arrest of 
the Governor, shall, upon application, receive his licence to remain in New 
South Wales; or such officers as, being on their passage from England at 
the time, may receive permission to exchange into the 73rd Foot.' 
These directives were a necessary measure intended to make a clean sweep of all 
military officers involved in the insurgency. 
The victim of the insurrection, Bligh, if still confined, was to be released and 
reinstated as governor with the proviso 'that he do give up the government into 
your [Macquarie's] hands immediately'2 3 Even with this caveat, it may be the 
Colonial Office was concerned that Bligh could attempt some vengeful or 
unpredictable action during this formal reinstatement. In a directive to Bligh, the 
Colonial Office instructed that he was 'not to proceed to the general exercise of the 
functions of Governor ... [but] receive Col. Macquarie as your successor'? 4 
Macarthur as a civilian was to be investigated, charged and tried in the 
colonial Criminal Court. These proceedings would have to be conducted by the 
Deputy Judge-Advocate Ellis Bent who travelled out from England with 
Macquarie, replacing the incompetent Atkins, who might be allowed to return to 
England. Also, all grants, and appointments made under the rebel administration 
were to be revoked and those dispossessed civil officials who held positions under 
Governor Bligh, were to be reinstated. Trials and investigations, of Bligh 
3° HRNSW, 7, p.112. This also covered the outwards journey in HMS Dromedary and Hindostan. 
HRNSW, 7, p.143, for Johnston and p.144 for Paterson and Foveaux. 
32 HRNSW, 7, p.141. Under-Secretary, Colonial Office to Quartermaster-General of 11 May 1809. 
The phase 'his licence', appears unusual, but a correct transcription. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.143. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.149. Under-Secretary's letter of 14 May 1809. 
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supporters, such as those of William Gore and George Suttor, who refused to bow 
to the military, 'cannot be considered as legal so as to bind you to confirm them'.' 
While the above measures were to be undertaken against the rebel 
administration and officers of 102nd Regiment, neither the British Government, 
nor Macquarie, expressed the slightest concern regarding the incoming governor's 
ability to exercise control over the former rebel unit. As well as two warships and 
the 73rd to reinforce Macquarie's rule, before the arrival of the main body of the 
73rd Regiment in December 1809, that unit already had troops on the ground in 
Sydney. Two Government and General Orders of 14 August 1809, published by 
the rebel administration, gave the first official news in Sydney of a new incoming 
administration appointed by the British Government. These orders were;- 
The Lt Governor has received an official notification that the New South 
Wales Corps has been numbered the 102nd Regt of the Line. 
and 
The Detachment of the 73rd Regt under the Command of Captain Cameron 
will arrive this day in the Boyd transport, [and] will disembark in the 
Course of the day.' 
A private letter of October 1809, provides evidence that it was clearly understood in 
Sydney the detaclunent`Commanded by a Captain and two Subalterns ... are a part 
of the relieving Regiment.' In late 1809, there was no doubt that the colonial 
service of the New South Wales Corps, now the 102nd Regiment, was ending. 
On landing at Sydney Cove on 1 January 1810, Macquarie found he was 
" HRN SW, 7, p.144. 
" Government and General Orders, State Records New South Wales (henceforth SRNSW), reel 6037, 
SZ 993, pp.103-104. 
37 Brabourne Collection, Mitchell Library (ML), reel FM4 1748, A 78-5, p.173. From WM . Grice? 
to Mrs Bligh of 6 October 1809. The strength of other ranks is not stated. Refer: C Bateson, The 
Convict Ships 1787-1868, Glasgow, 1969, pp. 172 and 326, for the troops came out from Cork 
guarding 139 male convicts, presumably the soldiers numbered between twenty and thirty. Bateson 
does not note the size of the detachment, nor, the point of interest, that these were the first troops of 
the 73rd to reach the rebel administered colony. 
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unable to carry out his instructions regarding Johnston and Macarthur as both, with 
Lieutenant-Governor Paterson's approval, had departed from the colony in Admiral 
Gambier in March 1809. Johnston had been directed to 'personally explain to His 
Majesty's Ministers the measures you have found it necessary to pursue'.' Thus, 
the rebel military clique endeavoured to gain an advantage by presenting their case 
to the English authorities before Bligh's return. Likewise, Macquarie could not 
formally reinstate Bligh as governor, as the latter, having broken his agreement with 
Paterson to depart for England in HMS Porpoise:9 was sheltering in the Derwent 
River, Van Diemen's Land. 
As ordered by Macquarie, the 102nd Regiment lined the route from Sydney 
Cove to Government House, then, after parading with the 73rd at Macquarie's 
inauguration as governor, Macquarie instructed that the 102nd was to be issued 
with 'an extra allowance of liquor ... in honor [sic] of the ceremony that took place 
this day'.' Paterson and Foveaux paid their respects to the new governor and 
were treated with civility. Surprisingly that day, with the stigma of rebellion, and a 
court martial in England, hanging over Foveaux's head, 4' Macquarie's first 
Government and General Order appointed Foveaux:- 
to command the troops at head-quarters, at Sydney, and to give such 
order as he may judge necessary and expedient for conducting the several 
garrison duties and details. [He] is to be received ... with the same 
compliments as are due to a colonel in the Army'.' 
On his return to Sydney Town, Bligh told Macquarie he was surprized' at the 
appointment, as Foveaux 'had been so much in the habit of persecuting the 
" HRNSW, 7, p.15. The ship sailed on 28 March 1809, refer p.155. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.17. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.248. Written order, Macquarie to Paterson. Government and General Order, p.254. 
for liquor issue. 
41 HRNSW, 7, p.229. Legal opinion, presumably to the British Government, of November 1809. 
The judge-advocate general's recommendation of March 1811, was to wait for the result of Johnston's 
trial, p.504. 
42 HRNSW, 7, p.254. 
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loyalists and myself when his Commander-in-Chief •' As Macquarie and 
Foveaux had not previously served together, nor had any known social links, there 
was no common bond which can explain why Macquarie immediately appointed 
Foveaux to a position of military command over two regiments. This outranked 
O'Connell, who was both the 73rd's commanding officer and lieutenant-governor 
of the colony. Macquarie's reason for appointing a rebel to such a position of 
command, second only to himself, demands an attempt to understand why 
Macquarie took such an action. 
After the pilot, Foveaux was the first rebel administration official to board 
HMS Dromedary and greet Macquarie when the ship arrived at Port Jackson on 
28 December 1809. Ritchie writes that Toveaux, [was] quite the man of business, 
with fresh provisions and the news that his commanding officer ... Paterson, lay 
indisposed'.' Foveaux must have made a considerable impact on Macquarie, who 
would have needed to update himself on the local situation ashore, in order to plan 
his orderly takeover of the administration of the colony. Further, without 
appointing Foveaux to any military or civil appointments', Macquarie could have 
"requested" him to call at Government House, to make use of Foveaux's local 
knowledge, which, as pointed out by Ritchie was indispensable to Macquarie. As 
the former rebel 'coveted his [Macquarie's] favour and hoped - with his backing - 
to be exculpated for not having reinstated Bligh', 47 no doubt Foveaux, even without 
an appointment, would have given maximum assistance to Macquarie. Again, 
Macquarie had no imperative to appoint Foveaux to a command position superior 
to that of O'Connell on the basis of their respective regimental seniorities in the 
" HRNSW, 7, p.310. Bligh to Castlereagh of March 1810. Bligh was incorrect in referring to 
himself as being 'Commander-in-Chief', his commission appointed him 'Captain-General and 
Governor-in-Chief', refer HRA, 1, 6, p.2. 
" ADB, I, pp.407-409. Prior to 1810, there is no record of Foveaux having served with, or under, 
Macquarie. No reference has been found to indicate any social links. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.118. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.255. Government and General Order of 4 January 1810. In addition to his military 
command, this order placed Foveaux in charge of 'public works and buildings of every description'. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.134. 
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rank of lieutenant colonel. He had by-passed appointing the ailing Paterson, and 
could have done the same with Foveaux. Finally, in view of 'Castlereagh's and 
[Undersecretary] Cooke's decisiveness' in supporting Bligh's cause after 1808,' 
it is unlikely that, as a result of some British governmental "secret agenda", or 
because of his service as lieutenant-governor of Norfolk Island, 5° Foveaux received 
preferential treatment by Macquarie. However, Fletcher comments that Foveaux's 
rapid promotions 'in an unimportant outpost ... suggests that someone in England 
may have looked after his interests'. 51 It is feasible that this 'someone', was 
influential and spoke favourably of Foveaux before Macquarie departed from 
England. In that age of patronage, for a person in Macquarie's position, to do a 
favour for another man's patron, could later be beneficial to his own interests. 
This leads to another conjecture as to why Macquarie was 'indulgent to his 
brother officers in the New South Wales Corps' s' and especially to Foveaux. 
Firstly, they were all wearing the same 'cloth' (to recall Banks' quote), and 
reportedly, Macquarie was anxious 'to promote the tranquillity of the colony'.' 
However, to an experienced soldier like Macquarie, such sentiments would not 
have protected the Corps' officers for an instant, if he considered the situation 
demanded strong action be taken. Some of all of these considerations; the same 
'cloth', Macquarie's endeavours to ensure tranquillity, and possibly prejudice 
against Bligh, which Macquarie may have gathered from Foveaux and others, could 
have made him sympathetic towards the Corps' officers. But, it is possible an 
additional factor worked in the Corps' favour. At the time of the 1808 coup 
" ADB, 1, p.408. Foveaux promoted April 1802, against O'Connell in May 1809 (as noted 
earlier). 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.107. Ritchie cites the French revolution in 1789, two British 
naval mutinies in 1797, and rebellion in Ireland in 1798 as factors which influenced Castlereagh and 
Cooke. 
50 A-M Whitaker, 'Joseph Foveaux: 'A gentleman of high repute', JRAHS, Vol.82, Pt.1, June 
1997, p.26 and passim. Whitaker commends Foveaux's service in Norfolk Island and dismisses much 
slander concerning this phase of his service. 
51 ADB, 1, p.409. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Mccquarie, p.121. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.257. For 'tranquillity' in Proclamation of 4 January 1810. 
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d'etat, the Corps was commanded by Major Johnston and here was a link of 
adolescent friendship, between two Scots, Lachlan Macquarie and George 
Johnston. They had both served together as ensigns on garrison duties in North 
America in 1777. It is possible that in 1810, Macquarie was honouring that 
friendship by endeavouring to quickly normalise relationships between the Corps, 
now the 102nd Regiment, and his administration and 73rd Regiment. His 
preferential treatment of the Corps and its senior actively fit officer, Foveaux, who 
was likely to face a court martial in England, could transmit an impression to the 
War Office and Horse Guards that the mutiny was considered of less significance 
in the colony than was first thought. This could work in favour of Johnston who 
was already in England, and possibly subjected to legal inquiries concerning the 
mutiny 
Yet, given the British Government's alarm at the insurrection against Bligh,' 
it would seem logical for Macquarie to have appointed O'Connell to command the 
troops in Sydney. Additionally, while the 102nd remained in their barracks and 
billets, the 73rd had to occupy a temporary camp site 'formed yesterday [31 
December 1809] ... at Grose's Farm'.' So, having been embarked for over six 
months, landed, taken part in the ceremonial swearing in of Macquarie, the 73rd 
then marched three miles to reach their rough camp site by 2pm. Further, 
apparently they were not even favoured with a special liquor issue as were the 
former rebels, the comfortably billeted 102nd Regiment. Instead, on the 73rd's 
arrival at their camp site, there was 'Nothing to eat this day but potatoes'. Then, 
the 'whole regiment was busily employed burning the stumps of trees which 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.116. Macquarie born 31 January 1761, p.12. ADB, 2, p.20. 
Johnston born 19 March 1764. 
" HRNSW, 6, p.777. Edward Macarthur (in London) to his father, of October 1808, 'the 
Government will, I fear, to the very last, support Bligh'. Also, p.779, Castlereagh to Duke of York, 
of October 1808, 'for restoring subordination ... bringing to trial those whose conduct seems most 
culpable'. 
56 HRNSW, 7, p.255, for formation of camp. 
315 
prevented the regiment drilling.' 
The favourable treatment of Foveaux and the 102nd, was at the expense of 
those officers and men of the 73rd who accompanied Macquarie to the colony, and 
whose loyalty he had no reason to doubt. George Suttor, who was imprisoned 
during the insurrection for his refusal to recognise the legitimacy of the rebel 
government, considered that Macquarie had a decided preference for the few 
wealthy emancipists who had supported the mutiny. He added that the 'few free 
settlers who had been loyal [to Bligh] were totally neglected or granted very small 
pieces of land.'" As well as apparently favouring the anti-Bligh faction in the 
colony, it appears that Macquarie offered at least one public slight to Bligh. 
Ensign Huey's recorded in his journal that:- 
On 17th [January] Commodore Bligh arrived in His Majesty's Ship 
"Porpoise". The 102nd was drawn up on the wharf to receive him, but 
he refused to come on shore and said he would not be received by those 
who had so lately threatened to cut his throat. The following day at 11.00 
in the forenoon Commodore Bligh came on shore and was received by 
our flank companies, who had marched into Sidney [sic] for that 
purpose.' 
The orders for parading the 102nd, although presumably issued by direction of 
Foveaux, must have had Macquarie's endorsement. Arrangements for Bligh's 
reception would have been a sensitive issue, one carefully considered and approved 
by the governor. The officers of 102nd, who paraded with their companies at the 
wharf, were "rebels" as far as Bligh, his supporters, and legal advice to the British 
Government were concerned.' 
On 1 January, Macquarie warned the 102nd to be ready to embark for 
England in 'a very few weeks'. 61 But this proved impossible, due to the time 
" A Huey, The Voyage of the 73rd, p.22, for activities on 1 January 1810. 
58 Memoirs of George Suitor FLS Banksian Collector (1774-1859), ed. G Mackaness, Sydney: 
Australian Historical Monographs, Vol. XIII (New Series), 1948, p.50. 
" A Huey, The Voyage of the 73rd, p.23. 
" HRA, 4, 1, pp.47-48. Counsel's opinion of November 1809. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.254. 
316 
required for the 73rd to relieve the 102nd at Newcastle, Norfolk Island and in Van 
Diemen's Land.' Meanwhile, in a Government and General Order of 29 January, 
after blatantly flattering the 102nd, following a regimental inspection he had 
conducted that day, Macquarie offered any soldier, under the age of thirty-five, the 
opportunity of transferring to the 73rd. With the incentive of receiving a 'three 
guinea' reenlistment bounty, 267 men, including a number of ex-convicts, were 
approved for enlistment by Macquarie at a further parade on 19 March.' This 
brought the 73rd to almost full strength.' 
In addition to the 267 men from the 102nd, Macquarie accepted a further 
111 old soldiers, with over twenty years service, to form a Veterans' Company, 
making a total of 378 men transferred from the 102nd. Macquarie advised London 
that the company would be commanded by an officer of the 73rd." Regarding the 
remaining three officer vacancies on establishment, Macquarie made surprising 
appointments in the selection of the two lieutenants and one ensign.' 
Surprisingly, Macquarie nominated three officers who were closely involved in the 
insurrection of 26 January 1808. Lieutenants W Lawson (a fellow Scot) and J 
Brabyn (now captain) were both members of the 'court' of six officers at 
" HRNSW, 7, p.343. The last outpost detachment of 102nd, from Norfolk Island, arrived in 
Sydney on 19 April 1810. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.282. The flowery language in the first paragraph was in keeping with typical 
comments issued by reviewing officers after most inspection parades. But as this General Order was 
written only twenty-nine days after Macquarie landed and assumed control over this rebel unit, such 
phrases as 'testimony to the steady discipline and orderly good conduct of the corps' since he assumed 
command, sounds hollow. 
" J. Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.121, for numbers reenlisted and HRNSW, 7, p.315 for inspection 
on 19 March. 
" HRNSW, 7, p.343. The regiment was now only nineteen men short of its establishment of 1000 
other ranks. 
" HRNSW, 7, pp.343-344. Macquarie's dispatch gave reasons for raising this company, command 
of, and numbers enlisted. A letter from Macquarie to General Dundas of May 1810, (pp.458-459) 
explains the background to the formation of the company, including the personal aspect of soldiers 
with family commitments. London approved vide: pp.299-300, Palmerston to Macquarie of March 
1811 (incorrectly dated 1810, and included in that year's correspondence). Footnote p.300, for 
authorised establishment of 4 officers and 107 other ranks. In fact, Macquarie enlisted 111 other ranks 
(p.459). 
67 Presumably, Captain Brabyn was nominated to fill one of the lieutenant's vacancies. 
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Macarthur's trial on 25 January 1808, and Ensign A Bell commanded the guard 
which surrounded and searched Government House. Further, before these 
officers could commence duty with the company (which was raised on 25 March 
1810), they had to return to England in conformity with the British Government's 
directive regarding officers of 102nd implicated in the mutiny. Obviously 
Macquarie was doing these three officers a personal favour, as he was not 
concerned about their absence of at least one year, before they could commence 
duty with the company. The treatment of these three officers, together with 
Macquarie's questionable appointment of Foveaux to command the troops in 
Sydney, and the issue of liquor to the 102nd, but not the 73rd, taken together, 
present an unusual series of conciliatory command decisions by Macquarie which 
indulged the rebel officers and men. As probably anticipated by Macquarie, this 
resulted in the high transfer rate to the 73rd and Veterans' Company, and meant 
only 320 soldiers of the 102nd finally returned to England.' 
During the 73rd Regiment's tour of duty in the colony, they carried out 
routine internal security duties in New South Wales and outlying settlements. 
From the records, while problems between the whites and Aborigines continued in 
mainland New South Wales, there were no major clashes or episodes. Even 
though there was increasing concern over bushranging in Van Diemen's Land, the 
potentially rebellious Irish were starting to be assimilated into the community. On 
his return to London, Foveaux, replying to queries from the Horse Guards, wrote:- 
The present military establishment of 1,100 effective men far exceeds the 
necessity; for when the large body of disaffected Irish were sent out the 
troops did not exceed 450 in all the settlements (tho' they were 
afterwards increased to 700), and were found perfectly adequate to keep 
order. All the then turbulent characters who now remain are becoming 
" HRN SW, 7, p.505 and third footnote. Names of officers and their travel to England and p.506 for 
their possible return. For Macarthur's criticism of his potential witness Lawson's hasty return to the 
colony, pp.526-527. First footnote, p.527, for return of the three officers to the colony. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.121, for total strength and numbers returned. With a unit 
strength of 697 soldiers and total enlistments of 378, a cross check shows a discrepancy of only one. 
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possessed of property, and have an interest in the welfare of the colony, 
and are no longer dangerous.' 
While Foveaux may have exaggerated the calm in the colony and need for 
fewer troops, he had apparently failed to consider the increased number of 
convicts transported to the colony after 1804, for example over 1100 males 
between 1805 and 1809. 7 ' Likewise, Foveaux inferred that as there were adequate 
troops to meet the crisis in 1804, 1100 troops were not justified in 1811. In this 
comment, he apparently overlooked that while Governor King had only one officer 
and nine other ranks detached from Sydney Town to Risdon Cove in 1804,72 by 
1811, Macquarie had two companies garrisoning Van Diemen's Land. With 
increased internal security problems in that island, of which Foveaux may have 
been unaware, Macquarie could not have reduced this military commitment at either 
Port Dalrymple or Hobart Town. 
During the latter half of 1810 in Van Diemen's Land, Surveyor-General 
John Oxley reported on 'atrocious cruelties' practised on Aborigines by convict 
bushrangers near Port Dalrymple and consequently the Aborigines were 
'extremely troublesome to the Solitary Hunter'.' In response to requests by 
Lieutenant-Governor Collins and then Lieutenant Lord for more troops in Hobart 
Town,' Macquarie sent a company of 100 men, commanded by a captain, 'for its 
Protection, and keeping the Settlers and Convicts under due and proper 
" HRNSW, 7, p.639. Foveaux to Lieutenant Colonel Gordon of November 1811. 
LL Robson, The Convict Settlers of Australia, Carlton, reprinted 1976, p.170. ADB, 1, p.408. 
During the Castle Hill Rebellion, Foveaux was a sick man and on duty at Norfolk Island. In his 
letter he is not commenting from first hand experience. In 1804, even with the two Loyal 
Association militias, King, supported by Paterson, requested more troops after the rebellion. 
" See above, Chapter 9, p.218 and footnotes 46,48 and 49 for troop strengths in 1804. 
" HRA, 3, 1, p.769. Report on Port Dalrymple by Oxley of 'latter half of ... 1810' (p.833, 
Commentary Note 274). 
" Collins died on 24 March 1810, conunand devolved to Lord (Royal Marines). 
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Restraine." Nevertheless, the activities of bushrangers continued to increase, 
involving skirmishes with the 73rd. In August 1814, Corporal Fentrill's patrol was 
captured by Michael Howe's gang.' That same month, a meeting of a bench of 
magistrates, 'strongly' recommended to Lieutenant-Governor Davey, that 'Military 
force be ordered out in aid of the Civil authority'. This was agreed by Davey.' 
Later, in March 1815, in two incidents, Corporal Miller's patrol captured four 
bushrangers and accomplices on his first patrol and two bushrangers on his 
second.' 
Meanwhile, in New South Wales, Macquarie took steps to better maintain 
order. In June 1810, he bolstered policing in Sydney Town by ordering the 
Main Guard be strengthened so that by night, at half hourly intervals, a small 
military squad would patrol the streets 'to take up all disorderly and idle people'.' 
He followed this up in October with two comprehensive sets of regulations to 
cover policing in Sydney and control over Port Jackson.' Both these regulations 
included important internal security instructions, indeed the Police Regulations, 
although mainly administrative in nature, had no other purpose. In Section 8, 
referring specifically to 'all prisoners and labouring persons [regulation's 
emphasisr, they were subject to curfew from 9pm until daylight and those 
prisoners in government employment were to register their lodging with the Chief 
Constable.' 
" HIM, 1, 7, p.261. Macquarie to Castlereagh of April 1810. Macquarie also recommended the 
return to England, or discharge, of the small remaining marine garrison of two lieutenants and forty-
five men (p.284 for marine's strength). HIM, 3, 1, p.466. Approval for return of marines and for 
married men to become settlers. 
76 HIM, 3, 2, pp.75-78. 
77 HIM, 3, 2, p.79, for magistrates and p. 80 for Davey's reply of following day. 
78 HIM, 3, 2, pp.102-106 and 106-108. 
79 See above, Chapter 3, p.55, footnote 67, for earlier development of police. 
80 HRNSW, 7, p.388. Government and General Order of 11 June 1810. 
81 HIM, 1, 7, pp.406-413, for Police Regulations and pp.656-664 for Port Regulations and Orders. 
82 HRA, 1, 7, pp.412-413. 
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The Port Regulations and Orders contained much administrative detail 
relating to the technical management of ships which entered Port Jackson, but 
throughout the regulations matters of internal security were included. For example, 
to enforce the regulations, all ships, both British and foreign, were to 'receive a 
Military Guard on board'. Their tasks included prevention of smuggling items 
like wine, 'Arms Ammunition, Military or Naval Stores', or embarkation of any 
'Convict, Free, Pardoned, or Emancipated person' without proper authority.' 
Other matters with internal security implications included the treatment of 
Aborigines which should be 'in every respect as Europeans' and dealing with 
deserting sailors and those who harboured them.' 
Of particular concern to Macquarie was the prevention of any weakening in 
command and control over troops in the colony. The example of the New South 
Wales Corps becoming identified with the lower social orders, was a particular 
matter of concern, to be strictly policed and minimised in relation to the 73rd. 
Apart from undermining discipline, such a situation could raise doubts about the 
reliability of troops called out in the event of civil disturbance. There were two 
separate, but related, aspects to this problem. Firstly, that the Corps had remained 
too long in the colony and secondly, through billeting in private houses, 
fratemisation was encouraged, with soldiers forming relationships, marrying, and 
raising families within the local community. Macquarie's immediate task was to 
reduce fraternisation. In November 1812, he indicated to London the dimensions 
of the problem:- 
nearly the one half of the 73rd Regiment and Veteran Company are at 
present quartered in Houses and Huts in different dispersed and distant 
parts of this populous town ... a circumstance attended with great present 
inconvenience and much prejudice ... to the discipline, morals and 
sobriety of the Soldiery and occasionally to the disturbance of the Peace 
and tranquility [sic] of the Inhabitants.' 
83  HRA, 1, 7, p.657, for guard and illegal wine, p.658 for arms and ammunition and those 
embarking and p.664 for prevention of smuggling. 
" HRA, 1, 7, p.661, for Aborigines and pp.659-660 for harbouring and deserters. 
85 HRA, 1, 7, p.529. Macquarie to Liverpool of November 1812. 
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From March 1810, Macquarie had several times pointed out the need for adequate 
barracks, including the requirement to accommodate 1000 men.' 
But the provision of barracks in itself was an inadequate measure, as 
security walls were needed around the barracks to keep the soldiers in. Macquarie 
wrote that his intention was:- 
to have surrounded the whole barracks ... with a Stone wall to prevent the 
men from leaving ... and thereby preclude the constant intercourse ... 
[with] the Inhabitants, which measure cannot be otherwise effected than 
by surrounding the Barracks with a high wall.' 
Not only was Macquarie concerned over barracks and walls in Sydney Town, he 
evidenced the same concern in Hobart Town. During his visit in November 1811, 
he ordered the barracks presently being built be pulled down and that 'a proper 
new Military Barrack for 200 Men, and a Military Hospital ... [be built on] 
"Barrack Hill" (Figure 25)." 
Unfortunately, discipline of the 73rd had been adversely effected by two 
factors which had previously undermined the New South Wales Corps; the poor 
quality of some officers and the problem of fraternisation, discussed above. 
Macquarie made specific complaints against a number of officers, especially 
against those on detached duty in Van Diemen's Land. Captain Murray, the first 
73rd officer to be commandant at Hobart Town, was directed to resign by 
Macquarie because of personal scandal concerning his wife, who Murray publicly 
condemned for 'shameful and abandoned conduct' and then against the accepted 
86 HRA, 1, 7, p.223, for first raising the issue in March 1810 and p.254 for the requirement for 
1000 troops. In October 1811, he informed London that new barracks (capacity not stated) had been 
built, p.396. 
87 HRA, 1, 7, p.530. 
88 HRA, 3, I, p.456. This order was given, as a memorandum to the then commandant, Captain 
Murray. In February 1812, his replacement, Major Geils, was given confirming details for building 
the new barracks, pp.458-459. This being the origin of Anglesea Barracks, the oldest continuously 
used barracks in Australia. Figure 25, 1961 painting by D Colbron Pearse (1883-1971), original in 
Anglesea Barracks Military Museum (by courtesy of the Museum). 
Figure 25: Macquarie selecting the site of Anglesea Barracks, Hobart 
Town, December 1811. 
Anglesea Barracks remains the oldest continuously occupied barracks in 
Australia. 
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code of behaviour 'taking [her] back and living' with her again. Murray was also 
involved in issuing unredeemed promissory notes and in privately selling a house 
provided at public expense. Nevertheless he avoided immediately resigning, and 
after returning to England, was promoted to major before resigning, thus 
successfully avoiding payment of a total colonial debt of £297.' Murray's 
replacement, Major Geils, was too overtly greedy in granting his wife and six 
children 3000 acres and too liberal in an allocation of cattle.' Additionally, Geils 
applied to buy the existing Government House in Hobart Town despite Macquarie 
having earlier made clear to Geils that the building of a new Government House 
was not a high priority. Macquarie's comment to Geils was that this application 
was 'equally unreasonable with that already adverted to of Grants of Land'.' A 
far more serious failure of an officer in his duty occurred with Major Gordon at 
Port Dalrymple. An adventurer, JB Hugo (also known as McHugo), who laid 
claim to being 'the rightful Heir to the Crown of England [his emphasis]' sailed 
into that port and convinced Gordon that he was empowered 'to supersede' him. 
Macquarie reported that Gordon then: 
Actually Surrendered his Command to Mr. McHugo, who was likely to 
have made a Very Alarming Use of the Power so Yielded to him 
[sentencing Gordon to death - to be shot next moraine], had not the 
Other [junior] Officers found it Necessary ... to remonstrate with Col 
" HRA, 3, 1, p.475. 
" HRA,1, 9, p.39. For debts owed on promissory notes and the house sale. For January 1817 
advice of resignation as a major, and inability to recover monies, p.197. 
" HRA, 3, 1, p.476. Macquarie relented to the extent he allowed Mrs Geils a grant of 1200 acres 
with some cattle, because of an earlier promise to her, pp.476-477. 
" HRA, 3, 1, p.477. Also: HRA, 1, 8, p.460, for comments on Geils, including that he was 'venal 
and corrupt'. 
" 73rd Regiment, unpublished two page paper, compiled by Brigadier EM Dollery, MVO, OBE, 
MC [Member of the Victorian Order, Order of the British Empire, Military Cross] (a Hobart military 
historian), Hobart, 1956. Provided by courtesy of The Black Watch Regimental Museum, Scotland. 
This paper includes a graphic description of the incident. Dollery stated that Gordon was to be shot 
and that it was Lieutenant William Lyttelton, who hurriedly returned from duck shooting and restored 
the hapless Gordon to his command. Dollery's account varies from Macquarie's, in the HRA, in 
regard to the departure of McHugo, whether under threat of 'being thrown into the river' he sailed 
away, or departed under military guard. Unfortunately, Dollery gives no primary source references. 
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Gordon, whereby they at length Effected sending Mr. McHugo hither [to 
Sydney] under a Military Guard.' 
A more serious scandal involving officers of the 73rd occurred in Sydney 
Town on the night of 30 June 1813. Two drunken officers, 'in Disguise, and 
dressed in Coloured Clothes', set upon and killed an inoffensive man, William 
Holness, who was endeavouring to protect his wife and another woman from the 
officers' unwelcome attentions, who were battering at the front door of his home.' 
The officers were imprisoned and charged in the Criminal Court with 'Wilful 
Murder'. This court was made up of the judge-advocate, one major, three captains 
and two lieutenants. The moral calibre of some of these officers is questionable. 
Major Gordon, of Port Dalrymple infamy, was the senior regimental officer and 
two of the other officers, Captain Brabyn and Lieutenant Lawson (both now of the 
Veteran Company) had been members of the infamous court which refused to try 
Macarthur on 25 January 1808. So, despite a strong prosecution case, the two 
accused were found guilty of 'manslaughter' only, fined one shilling and 
sentenced to six months in gaol.' Macquarie was furious that the two officers 
were not found guilty of murder. He directed that a strongly worded 
condemnation of 'the intemperate and disgraceful Conduct of Lieutenants 
Archibald M'Naughton and Philip Connor' be read at the next two parades of the 
73rd.' That the accused officers did not suffer to the full extent of the law, has 
similarities with the John Baughan scandal, where no recorded punishment was 
inflicted by the military on the four ringleaders who Hunter had initially threatened 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.391, for McHugo's claim to royal inheritance, p.545 for Macquarie's 1817 account 
to Bathurst, by which time Gordon had been promoted to lieutenant colonel. 
" HRA, 1, 8, p.6, for quotation from Macquarie's dispatch of July 1813. The officers were 
Lieutenants M'Naughton and Connor. Presumably 'Coloured Clothes' were a form of civilian dress. 
" HRA, 1, 8, pp.9-18. Evidence of witnesses for the prosecution, on which this outline account is 
based. 
" HRA, 1, 8, p.6, for Macquarie using the word, with his emphasis, 'MANSLAUGHTER'. The 
court, on 9 August 1813, found the two guilty of 'Feloniously killing and slaying', p.26. The 
sentence was to be served at Parramatta Gaol. 
" HRA, 1, 8, pp.5 and 7. 
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with punishment 'fatal to some'.' 
For Macquarie, Holness' killing, and the subsequent manslaughter finding, 
were the culmination of a number of breaches of military behaviour and discipline 
involving both officers and soldiers, which led him to take drastic action. He wrote 
to London:- 
gross irregularity of behaviour and an alarming degree of Licentiousness 
have for a length of time ... marked the general Conduct of the Officers 
and Privates ... of the 73rd Regiment ... [But] were a better example held 
forth [by the bulk of the officers], the Privates would, as a body, [have 
been] as correct as those of other Regiments!' 
Therefore, Macquarie requested the 'immediate removal' of the 73rd, to be 
replaced by a regiment 'from Home' and that in future no regiment remain more 
than three years in the colony. 
Macquarie deplored that the troops formed 'Matrimonial, or less proper 
Connexions [sic] with the Women of the Country ... lose sight of their Military 
duty and become ... identified with the lowest Class of the Inhabitants'. Possibly 
unintentionally, Macquarie may be referring to influence on the soldiers from 
England by the 267 soldiers transferred from the 102nd Regiment to the 73rd, and 
111 men transferred to the Veterans' Company. Had the 73rd's officers imposed 
severe discipline on these soldiers when they first transferred, the men, having been 
shown what was expected of them in their new unit, should not have caused the 
adverse influence they apparently did. 
Macquarie requested that no officers from the 73rd be allowed to exchange 
into the relieving regiment. This was to ensure such officers did not 'prolong the 
evil, they have so much fostered'. 101 Ritchie wrote that included amongst the 
" See above, Chapter 8, p.194, for quotation. 
I" HRA, 1, 8, pp.1-2. Macquarie to Bathurst of July 1813. He exempted Some of the Officers' 
from this criticism. 
"I HRA, 1, 8, p.4. 
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officers was Macquarie's cousin and aide, Lieutenant Maclaine, and that the 
governor 'was heartily glad to be rid of him in 1814'.' In conclusion, Macquarie 
admitted he was:- 
most truly distressed in making the present representation of the 73rd 
Regt., which, from my personal connexion with it, I have formed a strong 
partiality for, and thence naturally became induced rather to pass over, 
unnoticed, some occasional deviations (when they were not of a flagrant 
nature) than to draw'them thus into public View.' 
As an accepted truism, certainly within the British and Australian Armies, 
the commanding officer is held responsible whether his unit be good or bad.' 
Ritchie notes that 'Long before its removal, the governor had complained of the 
regiment's nefarious behaviour which he secretly attributed to O'Connell's 
indolence'. Regarding the sad record of the 73rd Regiment in the colony, 
Macquarie 'had fondly hoped that a stricter Discipline would have been 
adopted'." In this regard Macquarie, on his arrival in the colony, probably 
contributed to a somewhat relaxed attitude by his indulgent treatment of the 
102nd's officers and men 
Crossing Macquarie's dispatch of July 1813 requesting the relief of the 
73rd, the War and Colonial Office wrote to Macquarie in August 1813, advising 
that the 46th (South Devonshire) Regiment of Foot was to replace the 73rd. Upon 
arrival in the colony, the ships which had carried the 46th, were to be utilised to 
transport the 73rd to Ceylon (now Sri Lanka). To save time in preparing for this 
change-over, the War and Colonial Office instructed Macquarie to relieve 
outstation detachments of the 73rd with troops from the Veteran Company.' In 
102 J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.139. The 1811 Army List, for 73rd Regiment, p.279, shows 
John Maclaine promoted to lieutenant. 
1" HRA, 1, 8, p.5. 
'" Writer's personal experience and general reading. See above, Chapter 5, p.121, for Slim's 
quotation that 'there are no good battalions and no bad battalions ... only good and bad officers'. 
J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.139 HRA, 1, 8, p.4, for 'stricter Discipline'. 
106 HRA, 1, 8, p.55. Bathurst to Macquarie of August 1813. 
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reply, Macquarie admitted that company was incapable of such a task as 'Strong 
and Active Men' were required in Van Diemen's Land whereas soldiers of the 
Veteran Company were 'old and Infirm'.' An unfortunate commentary on their 
worth in assisting in internal security tasks. Nevertheless, the 73rd were shipped 
as planned between January and April 1814. Harking back to Holness' death on 
30 June 1813, the General Embarkation Return for the 73rd's transfer to Ceylon 
shows that Lieutenants 'Archibald McNaughton' and 'Philip Connor' sailed on 
the Earl Spencer, in January 1814. 1' With these officers in gaol from July 1813, 
they would have virtually served their six months. It is surprising that they were 
not forced to resign, as it is doubtful they would have commanded respect from 
their fellow officers and soldiers after their release. While presumably Macquarie 
was pleased to see the final departure of the 73rd, his criticisms still followed 
eleven months after their commanding officer sailed.'' He wrote highly critically 
of both Lieutenant Colonels O'Connell and Geils, who Macquarie believed were 
'particularly solicitous to obtain the Lieutenant Government of Van Diemen's 
Land' to replace the denigrated occupant, Davey."' 
The history of the First Battalion of the 73rd in Australia, was not a glorious 
page in the annals of that regiment. While there was apparently no major conflict 
of interest between Macquarie representing the civil power, and the military, several 
problems which led to lack of discipline in the New South Wales Corps were also 
apparent in the 73rd. Of particular note were poor officer leadership, and 
fraternisation of the soldiers with local inhabitants. These problems were 
accentuated by a lack of suitable barracks and the influence and example of those 
soldiers transferred from the 102nd to the 73rd and Veterans' Company. 
Nevertheless, it is probable that these same problems would have had worse 
HRA, 1, 8, p.119. Macquarie to Bathurst of January 1814. 
1 °9 HRA, 1, 8, p.163. M'Naughton, spelt as quoted above `McN.'. 
1 °9 HRA, 1, 8, p.142. In General Hewitt in April 1814. 
HRA, 1, 8, pp.460-461. Macquarie to Bathurst of March 1815. He again 'took the liberty to 
recommend [now] Major General Foveaux' for the appointment. 
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consequences leading to serious disputation between the civil and military powers, 
had a naval officer been appointed governor instead of Macquarie. As an 
experienced military commander, he was in a stronger position than that of a naval 
appointee to control and discipline the sometimes recalcitrant and self interested 
detachment commanders and their men, ensuring they carried out their prime role 
of providing security within the colony. 
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Chapter 13 
The 46th and 48th Regiments 
Whilst Macquarie was relieved to see the 73rd Regiment with their 
troublesome officers gone, his problems were not over as he was to experience 
difficulties with the replacement unit, the 46th (South Devonshire) Regiment of 
Foot. This was despite the fact that Lieutenant Colonel George Molle, the 46th's 
commanding officer, and incoming lieutenant-governor, was an old comrade with 
whom Macquarie had served in India and Egypt. 1 
Two events occurred before the 46th landed in the colony in 1814, which 
made a clash between the governor and the officers of that regiment inevitable. The 
first was Macquarie's policy on emancipists, advised in his first dispatch of April 
1810, in which he referred to the previous 'illiberal Policy' that existed in the 
colony in relation to:- 
Men who had been originally sent out ... as Convicts, but who, by long 
Habits of Industry and total Reformation of Manners, had not only become 
respectable, but ... the most Useful Members of the Community.... I have 
adopt[ed] a new Line of Conduct, Conceiving that Emancipation, when 
United with Rectitude and long-tried good Conduct, should lead a Man back 
to that Rank in Society which he had forfeited ... The Number of Persons 
of this Description whom I have yet admitted to my Table consist of only 
four. ... I have already appointed ... [one] a Justice of the Peace and 
Magistrate ... I intend to Confer the same Marks of Distinction [on two 
others] ... when Vacancies in the Magistracy ... may occur.' 
By 1812, Macquarie was able to write to London; 'I have found the greatest Benefit 
to result from ... this ... Policy'. However, he did note that some individuals who 
supported the anti-Bligh faction before his arrival in the colony, now refused to 
J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie A Biography, Carlton, 1986, p.59. HRA, 1, 9, p.442. 
2 HRA, 1, 7, pp.275-276. 
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recognise those emancipists favoured by himself, considering them 'Outcasts 
beneath their Notice'? 
The officers of the 46th Regiment were diametrically opposed to 
Macquarie's policy on emancipists. This gave rise to the second, and associated 
problem. Before their arrival in New South Wales, 'on the particular 
Recommendation of their commanding officer, Colonel Molle' they voted that no 
emancipists in the colony be allowed entry to their Officers' Mess. When 
Macquarie learnt of this, he took no action, believing the officers were at liberty to 
make mess rules as they saw fit. 4 However, this was later to become a matter of 
concern to him. Meanwhile, Macquarie was more concerned about two internal 
security problems; the increasing hostility of the Aborigines in New South Wales, 
and the scourge of bushrangers in Van Diemen's Land.' Both these issues 
involved the 46th Regiment 
By April 1814, Macquarie noted that some Aborigines had a 'Spirit of 
Hostility ... in Retaliation for Injuries done them Wantonly by the Settlers or their 
Servants'.6 The following month he reported that a soldier and three 'Europeans' 
had been killed in revenge for 'Liberties' being taken with Aboriginal women which 
had included the killing of one woman and her two children, who were 
'treacherously attacked'. In July 1814, a party of sixteen settlers, accompanied by 
four named Aboriginal guides, were ordered to 'use force in taking' five named 
'Wild Mountain Natives',7 Despite continuing disturbances, Macquarie expressed 
optimism that there would be no further attacks on the settlers 'unless provoked'', 
In October 1814, he optimistically told London that the country was in a 'State of 
perfect Peace and Tranquility [sic]', Further, he proposed to establish a Native 
• HRA, 1, 7, p.617. 
• HIM, 1, 9, p.443-4.44. 
• See above, Chapter 12, p.319. Bushrangers skirmishing with 73rd's patrols. 
• HIM, 1, 8, p.148. Macquarie to Bathurst. 
▪ Colonial Secretary Papers (henceforth CSP), SRNSW, reel 6044, 4/1730, pp.218-219. 
Macquarie to J Warbey and J Jackson of 22 July 1814. For list of participating settlers and 
Aboriginal guides, p.231. Presumably the sortie was unsuccessful, no report of results have been 
noted in any primary source. 
8 HRA, 1, 8, pp.250-251. 
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Institute for Aboriginal children at Panumatta as 'an Experiment towards the 
Civilization of these Natives'? In 1815, Macquarie made few references to 
Aborigines in his dispatches to London. His longest comments related to having 
met natives on his visit to Bathurst, noting they were 'perfectly harmless and 
Inoffensive, and not at all Warlike'.' Otherwise, he only made a passing reference 
to starting the proposed Native Institute at Parramatta and settling Aborigines on a 
small Farm near Sydney Cove on the northern shore." 
Unfortunately Macquarie's hopes for a peaceful coexistence between the 
expanding white settlement and threatened blacks were not realised and clashes 
occurred.' In December 1815, the Colonial Secretary wrote that the governor 
regretted:- 
that an Outrageous attack has been made ... by a large party of Natives, on 
huts of Your [Blaxland's] Government Men which it appears they have 
plundered all they [the huts] Contained, two men and a Woman narrowly 
escaped with their lives.' 
By March 1816, Macquarie reported to London that he could no longer 'have 
forgiven or Overlooked Many of their Occasional Acts of Violence and Atrocity ... 
on the defenceless remote Settlers' by the Aborigines. He advised that he already 
had small parties of troops on protective duties in threatened areas. These measures 
were inadequate. Therefore, Macquarie decided to conduct a widespread punitive 
expedition to protect settlers who were suffering 'outrages ... on and near the Banks 
of the Rivers Nepean, Grose and Hawkesbury'.' The troops detailed for this 
operation were the flank companies of the 46th Regiment. the Light Company 
commanded by Captain Shaw and Captain Wallis' Grenadier Company.' These 
two companies of selected men being the best troops in an infantry line battalion. 
9 HRA, 1, 7, p.313, for peace and tranquillity and pp.369-373 for details of Native Institute. 
1 ° HRA, 1, 7, pp.609-610. Macquarie to Bathurst of June 1815. 
" HIM, 1, 7, pp.466-467. Dispatch of March 1815. 
I 2 There is a parallel here to the "Black War" that developed from the mid-1820's in Van 
Diemen's land, despite Lieutenant-Governor Arthur's sympathy for the Tasmanian natives. A 
similar problem to that faced by Macquarie in 1816. 
CS?, SRNSW, reel 6004,4/3994, p.298. Campbell to Blaxland of 29 December 1815. 
CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1704, p.151. 
CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1735, p.40 for Wallis 'with the Grenadiers'. 
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Macquarie issued written orders on 9 April 1816 to various detachment 
commanders, for a coordinated operation to commence next day (Figure 26). 16 His 
operational aim as stated to the senior officer, Captain Shaw, was as follows 'The 
great objects in view being to Punish the guilty with as little injury as possible to the 
innocent.' Shaw was directed to observe "Secrecy ... so as if possible to surprise 
[hostile Aborigines] ... in their lurking places'." Both Shaw and Wallis were to 
have a mounted trooper attached to 'convey intelligence fast' and were supplied with 
the names of the wanted Aborigines as well as those who were to act as native 
guides!' Macquarie's instructions stressed that:- 
on falling in with the Natives, either in Bodies or Singly, they are to be called 
on by your friendly Native Guides, to surrender ... If they refuse ... [or] make 
the least Show of resistance, or attempt to run away ... you will fire upon and 
Compell [sic] them to surrender. ... Such Natives as happen to be killed ... if 
grown up Men, are to be hanged up on Trees in Conspicuous Situations, to 
Strike the Survivors with the greater terror ... You will use every possible 
precaution to save the lives of the Native Women and Children, but taking as 
many of them as you can Prisoners.' 
Amongst other detail, Macquarie pointed out that the 'Five Island Natives' were not 
involved in any murders or attacks initiated by the 'Cow Pasture and Mountain 
Natives'. Therefore, 'I do not wish them [the Five Island Aborigines] to be 
molested or injured in any way whatsoever'." 
While Macquarie enjoined his troops to strike terror into the hostile 
Aborigines, he also specifically ordered that mercy should be shown to all native 
women and children as well as to non-belligerent tribes. Regrettably, this amounted 
to almost contradictory orders when applied in the heat of a clash. Additionally, 
should bushcraft wise hostile natives be encountered, as soon as a friendly guide 
16 CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045,4/1734, pp.151-168. Macquarie to Captain Shaw. 4/1735, to 
Captain Wallis, pp.7-13 and Lieutenant Dawe, pp.1-6. All of 9 April 1816. Macquarie issued 
orders for subsidiary operations; to Sergeant Murphy, 4/1798, pp.35-37 of 22 April 1816 (for 
clearing areas to Cox's River and setting up a post to protect communications to Bathurst) and to 
Sergeant Brow:1foot? (4/1735, pp.44-48 of 8 May 1816) to proceed to the 'Bringelly District ... to 
attack [unnamed natives] ... and to compell [sic] them by Force of Arms to surrender'. J Connor, 
The Australian Frontier Wars 1788-1838, Sydney, p.50, for map of operations, Figure 26. 
" CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1732, pp.153-154. 
18 CSP, SRNSW, reel 6065, 4/1798, pp.44-48. 
19 
 
CS?, SRNSW, reel 6045,4/1734, pp. 157-158. 
20 CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1734, p.163. 
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Aborigines, April 1816 
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called on them to surrender, they would rapidly disappear and provide few, if any, 
targets upon which the troops could fire. Common sense would indicate that this 
surrender call would not be observed if soldiers made contact with hostile 
Aborigines, especially in the confusion of a night contact, as indeed happened on the 
night of 17/18 April 1816. Clashes at night would have had to have been anticipated, 
as a common way of locating Aborigines was to search for their camp fires from 
high ground at dusk, 21 . But in favourable circumstances, contacts were peacefully 
made with Aborigines. Lieutenant Parker later reported that on 26 April, his 
detachment built huts, and at first the local natives were alarmed, but because of 'our 
pacific Intentions, [they] declared themselves at Enmity with the Mountain Blacks'." 
Bearing in mind Macquarie's experience in fighting frontier wars in India, and how 
his orders were framed to detachment commanders, he was obviously aware that his 
blending of terror and humanitarianism would be hard for soldiers to apply in the 
confusion of a contact with hostile natives. 
In a proclamation made shortly after the return of the troops, Macquarie 
stated that detachments were ordered to 'drive away' hostile Aborigines from the 
remote settlements and take as many prisoners as possible. Subsequently, in the 
first paragraph of his dispatch to London reporting the operation, Macquarie wrote 
that the troops were to 'apprehend or destroy' the Aborigines. This was modified 
in the dispatch's second paragraph in that he gave instructions to 'take as many 
Prisoners as possible'. This was no doubt to soften, in the same paragraph, the 
stark report of the operation's only significant contact, when Captain Wallis' 
detachment, surprised a native camp at night, killing fourteen, of whom Wallis 
reported seven 'met their fate by rushing in despair over the precipice' on which 
they were camped. The troops only captured two women and three children. 
Ominously, no Aboriginal males, particularly wounded, injured or concussed were 
reported captured. Macquarie did concede that 'some few innocent Men Women 
and Children may have fallen'. J Connor notes that afterwards, the bodies of two 
21 CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1735, p.38. For example: on Sunday 21 April, Shaw sent `Lieut 
Parker to the heights at Sunset to look out for fires'. Post-operational report by Captain Shaw. 
" CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1735, p.60. Post-operational report by Lieutenant Parker. 
23 HRA, I, 9, p.142. 
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named male Aborigines were recovered 'from the creek and hung up' nearby.' 
Nevertheless, Macquarie confirmed that this 'painful Duty was Conducted ... 
perfectly in Conformity to the instructions I had furnished them! This attack 
which, to this writer, has the hallmarks of an action which became a massacre, 
enforced Macquarie's 'painful Duty', to create maximum terror amongst the 
Aborigines. 
As a prelude to this clash, Wallis' detachment was led to the site of an 
Aboriginal camp by a settler who earlier saw natives' fires burning. Their dogs 
gave warning of the approaching troops, who were however led directly onto the 
camp by the cry of a child. Pushing 'through a thick brush terrain', the soldiers 
attacked the Aborigines who fled from their steep cliff top camp, with a number 
jumping off this cliff which was located near a deep rocky creek. As the attack took 
place in 'moonlight [with] the grey dawn of morn appearing', the officers and non-
commissioned officers should have had sufficient vision to enable them to exercise 
a greater degree of troop control than would be possible on a dark night. Despite 
thisJourteen dead bodies were counted in different locations', but no immobilised 
wounded or injured were reported. In his post-operational report to Macquarie, 
Wallis stated, no doubt correctly, that 'I ordered my men to make as many 
prisoners as possible, and to be careful in sparing and saving the women and 
children'.' But it would appear that with the troops obviously weary after a long 
night march, then suddenly engaged in action, moderation did not prevail, only two 
women and three children being taken prisoner. 
Following the April 1816 operation, Macquarie issued a long and legalistic 
proclamation, presumably designed to satisfy London about his concern for the 
Aborigines' welfare. Also, it gave settlers legal protection allowing the Aborigines 
to be 'driven away by Force of Arms by the Settlers themselves'. The Aborigines 
knowledge of the proclamation's detail was probably minimal.' Macquarie, forever 
" J Connor, Frontier Wars, p.51. HRA, 1, 9, p.140, detail including casualties. 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.139-140. Macquarie to Bathurst of June 1816. 
CSP, SRNSW, reel 6045, 4/1735, pp.55-56. Wallis' post-operational report of 9 May 1816. 
27 HRA, 1, 9, pp. 141-145, for proclamation, quotation p.145. 
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optimistic in his endeavours to stabilise security along the borders of settlement, and 
also to present London with the impression of a well ordered colony, in April 1817, 
reported:- 
the Measures I had then and have Subsequently adopted have been attended 
with the desired Effect, and that all Hostility on both Sides has long since 
Ceased; the black Natives living now peaceably and quietly in every part of 
the Colony, Unmolested by the White Inhabitants.' 
Although the use of Aboriginal trackers was not mentioned in Macquarie's 
dispatch, this was possibly the first time that Aboriginal guides were publicly 
honoured for working with the security forces against other Aborigines. WC 
Wentworth, in his book published in 1819, quoted an article from the Sydney 
Gazette of 4 January 1817, referring to Macquarie calling the Aboriginal tribes 
together, at Parramatta in December 1816. In this, it was recorded that he:- 
afterwards conferred badges of merit on some [Aboriginal] individuals, in 
acknowledgement of their steady and loyal conduct in the assistance they 
rendered the military party, when lately sent out in pursuit of the refractory 
natives to the west and south of the Nepean river.' 
But, as noted by Connor, Aboriginal guides were used as early as 1805, when 'New 
South Wales Corps detachments were given native guides'?" 
Ritchie suggests that some actions by Macquarie between 1815 and 1818, 
including those he ordered against the Aborigines in 1816, were irrational as 
'Power had partly corrupted him; his opponents had done much to undermine his 
balance; sickness [effects of syphilis] had also contributed to his decline'.' 
However, if the harsh internal security operations ordered by other governors are 
considered, Ritchie's criticisms are possibly too severe. Phillip's two punitive 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.342. To Bathurst. 
" WC Wentworth, Statistical, Historical, and Political Description of The Colony of New South 
Wales and Its dependent Settlements in Van Diemen's Land, London, 1819, Adelaide facsimile 
edition 1979, p.20. 
" J Connor, Frontier Wars, p.48. 
31 J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.152. 
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raids,' and Arthur's "Black Line" of 1830 in Van Diemen's Land,' also had their 
critics, but never was it suggested that these governors were corrupted by power or 
unstable in any way. While Macquarie's reprisals are retrospectively considered 
brutal, judged by contemporary standards, they were an acceptable response. 
Indeed, nine years after Macquarie's 1816 operation, Bathurst directed the then 
governor, Lieutenant General Darling:- 
respecting the manner, in which the Native Inhabitants are to be treated 
when making hostile incursions for the purpose of Plunder, ... it is to be 
your duty when such disturbances cannot be prevented or allayed by less 
vigorous measures, to oppose force by force, and repel such Aggressions in 
the same manner, as if they proceeded from subjects of any accredited 
[enemy] State.' 
A later series of incidents concerning Aborigines was related by Louis 
Freycinet, commanding the French ship Uranie, which visited Sydney in 
November/December 1819. He wrote of his officers who encountered Aborigines 
while crossing the Blue Mountains, where they met an old man, Karadra, a tribal 
chief. William Lawson who accompanied them stated that Karadra was 'dangerous 
to the English, who died in considerable numbers at his hands, and yet nobody had 
been able to catch him in the act.' Nevertheless, Karadra had helped the British 
fight 'primitive peoples of the interior', when they approached the Nepean, or 
warned the English when he was not strong enough to turn them back, also he acted 
'as a guide for English troops when enemy tribes spread across the countryside to 
plunder it.' Possibly Karadra had mixed motives which could explain his 
contradictory behaviour; allying himself with the British when threatened by strong 
hostile tribal raids, or attacking the whites when provoked or suitable targets 
presented themselves. 
By 1817 Macquarie was sanguine about the Aboriginal situation, but he was 
32 See above, Chapter 3. pp.65-67. 
33 JF McMahon, 'The British Army: Its Role in Counter-insurgency in the Black War in Van 
Diemen's Land', Tasmanian Historical Studies, Vol.5.1, 1995-1996, pp.60-61. For brief 
background, when during October/November 1830, about 2000 soldiers and anned civilians, 
attempted to sweep insurgent Aboriginal tribes into Tasman Peninsula. 
HRA, 1, 12, p.21. Bathurst to Darling of July 1825. 
35 L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales 1788-1839, translated T Cullity, Potts 
Point, 2001, p.22. 
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becoming increasingly concerned about the number of convicts absconding. 
Bushranging was a problem, especially in Van Diemen's Land, where as early as 
1809, Bligh reported that 'about Sixty, and some of them well armed, are now in the 
Woods'.' L Robson believed that arming convicts to hunt kangaroo to feed the 
hungry settlers, was the origin of the bushranger menace. From this evolved a 
'sub-culture ... of those who found a hunting and wandering life to their taste'' 
These men formed associations with non-outlaws who acted as receivers Of 
kangaroo flesh and stolen mutton, and who in turn supplied the bushrangers with 
ammunition, clothing and spirits. Collins' threats to punish the receivers were 
fruitless, because the colony needed food, and the receivers were profiting. As a 
result:- 
A whole industry sprung up ... aided by the fact that many of the convicts 
in the bush were twice-convicted men who preferred almost anything to 
further punishments ... As settlement slowly extended, the stock-keepers 
and Crown servants [convicts] on the edges of the bush ...became more 
hand-in-glove with the outlaws'." 
In 1812, Macquarie called on the commandants of Hobart Town and Port 
Dalrymple in Van Diemen's Land to supply names of absconders for inclusion in a 
proclamation to induce bushrangers to surrender, or alternatively, be hunted down." 
This was apparently his initial step in preparing his proclamation issued in 1814, the 
year in which the under strength 46th Regiment, gradually assumed responsibility 
for internal security in the colony. Macquarie expressed concern to London about 
bushrangers, particularly around Port Dalrymple. Surprisingly, the leaders were 
'two persons, who lately held official and creditable Situations under this 
Government, namely Peter Mills, late Acting Deputy Surveyor of Lands, and 
George Williams, lately Acting deputy Commissary of Provisions at Port 
36 HRA, 1, 7, p.161. Bligh to Castlereagh of July 1809. 
37 L Robson, A History of Tasmania, Vold, Van Diemen's Land from the Earliest Times to 
1855, Oxford, 1983, p.79. 
38  L Robson, A History of Tasmania, pp.80-81. 
" HRA, 3, 1, p.483. Macquarie to Geils of June 1812. 
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Dalrymple'.' Both were known to Macquarie, and Mills had worked with the 
governor during Macquarie's tour of the Port Dalrymple area, accompanying him 
on some exploratory trips in the Tamar region. In his journal entry for Thursday,12 
December 1811, Macquarie recorded that 'Dr. & Mrs. Mountgarrat and Mr. & 
Mrs. Mills dined with us this day and also the officers of the Detachment'!" That 
Mills and Williams should fall so far from grace is unusual, although it was 
reported that both 'became embarrassed financially, and, to escape their creditors, 
joined the bushrangers.'' 
Finally, when Macquarie issued his proclamation on 28 May 1814, both 
Mills and Williams, together with twenty-seven other named bushrangers, including 
Michael Howe, were offered a pardon, provided they surrendered by 1 December 
and had not committed 'the Crime of Wilful Murder'.' The lieutenant-governor of 
Van Diemen's Land, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Davey, who first came to the 
colony as a lieutenant with the marine detachment of the First Fleet, considered 
Macquarie's proclamation unfortunate. Davey wrote in a dispatch:- 
a latitude was given [in Macquarie's proclamation] for the Commission of 
crime for no less a period than six Months, and which I cannot help 
ascribing as the great cause of all the distress and difficulties, with which 
these Settlements have lately had to contend.' 
While Davey blamed Macquarie, Macquarie 'Attributed to the Want of an Efficient 
and Energetic Government in that Island' the need for Davey to later declare martial 
law.' 
" HRA, 1, 8, p.250. Macquarie to Goulbum of May 1814. HRNSW, 7, p.367, for Mills' 
appointment by Bligh at a salary of £911510 per annum. HRA, 1, 8, p.126, for Macquarie 
advising London, in February 1814, that Williams was appointed, as recommended by Bathurst, 
and that a free passage to the colony would be available to Mrs Williams on request. 
" Lachlan Macquarie Governor of New South Wales - Journals of his Tours in New South Wales 
and Van Diemen's Land 1810-1822, Sydney, 1956, p.71, for dinner and pp.70-77 for occasional 
reference to Mills. 
" HRA, 3, 2, p.764, Commentary Note 42. 
" HRA, 1, 8, pp.264-265, for proclamation. HRA, 3, 2, p.451-452, for Mills' escape after 
capture, aided by a soldier of the 46th. Both were recaptured. HRA, 1, 8, p.452, by October 1814, 
Lieutenant-Governor Davey had requested that Mills be shipped to Sydney, together with 
witnesses. HRA, 3, 2, p.568, Mills, and two other bushrangers from Van Diemen's Land, did not 
stand trial in Sydney as the judge-advocate considered there was inadequate evidence presented 
against them. 
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HIM, 3, 2, 131. Davey to Bathurst of September 1815. 
" HRA, I, 8, p.555. Macquarie to Bathurst of June 1815. 
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The discord between Macquarie and Davey reflected in dispatches to the 
Secretary of State revealed a personality clash between the two men. Ritchie 
considers that with Macquarie unimpressed by Davey's record in Van Diemen's 
Land, he was 'Alarmed lest his subordinate bring his own administration into 
dispute' Additionally, Macquarie's pique may have been increased by his 
nominee for the lieutenant-governorship of Van Diemen's Land being consistently 
overlooked. Macquarie, surprisingly, first nominated Lieutenant Colonel Foveaux 
in March 1810, before Foveaux returned to England to possibly face court martial 
charges connected with Bligh's illegal detention in the wake of the mutiny.' 
Macquarie again strongly recommended Foveaux in April 1810 (following 
Collins's death), in April 1814 (should Davey give cause to be `remove[dr) and in 
March 1815 (should Davey be 'superseded or recalled'). Apparently Macquarie 
resented that his recommendations were ignored when Davey was appointed in 
preference to Foveaux, and from their first meetings in Sydney, Macquarie indicated 
his poor opinion of Davey. For example, Macquarie informed Bathurst he had to 
be 'more pointed and Strict in my Instructions' to Davey, noting that 'Davey 
should be tied down by Rules, and held Accountable to me [Macquarie's emphasis] 
for his Conduct and Measures in the immediate Administration of them'.' Two 
days later referring to these Instructions, Macquarie, based on a warning of Davey's 
character by Under Secretary Goulbure, stated:- 
I shall use every possible precaution to prevent his [Davey] making any 
improper use of the authority He is invested with as Lieutenant Governor ... 
[and Macquarie had yet] to form any accurate Judgment of his Conduct or 
of the regularity in his Accounts. 
But the moment I discover that He sanctions any peculation ... I shall take 
immediate measures to prevent a repetition thereof.' 
This initial distrustful attitude was followed by several adverse reports to London 
including that of April 1814, reportips, that Rovey was 'dissipated in his Manners 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.150. 
" HRA 1, 7, p.222. See above, Chapter 12, pp.313-314, for early preferential treatment. 
" References respectively: HRA, 1, 7. p.262, HRA, 1, 8, p.242 and p.460. 
49 HRA, 1, 7, p.709. Macquarie to Bathurst of June 1813. 
" ADB, 1, p.289. 
" HRA, 1, 7, p.790. Macquarie to Under Secretary Goulburn of June 1813, requesting that Lord 
Bathurst be informed. 
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and Morals... [and] a very unfit man' to be lieutenant-govemor. Again, in March 
1815, he had 'an extraordinary degree of frivolity and low buffoonery in his 
Manners'.' As a result of this destructive onslaught, in April 1816, Bathurst 
directed that Davey resign. He was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel William Sore11, 
instead of Foveaux who Macquarie had preferred In November 1828, memories 
of this clash of personalities still lingered and were summarised by Lieutenant-
Governor Arthur who, in a dispatch to London, wrote:- 
from the unaccountable jealousy entertained by Governor Macquarie 
towards Van Diemen's Land, every measure appeared most directed to 
retard it's [sic] advancement, certainly nothing was done to hasten its 
prosperity.' 
Unfortunately for Macquarie, in March 1815, with few bushrangers 
surrendering, he had to accept that his proclamation of May 1814 had been 
unsuccessful. He therefore sent Instructions to Lieutenant-Governor Davey that 
more constables were to be appointed, armed, and together with small parties of 
soldiers, scour the bush. Also, consideration was to be given to offering rewards 
for capturing a bushranger. Macquarie wrote to London that 'the very Small 
Military Force' on the island since the departure of the 73rd, would not justify 
martial law being proclaimed. Nevertheless, he considered that 'I greatly fear this 
Banditti Can never be entirely extirpated by any other Means than by Enforcing 
Martial Law and Using of a Strong Military Power against them.'" 
Meanwhile, with increasing bushranger activity becoming 'outrageous and 
alarming', Davey published his own proclamation in March 1815, offering 
substantial rewards for information leading to the arrest of any bushranger. This 
included a pardon, and return to Britain, for any bushranger who betrayed his 
" HRA, 1, 8, p.242. Macquarie to Goulbum. 
" HIM, I, 8, p.458. Macquarie to Bathurst. 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.113-114. Bathurst to Macquarie. 
" HRA, Resumed Series 3, 7, p.639. Arthur to Sir George Murray of November 1828. Also 
p.847, Commentary Note No.529. 
56 HIM, 1, 8, pp.465-466. Macquarie to Bathurst of March 1815. 
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fellows. As with Macquarie's proclamation of May 1814, bushranger activity 
continued unabated. The Reverend Robert Knopwood recorded on Monday, 24 
April 1815, that at New Norfolk:- 
8 of the bushrangers had been there that morning and robbed severe! [sic] of 
the settlers ... [they] had wounded Jemott, Triffet, Obyrn [Oburn], Carlile 
[Carlisle], Murphy ... the same night Carisle was dead and they did not 
expect that Oburn and Murphy would live. 
Next day, 25 April 1815:- 
At 10 all the officers, civil and military, and the gentlemen of the colony met 
and ... from the alarmed state of the colony, His Honor the Lieut Govnr 
found it necessary [to] proclaim martial law as a security to the inhabitants, 
which was accordingly done at Govmt. House before all the inhabitants.' 
Despite Macquarie's rejection of the option of martial law, in Davey's 
opinion this proclamation was necessary to overcome a serious legal problem in 
Van Diemen's Land, in that there was no Court of Criminal Jurisdiction in the 
island, therefore all major crime cases had to be referred to Sydney for trial. 
Commenting on this, RW Giblin noted that 'so great was the delay, expense and 
inconvenience caused by forwarding accused persons, accompanied by witnesses, 
that in 1815 and 1816 only two cases were sent to trial [at Sydney]'." This was 
unacceptable to Davey who considered swift administration of justice was necessary 
for the 'effectual suppression' of bushrangers. Thus, he 'felt it my [Davey's] duty 
to proclaim Martial Law as the only alternative in my power to restore peace and 
tranquility [sic]' 6°  The resultant death sentence passed on bushranger, Hugh Burn, 
by a general court martial established under martial law, was carried out three days 
later, showing justice and retribution were swift.' Of the six men sentenced to 
57 HRA, 1, 8, p.472. Davey to Macquarie of March 1815. For proclamation, pp.473-474. 
58 The Diary of The Reverend Robert Knopwood 1803-1838, ed. M Nicholls, Hobart, 1977, 
p.201. The second quotation has been amended from the published text, as one line of print was 
obviously out of sequence. 
59 RW Giblin, The Early History of Tasmania, Vol.2, The Penal Settlement Era, 1804-28 
Collins, Soren and Arthur, Melbourne, 1939, p.126. However, these limited numbers are partly 
explainable due to martial law between April and October 1815, when criminal cases were dealt 
with in Van Diemen's Land. 
60 HRA, 3, 2, p.131. 
61 HRA, 3, 2, pp.119-120, for proceedings of the court. The Diary of The Reverend Robert 
Knopwood, pp.207-208. Burn was court martialled on Monday 26 June 1815, and executed on 29 
June. 'He died very hardened.' 
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death during the period of martial law, four were executed.' Mr Justice Jeffery Bent 
commented to London that these men were 'illegally [executed] though perhaps 
deservedly'. Commissioner Bigge agreed with Macquarie's 'rightly considered' 
opinion that Davey's legal power 'did not extend' to such a declaration. 
Nevertheless, he recognised that the want of a local criminal court was the 'principal 
justification' for Davey's action. " Finally, 'with the dreadful state owing to the 
bushrangers', martial law imposed an additional strain on the available troops, to the 
extent that Knopwood commented that in Hobart, the town was defended by patrols 
of inhabitants.' 
Bearing in mind unsuccessful measures already undertaken by Macquarie 
and Davey (who offered convict informers a 'Free Pardon and a Passage to his 
Native Country'), it would appear that "Mad Tom" Davey's declaration of 
martial law was best suited to the circumstances, even though taken against the 
advice of his Deputy Judge-Advocate. The final outcome was that Macquarie 
deplored Davey's action and ordered the proclamation be immediately annulled.' 
Once this was repealed by Macquarie's order in October 1815, the bushranger 
menace continued unabated. Finally, following Macquarie's demands that Davey 
be replaced, the latter was allowed to resign his appointment.' It was left to his 
replacement, Lieutenant-Governor Sorell, to continue to grapple with the problem.' 
While Macquarie was having problems with Davey, an outright feud 
developed between himself and many officers of the 46th. The bonds of friendship 
62 HRA, 4, 1, pp.919-920, Commentary Note No.75 . For execution numbers, p.920. 
" HRA, 4, 1, p.168. Bent to Bathurst, November 1815. 
64 Report of the Commissioner Of Inquiry Into The State Of The Colony of New South Wales. 
Ordered ... to be Printed, 19 June 1822, [The Bigge Report], Adelaide, 1966, p.110. ADB, 1, 
p.289, notes that `Bigge later upheld the expediency of Davey's action'. However, except for 
noting Davey's legal justification, Bigge did not appear to support Davey's declaration. 
" The Diary of The Reverend Robert Knopwood, p.205. Diary entry of 19 May 1815. 
" HRA, 1, 8, p.474. Subject to approval by 'the Governor in Chief'. 
67 HRA, 3, 2, p.126. Macquarie to Davey of September 1815. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.114. Bathurst to Macquarie, of April 1816, directing Davey be allowed to 
resign. 
69 BRA, 3, 2, p.194, for Sorell assuming the appointment in April 1817. 
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between Macquarie and Molle broke down to the extent that Macquarie wrote in 
1817:- 
the Rank and Title of Lieut. Governor seem more favourable to the 
Cherishing Principals of Opposition to the Measures of the Government and 
Governor than to the promoting the Public Service; a jealousy of the power 
of a Superior [Macquarie's emphasis]. ...On these Grounds, ... I do not 
hesitate to recommend that, when Colonel Molle the present Lieut. 
Governor shall be ordered hence with the 46th Regiment, that the office of 
Lieutenant-Governor be totally abolished' 
Major General Sir Thomas Brisbane, who succeeded Macquarie as governor on 1 
December 1821, followed this up, writing to the War Office that 'the Lieutenant 
Governor should never be selected from amongst the Troops in the Colony, as His 
interest and that of the Government are at variance and prejudiced to the Service'." 
Both Macquarie and then Brisbane wanted to ensure that the civil power dominated 
that of the military. 
Macquarie's disputation with the officers of the 46th developed in 1815 
when he reprimanded a domineering officer, Captain Sanderson. The latter then 
formed a strong clique amongst the 46th's officers, who took every opportunity to 
belittle Macquarie's govenunent,n They extended their mess embargo on 
emancipated convicts, by refusing - without bothering to make any excuse - 
Macquarie's invitations to dine at Government House.' This unprofessional 
military embargo became part of a larger three sided wrangle between Molle and his 
officers on one hand, and the 46th's officers, sometimes including Molle, against 
Macquarie on the other. This extended disagreement was indicative of the poisoned 
atmosphere which developed in this isolated garrison. WC Wentworth summed 
this up:- 
the civil and military officers with their families ... [are] not free from those 
divisions which are so prevalent in all small communities. Scandal appears 
to be the favourite amusement to which idlers resort to kill time and prevent 
ennui;" 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.393. Macquarie to Bathurst of May 1817. 
" HRA, 1, 10, p.610. Brisbane to Major General Sir H Taylor of January 1822. Commentary 
Note No.131, pp.833-834, for problems governors had with their lieutenant-governors, from Ross 
to Molle. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.445. 
" HIM, 1, 9, p.446. 
" WC Wentworth, Statistical, Historical, and Political, p.28. 
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The result of this disputation was that Macquarie, in July 1817, submitted to 
'the Prince Regent', through the Commander-in-Chief, a detailed report, with copies 
of voluminous correspondence generated by the dissension amongst the officers.' 
In this dispatch, Macquarie also requested the 'Speedy Removal' of the 46th 
Regiment from the colony.' This request proved unnecessary, as in the following 
month, the first transports entered Port Jackson carrying elements of the 48th 
(Northamptonshire) Regiment of Foot, to replace the 46th. The commanding 
officer of 48th, and in-coming lieutenant-governor, was Lieutenant Colonel James 
Erskine, who despite rumblings amongst some of his officers, ensured that 
Macquarie's emancipists were not excluded from the 48th's Officers' Mess.' 
Ritchie places the dispute between Macquarie and officers of the 46th within 
a wider social context. He notes that amongst others, conservatives such as Justice 
Jeffery Bent and his judge-advocate brother Ellis, together with Reverends S 
Marsden and B Vale and a crown solicitor, William Moore, did their utmost in the 
colony and in London, to undermine Macquarie because of his emancipist policies 
and unbending attitude to his opponents - 'his absolutism'.' This was a conflict of 
interest within a divided society, where the dictates of penal-type internal security 
was disputed by settlers opposing Macquarie's government. The conservative 
settlers, or `exclusivist faction', led by Reverend Marsden and the Bent brothers, 
'wished to exclude emancipists from all places of trust and consequence, as well as 
from respectable company'. Ritchie illustrates this, noting that from December 
1813, the rift between the Bents and Macquarie 'widened when Ellis's brother, 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.441-475. 
76 HRA, 1, 9. p.450. This was despite general knowledge that the 46th were shortly due to be 
replaced. First transports carrying part of the 48th Regiment arrived in August 1817, pp.487 and 
709. 
77 It is not known whether the emancipists wanted to, or did, attend the 48th's Officers' Mess for 
social visits (as opposed to formal vice-regal occasions), but for Macquarie this represented a 
victory. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.161, for conservatives, and p.146 for 'absolutism'. 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.224, for 'exclusivist faction'; pp.136-137, led by Marsden and 
the Bents; p.146, for exclusion of emancipists. 
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Jeffery, arrived [in the colony] and opposed the admission of ex-convict attorneys 
to his court'.  Commissioner Bigge, who was not backward in criticising 
Macquarie, reported that he 'manifested ... towards them [the emancipists] a larger 
share of attention than he has manifested towards those of the free class.' Again, 
Bigge noted 'Mr. Marsden's objections to the policy of appointing men who had 
been convicts to the magistracy ... [and that] Governor Macquarie ... could not 
tolerate any difference of opinion upon it' 81 
Macquarie's bitter wrangles with those who opposed him, led to agitation in 
parliament against the governor, whose reputation was sullied by a variety of 
allegations, including his post-war lack of instigating fiscal responsibility in limiting 
expenditure in the colony, and also in being too lenient with convicts. The Vale 
affair, and a submission by Macquarie's opponents to parliament, described in 
Chapter 14, were typical of incidents which contributed to the tarnishing of 
Macquarie's reputation in London. His alleged faults were actively canvassed by 
Macquarie's detractors, and Bathurst, hoping 'to forestall attacks on his Office and 
his governor ... proposed an enquiry'.' In making this submission, Bathurst 
noted the irritation of the settlers who 'feel a Repugnance to submit to ... the Rules 
applicable to a Penitentiary'.' His recommendation to the Home Secretary, Lord 
Sidmouth, was for the 'appointment of Commissioners ... to investigate all the 
Complaints which have been made both with respect to the Treatment of the 
Convicts and the General Administration of the Government'. The result was the 
establishment of the Bigge Inquiry, whose recommendations had far reaching 
effects on administration in the colony. Nevertheless, before this eventuated, Ellis 
and Jeffery Bent had been removed from their colonial appointments.' 
In Chapter 5, reference was made to Montague's article, in which he noted 
" J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.136. 
" The Bigge Report, pp.147 and 83 respectively. 
82  J Ritchie, Lachlan Macquarie, p.156. 
" HRA, 1, 10, pp.807-808, Commentary Note No.5. Letter Bathurst to Sidmouth of April 
1817. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.111. Bathurst to Judge-Advocate Bent of April 1816. Ellis died in November 
1815 before arrival of the letter. Justice Bent was separately dismissed, pp. 112-113. 
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the relative youth and inexperience of the officers and men of the 46th and lower 
physical standard of its soldiers compared to those of the New South Wales 
Corps. Several incidents in Van Diemen's Land, where inexperienced men of the 
46th performed poorly (to be referred to later), contrasted unfavourably with their 
successors, the more seasoned 48th, of which, at the time of their arrival in the 
colony, half the corporals and privates were veterans. The 48th was a proud 
experienced unit, having had two battalions on active service from 1809 in the 
Peninsula campaign. The soldiers of these battalions were amalgamated after the 
slaughter of Albuera in May 1811. Thereafter, the First Battalion served throughout 
the campaign, up to and including the last battle, at Toulouse, in April 1814." The 
post-war morale of the regiment was high, as indicated by their march to Cork to 
embark for New South Wales. Referring to this, the 48th's regimental history 
recalls 'during this march not a single desertion took place, which was quite 
exceptional at the time in the case of a unit ordered on foreign service.' With this 
depth of experience amongst all ranks, especially during the earlier part of its tour 
of duty in the colony, the regiment's actions against bushrangers were often 
successful. Their task was made more difficult, as many bushrangers were service 
trained and experienced. From 1811, during the Peninsula War, an increasing 
number of convicted soldiers were sentenced to serve in the colony, or were 
transported. Also deserters who 'had not gone over to the enemy' were transferred 
to African or New South Wales based units. This was probably a comparatively 
small number, as there appears to be no historical documentation concerning this 
issue. However, where a soldier was sentenced to penal servitude, the 'penal 
settlement to which the convict was sent ... was almost invariably New South 
Wales!' These trained and disaffected ex-service convicts, created a major 
problem which concerned Macquarie in the post-war period. 
" RH Montague, 'The Men of the New South Wales Corps: a Comparison?', JRAHS, Vol.62, 
Pt.4, March 1977, passim. 
" C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison 1817-1824, The 48th Foot The Northamptonshire Regiment 
in the Colony of New South Wales, Canberra, 1996, p.46, for number of veterans, pp.11-16 for 
Peninsula. 
" R Gurney (Lt. Col), History of The Northamptonshire Regiment 1724-1934, Aldershot,1935, 
extracts courtesy Museum of The Northamptonshire Regiment, p.187. 
88 C Oman, Wellington's Army 1809-1814, London, 1912, p.238. 
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Following the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815, the rapid demobilisation 
of the navy and army found many thousands of ex-servicemen destitute, a 
discharged soldier of 71st Regiment, wrote in a letter of May 1818:- 
These three months, I can find nothing to do. I am a burden on Jeanie and 
her husband. I wish I was a soldier again. I cannot even get labouring 
work. ... I have seen my folly. I would be useful, but can get nothing to 
do.' 
The regular army, which did not include the militia, shrunk from a war-time peak of 
237,000 men at home and abroad to 64,426 at home by 1820. 9° With high 
discharge rates, there was an increase in numbers of convicts with previous military 
service sent to the colony after the war. Macquarie expressed concern about the 
many convicts 'trained to the Use of Arms as Soldiers and Sailors'. 91 Additionally, 
the number of convict ex-servicemen was boosted by an increase in soldiers 
sentenced to transportation for 'Military offences', described by Robson as 
'Insubordination; breach of the Articles of War'. For the period that overlaps this 
thesis, Robson's five per cent sample of convicts sent to the colony shows the 
number of military offenders as:- 
1787-1789 
1790-1799 
	
1800-1809 	4 
1810-1819 	13 
1820-1829 	12" 
Robson states that 'an indication [his emphasis] of true totals may be obtained by 
multiplying [these numbers] by twenty'. Therefore, the approximate total 
represented above is:- 
29 x 20= about 580 military offenders transported between 1800 and 1829. 
Of this number, approximately 318 were transported to Van Diemen's Land and 
89 '71st', 'A discharged soldier's farewell to his family, 1818', Rank And File, The Common 
Soldier at Peace and War 1642-1914, TH McGuffie compiler, London, 1964, p.400. 
" C Bamett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970, A Military, Political and Social Survey, 
Harmondsworth, Pelican 1974, pp.258, for wartime and p.278 for 1820. 
91 HRA, 1, 10, p.184. Macquarie to Bathurst of July 1819. 
" LL Robson, The Convict Settlers of Australia, Carlton, 1976 reprint, p.179 and p.192, for 
extract from table. Interestingly, in the next 20 years, 1830-1849, there was a dramatic increase in 
these numbers. 
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262 to New South Wales.' 
The increase of ex-service convicts, plus military offenders transported to the 
colonies, posed a significant internal security risk, mainly, but not exclusively, in the 
post-war period. The notorious bushranger, Michael Howe, was so trained, having 
deserted from both the army and navy before being transported for highway 
robbery in 1812. 94 Also there were a few deserters from regiments in the colony 
who took to bushranging. As discussed later, Peter Geary, of the 73rd Regiment, is 
an example of a deserter who caused the security forces many problems before he 
was killed in June 1817. After his death, Geary's gang 'was led by .Septon, 
formerly a Soldier of the Rifle Corps', who must have been transported during the 
Napoleonic Wars, being already known as a bushranger in April 1815. 96 
Macquarie noted that Captain McKenzie, 46th Regiment, reported 'several 
Desertions have taken place from ... the 73rd Regt. ... previous to their Embarkation 
at Hobart Town'!" Reviewing the problem of service trained convicts and deserters 
in the colony, Macquarie complained to Bathurst of 'the total Inadequacy of the 
present Force' at his disposal.' 
The relief of the 46th created a shortage in the number of troops available for 
duty, for apart from 250 men (made up of two companies in Van Diemen's Land 
and a half company at Newcastle), the regiment sailed with a strength in excess of 
'500 Rank and File'. Yet the strength of the incoming 48th was 'under 440 Rank 
and File, and out of that number only about 350 ... [are] fit for duty'. Therefore, 
Macquarie sought retrospective War Office approval for his action in retaining the 
" LL Robson, The Convict Settlers, pp.176, for multiplying factor, and p.210 for total 
transported to each colony, converted to a percentage and applied to statistics under study. 
" C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, p.62. 
" HRA, 3, 2, p.264. Sorell to Macquarie of July 1817, for killing of Geary: p.776, 
Commentary Note 103, for Sorell's proclamation of July 1817, which noted Geary deserted from 
the 73rd. 
" HRA, 3, 2, p.274, for taking over leadership, and p.94 for inquest in April 1815, into a murder 
by bushrangers. On p.97, there is a reference to a bushranger who was 'the Fifer of the 73d Regt.' 
" HRA, 3, 2, pp.446-447. Copies of McKenzie's first four dispatches to Macquarie are missing 
(p.446), so it is uncertain if Geary was listed amongst this group. 
98 HIM, 1, 10, p.184. Dispatch of July 1819. 
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outlying detachments of the 46th until the 48th were reinforced. In Van Diemen's 
Land, the last company of the 46th continued to be severely stretched by constant 
patrols against bushrangers up until it was replaced in June 18182' 
An incident involving ex-soldier turned bushranger Geary, emphasises the 
disadvantage young inexperienced soldiers of the 46th faced against desperate 
trained opponents. In May 1817, a patrol of a lieutenant and eight soldiers of the 
46th, accompanied by a constable and 'Crown Servant [convict] who had been a 
soldier', surprised a party of eight bushrangers led by Geary. The bushrangers 
dropped their packs and hastily retired to the edge of a wood, here they rallied and a 
fire fight developed in which the lieutenant was wounded. With some indecision 
the military withdrew 'across the plain' - presumably a somewhat disordered retreat 
over open ground where they were exposed targets for the hidden bushrangers. 
The bushrangers followed the hastily departing soldiers, recovering their packs 
before quitting the area. Sore11, himself an experienced officer,' considered that 
'the faults and oversights, committed ... appear to have arisen more from want of 
steadiness and coolness, which usually fail in very young soldiers'.' 
In a further incident involving Geary's gang, Georgetown was seized and 
plundered by bushrangers in June 1817. The garrison of a lance-sergeant and five 
soldiers 'were surprised in their Hammocks and tied' while the stores were 
plundered and two boats stolen for an abortive attempt by the bushrangers to 
escape. The convict work party at Georgetown joined in the plundering, as their 
sole supervisor, Inspector of Works, William Leith, was himself imprisoned, under 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.487-488. Macquarie to Torrens of September 1817. 
C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, pp. 60 and 62. The companies of the 46th were replaced 
by the 48th in Port Dalrymple and Hobart Town, in April and June 1818 respectively. The 46th's 
detachment at Newcastle was not relieved until December 1818, p.37. 
`ol ADB, 2, p.459, for details including active service in the West Indies in 1793 where he was 
wounded, also in North Holland in 1799 and in 'minor attacks on Spanish naval ports' in 1800. To 
his credit, as a major, Sorell was a member of the Light Brigade trained in England by Sir John 
Moore. Lieutenant Colonel Sorell proved his worth as a staff officer in the Cape of Good Hope 
from 1807 to 1811. 
1" HRA, 3, 2, p.248. Sorell to Macquarie of May 1817. The officer was Lt Nunn, whose 
seniority in that rank dated from 7 September 1815, Army List, June 181 7, no other 
bibliography, (courtesy of The Museum of The Northamptonshire Regiment), p.34. 
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trumped up charges, by the Commandant of Port Dalrymple, Brevet-Major James 
Stewart, 46th Regiment. Again Soren attributed the incident to 'our Young Soldiers 
are not knowing [Sore11's emphasis] enough'. Sore11 continued, the bushrangers 
'Number is now thirteen, which requires such strong parties as are impracticable 
with the present force'. He commented that while Geary:- 
believed himself proscribed from all chance of Mercy, he retains influence 
or even command sufficient to keep them [his gang] united ... Their perfect 
knowledge of the Country and habits of fatigue, temperance and caution 
render them a difficult Adversary. Could the present [leadership] be 
removed, who have acquired their experience by three years practise, I 
confidently feel that Bush Rangers as an Armed Band would not again 
appear in the Colony.' 
Despite the gloom cast by bushranger successes, shortly after the 
Georgetown raid, Geary was dead. The chain of disasters for the gang started in 
March 1817, when a patrol under Ensign Mahon, 46th Regiment, discovered three 
bushrangers in an ambush position. In a brisk action, two were killed and one 
wounded who escaped.' This escapee, Parker, unable to regain contact with the 
rest of Geary's gang, was captured in July 1817, although he had already made an 
offer to surrender. About the same time, two other gang members, separated after 
Georgetown, 'offered to give themselves up ... provided their lives were spared'. 
These two 'experienced Bush-Men', assured of mercy by Sore11, gave valuable 
information. This resulted in the gang, totalling eleven, being successfully attacked 
by a sergeant's patrol of eight from Captain Nairn's Company of the 46th based at 
Hobart Town. They captured three bushrangers, including Geary who was 
wounded and died that night. All the gang's knapsacks were also seized.' 
Vigorous patrolling by the 46th, had splintered off gang members, as a prelude to 
disaster for Geary. 
1" HRA, 3, 2, p.254. Sorrel to Macquarie of June 1817. 
1" HRA, 3, 2, pp.201 and 473-474 for details. Mahon was the senior ensign in 46th, with 
seniority dated 13 January 1814, Army List, June 1817, p.34. 
1 " HRA, 3, 2, pp.264-265, for narrative in this paragraph. For Sore11's proclamation of 5 July 
1817, offering large rewards for key members of Geary's gang, refer. Commentary Note 103, 
p.776. The reward for Geary was 'One hundred guineas'. No reference has been noted about any 
reward being paid to the soldiers. However, the sergeant was highly commended to his 
Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Molle, p.265. 
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While the companies of the 46th continued patrolling the bush in Van 
Diemen's Land, on the mainland of New South Wales, the incoming 48th Regiment 
carried out routine internal security duties, which continued for most of their tour of 
duty. The regiment's history records 'work carried out by the troops was that of 
police rather than soldiers; ... the maintenance of order amongst the convicts and the 
protection of the free settlers, not only against the convicts, but also against the 
aborigines!' Typical duties included 'guards on convict working gangs, in 
pursuit of escaped convicts and bushrangers and at remote military outposts, such 
as at Cox's River on the Blue Mountains road ... to check the passes of 
travellers'.' In Sydney, eighty-six soldiers were routinely rostered daily for duty 
at the governor's residence, the dockyard, the barracks, Dawes Battery, Fort Phillip 
and the main town guard.' But despite Macquarie giving little indication in his 
dispatches that conditions were other than tranquil on the mainland, the troops were 
often engaged in anti-bushranger operations. 
Sargent gives several examples of the 48th's operations in New South 
Wales. Corporal Marland and his four soldiers, in fifteen months at Cox's River, 
captured '25 bushrangers, including one group of thirteen who had attacked the 
post at Springwood'.' Marland, and two other soldiers were veterans of the 
Peninsula campaign which could account for their successes. On another occasion, 
twenty-two soldiers, under command of Lieutenant Close, unsuccessfully scoured 
the Cow Pastures (near today's Picton) for a 'Banditti of about 20 armed runaway 
convicts"' While this expedition was unsuccessful, Bigge refers to the assistance 
given to the military by the Aborigines of 'Port Hunter and Port Stephens [who 
have] become very active in retaking the fugitive convicts." So, although 
Macquarie did not draw attention to the fact in his dispatches, it is apparent that 
there was a considerable degree of lawlessness during the latter period of his 
1" R Gurney, Northamptonshire Regiment, p.187. 
'" C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, p.30. 
1 " C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, p.32. 
1 " C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, pp.43-44. 
110 C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, p.42. 
The Bigge Report, p.117. 
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government from 1817 to 1821. This is confirmed in a letter written by an officer, 
to his father, regarding the two companies of the 48th stationed in Sydney:- 
a very inadequate force ... Our men have very hard work; they are almost 
continually in the bush after runaway prisoners who are a great terror to the 
peaceable settlers" 2 
Emphasis in the above paragraphs has been placed on internal security 
problems posed by bushrangers while little is officially recorded regarding 
mainland Aborigines creating disturbances after Macquarie's punitive expedition of 
April 1816. A rare exception was Macquarie's instructions to the commandant at 
Port Dalrymple that no special treatment should be given to a native sentenced to 
seven years transportation from Sydney."' However, Surveyor-General Oxley 
reported to Macquarie on 'the ferocious treachery of the Natives along the Coast to 
the Northward [of New South Wales, and] ... having one man ... wounded by 
them'.' Macquarie, now exhibiting a paternal attitude towards the Aborigines in 
and around the settled area, wrote to Bathurst:- 
The rapid Increase of British Population, and the Consequent Occupation of 
the Lands formerly dwelt on by the Natives having driven these harmless 
Creatures to more remote Situations, It is my purpose to form the proposed 
[Aboriginal] Establishment in the distant fertile Tract of Country, lately 
discovered ... 
I propose to Assign a proportion of Land to the Extent of ten thousand 
Acres for their permanent Benefit ... this Measure [is] ... One worthy of 
British Feelings to a harmless Race, who have been without a Struggle 
driven ... from their ancient places of Inhabitation."' 
Whilst this statement proposed a means to redress the unfortunate plight of the 
Aborigines, there is no doubt from an internal security view point, with only limited 
troops available to Macquarie, such a conciliatory attitude also made good military 
sense. 
112 C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, p.54. Quotation from The Blomfielcl Letters. 
1 " HRA, 3, 2, p.471. Macquarie to Stewart of July 1816. 
" 4 HRA, 1, 10, p.31. Oxley to Macquarie of November 1818. 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.262, Macquarie to Bathurst of February 1820. This dispatch was written 
almost four years after his punitive military action of April 1816. Therefore, allowing for changed 
circumstances over this period, and changing opinions, to which all individuals and groups are 
subject, it is still argued that Ritchie's view of Macquarie's aberrant behaviour (referred to earlier in 
this chapter) is not valid in this instance. 
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In Van Diemen's Land, during the period of Macquarie's government, there 
was negligible trouble between whites and blacks involving the security forces. A 
typically minor incident was reported by Ensign Mahon that he had arrested one of 
'three civilized Black Natives', who were armed and had committed 'a robbery on 
Mr. Beaumont's cart'.' Statistically, this relatively peaceful situation is confirmed 
by B Plomley's extensive studies. He notes that in Van Diemen's Land in the first 
twenty years of white settlement, 'there were few attacks [on whites] each year, 
sometimes none at all, and the average rate between 1804 and 1823 is no more than 
1.75 attacks per year'."" Wentworth wrote of this period, when 'Two persons 
armed with muskets may traverse the island from one end to the other in the most 
perfect safety.' 118 Whilst the number of individual Aboriginal deaths is not 
recorded by Plomley, the comparatively low level of violence against the settlers is 
indicated by only three Europeans and one Pacific Islander being speared to death 
by Aborigines between 1803 and 1823. Additionally, in the same period, two 
whites were wounded by spears.' Nevertheless, as noted by LC Mickleborough, 
the apparent calm was changing, and Sore11 'recognised that the extension of and 
progressive occupation of land was likely to produce clashes' with the 
Aborigines.'' Indeed this was a basic cause of the vicious "Black War" which 
developed from the mid-1820's.' 
In Van Diemen's Land, while the Aborigines at the time were generally 
passive, the bushranger menace continued unabated. Sore11, who assumed the 
116 HRA, 3, 2, p.474. Report of March 1817. 
117 B Plomley, The Tasmanian Aborigines, Launceston, 1993, p.85. 
" 8 WC Wentworth, Statistical, Historical, and Political, p.117. However, Wentworth also wrote 
of the lingering hate engendered by the Risdon Cove incident of 1803, when soldiers used a cannon 
to fire on a large group of Aborigines, pp.116-117. 
1 " NJB Plomley, The Aboriginal / Settler Clash in Van Diemen 's Land 1803-1831, Launceston, 
1992, pp.54-58. Table of 'Aboriginal/Settler clash : Incidents reported 1804-1831'. The first 
incident was 'The Risdon Affair' of 3 May 1804, in which no whites were casualties. Over this 
period, Plomley recorded a total of thirty-seven incidents. 
1 " LC Mickleborough, 'Colonel William Sorell, Lieutenant-Governor of Van Diemen's Land 
1817-1824: An Examination of his Convict System and Establishment of Free Settlement', 
Hobart, unpublished MA Thesis, University of Tasmania, 2002, p.189. 
1 " JF McMahon, 'The British Army and the Counter-Insurgency Campaign in Van Diemen's 
Land with Particular Reference to the Black Line', Hobart, unpublished MHum Thesis, University 
of Tasmania, 1995, passim. 
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appointment of lieutenant-governor in April 1817, during the worst of Geary's 
excesses, was obviously prepared to learn from bush wise members of the 46th. 
Looking towards the future, he wrote at length to Macquarie about anti-bushranger 
tactics, including continuation of disguised patrols, sanctioned by Davey and 
practised by the 46th. Ensign Mahon's party was wearing civilian clothes at the 
time they successfully contacted the group of bushrangers referred to earlier. Sore11 
advised that 'two parties (disguised) were constantly out' - apparently one from 
Port Dalrymple and the other from Hobart Town.' An unfortunate sequel 
occurred in March 1821, when disguised 48th Regiment patrols from the north and 
south, failing to recognise each other, engaged in a fire fight in which a corporal was 
killed and several soldiers wounded.' Nevertheless, this scheme provided the 
military with a greater chance of moving undetected, particularly as sympathisers 
would warn bushrangers of any threat. Additionally, Sore11 proposed 
encouragement to informers, such as Michael Howe, who had been in useful 
communication with Davey. Macquarie agreed with this proposal noting that 'Bush 
Rangers had numerous friends and abettors at Hobart Town ... [and that] Howe will 
be able to throw sufficient light on this subject.' 
Concluding his dispatch, Sore11 recommended the establishment of 'a 
permanent party or two on the [Hobart Town/Port Dalrymple] line of 
communication [which] will greatly check improper intercourse, robberies of Cattle 
and other Offences, and will give confidence to the quiet and honest settler."' 
Macquarie agreed with this concept, suggesting four military posts at 'nearly equal 
Distances from ... Derwent to Port Dalrymple', when adequate troops were 
available.' During Macquarie's visit to Van Diemen's Land in 1821, he 
designated these sites and named them Perth, Campbell Town, Oadands and 
1 " HRA, 3, 2, p.194. Sore!! to Macquarie of May 1817. 
1 " C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, p.80. 
1 " HRA, 3, 2, p.241. Macquarie to Sore!! of May 1817. 
1 " HRA, 3, 2, p.195. Also p.773, Commentary Note 85, for informers and Howe 
communicating with Davey. By September 1817, Howe had escaped from his nominal arrest and 
forfeited any hope for mercy, p.275. He was killed in October 1818 by a private of the 48th and a 
convict, p.363. 
126 HRA, 3, 2, p.269. Macquarie to Sore!! of July 1817. 
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Brighton, all of which continue as townships today.' In a separate dispatch to 
Macquarie, of the same date, Sore11 requested forty or fifty muskets for issue to 
'Crown servants' [convicts] in an 'Emergency', and thirty reinforcements for the 
46th, 'upon the success of which ... the reestablishment of order in the Interior 
mainly depends." This bundle of proposals indicates the careful consideration 
Sore11 gave to measures intended to overcome the bushranger menace. Bigge's 
assessment of Sore11 was 'measures adopted by Lieutenant-governor Sorel!, 
immediately on his arrival at Hobart Town ... were of the most judicious kind."' 
Bushrangers continued to be active, and by September 1817, Sore11 lamented 
that 'there were twenty Men in the Bush'. One means of reducing the menace was 
considered in correspondence between Sore11 and the Commanding Officer of the 
46th, Lieutenant Colonel Molle. The latter had agreed to the transfer of an 
operationally experienced sergeant from the 46th to the incoming 48th. As a result, 
Sore11 recommended to Macquarie that should two or four bush-wise soldiers 
consent to a transfer to the 48th, it would provide the detachments of the 48th 'with 
some few Leaders and Guides perfectly acquainted with the Country and the Bush-
ranging System ... [making the] new Troops speedily efficient.' Subsequently, 
Sore11 submitted the names of two suitable lance corporals with less than twelve 
months to serve.' 
While Sore11 was pleased to retain the services of two soldiers of the 46th, he 
would have been gladdened to be rid of Stewart's company from Port Dalrymple, 
which was replaced by Major Cimitiere's company of the 48th in April 1818. 1' It 
will be recalled that Stewart was commandant at Port Dalrymple when Geary and 
his bushrangers captured the detachment at Georgetown. During his command, 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.504, for towns. 
128 HRA, 3, 2, p.198. 
1 " The Bigge Report, p.109. 
130 HRA, 3, 2, p.275. 
HRA, 3, 2, p.280. To Macquarie of October 1817. 
132 HRA, 3, 2, p.316. Macquarie to Sorell of April 1818. Commentary Note 122, p.780, for 
details of Cimitiere's regimental service with the 48th. This only partly describes the extraordinary 
military career of this mercurial officer, also ADB, 1, pp.223-224. 
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discipline within his company deteriorated, as exampled by murders committed by 
two of his soldiers, one at York Plains and the other at Launceston. In the latter 
case, Sore11 believed that Stewart failed to forward evidence in order to `skreen the 
Man'." Stewart also showed serious lack of judgment, such as wrongly arresting 
Ensign Mahon over a minor quibble, when Mahon was acting on Sorell's orders to 
pursue convicts who had stolen a boat, delaying the chase by three days.' 
Stewart's behaviour was such, that despite having returned to Sydney, Sorell 
preferred ten court martial charges against him.' This lack of discipline and sound 
command around the Tamar River area detracted from the efficiency of the 
company to perform its internal security duties. Meanwhile, Captain Naim's better 
disciplined company of the 46th, at Hobart Town, had one soldier found guilty of 
manslaughter as a result of a violent quarrel with a civilian.' Macquarie's view of 
the situation was:- 
It is ... much to be regretted that the Soldiery at Port Dalrymple more 
especially, and in a recent instance even at the Derwent, should have 
manifested such a Spirit of licentiousness and insubordination. ... [This] 
can only be repressed by making some few dreadful examples of those most 
guilty, and the officers commanding the Detachments observing and 
enforcing a more strict and rigid Discipline in future.' 
It is probable that the company commanders of the 48th, who relieved the 
46th in Van Diemen's.Land, received a strong brief from Macquarie before their 
HRA, 3, 2, p.287. Sore!! to Macquarie of November 1817. 
"4 HRA, 3, 2, pp.322-323. Sore!! to Macquarie of May 1818. 
"5 HRA, 3, 2, pp.477-478. 	Macquarie to Stewart of June 1818. As Sorell and other witnesses 
would have been required to give evidence at a court martial in Sydney, with consequent 
interruption to government in Van Diemen's Land, the charges were not laid. Instead, Macquarie 
wrote to the Commander-in-Chief reporting Stewart's behaviour. Macquarie believed this would 
cause Stewart to be 'dismissed from His Majesty's Service', pp.325-326. 
136 HRA, 3, 2, p.289. Sore!! to Macquarie of December 1817. Despite this incident, Sorell did 
not fault this company whose 'services have been most useful'. 
'' HRA, 3, 2, p.292. Macquarie to Sore!! of January 1818. This statement is not seen as an 
example of Arthur's opinion of Macquarie's 'unaccountable jealousy ... towards Van Diemen's 
Land'. Rather, it is seen as consistent with a need to maintain discipline in distant outposts where 
there had been reports of problems, especially in Port Dalrymple. 
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departure from Sydney.' Undisciplined behaviour would detract from the image 
he presented in his dispatches to London, of a peaceful law abiding colony. For 
example, some five months after Michael Howe was killed, in March 1819, 
Macquarie wrote:- 
Van Diemen's Land is at length restored to perfect Peace and Tranquility 
[sic] by the Vigorous, Energetic, and Judicious Measures of Lieut. 
Governor Sore11; by which their Leader, or Chief, Michael Howe, and the 
whole of the ferocious Banditti of Runaway Convicts, that so long Infected 
the Settlements [Hobart Town and Port Dalrymple areas] ... have either 
been taken or Extirpated. In Consequence of which happy Change, the 
Settlers now Carry on their Agricultural and Grazing Concerns 
undisturbed' 
He had written in the same tone in December 1817, lauding SoreII's actions, noting 
'The Banditti ... [which] Infect those Settlements and Commit various Sanguinary 
Acts ... have been almost entirely extirpated" 4° 
Despite Macquarie's continued optimistic statements, during his tour of Van 
Diemen's Land in 1821, he conceded that 'arising out of the System of Marauding 
and Plunder, which had been only partially subdued', firm action was required. 
Therefore, of twenty-six capitally convicted prisoners at Hobart Town, he ordered 
ten hanged. Shortly after, of thirteen at Port Dalrymple, nine were executed after it 
was 'mutually agreed between the Judge Advocate and Myself that it was highly 
expedient to make striking Examples amongst these reprobate Characters.'' 
Macquarie noted in his journal on Saturday, 28 April 1821 'This morning the 
undermentioned criminals [their 10 names listed] ... were executed at Hobart 
Town'. Then, on Friday, 25 May, 'It rained all day ... I signed the warrants for the 
execution of nine [named] criminals ... the five former being directed to be executed 
1 " HRA, 3, 2, p.333. Major Thomas Bell's company relieved the 46th's company at Hobart 
Town in June 1818. C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison, pp.10, 14-15, 148. Bell joined the 48th 
as an ensign in 1799 and in 1812, as a captain, was wounded at Badajoz during the Peninsula 
campaign. Fighting in the Pyrenees in 1813, After a bloody action Bell was awarded a Gold 
Medal after command of the 48th devolved on him during the engagement. Also, he was awarded 
the rank of brevet major for this distinguished service and a CB (Companion of the Order of the 
Bath), probably on four occasions, due to officer casualties, he commanded the 48th in action. In 
India in 1827, Lieutenant Colonel Bell was appointed to command the 48th. 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.90. Macquarie to Bathurst. 
1 " HRA, 1, 9, pp.717-718. Macquarie to Bathurst. 
141 HRA, I, 10, pp.507-508. Macquarie to Bathurst of July 1821. This is an extraordinary 
mixing of the executive and judicial functions. 
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on Wedy. the 30th inst. at Launceston, and the last four on Monday the 4th of June 
at George-Town' . 142 
Apart from Macquarie's attempt to control lawlessness by threat of 
execution, Sorell had earlier visualised another means to maintain internal security 
on the island. He proposed that 'a small Settlement' be formed at the newly 
discovered Macquarie Harbour, where coal and huon pine could be obtained and 
'as a Place of Banishment and Security for the Worse Description of Convicts'. In 
May 1818, Macquarie advised London he supported this proposal, and that the 
settlement be established 'as soon as practicable'. Receiving no response, Sorell 
again wrote to Macquarie in June 1821 on this topic. Noting that due to 'the rapid 
encrease [sic] of the Convict Population' this establishment was 'most urgently 
required'.' Meanwhile, Sorell had discussed this proposal with Bigge who 
reported that Macquarie Harbour 'appeared... to possess some particular 
recommendations for a place of punishment.' Thereafter, the latter advised 
London that he had authorised the founding of this settlement 'as a Place of Ultra 
Banishment and Punishment of Convicts'.' 
Provided expenses were minimised, Macquarie knew that Bathurst would not 
object to this proposal having been ordered by Bathurst in January 1819 to avoid 
'ill considered Compassion for Convicts'. Bathurst intended that within the United 
Kingdom, transportation would be 'an effectual Punishment for the Prevention of 
Crime', being seen as 'an Object of real Terror to all Classes of the [British] 
Community'.' Nevertheless, while Macquarie saw the need for places of ultra 
punishment, there was a fundamental difference between Macquarie's vision of a 
grand future for the colony, and Bathurst's more immediate requirement for it to 
1 " Lachlan Macquarie - Journals of his Tours , pp. 179 and 189. 
HRA, 1, 9, p.796. Macquarie to Bathurst. 
HRA, 1, 10, p.528. 
145 The Bigge Report, p.113. 
146 HRA, 1, 10, p.527. Macquarie to Bathurst of July 1821. 
' 47 HRA, 1, 10, p.7. Bathurst to Macquarie of January 1819. Quotations from Bigge's three 
Instructions of 6 January 1819, pp.4-11, copied to Macquarie. Caution to Bigge on control of 
expenditure, pp.6-7. 
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serve as a serious deterrent to crime in Britain. While Bathurst also appreciated the 
need to encourage the rule of law for free settlers, he wanted New South Wales to 
again gain a reputation as a dreaded penal colony, such as when the 'Settlements 
were in their Infancy'.' 
Before he left England, Bigge was well aware of Bathurst's particular 
concern that the British public had:- 
so little of Apprehension [of transportation] ... that numerous applications 
are made from those who are sentenced to Imprisonment for Minor 
Transgressions [pleading] that they may be allowed to participate in the 
Punishment to which the greatest Offenders are condemned! 5° 
Freycinet, who had the greatest regard for Macquarie and his administration, which 
was 'so fatherly and firm and replete with important and useful achievements', 
noted that it was said 'this worthy General had granted too many tickets-of-leave'. 151 
Possibly, the two large groups of convicts hanged during Macquarie's 1821 tour of 
Van Diemen's Land, reflected a tougher attitude by Macquarie, as demanded by 
Bathurst, considering that these nineteen convicts, hanged specifically on 
Macquarie's orders, were the only persons executed in Van Diemen's Land in 
1821. This number contrasts markedly with the total of only thirty-three executions 
(including the nineteen in 1821) carried out during Sore11's seven years in office.' 
To tighten convict discipline, Macquarie had recognised the desirability of 
remote penal settlements as places of secondary punishment, before Bathurst 
(possibly influenced by the logic of Macquarie's dispatches) directed that in 
isolated areas:- 
distinct Establishments exclusively for the Reception ... of Convicts ... 
[should be established to] effectually separate the Convict from the Free 
1 " See below, Chapter 14, p.373-374, for vocal settlers and footnote 23, for Bathurst's quotation. 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.5. 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, pp.5-6. 
151 L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales, p.209, for 'fatherly and firm' and p.612, for 
'tickets-of-leave' (Freycinet's italics). 
152 LC Mickleborough, 'Colonel William Sorell', p.265, for execution statistics. The lowest 
yearly total was one person hanged in 1819. 
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Population ... [and aid] classifying the Offenders, according to the Degrees 
of Crime" 
Meanwhile, before this directive was received, Oxley had discovered Port 
Macquarie, north of Newcastle, on the New South Wales coast. In July 1819, this 
was reported by Macquarie, as a suitable 'place of Banishment'. After approval by 
Bathurst, Macquarie ordered it be established in March 1821 as a penal outpost.' 
Despite this approval, Bigge did not favour this site as a place of secondary 
punishment being not 'sufficiently distant from other settlements to prevent the 
attempts at escape, that are already so frequent at Port Hunter'.' 
The establishments of Macquarie Harbour and Port Macquarie generally 
aided internal security by isolating hardened secondary offenders from colonists, 
both bond and free. Yet, this benefit also contributed to a different security 
problem. The establishment of additional guarded penal settlements, and other 
guard detachments in both Van Diemen's Land and New South Wales, further 
stretched, into "penny packets", the limited military garrison. WC Wentworth 
gives a contemporary view of this problem:- 
The military force stationed in the colony ... form an effective body of about 
seven hundred firelocks. ... [They] furnish parties for the various towns 
and outposts of the extended territory of Port Jackson: so that very few 
troops remain at head quarters. ... Much anxiety is felt on this subject by 
the generality of the inhabitants, who have not forgotten the insurrection [of 
1804] which took place when the whole population was not nearly so great 
as the present amount of the convicts, although the military force was of 
equal magnitude. That insurrection indeed was easily quelled; but the result 
of another, under existing circumstances, would in all probability, be very 
different.' 
The increased burden placed on the security forces is indicated by Fletcher's 
comment that between 1815 and 1821, due to the abysmal socio-economic 
conditions in post-war England, 'the number of convicts on the mainland increased 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.6. HRA, 1, 9, p.796, for Macquarie's recommendations for establishment of 
Macquarie Harbour in May 1818, and see below, footnote 147, for Port Macquarie. 
1" HRA, 1, 10, p.178, for reporting discovery of Port Macquarie in July 1819; p.306, for 
Bathurst's dispatch of May 1820 authorising an establishment there; and pp.479-487, for 
Macquarie's dispatch of March 1821 and Instructions for establishment of the outpost. 
1 " The Bigge Report, p.164. 
156 WC Wentworth, Statistical, Historical, and Political, pp.32-33. 
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by 14,081'.' This increase over five years almost equals the total of 15,648 
convicts transported over the twenty-seven year period from 1787 to 1814. 1' 
Whilst the post-war increase in convicts transported was dramatic, at the same time 
there was a slight decrease in the size of the garrison, from 73rd Regiment's 
wartime strength of 813 other ranks, to post-war strengths as shown below;- 
In 1817: the 46th Regiment's strength was approximately 750 other ranks, 
In 1819: the 48th Regiment's strength was 776 other ranks.' 
One initiative of Macquarie's to 'separate the Convict from the Free 
Population' while conserving troop deployments, also came to fruition before he 
was advised of the forthcoming Bigge Commission. In March 1819, Macquarie 
advised London that in Sydney, the 'New Convict Barrack ... Surrounded by a very 
high Stone Wall ... [with the barracks built] to Contain between Five and Six 
hundred Men ... will be occupied in One Month'. Then in July, he reported:- 
The beneficial effects, experienced by the Police ... [and] Community from 
this new Establishment ... not a tenth part of the former Night Robberies 
and Burglaries being now committed, since the Convicts have been lodged 
in the New Barracks.' 
AGL Shaw noted that at first the convict barracks housed 688 prisoners with the 
capacity increased to 800 in 1820. Additionally, he wrote of 'another smaller 
barrack [in Sydney, accommodating] 250, and another at Parramatta 150; another 
was building at Windsor, and there was another at Sydney for 150 juveniles. All 
this permitted closer discipline'. 161 
Convict barracks were well utilised and the Sydney Gazettes for 1817 
(tabulated by Wentworth) noted seventy-three convictions in the criminal court for 
crimes which 'for the most part [were] of a heinous nature'. But, as Wentworth 
BH Fletcher, Landed Enterprise and Penal Society A History of Fanning and Grazing in New 
South Wales Before 1821, Sydney, 1976, pp.160-161. Quotation from p.161, p.136 for 3,090 
convict arrivals between 1810 and 1814. 
158 LL Robson, The Convict Settlers, pp.170-171. Based on statistics from both 'Tables (ii)' 
based on Bateson's research, which Robson considers reliable. 
1 " HRA, 1, respectively Vol.8, p.163, Vol.9, p.487 and Vol.] 0, p.287, for strengths. 
Apparently, the reduced peace time establishment for the 48th, of 650 rank and file, referred to 
later, was never implemented because of Macquarie's, and later, Brisbane's protestations. 
1" HRA, 1, 10, p.96, for dispatch to Bathurst of March, and p.193 for that of July 1819. 
161 AGL Shaw, Convicts and the Colonies A Study of Penal Transportation from Great Britain and 
Ireland to Australia and other parts of the British Empire, Carlton, reprinted 1978, p.81. 
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pointed out, only a fraction of persons charged passed through the criminal court 
that year with a total of approximately 10000 convicted by 'the criminal courts, by 
the benches of magistrates, by the superintendent of police, or by the district 
magistrates'. 
One of Macquarie's major concerns during the latter part of his 
governorship was lack of troops. As a result of the run down of the British Army 
following the end of the Napoleonic Wars, Bathurst, in September 1818 advised 
there would be no increase in the garrison's strength, as requested by Macquarie. 
As a substitute, Bathurst suggested a militia be formed from the 'Free 
Population'.' In acknowledging Bathurst's dispatch, Macquarie, in July 1819, 
pointed out that the 48th Regiment's proposed peace-time establishment of 650 
rank and file was 'totally inadequate to the wide Range of Duties required ... in this 
Country'. He had 'Serious Apprehension ... [should a] Demagogue ... light the 
Torch of Sedition'. Further, Macquarie stated that 'To give a reasonable Security 
for the good order and Peace of this Country, including Van Diemen's Land, ... a 
disposable Force of double the present Strength of the 48th Regt. is absolutely 
Meanwhile, Macquarie agreed with Bathurst that 'a Militia might serve a 
very valuable purpose ... [but] one [Macquarie's emphasis] far inferior to what is 
derivable from Soldiers of the Line'. Macquarie advocated that 'Cavalry will be 
Eminently Useful in the present Extension of the Population'. He went on to 
propose a colonial establishment of 443 infantry and 165 cavalry. This being 
subject to London's approval, and also supply of designated uniforms, equipment 
`(including Saddles etc. etc.)'.' There the matter apparently died. 
Macquarie's representations of July 1819 regarding 'Soldiers of the Line', 
did have some effect. Almost a year after he signed his dispatch, the War and 
1" WC Wentworth, Statistical, Historical, and Political, pp.230-235. 
1 " HRA, 1, 9, p.837. 
1 " H RA , 1, 1 0 , p.184. Macquarie to Bathurst of July 1819. 
165 HRA, 1, 10, pp.185-187. 
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Colonial Office advised a small, but heartening, troop increase, 'for the Safety of The 
Settlement'. Bathurst wrote that included in the 'Army Estimates for the present 
Year [1820]', approval was given by the Lords of the Treasury for 'a Regiment of 
not less than One Thousand Rank and File' for the colony.' Indeed by 1821, the 
strength of the 48th was 81 rank and file, representing an improvement in forces 
available to Macquarie.' With the British Treasury struggling to reduce a massive 
war time national debt,' this was a small, but significant victory by the War and 
Colonial Office, forcing Treasury to act in support of internal security in a remote 
and relatively unproductive penal colony.' 
Meanwhile in London, Macquarie's designated successor, Major General 
Sir Thomas Brisbane, (who assumed office on 1 December 1821), had been 
studying Macquarie's dispatches and corresponding with the War and Colonial 
Office. In March 1821, he requested three artillery pieces, ammunition and 
associated stores, together with two instructors, be added to the colonial garrison. 
This was agreed, but apparently the two instructors were never posted to the 
colony.' 
Brisbane, before he left England, was also advised that the Rear Admiral 
Commanding the Fast Indies Station had received orders from the Admiralty 'that 
one of His Majesty's Ships should always be stationed on the Coast of New South 
Wales'. Further, this ship's commander was to 'communicate with the Governor 
of the British Colony for the general benefit of His Majesty's Service'. Similarly, 
1 " HRA, I, 10, p.315. Bathurst to Macquarie of July 1820. 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.576. The increased strength of the 48th by November 1821 (not including 
other supernumerary troops in the colony) was more than offset by the arrival of a further 12,244 
male convicts between 1820 and 1824, LL Robson, The Convict Settlers, pp.170-171. 
1 " RM Hartwell, The Rising Standard of Living in England, 1800-1850', in European Political 
History, 1815-1870, Aspects of Liberalism, editor EC Black, New York, 1967, p.24. The 
national debt stood at a record figure of £33.9 million in 1815, reduced to £28.1 million by 1845. 
169 Apparently the Treasury approval advised by Bathurst to Macquarie in July 1820 (see above, 
footnote 166 refers), was rescinded in August 1821, as indicated by Governor Brisbane's 
objections of January 1822 (see below, footnote 172). 
1 " HRA, 1, 10, p.830, Commentary Note 116, for Brisbane's request and p.497 for Under 
Secretary Goulburn's reply of April 1821. For non arrival of instructors, refer p.708, Brisbane to 
Bathurst of August 1822. 
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Brisbane was to communicate with the ship's commander in all cases where such 
communication may appear to be necessary 'for the Benefit of His Majesty's 
Service'. 171 This was a loose arrangement with 'the general benefit of His 
Majesty's Service' being in danger of differing interpretations by an army governor 
and a naval commander. 
Shortly after his arrival in Sydney, Brisbane was confronted with the same 
internal security problems that had beset Macquarie. In January 1822, he wrote to 
the War and Colonial Office, referring to Macquarie's dispatch that the garrison 
should consist of at least 1000 troops, and complained against the directive, of 
August 1821, that the 48th should be reduced to the peacetime establishment of 
regiments 'at Home'. He continued:- 
'I hope ... I shall stand excused for suspending, for a time, the reduction of 
the Regiment here, as I could not consider myself responsible for the 
consequences, if any diminution of the Force took place.' 
Brisbane followed up these strong words by recommending the disbanding of the 
'Invalid Company'; that no regiment should be stationed in the colony for more 
than three years; the colonel of this regiment should not be the lieutenant-governor; 
and the garrison should be increased by a second regiment.' By 1823, Brisbane 
had his second regiment, with the arrival of the 3rd (East Kent) Regiment (The 
Buffs). In the following year, the 48th was relieved by the 40th (Somersetshire) 
Regiment.' 
Brisbane and Macquarie also had a similar security problem attempting to 
control the bushranger menace. During his first month in office, Brisbane issued a 
proclamation offering pardon to 'Prisoners of the Crown, and Others, who have 
absconded ... where, as Bushrangers, they can maintain themselves by ... Pillage and 
Rapine.' Bushrangers guilty of murder were exempt from mercy.' That these 
were troubled times is illustrated by the dates when places of secondary punishment 
' 7 ' HRA, 1, 10, p.498. Bathurst to Brisbane of May 1821. 
172 HRA, 1, 10, pp.609-610. Brisbane to Major General Sir H Taylor, London. For Brisbane's 
refusal to accept responsibility if there was any 'diminution of the Force'. 
1" G Odgers, Army Australia an Illustrated History, Frenchs Forest, 1988, p.17. 
174 HRA, 1, 10, p.721. Brisbane assumed office on 1 December 1821, p.612. 
364 
were opened with agreement from London. It is more than coincidence that four 
major settlements were established over a short four year period. These were:- Port 
Macquarie 1821; Macquarie Harbour 1822; Redcliff, Moreton Bay, 1824; and 
Norfolk Island, reopened in 1825. These were needed to control and discipline 
serious re-offenders whose sentences were short of execution. This rapid 
development of penal establishments indicates a crisis in maintenance of order, of 
which bushranging was the major security problem. 
In June 1824, Brisbane recommended to London that a 'Troop of Colonial 
Cavalry' be raised, with the aim of controlling Aborigines in the Bathurst area.' 
This was the genesis of the military's mounted police, often praised for their 
efficiency. In fact, while they were still in the process of being formed from 
officers and men of the 3rd East Kent's, a detachment was sent over the Blue 
Mountains to the Bathurst District to deal with a bushranger menace, and they 
'effectually cleared that part of the Country of those desperate Characters."' 
The dilemma of Brisbane's continuing struggle against the bushrangers was 
summed up by the Executive Council as:- 
an evil, which has gradually increased for some time past and has reached 
an alarming height in this Colony. Repugnant as the Council feel to 
recommend a resort to the use of a Military force to repress Civil outrages, 
Yet they are convinced that, under the peculiar circumstances of the Colony 
at present, it offers the only means, which are likely to remedy the Evil 
complained of. 
Unlike the Macquarie era, when no such body existed, this reference to the 
Executive Council, and their repugnance to employ the military, is indicative of the 
strengthened position of the civil over the military power. 
In the wake of seven settlers being killed by Aborigines in the Bathurst 
region (which led to Brisbane's recommendation to raise a Colonial Cavalry force), 
1 " HRA, 1,11, p.283. 
1" HRA, 1, 12, p.85. Stewart to Bathurst of December 1825. Lieutenant Colonel William 
Stewart, Commander, 3rd Regiment of Foot, and lieutenant-governor, assumed administration of 
the colony on the departure of Brisbane in December 1825. 
'" HRA, I, 11, p.898. Council to Brisbane of September 1825. 
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Brisbane's immediate action in August 1824 was to declare martial law 'beyond the 
blue Mountains'.' Additionally, the garrison at Bathurst was increased to seventy-
five men, divided into small parties, each under a magistrate.'' These parties 
searched designated areas under a coordinated plan. The military effort was 
supplemented by a call for settlers 'to assist the mastrates'' This show of force 
was sufficient to restore security in the area and four months later, in December 
1824, Brisbane was able to issue another proclamation repealing martial law. 181 
Unlike Macquarie's earlier heavy handed punitive expedition against the 
Aborigines, Brisbane's declaration of martial law stressed:- 
the Shedding of Blood is only just, when all other Means of Defence or of 
Peace are exhausted; that Cruelty is never Lawful; and that, when personal 
Attacks become necessary, the helpless Women and Children are to be 
spared.' 
After martial law ended, Brisbane was able to report to London that due to the 
'prudence and moderation' of the local military commandant and the magistrates 
'not one outrage was committed ... neither was a life sacrificed or even Blood 
spilt.' Interestingly, this is one of the earliest occasions recorded in the history of 
Australia where the civil power, in the form of magistrates, was seen to be dominant 
over the military power.' This was a step forward in the rule of law in the 
Australian colonies, as normally under martial law, the army can act alone and not in 
aid of the civil power.' 
178 HRA, I, 11, p.283, and pp. 410-411; for proclamation of martial law. 
178 HRA, 1, 11, p.431. Brisbane to Bathurst of December 1824. 
i" HRA, 1, 11, p.411. MAGISTRATES in blocks in Brisbane's proclamation. 
I" HIM, 1, 11, pp. 431-432. 
187 HRA, 1, 11, pA 1 1. 
'" HRA, 1, 11, p.431. 
1 " Whilst it is appreciated that some full time duty and retired military officers were also 
appointed as magistrates, irrespective of this the trend towards domination of the colony by the 
civil power is unmistakable. The civil power was boosted from 1826 by being able to appoint 
magistrates from the increasing numbers of half-pay or retired naval and military officers, who, 
encouraged by the British government policy, became settlers. 
iss Manual of Military Law, London, 1914, p.4. 'In time ... of rebellion ... exceptional powers 
are often assumed by the Crown, acting usually (though by no means necessarily) through its 
military forces for the suppression of hostilities or the maintenance of good order within its 
territories (whether the United Kingdom or British possessions);'. 
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In retrospect, the era of Macquarie saw a profound change, resulting in the 
domination of the civil power over the military. When he assumed office, 
Macquarie took over the colony from a rebel military administration. By the time 
he returned to Britain, the military power was properly subservient to his 
government. Macquarie encouraged the emancipists to come forward to play an 
active role in the colony despite the vitriolic opposition of the officers of the 46th 
and conservative exclusionist forces in the colony led by Marsden and the Bent 
brothers. The resultant Bigge Inquiry recognised the need for constitutional 
reforms. When implemented, these were 'concerned with the legislative and judicial 
aspects of government rather than with the executive. [This] assured that the 
Governor should remain within the law." Finally, the Act of 1823 was 
'precipitated' by Bigge's reports, which amongst other reforms, established a 
Legislative Council.' Accordingly, in the atmosphere of the primacy of the civil 
power over the military, constitutional reform commenced during the government of 
Macquarie's successor. Macquarie's concept of a proud emancipated colony, 
rather than a penal settlement, became more of a reality, while at the same time the 
settlers' demands to be governed by the laws of England, became an achievable 
goal. Nevertheless, Macquarie's successor, Brisbane, faced the same security 
problems as his predecessor: insufficient troops to control the convicts and 
problems with the Aborigines. But he took over an economically viable and 
politically stable colonial government, a tribute to Macquarie's place in Australian 
history. 
186 ACV Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development in Australia, New South Wales 1788- 
1856, Queensland 1859-1922 (with Notes to 1963 by the Editor), ed. RB Joyce, St. Lucia, second 
ed. 1963, pp.88-89. 
187 ACV Melbourne, Early Constitutional Development, pp.88 and 98-99. 
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Chapter 14 
External Security During Macquarie's 
Governorship 
After Great Britain's victory at the Battle of Trafalgar in October 1805 
which established her world-wide naval supremacy, the Royal Navy was better 
placed to more widely project British power.' In December 1810, the same year in 
which Macquarie became governor of New South Wales, British naval operations 
in the Indian Ocean resulted in the capture of both Mauritius (Ile de France) and 
Reunion Islands. The French loss of Mauritius denied their vessels a support 
base from which warships or privateers could attack British shipping in the Indian 
Ocean en route to New South Wales and India, or interfere with the 'country' 
trade to China.' As considered in Chapter 10, any wartime Napoleonic dream, or 
British colonial fear, that the French could establish a foothold in Australia or 
conduct a coastal raid was gone. Nevertheless, in August 1813, Bathurst advised 
Macquarie of a French plan to attack the 'Settlements under your Government'. 
This was based on unreliable intelligence from the Danish adventurer Jorgen 
Jorgenson, which led H.M's Government to refuse any Credit to the 
HRA, 3, 1, p.546. Illustrating the geographic isolation of the settlements in Australia, news of 
Trafalgar did not reach Hobart Town until mid-August 1806. 
DUE Hall, A History of South-East Asia, London, second ed. 1966, p.462; for development of 
British 'country' trade based on India, which weakened 'Dutch control over the trade of Malaya and 
Indonesia'. While Mauritius was of some value as a forward base for the French, desolate Reunion 
Island without a good anchorage, had little value. 
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information'. 3 Replying to this secret dispatch in April 1814, and referring to 
Bathurst's cautionary advice of a 'sudden incursion or descent of the Enemy', 
Macquarie argued for the speedy augmentation of his existing military garrison. 4 
As this force was stretched to its limit on internal security duties, which was 
Macquarie's priority concern, he possibly used Bathurst's dispatch as another 
excuse to request urgently needed reinforcements. 
While a major French threat could be discounted, there was always a risk 
from French warships or privateers operating in the Atlantic. In 1809, Ensign 
Huey, en route to the colony with the 73rd recorded that in the Bay of Biscay 'we 
were chased for 10 hours by a line of battleship and a frigate: 5 In June 1812, a 
new external security risk to the colony developed when the United States declared 
war against Great Britain, to defend America's right to freedom of the seas'. This 
chapter considers the effects the War of 1812 had on New South Wales (of which 
Van Diemen's Land was still part). It also covers perceived post war external 
security threats to the colony. 
The nature of the threat to New South Wales posed by the War of 1812, 
was interdiction to the colony's maritime lines of communication with England, 
India and Pacific islands such as Hawaii. By mid-1814, over 800 British merchant 
HRA, 1, 8, p.72. Attached to the dispatch was a report by Jorgensen of the supposed French 
and American intentions against the colony (pp.73-77). Commentary Note 12, pp.653-656, for 
Jorgensen's career, prior to being sent to New South Wales as a convict, and a departmental paper 
on countering the reported French plan. When Bathurst signed his dispatch, Wellington was driving 
the French back across the Pyrenees, and Britain's continental allies were forcing the French to 
fight the defensive Leipzig Campaign. Following Napoleon's return to Paris from Russia in 
December 1812 to recruit new armies and stabilise his hold on Europe, any plan against New 
South Wales in 1813, appears fanciful. Jorgensen's revelations may have had their origin in 
Napoleon's unfulfilled directive of 1810, that a French squadron be fitted out for service in the 
Indian Ocean (see above, Chapter 10, p.262). 
o HRA, 1, 8, p.241. Macquarie's reply of April 1814 to Bathurst's dispatch of August 1813. 
• A Huey (Ensign), The Voyage of the 73rd of Foot, photocopy of typed manuscript by courtesy 
Black Watch Museum; their reference: "BW Arch 0415. Typescript.", p.3. 
• H Richmond, Statesmen and Sea Power, Oxford, 1946, pp.244-248, for causes of the war. 
Richmond notes a contributing factor was the American desire to conquer Canada (p.247). 
369 
ships had been captured or destroyed on the high seas', although limited impact 
was felt in the colony. Lieutenant-Govemor Davey was amongst those 
inconvenienced, as some of his property was aboard the colonial vessel Emu, 
which was carrying female convicts, and was captured by an American privateer 
Holkar in the Atlantic in November 1812, 8 Even after being forced to resign his 
office, Davey continued to negotiate to obtain a grant of additional land as 
restitution for this loss. While Davey bewailed the loss of his belongings, a far 
greater loss was felt by the predominately male population in the colony. It was 'a 
very great Disappointment ... [concerning] the Loss of the Number of Female 
Convicts ... for the Settlements on Van Diemen's Land', when these women were 
off loaded at the island of St. Vincent.' 
In the Pacific, the American capture of a British whaler and its recapture by 
imprisoned British sailors, subsequently involved Macquarie's government. In 
July 1813, off the Galapagos Islands, Seringapatam was captured by the American 
warship Essex, the first American naval vessel to enter the Pacific.' 
Seringapatam's British crew, together with other captured seamen, were 
imprisoned and forced to construct a fort on the Marquesas Islands, while the 
captured ship, moored off shore, was being converted to an armed raider by the 
Americans. Seizing the opportunity when only three American prize crew were on 
board, fourteen sailors including some of Seringapatam's original crew, 
recaptured the ship and sailed her to the nearest British possession, Port Jackson. 
They were fortunate, as a few days sail from Port Jackson with her crew 
RE and TN Dupuy, The Collins Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the 
Present, London, 4th ed., 1993, p.879. No confirming reference has been found to substantiate 
this figure. But the authors mention that USS Essex, in seventeen months before being sunk 
herself, `captured or destroy[ed] more that 40 merchantmen and whalers' in the Pacific, and USS 
Wasp whilst cruising after sinking HMS Reindeer, 'captured 13 merchantmen' (p.879). 
HRA, 1, 7, p.700. Bathurst to Macquarie of April 1813. Also Commentary Note 188, p.830. 
For Davey's loss and reimbursement offers, HRA, 1, 9, pp.113 and 339. 
9 HRA, 1, 7, p.728. Macquarie to Bathurst of June 1813. For off loading of female convicts, 
Commentary Note 188, p.830. 
1 ° W Levi, American-Australian Relations, Minneapolis, 1947, p.17. Essex, during seventeen 
months cruising in the Pacific, wreaked havoc, especially against British whalers before being 
captured by HMS Phoebe in March 1814. For action with Phoebe, RE and TN Dupuy, Military 
History From 3500 B.C., p.879. 
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'debilitated from constant duty and short of rations, they fell in with Campbell 
Macquarie, whose owner 'humanely furnished them such articles as they stood in 
need of', then escorted them to Sydney." Lacking adequate skills to navigate 
Seringapatam to England, the crew had an experienced captain appointed in 
command of the ship, and in October 1814 Macquarie furnished a 'Licence as 
Registration' to replace the original lost at the time of capture. This identified the 
vessel, validating the circumstances of capture and recapture, so that salvage rights 
could be determined in England!' 
Despite the capture of vessels such as Emu and Seringapatam, as the 
colony was becoming increasingly self-supporting, this interdiction of sea 
communications was not as critical as it would have been earlier in the colony's 
history. Nevertheless, as American sealers and whalers had operated in colonial 
waters, there was a possible threat (which did not eventuate) that they could return 
to blockade, or conduct shore raids against scattered settlements in the colony. 
This had elsewhere occurred less than forty years before, in April 1778, when 
during the War of American Independence, John Paul Jones twice landed to attack 
places in the British Isles!' Such fears were reinforced by information gained that 
American bases were now established on the Marquesas, which they had claimed,' 
and also on the Sandwich and Society Islands. As Levi pointed out, this 
'threatened to make this new American influence in the Pacific permanent'2 5 
Even though the war was concluded by the Treaty of Ghent in December 
1814, the last naval action did not take place until March 1815. 16 likewise, a 
transport to New South Wales was captured after the war ended. This was the 
convict transport Francis and Eliza captured in the Atlantic by the privateer 
" L Rose, Richard Siddins of Port Jackson, Canberra, 1984, pp.76-78. Also: HRA, 1, 8, p.351. 
12 HRA, 1, 8, pp.312-313 and pp.350-356. 
" LC Kleber, 'Jones Raids Britain', History Today, Vol. XIX, No.4, April 1969, pp.277-282. 
As an indication of the impact of Jones' raids, Kleber, writing about the first raid (on Whitehaven), 
commented that 'Nothing like this had happened since a Dutch fleet under Admiral Ruyter captured 
and burned Sheerness in 1667', p.279. 
' 4 See above, Chapter 10, p.261, footnote 84. 
" W Levi, American-Australian Relations, p.20. 
16 RE and TN Dupuy, Military History From 3500 B.C., p.880. 
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Warrior and released twenty-four hours later, having been stripped of armaments 
and many stores. She reached Port Jackson in August 1815. Despite several of 
the crew deserting to the American ship, and some seamen acting in a mutinous 
manner for much of the voyage, the ship's captain together with the naval surgeon 
in charge of the convicts, and a solicitor travelling as a passenger, praised the 
conduct of the convicts, even when the ship was in enemy hands. They 
commended the good behaviour of the convicts 'very Strongly' to Macquarie. As 
a consequence, he recommended, unsuccessfully, to London that he'be Authorised 
to grant Conditional Pardons to All the ... Convicts [Macquarie's emphasis]' who 
came out in that transport' 
A further war related incident, involving the American ship Traveller, 
occurred at Port Jackson after Sydney residents knew that the Treaty of Ghent had 
terminated the conflict. This incident was described by Macquarie as 'A 
Circumstance as Extraordinary as Unexpected'. Traveller was correctly cleared 
from Canton, and from the British view, had proper authority from the East India 
Company to trade with Australia. She arrived in Port Jackson in February 1816 
and Macquarie was 'Pleased with the Prospect of a beneficial [trade being] ... 
renewed by this first Arrival of an American since the Treaty of Peace'. Using the 
'Usual and Accustomed Form by Me to the Naval Officer', Macquarie granted 
authority for Traveller's goods to be landed for sale. As pointed out by 
Macquarie the 'Transaction had the fullest Publicity'. Shortly after issuing this 
authority, he departed for a tour of the interior. On his return he was surprised to 
learn that Traveller:- 
Whilst in the Discharge of her Freightage at the Public Government Wharf, 
had ... been Seized as a lawful Prize ... and this Surprise was Not a little 
increased When informed that the Seizure had been made by the Reverend 
Benjamin Vale, One of the Assistant Chaplains, Supported and Abetted by 
W.H. Moore, One of the Solicitors lately sent out by Government' 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp. 55 and 57. Macquarie to Bathurst of March 1816 and Conunentary Note 
No.11, p. 849: p.202, for Bathurst's recommendation to Home Office of January 1817 and pp.414- 
415 for Home Office decision, authorising Macquarie to only grant some concession on length of 
time to be served. 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.42-43. 
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Macquarie had no legal advisor to consult regarding Vale's actions. 
Attorney-General Bent had died, and Macquarie was feuding with that man's 
brother, Justice Bent, who refused to give Macquarie one of only two sets of 
statutes sent out from England.' Therefore, in clearing Traveller to trade, the 
governor based the legality of his actions on precedence. Previously forty-one 
American ships had been allowed these rights, with the majority granted by former 
naval governors who had expertise in this area.' On this basis of precedence, 
Macquarie dealt with Vale, who refused to apologise to Macquarie, and 'Attempted 
by Argument to Vindicate the Measure'. As Macquarie considered Vale's 
conduct `so Glaringly Offensive', and that his position of authority had to be 
maintained, he ordered Vale into 'Military Arrest, [as] his [Vale's] Commission as 
Assistant Chaplain Specifically render[ed] him Amenable to Martial Law'. 21 
Subsequently, Vale was court martialled, and of four charges preferred, was found 
guilty of one, and guilty in part of a further two. Although sentenced to be 
`Publickly [sic] and Severely reprimanded and Admonished', his sentence was 
carried out by Macquarie, privately rather than publicly.' 
While this unusual case, had external security overtones, its significance 
was the ultimate assistance it gave the conservative forces in the colony who were 
determined to undermine Macquarie. Whereas Phillip, in the penal colony from 
1778 to 1792, may have escaped unscathed in court martialling a government 
commissioned chaplain, thirty-eight years later, in a developing colony, Macquarie 
did not. He was reprimanded by Bathurst, who stated that it was 'a matter of 
doubt whether Mr. Vale's Appointment might not be considered ... a Military 
Commission of Chaplain to His Majesty's Forces'. Further, Bathurst listed 
specific charges on which Vale could be court martialled should he be found to be 
a military chaplain. None of these had applied in Vale's case. Bathurst also 
` 9 HRA, 1, 9, pp.43-44. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.43 and p47 for list of forty-one vessels, of which thirty were inwards cleared 
before 1808, whilst naval officers were governors. 
21 HRA, 1, 9, p.45. 
" HIM, 1, 9, p.48, for charges and pp.100-101, for finding of the court and carrying out of 
sentence. 
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wrote:- 
I have now only to lament that you should, in a moment of irritation, have 
been betrayed into an act which, at the same time exposes you personally to 
considerable risk ... [of] diminish[ing] your Influence amongst the more 
respectable part of the Community, who justly look upon the Law as the 
only true foundation of authority.' 
This incident illustrates two points. Firstly, Bathurst's comments 
immediately above, and subsequent commotion over a petition to the House of 
Commons, supports Ritchie's view of Macquarie's aberrant behaviour which at 
times unduly influenced decisions during his government. Secondly, and of 
greater significance is the recognition in London of a growing sophistication in 
colonial society, with the free settlers voicing their opinions and being heard in 
London. But Macquarie could not see this. He replied to Bathurst, somewhat 
unwisely defending his behaviour. The motivation behind Macquarie's apparent 
over-reaction both with Vale and then in his reply to Bathurst, is partly explained in 
the last paragraph of his dispatch:- 
I have been bred in the School of Subordination too long ... Your Lordship 
would not wish to see me degraded by tamely submitting to the subversion 
of my Authority as Governor in Chief ... either by Mr.Vale, or any other 
seditious, unprincipled person.' 
Shortly after, in a private confidential letter, Macquarie submitted his resignation to 
Bathurst due to the 'sudden change in your Lordship's Sentiments towards me'. 
Macquarie also formally submitted his resignation in an official dispatch. Bathurst 
declined to accept Macquarie's resignation in the private letter, and took no action 
on the official dispatch.' 
Macquarie's wrathful self-justification continued when he learnt of a 
petition submitted to the House of Commons. Linked with the Vale affair, it 
contained many complaints against Macquarie and his government.' In 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.206-207. Bathurst to Macquarie of February 1817. 
" See above, Chapter 13,p.331. Considered in relation to the 1816 anti-Aboriginal operations. 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.491-493. To Bathurst of November 1817. 
" HRA, 1, 9, pp.495-501. Private letter to Bathurst; pp.501-502, official dispatch; both of 
December 1817. For Bathurst's reply, pp.838-840, of October 1818. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.866, Commentary Note 77. While a copy of the petition is 'not available', this 
note lists the charges against Macquarie. 
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Macquarie's opinion this was a 'wicked, libellous [sic] and Seditious Address', 
and on this basis, he dealt with the signatories. They came under direct attack by 
Macquarie, who advised London that recent land grants and 'other Indulgences' 
would be cancelled, as these men intended 'to undermine me and blast, if possible, 
My honor and Public Character'." As a result, Macquarie was further 
reprimanded by Bathurst, who cautioned him 'most strongly against any 
proceeding in future, which can have a tendency to check the Right of Petitioning 
either House of Parliament, as such Conduct on your part cannot fail to call forth 
from His Royal Highness the strongest Marks of Displeasure: 3° In this episode, 
Macquarie appears almost not to represent the civil power, but to act as a rather out 
of touch military figure, reacting against the increasing power of free settlers in 
"his" colony. As considered in Chapter 13, the longer term implications of these 
conflicts contributed to the appointment of the Bigge Inquiry. 
While the Treaty of Ghent, and later in November 1815, the Second Treaty 
of Paris, brought peace to the world, this peace did not end external security 
problems for geographically isolated New South Wales. Both the British and 
colonial governments showed concern over the colonial ambitions of both the 
Bourbon monarchy of France and the Dutch government. Threats from these 
nations are considered below. 
In the immediate wake of the Napoleonic Wars, J Dunmore sums up 
France's maritime position under the restored monarchy. With 'their ports in 
ruins, their maritime trade almost at a complete standstill, the French had little 
opportunity of organizing or financing a major voyage of exploration'. 3 ' Revival of 
trade links, not empire, were the immediate concern in the post-war period. In this 
environment, the French Parliament `reduce[d] the combined naval-colonial vote in 
1817'. However, in 1816, Louis de Freycinet having completed his account of the 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.410. Macquarie to Goulbum of May 1817. 
" HIM, 1, 9, pp.330-331. Macquarie to Bathurst of April 1817. 
" HIM, 1, 9, p.762. To Macquarie of May 1818. 
3 ' J Dunmore, French Explorers in the Pacific, The Eighteenth Century, Vol. 2, Oxford, 1965, 
p.49, and passim Chapters: 'The Background' and `Freycinee. 
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1800-1804 Baudin expedition (which he accompanied as a naval officer), drew up 
a plan which won the support of Louis XVIII. In this 'emphasis was not on 
discovery - for there was not much left to discover - nor on close hydrographic 
surveys, but rather scientific work. The Academy of Sciences outlined some of the 
research which Freycinet might undertake'.' 
Freycinet's expedition was to be exclusively of naval officers and men, 
unaccompanied by civilian scientists who had created problems on 
D'Entrecasteaux's and Baudin's voyages.' It was planned that Freycinet make 
detailed historic, geographic and natural history observations on the coast of New 
Holland (between what is now Albany and Shark Bay), thence to the East Indies, 
central Pacific islands and Port Jackson, returning around Cape Horn. Sailing in 
September, he did not make for King George's Sound but went directly from 
Timor to Shark Bay, then sailed through the central Pacific before arriving at Port 
Jackson, where 'a most comprehensive study was made of the aborigines and 
colonial society'. Shipwrecked in the Falkland Islands, Freycinet and survivors 
did not return to France until November 1820. 4 Unlike subsequent French 
expeditions, neither LR Marchant nor J Dunmore suggest that this first post-war 
French exploration had any ulterior colonial-political motives. 
The British, having diplomatic relations with France, and a contingent in the 
army of occupation in the country until 1818, should have been well placed to 
obtain overt and covert intelligence to confirm the purely scientific nature of 
Freycinet's planned voyage. Yet despite this, London reacted as though this 
voyage was either a precursor to, or an actual threat to their Pacific interests. 
Perhaps this was not an unreasonable attitude, as the next French expedition led by 
Isidore Duperrey 'was enjoined ... by his instructions ... to report on the 
possibility of establishing a settlement in Western Australia, which was not yet 
" J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol. 2, p.63. 
" LR Marchant, France Australe, a study of French explorations and attempts to found a penal 
colony and strategic base in south western Australia 1503-1826, Perth, 1982, p.213. The 
scientific duties being carried out by naval officers. 
" LR Marchant, France Australe, pp.212-213. For Freycinet's tasks and proposed route, pp.218- 
219 for voyage. 
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recognised as a British possession' 
Two dispatches from Bathurst to Macquarie referred to Freycinet's 
expedition. The first of January 1817 advised that a French expedition under 
`Monsr. de Freycinet [was] upon a Voyage of Circumnavigation', and should be 
given 'every facility ... both in regard to the repairs ... [and] supplies' required. As 
the copy of this dispatch, quoted in Historical Records of Australia, indicates this 
was sent 'per corvette L'Uranie', Freycinet's vessel, it is reasonable to assume that 
another copy was sent directly to Macquarie.' The other dispatch of February 
1817, indicated the thrust of British reaction to this expedition. The governor was 
advised that 'Circumstances consequent upon the restoration of Peace [with 
France] have rendered it most important to explore, with as little delay as possible' 
parts of the Australian coastline not previously charted by Matthew Hinders, and 
that an expedition had been commissioned to do so.' This dispatch was probably 
amplified by the verbal brief that Macquarie would have received from the 
expedition's leader, Lieutenant Philip King, who arrived in Sydney in September 
1817, the same month in which Freycinet sailed.' The urgency in commencing 
King's mission is evident from Dunmore's comment (above) that the French did 
not recognise Western Australia as a British possession. 
In September 1817, probably after discussions with Lieutenant King, 
Macquarie replied to Bathurst's dispatches:- ' 
I am perfectly sensible of the great importance, both in respect to the 
Mother Country and the future prosperity of this Colony, of preventing the 
French or other European Nation from forming any Settlement in any part 
of this Continent ... and necessity of using every possible means and 
precaution to frustrate the present intentions of the French Government in 
this instance. 39 
" J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.2, p.111. Duperrey's expedition lasted from 1822 to 1825. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.196. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.207. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.543; for Lieutenant King's arrival in Sydney and Commentary Note 52, p.859 
for King's personal details. 
" HRA, 1, 9, p.488. To Under Secretary Goulbum; also Commentary Note 51, p.859 stated 'At 
this period [February 1817] the continent ... was regarded generally [author's emphasis] as divided 
into two parts__ known as New South Wales and New Holland.' 
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This indicated two inter-related politico-strategic points emanating from London 
and concurred with in Sydney. Firstly, there was a growing realisation that New 
Holland was not considered a territory separate from the colony of New South 
Wales, but rather the whole continent of Australia was seen as a British sphere of 
influence, even if not of future domain. Secondly, the British government was 
concerned over Bourbon France's intention to regain a position of power in the 
Indian-Pacific Ocean regions, and the possibility of their developing a settlement in 
Australia which could serve as an anchorage and base for future expansion in the 
region. 
While London's reaction to Freycinet's expedition was to task King to 
complete Hinders' charting of the Australian coastline, there were separate colonial 
reverberations to this perceived French threat. Lieutenant-Governor Sore11 in Van 
Diemen's Land, having received warning of Freycinet's cruise from a visiting 
British ship's captain, wrote to Macquarie: 'I conclude, that with respect to this 
Island, in its whole circumference, it is considered as possessed by Great Britain, 
and of course that foreign ships should not act in any way upon its Shores.' 
Macquarie replied to Sore11:- 
As to their [the French] attempting to make any footing in Van Diemen's 
Land, ... [this] must be resisted in case they should have the temerity to 
attempt such an Act of aggression, the whole of the Island ... being the 
exclusive Property of the British Crown. Lieut. King set sail from hence 
... on the 22d of last month, along the Western Coast of Australia.' 
This dispatch again emphasises Macquarie's (and Bathurst's) concern that the 
sovereignty of the whole of the Australian continent was a matter of import. 
With the flurry of dispatches between Sorell and Macquarie of December 
1817 and January 1818 regarding Freycinet, it may have been more than 
coincidence that during 1818, the `Mulgrave Battery' of six guns was completed at 
Knopwood's (now Battery) Point in Van Diemen's Land. In April 1819, to 
" HIM, 3, 2, p.290. Dispatch of December 1817. 
" 111M, 3, 2, p.297. Dispatch of January 1818. 
42 C Sargent, The Colonial Garrison 1817-1824, The 48th Foot The Northamptonshire 
Regiment in the Colony of New South Wales, Canberra,1996, p.64. First fired for a royal salute 
in August 1818. 
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create interlocking arcs of fire with the Mulgrave Battery, Sore11 sought authority 
for 'Security of whole Harbour ...[to construct] a small Work and Guard on 
Hunter's Island [now Hunter Street]' using some old Guns which were not in use 
at Sydney. As there were no spare guns in Sydney, Macquarie authorised SoreII 
to purchase 'Two or Three Guns' from any visiting ship, using 'the Police Fund, 
provided you can procure them on reasonable terms.' TM 
Meanwhile, in Sydney, defences were also strengthened, with a seven gun 
'small Fort' constructed at Bennelong Point. London was advised of this in 
December 1817. These guns had remained untouched since being sent out from 
England a few years earlier, and were only now mounted as a result of the defence 
activity created by Freycinet's projected visit.' Presumably, these were the same 
'old Guns' which Sore11 referred to in his request to Macquarie. Despite this 
extra defence activity, Freycinet commented after his visit to Sydney in November-
December 1819, that:: 
Should one arrive in the colony from the Botany Bay side, from Broken 
Bay, or from any direction other than the normal route, fortifications are 
even more strikingly lacking. It is obvious that the Governors have relied, 
for the colony's security, rather more on the degree of isolation that results 
from its immense distance from Europe's conurbations, than on military 
means.' 
At Botany Bay, Dunmore recounts that in January 1824, French officers 
from Duperrey's expedition, visited the site 'where La Perouse wrote his last 
message', and refers to 'soldiers from the near-by fort' growing vegetables in the 
'Frenchman's Garden'.' Apart from the temporary fort built by La Perouse in 
1788,110 other record of a defence work covering Botany Bay has been noted. 
This 'fort', was only a watch tower, built at Macquarie's orders to prevent 
" HRA, 3, 2, p.389. Sore!! to Macquarie. 
" HRA, 3, 2, p.396. Dispatch of May 1819. 
45 HRA, 1, 9, p.720. Macquarie to Bathurst. 
" L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales 1788-1839, translated T Cullity, Potts 
Point, 2001, p.522. For description of fortifications, p.521. 
" J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.2, p.139. Dunmore's text appears to refer to a fort other 
than that built by La Perouse's expedition. Although the wording 'A few rows of vegetables still 
survived in Frenchman's Garden' would indicate a counter view. 
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clandestine smuggling of liquor. It was apparently only manned for two years; in 
1824 by four invalid soldiers and in 1825 by two others. Nevertheless, as 
pointed out by Freycinet, Sydney was vulnerable to attack from the landward side 
by an enemy landing at Botany Bay. Austin is of the opinion that when 
constructed, Victoria Barracks was sited to fend off any threat from that direction.' 
Discussing French motives for maritime expeditions, Marchant comments 
that it was not until after Freycinet's departure and the end of allied occupation in 
1818, that 'the newly independent French restoration government lost little time 
preparing to create a new French empire.' They also, for the first time, made 
'specific plans to colonise western Australia'. This resulted in expeditions in 
Australian waters by Duperrey in 1822, Bougainville 1824 and d'Urville 1826. 
Although outside the parameters of this thesis, these voyages created a continuity 
of concern, linking Macquarie's government with those of Governors Brisbane 
and Darling. An indication of renewed French interest in a western Australian 
settlement comes from Bougainville's Journal. He wrote that the French 
government (somewhat optimistically) 'thought it could establish a colony here 
without giving umbrage to them [the British]'.' On this, Dunmore comments:- 
the British had been advised by their ambassador in Paris that the French 
were thinking of a penal settlement in New Holland; the news of 
Bougainville's expedition and of the projected departure of Dumont 
d'Urville's had further shaken British composure. ... As late as 1824, 
British administrators in New South Wales laid no claim to jurisdiction 
beyond the Nullarbor Plain' 
The ambassador's warning was translated into action by Bathurst in a 
secret directive to Governor Darling of March 1826:- 
The sailing of Two French Ships [presumably Bougainville's and 
d'Urville's] ... have led to the consideration how far our distant 
possessions in the Australian Seas may be prejudiced by any designs, 
" L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales, p.255, for built at Macquarie's orders; 
p.481, for smuggling and p.521, for manning details. 
" M Austin, 'The Early Defences of Australia', JRAHS, Vol.49, Pt.3, November 1963, p.204. 
Austin considered that the barracks also protected Sydney's main water supply at Bushby's Bore. 
" LR Marchant, France Australe, p.221. 
" J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.2, p.169. 
52 J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.2, p.169. 
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which the French may entertain of establishing themselves in that quarter, 
and more especially on that part of the Coast ... which has not yet received 
any Colonists from this Country.' 
This directive resulted in Darling dispatching parties to form settlements at 
Westernport (present day Victoria) visited by d'Urville in 1826, and also at King 
George's Sound (Albany, Western Australia). Freycinet, who drew a detailed 
chart of the Sound during Baudin's expedition, later wrote that the 'magnificent 
situation of King George Sound ... had for long been tempting Europeans to 
establish themselves there ... [and] could not escape England's bright and questing 
glance.' m This location was visited by d'Urville in October and settled by the 
British in December 1826." After this, Marchant notes that French interest in, and 
exploration of the western coasts of Australia ceased.' This comment is subject to 
doubt, for while no further French expeditions were sent to New Holland, as late as 
August 1828 the Colonial Office was concerned about plans for a French penal 
colony in the region. As discussed below, this information led to the establishment 
of the Swan River colony. 
While the French searched for new colonies, the Dutch were also active, 
anxious to re-establish control over their former colonial empire, the Fast Indies, 
and to enforce their former dominant position in the island chain to Australia's 
immediate north. This empire had been captured by the British during their 1810- 
1811 colonial war with the Dutch, but was returned to them in 1816, in accordance 
with treaties ending the Napoleonic Wars.' It was therefore inevitable that there 
would be post-war rivalry between the Dutch striving to regain their former pre-
eminent position and an enveloping British threat to their trade. This came from 
"HIM , 1, 12, p.195. 
" L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales, p.221. Freycinet also noted that 
Westernport 'failed to prosper' and was abandoned by the British in 1831. 
" J Dunmore, French Explorers, Vol.2, pp.181-182. HRA, 1, 12, p.699-702 Darling to 
Bathurst of November 1826 with attached secret instructions to the two settlement commandants. 
Also p.730, Governor Darling to Under Secretary Hay of December 1826: reporting French 
movements and a fortunate concentration of British warships at Port Jackson. 
" LR Marchant, France Australe, p.209. 
57 RE and TN Dupuy, Military History From 3500 B.C., p.868. Under the terms of the 
Capitulation of Semarang, September 1811, Java, Palembang, Timor and Macassar were ceded to 
Britain. 
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the north in 1786 with the British acquisition of Penang, and increased after 1819, 
when Sir Stamford Raffles negotiated the use of Singapore's harbour to erect a 
factory. A southern threat to Dutch trading interests was posed by the spread of 
settlement in Australia accompanied by a likely development of maritime trade in 
the islands to the north. 
Lieutenant King on his return to England in 1823 (less than two years after 
Macquarie handed over government to Major General Sir Thomas Brisbane) 
reported favourably on the possibility of a settlement in northern Australia and 
development of British trade in the East Indies.' The Second Secretary of the 
Admiralty 'supported the plans for a British establishment on Australia's north 
coast, ... primarily ... to secure a British presence there for strategic reasons!' 
Such a settlement was intended to pre-empt the Dutch establishing an outpost in 
northern Australia, based on their claim of sovereignty by right of discovery. 
Commercially, it was hoped that a settlement would provide an entrepot, attracting 
Malays who visited the region fishing for trepang. Another commercial factor 
which influenced the establishment of a British settlement, was pointed out by 
Freycinet. He noted that the Dutch were demanding exorbitant tolls from British 
merchants to use East Indies ports and the latter looked to establishing warehouse 
facilities on Australia's northern coast." 
Meanwhile, diplomatic conversations between the English and Dutch, were 
taking place preparatory to finalising an Anglo-Dutch Treaty to ensure friendly 
relations between the two.' As pointed out by Hall, to reach a satisfactory 
outcome, the treaty needed to resolve the contentious issue of recognition by both 
powers of their separate spheres of influence in the East. A proposed provision of 
" DGE Hall, South-East Asia, p.471. 
" HRA, 1, 11, p.918, Commentary Note 54. 
" P Donovan, 'Chapter 3, History of the Northern Territory', The Northern Territory in the 
Defence of Australia: Geography, History, Economy, Infrastructure and Defence Presence, eds. D 
Ball and JO Langtry, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No.63, 1990, p.52. 
61 L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales, p.218. 
" DGE Hall, South East Asia, p.479. For account in this paragraph of Anglo-Dutch 
negotiations. 
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this treaty was that officials of either party would not 'form any settlement on any 
of the islands in the Eastern Seas without previous authority from their respective 
governments in Europe'. Apparently Bathurst was intent on ordering the 
establishment of a settlement in northern New Holland or adjacent islands, before 
this treaty was signed. This may have been because the question of sovereignty 
over that region remained unresolved. 
One month before the Anglo-Dutch Treaty was signed, Bathurst acted 
decisively, apparently with Admiralty cooperation, to ensure British sovereignty 
over northern Australia. Captain James Bremer, commanding HMS Tamar, was 
directed to 'establish a British settlement on the North West Coast of New 
Holland'. Also he was to take formal possession of the 'Coast between the 
Western Coast of Bathurst Island and the Eastern side of Cobourg Peninsula, 
including the whole of Bathurst and Melville Islands and the said Peninsula' 
(Figure 2763 ). Before sailing to northern Australia, Bremer was ordered to 
proceed without delay to Port Jackson, where Governor Brisbane was instructed to 
provide Bremer with a small military detachment and stores to establish the 
settlement. In advising Brisbane of the plan, Bathurst wrote that from:- 
a Commercial and Military point of view ... a Ship of War without loss of 
time [shall be dispatched from England] to the North West Coast of New 
Holland for the purpose of taking formal possession in the name of His 
Majesty of that part of the said Coast. 
There a settlement was to be established which Bathurst made clear was to be:- 
a Military Station involving the security of our important possessions and 
valuable Trade in that part of the World ... [which] would ... not only 
furnish the necessary Protection to our Trade in that Quarter, but would 
give security to the East India Company's and the Indian Private Trade to 
China by the Eastern Route. 
Additionally, if the Dutch had already established an outpost in the north west 
before Bremer's arrival, he was to then establish a settlement at Liverpool River in 
Arnhem Land (Figure 27). 6' 
A Sharp, The Discovery of Australia, Oxford, 1963, Figure 27 map facing p.282. From 
Phillip Parker King's chart of the northern coast. 
64 HRA, 1, 11, pp.227-229. Bathurst to Brisbane of 17 February 1824. For instructions to 
Bremer and Brisbane. 
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Figure 27: Northern Australia including area claimed by Bremer 1824 
(Part of Phillip King's Chart of the north coast of Australia) 
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Six months after Bathurst's dispatch was written, Brisbane was able to 
advise Bathurst that support as directed had been given to Bremer. Tamar sailed 
from Port Jackson 011 24 August, and on 20 September 1824, at Port Essington, on 
Cobourg Peninsula (Figure 27) in northern Australia, Bremer took formal 
possession of the area as delineated by Bathurst. Bremer then sailed to Melville 
Island, where due to concern for imperial rather than colonial external security, 
construction of a fort was commenced. On 21 October 1824, Bremer noted that 'I 
had the satisfaction of hoisting His Majesty's colours at Fort Dundas' (Figure 
27)." 
Sovereignty over Australia's northern coastal areas was strengthened in 
July 1825 with the publication of Governor Darling's Commission which 
incorporated the strategic area claimed by Bremer and all land to the south, into the 
colony of New South Wales. This was achieved by promulgating that the 
colony's western boundary was moved further westwards, from 135 degrees to 
129 degrees of longitude east of Greenwich (Figure 28). 6' But as Darling pointed 
out to London in November 1826, despite the Fort Dundas settlement, and similar 
outposts about to be established at Western Port and at King George's Sound, the 
legality of Great Britain's claim over all of New Holland remained doubtful. He 
wrote 'it would be difficult to contend or satisfy any other Nation, desirous of 
making a Settlement on the Western Coast [of New Holland], that we have an 
indisputable right to the Sovereignty of the whole Territory.' Darling continued, 
suggesting that his commission as governor be amended to include all New 
Holland as a part of New South Wales. Such an action, coupled with a settlement 
on 'the Western Coast ... might possibly tend to prevent the interference of any 
65 HRA, 1, 11, p.338. Brisbane to Bathurst of August 1824. 
" D Lockwood, The Front Door, p.6. P Donovan, 'Chapter 3, History of the Northern 
Territory', p.52. Fort Dundas being unsuitable for trading was abandoned in January 1829. 
Meanwhile, based on advice by Captain James Stirling RN (HRA, 1, 12, pp.775-776 to Governor 
Darling of December 1826), a new outpost, Fort Wellington, was established in June 1827 at 
Raffles Bay on Cobourg Peninsula (Figure 27). In August 1829, this settlement was also 
abandoned as a result of directive from London of November 1828. 
67 HRA, 1, 12, p.100. Map for Figure 28, drawn from concepts noted elsewhere. 
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Foreign Power and might set the matter at rest.'" 
Although these events occurred after Macquarie's departure from Sydney, 
the imperative for establishing the outposts in northern Australia and the 
subsequent change to the colony's western boundary were directly linked to the 
Napoleonic post-war settlements between the Dutch and British, the establishment 
of Singapore, and King's circumnavigation of Australia. All these events occurred 
during Macquarie's governorship although the final resolution of these post-war 
external security threats, of French or Dutch settlements on continental Australia, 
was not achieved until 1829, in the post-Macquarie period. 
Following an 1827 proposal by Captain James Stirling RN that a colony be 
established at Swan River on the west coast of New Holland', there was 
considerable criticism within the Colonial Office, due to the costs involved. Also it 
was disputed that the French would form a settlement in such a remote land. 
However, the Colonial Office finally approved the scheme after advice was received 
in August 1828 from the British Ambassador in Paris, of a press report suggesting 
a French penal colony was being considered for New Holland. The ambassador 
also reported that the French Minister of Marine was examining the possibility of 
transportation to Australia. As a result, in November 1828, the Colonial Office 
requested the Admiralty dispatch a warship to Swan River to proclaim British 
sovereignty. This was implemented in May 1829, when Captain Charles 
Fremantle RN took formal possession of the western part of the continent.' 
Expressing a French view of the British imperialism evidenced by the Australian 
colonies, Freycinet wrote:- 
By creation of its southern colonies, Great Britain has laid the foundation 
of a vast empire in the four corners of the globe. This has arisen ... behind 
a veil of mystery ... without appearing to attract a great deal of attention 
from European diplomats. A possession, however, which borders on 
India's seas, which has control over the archipelagos of the Pacific Ocean, 
" HRA, 1, 12, p.700. Darling to Bathurst of November 1826. 
69 HRA, 1, 12, pp.777-780. Stirling to Darling of December 1826. 
" JJ Eddy, Britain and the Australian Colonies 1818-1831 The Technique of Government, 
Oxford, 1969, pp.242-244. It was not until February 1829 that the settlers under Stirling departed 
from England. 
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and threatens the richest states of Spanish America, seems ... of political 
concerns. ... [British] policy seeks to ensure that their industrial products 
have a place everywhere. They are practised at the seizure of any position 
of military significance anywhere on the ocean ... [leading to] the vastness 
of the[ir] network ... around the whole planet.' 
Although the road over the Blue Mountains had been opened by 1815, 
British nineteenth century claims for extended sovereignty in Australia were not 
linked to the outward spread of settlement from Sydney. In regard to the extent of 
this spread, as late as 1829 it was still of a limited nature. This is illustrated by the 
limits of location gazetted by Government Order of 14 October 1829, restricting 
settlement to nineteen specified counties. This order, in theory, created a 
boundary to white settlement in New South Wales which was 'a rough semi-circle, 
with Sydney as its centre, and a radius of about 150 miles.' It is noteworthy that 
the restrictions ordered were promulgated some five months after the British had 
laid claim to the whole continent. 
The above argument, that the British flag preceded, rather than followed 
settlement and trade, is not negated by emigrant expeditions coming directly from 
England, as in the case of the failed settlement at Port Phillip in 1803 and the Swan 
River settlement of 1829. Western Australia as the first convict-free Australian 
colony was initially established by sixty-eight settlers, who sailed from England in• 
February 1829 and arrived off Rottnest Island in June, the month after Fremantle 
laid claim to the region. It was not until August 1829 that the settlers moved to the 
mainland.' They had been drawn to this new land by Stirling's favourable reports 
of its potential prosperity, which resulted in a speculative expedition with Stirling 
as lieutenant-governor. But despite the commercial motive for settlement, RM 
Hartwell argues that the British government only approved the settlement to make 
• L De Freycinet, Reflections on New South Wales, pp.616 and 617-618, for British global 
policy. 
• CMH Clark, Select Documents in Australian History 1788-1850, Sydney, reprinted 1970, 
pp.225-226. This unenforceable order did not halt outward expansion from Sydney, nevertheless 
(without any consideration of settlement in Van Diemen's Land spreading between Hobart and 
Launceston) this order clearly indicates the limited nature of mainland expansion in 1829. 
• NK Hancock, Australia, Brisbane, reprinted 1966, p.4. 
The Macquarie Book of Events, ed. B Fraser, McMahons Point, second impression 1984, p.29. 
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good a claim of sovereignty over the complete continent because of their suspicion 
of French activities. This was unlike the 1836 establishment of the other convict-
free colony, South Australia, which was founded on the 'faith' of liberalism and 
the 'formula' of Wakefield's theory of colonisation. It was also founded over the 
many objections of the Colonial Office, concerned about the added cost to the 
British government, while believing there was no strategic imperative or need to 
demonstrate sovereignty in that region." 
After Trafalgar, a French invasion, or maritime coastal raids on New South 
Wales could be discounted. Spain and Holland were fully embroiled in the war, 
and even the American War of 1812 caused little concern in New South Wales. 
But, paradoxically, with foreign powers involved in these hostilities, the war in 
itself provided a protective shield against foreign powers making incursions into 
continental Australia. Probably CEW Bean was correct in emphasising another 
factor which was vital to Australia coming exclusively under British rule. He 
wrote that up to 1914, Australia was 'abnormal[ly]' fortunate that 'British 
command of the sea had given us in Australia 126 years of freedom without 
fighting for it.'" It is conceivable that without this defensive screen, the continent 
of Australia could have been divided between the British and French or Dutch, or 
between the three nations. 
During this period, despite paying lip service to the needs of external 
security, Macquarie appears to have been more concerned with increasing his troop 
strength to ensure the maintenance of internal security. Nevertheless, long term 
external security problems developed in the post-war period, resulting from the 
possibility that Great Britain may have had to share continental Australia with other 
powers. In some regards British concerns to counter Dutch expansion and 
domination of sea routes, was seen in London as being of greater imperial 
RM Hartwell, 'The Pastoral Ascendancy, 1820-1850', Australia: A Social and Political 
History, ed. G Greenwood, Sydney, 1955, pp.70 and 72-73, for Western and South Australia 
respectively. 
" CEW Bean, ANZAC to AMIENS A shorter history of the Australian fighting services in the 
First World War, Canberra, fifth ed. 1968, p.535. 
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significance than the security of New South Wales. Meanwhile, the possibility of 
the French founding settlements was taken very seriously in the colony as well as at 
the War and Colonial Office. This led to endeavours to improve coastal defences 
when advice of Freycinet's and subsequent French voyages became known. While 
Macquarie appreciated the post-war external security problems evident during his 
government, these were resolved after his return to the United Kingdom. Finally, in 
the same way that Risdon Cove was established for security reasons during the war, 
in the post-war period, external security stresses led directly to the development of 
British sovereignty and a scattering of outposts around Australia's seaboard 
(Figure 28). Under the protective shield of British sovereignty, settlements and 
squatters spread out, pastoralism and wool came into its own, together with 
commerce, industry and the great boost of gold mining, all contributing to colonial 
development. 
Chapter 15 
Conclusion 
This study of external and internal security in New South Wales begins with 
consideration of problems involved in establishing a British overseas penal 
settlement at Botany Bay. At this point, the government gave serious consideration 
to particular security issues for the proposed colony. With the implementation of 
the scheme, and commencement of convict transfers to First Fleet transports, 
internal security duties commenced aboard the ships and continued ashore in the 
colony. In this strange and isolated outpost, problems were many, not the least 
being a long running struggle for authority between the civil and military powers. 
In 1793, five years after the founding of the colony, Britain was again at war, which 
virtually continued until 1815. This lengthy period of warfare created an 
interweaving of external with internal security problems. During the wars, the 
geographically isolated colonial administrations were understandably more 
concerned about the local impact of these conflicts than either the War and Colonial 
Office or Horse Guards. In the post-war period, internal tensions in the colony 
continued, with the autocratic governor, Macquarie, prepared to enforce harsh 
discipline, as required to maintain internal security in a penal settlement, while at the 
same time looking to the future by building an infrastructure appropriate to a crown 
colony. Towards the end of his appointment, the Bigge Inquiry led to the 
recommendation of civil reforms which were implemented after Macquarie's 
departure. Meanwhile, external security problems continued after the 1815 peace, 
resulting in British sovereignty being established over the Australian continent by 
1829. 
With the prison hulks oyerflowing4ter the loss of her former American 
colonies, it was imperative tbi . tjle Britigriorrnment to locate a suitable site for a „. 
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penal settlement, and several African locations were examined. Finally after Das 
Voltas Bay was found to be unsuitable, a decision was hurriedly taken to 
establishment a penal colony at Botany Bay. In the government's planning to 
implement this decision, consideration was given to ensuring the internal and 
external security of the proposed settlement. 
Despite its geographical isolation from Europe, and from western powers' 
settlements in the Indian-Pacific Oceans, international power politics involving 
France, Holland and Spain influenced the British government in their decisions, 
designed to protect the external security of the future settlement. There was 
traditional enmity between England and France, and that country, together with 
Spain and Holland had been at war with Great Britain only four years (three in the 
case of Holland) prior to the First Fleet sailing. Spain had stakes in the Pacific and 
the Dutch in the southeast Asian archipelago. Additionally, from the time of 
Bougainville's circumnavigation in the 1760's, French interest had become evident 
in the region. Her possession of Ile de France, in the Indian Ocean could provide a 
base for any further aggressive French moves in the Pacific. From 1785, British 
concern was heightened by the treaty between the Dutch 'Patriot' government and 
the Kingdom of France. Diplomatic care needed to be exercised by the British, as 
antagonising one power could lead to repercussions with both. Such a situation 
short of war, could include denial of the essential port facilities at the Cape of Good 
Hope, curtailing Britain's trade with India and the east. 
Britain was apparently less concerned about antagonising the weakened 
Spanish Empire. However, any wartime alliance between Spain and France created 
a potential naval threat to the British, as it had during the War of American 
Independence, and would in the future, until the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. The 
Spanish claims to the Pacific dated back to the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas. These 
were ignored by the British in proclaiming the eastern boundary of New South 
Wales extending for an indeterminate distance off-shore. Likewise, Phillip's 
orders to occupy Norfolk Island, completely ignored Spanish pretensions to 
sovereignty in that part of the Pacific. With La Perouse known to be making for 
the Pacific, London had feared that the French would lay claim to the island with a 
view to using it as a forward base for any raid on Botany Bay. Hence the British 
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interest in settling the island to forestall the French. 
A different approach was required to prevent Dutch antagonism over the 
establishment of Botany Bay. Due to Holland forcing Portugal out of the East 
Indies, the Dutch became the inheritors of that spice rich archipelago which lay to 
the west of the Tordesillas' antimeridian of 134 degrees 44) minutes longitude east 
of Greenwich. This antimeridian which roughly divided the Australian continent, 
was equally acceptable to the Dutch as well as the Spanish, with the latter's interest 
centred on trading across the Pacific, and not westward of the antimeridian. In 
addition to the western coastline of New Holland, with Tasman's claim to 
sovereignty over Van Diemen's Land, and his, and other Dutch explorations in the 
Gulf of Carpentaria, they, by right of discovery, could have claimed New Holland. 
However, they refrained from doing so, as opposed to Cook, on the eastern 
seaboard of Australia, laying claim to the whole east coast which became known as 
New South Wales. 
It is suggested by some historians that to replace the empire lost in America 
in 1783, the British decided to claim sovereignty over that vast part of Australia 
outside the main area of Dutch interest. This was achieved by declaring the western 
boundary of New South Wales to be 135 degrees of longitude, being on the 
Spanish side of the Tordesillas antimeridian. In doing this, the British government 
must have considered that the Dutch, would not take any punitive measures 
although Van Diemen's Land and the Gulf of Carpentaria lay inside the boundaries 
proclaimed for the future colony. They were correct, the only recorded reaction was 
a verbal protest made by the Dutch Ambassador in London against the British claim 
to territory which belonged to 'another country'. Nevertheless there was a degree 
of apprehension over Dutch reaction to this initiative. This was evident when the 
First Fleet unexpectedly sighted La Perouse's ships off Botany Bay. Some British 
officers speculated whether these vessels were Dutch warships intent on opposing 
their landing. This respect for Dutch power changed after the Napoleonic Wars in 
which they had suffered defeat in Europe, and conquest of their East Indies 
possessions by the British. In the 1820's, the victorious British Empire claimed 
sovereignty over New Holland lying to the west of the Tordesillas antimeridian. 
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Internal security for the planned colony was to be provided by an aimed force 
allotted to support the civil power - an autocracy commanded by a naval governor. 
The marines initially provided the military 'battalion', in which both officers and 
men, were virtually all volunteers and apparently as good as any regular unit of that 
period. Unfortunately their commanding officer, Major Ross, had significant 
character weaknesses. With an inflexible attitude, and a temperamental and 
impulsive nature, he demanded loyalty from his subordinate officers, while not 
being prepared to show loyalty to his own superior officer, the 'Captain-General 
and Governor-in-Chief'. His continual complaints to London that Phillip would 
not follow his advice to build a fort for internal defence, and more significantly, 
threatening to order his marines to use bayonets if apprehended by the civil watch 
(which had been formed in Sydney with Ross' concurrence), led to clashes with 
Phillip. Philip's traditional naval attitude of remaining aloof from his junior 
officers, did not ease the relationship. Ross' inefficiency over critical matters was 
demonstrated by his failure to ensure that sufficient musket ammunition was 
available for his marines before the First Fleet sailed from England, and also when 
he incorrectly placed five of his officers under arrest in the colony. Yet freed from 
Phillip, and no doubt having gained in experience from carrying out the duties of 
his civil office as lieutenant-governor in Sydney, when posted to Norfolk Island, 
Ross performed credibly. Unfortunately, he was typical of many officers, 
demeaned and annoyed in being required to perform colonial penal functions of a 
less than military nature. This attitude, amongst others, gave rise to a strained 
relationship between the civil and military powers in New South Wales which 
continued through to the Macquarie era. 
In particular, the judicial system approved by parliament, relied on naval and 
military officers acting as both jurors and sentencing judges. Jeremy Bentham 
severely attacked this form of justice in 1803, because, while the governor had been 
granted power to promulgate orders which had the force of law, he had no formal 
approval to order appropriate punishments. This was a philosophic argument, but 
in practical terms, as the colony developed, free settlers strongly objected to being 
subject to local orders devised to suit a penal settlement, rather than English laws. 
Further, they resented the possibility of facing a court in which uniformed officers 
used court martial procedures to dispense justice. With a lack of suitable officers 
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coming out to the colony during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, 
Balmain made the point that some 'ill-bred and ignorant' officers were not fit to be 
court members. 
As well as the criminal court later causing civilian resentment, the marine 
officers of the First Fleet vigorously opposed being detailed as members of this 
court Claiming, apparently correctly, that when they volunteered for duty in New 
South Wales they were not told of this quasi-civil legal requirement in the new 
colony, they resented being employed on other than strictly military duties. For a 
force that was specifically raised to 'enforce due subordination and obedience over 
the convicts', this was a fine point. Clearly the intention was to use the marines on 
internal security duties as police and jailers. Nevertheless, this discontent amongst 
the marine officers, caused Phillip and London concern, and was one of many 
factors which contributed to the replacement of the marines by the New South 
Wales Corps. 
Another grave weakness associated with military officers forming the 
criminal court was their capacity to manipulate the law to suit their own ends. This 
occurred in 1803, when Captain Kemp was being prosecuted by Surgeon Harris, 
acting under Governor King's instructions. The acting commanding officer of the 
Corps, Major Johnston, forced King to replace Harris by threatening to indefinitely 
delay Kemp's hearing, which would have completely disrupted the dispensing of 
justice in the colony. These circumstances were replicated in 1808, when Kemp 
presided over the trial of John Macarthur, with Johnston again the acting 
commanding officer in Sydney. Kemp's aim was to force Bligh to replace the 
nominated prosecuting officer, but the result was different. Bligh held firm, and as 
a result of the two day confrontation, the Corps' insurrection against Bligh took 
place. Here, the justice system was itself a factor contributing to the breakdown of 
internal security as far as the civil power was concerned. A farcical scandal 
involving military officers administering "justice" occurred in 1813, when two 
drunken subalterns of the 73rd Regiment attacked and killed a man, who was 
attempting to protect his wife and another woman. The two officers found were 
guilty of manslaughter and fined one shilling and sentenced to six months jail. 
Macquarie was appalled at this miscarriage of justice. When the 73rd departed 
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from Australia, the two were again serving in the regiment. 
Hunter had previously appointed two civilian magistrates in an effort to limit 
the power the military derived from their tight grip on the judicial system in the 
colony. He advised London that his intention was to thwart the Corps in their 
attempts to 'overthrow the civil power and to continue that disorder, confusion and 
disobedience' which had commenced after Phillip's departure from the colony. 
Despite these apparent weaknesses in the administration of justice, and its impact 
on internal stability, the scheme approved by the British parliament in 1786 was a 
practical attempt to overcome the lack of free settlers available to form a jury. 
Additionally, in the longer term, the military-style criminal court did provide an 
example, albeit a poor one, of a functioning jury system, from which evolved a 
civilian manned court under the control of a chief justice, rather than that of an 
autocratic governor as was the case up to Macquarie's time. 
Stress in the colonial judicial system between the civil and military powers, 
contributed to the 1808 insurrection and breakdown of security. Yet even when the 
military was in revolt, they still maintained security over the convicts in the colony. 
Further, by the Corps arresting Bligh in Sydney and preventing him fleeing to the 
Hawkesbury, Bligh was unable to attempt to raise a militia 'loyal association' 
against the military. Should he have been successful, such an unstable situation 
could have encouraged dissident convict elements to take advantage of the disorder 
and possibly rebel against the authority of both Bligh and the Corps. The potential 
for civil strife was indicated during the Castle Hill rebellion of 1804, when a 
handful of leaders expected over a thousand convicts to rise up on their orders 
against the security forces. 
Reports from Captain Cook's visit in 1770, left little doubt in the minds of 
the British authorities in London that the first settlers sent to New South Wales 
would be occupying an undeveloped land, empty except for wandering groups of 
natives. Later it came to be formally held that the 'colony was acquired neither by 
conquest nor cession, but by the mere occupation of a desert or uninhabited land', 
and thus the principle, if not the name of Terra Nullius, came to be legally applied. 
The authority to grant land sprang from Philip's Second Commission of 1787 
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which gave him (and future governors within certain restrictions imposed from time 
to time) authority to dispose of and grant land to persons as he saw fit. 
The predatory appropriation of traditional Aboriginal lands for white 
settlement, created inevitable enmity between the two groups. Without a police 
force, it was the unenviable task of the military to keep the king's peace, particularly 
along the ever expanding boundaries of white settlement. Soldiers, by training, 
understood their role in operations against Aborigines such as those conducted by 
Phillip and Macquarie in 1790 and 1816 respectively. But it was a perplexing 
internal security task for the military attempting to maintain control between the two 
culturally alien populations, which often intermingled both on the borders and 
hinterland of settled areas. Apart from a predilection by the military to favour their 
fellow countrymen, the granting of land to both officers and men would have 
created a conflict of interest in providing impartial protection to the Aboriginal 
populations. Macquarie's endeavours to establish a Native Institute for children 
and later a 10,000 acre reserve 'in a fertile Tract' for the Aborigines did not solve 
the problem. Unfortunately, the pattern of land development established in the early 
colonial period continued as pastoral properties spread throughout the country. 
The legacy of this acquisition of Aboriginal land remains a divisive issue and a 
matter of great concern in Australia. 
Another problem with worrying overtones to both internal, and to a lesser 
extent, external security, was the process of raising, and more particularly 
reinforcing, the New South Wales Corps. As an alternative to the marine battalion 
which had been specifically enlisted for a three year tour of duty, it was considered 
preferable not to replace the marines with a line regiment which, in due course, 
would be reposted elsewhere. Raising a special unit of infantry to remain in the 
colony, offered administrative simplicity and financial saving in avoiding the 
rotation of regiments. Unfortunately with no esprit de corps founded on 
regimental tradition, and with no honour and glory to be gained in acting as gaolers 
in a remote convict settlement, the Corps faced difficulties in attracting recruits. The 
difficulty was greater as the Corps was attempting to enlist men at a time when even 
well known regiments faced recruiting problems. 
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In contrast to the soldiers, the initial officer volunteers appear to have been of 
average quality, for with the exception of their commander, and the newly appointed 
ensigns, they were all serving on full duty. This was in a period of post-war 
financial stringencies following the American War of Independence, when many of 
their fellow officers were on half-pay. On being accepted and posted to the Corps, 
the officers also benefited from a step up in rank without purchase. However, with 
the purchase system normally determining rank amongst the army officer class, 
many officers considered the profession of arms a business rather than a vocation. 
The newly promoted Lieutenant John Macarthur was typical of this type of officer, 
and before he left England, was looking past his windfall promotion to the 
possibility of making money in the colony by exploiting non-military opportunities. 
Remote from the Horse Guards, the Corps' weak commanding officer, 
Major Grose, allowed illegal trading by the military officers. Monopolistic trading, 
coupled with land grants and other indulgences, produced substantial profits for the 
officers. Their determination to defend these privileges brought them into conflict 
with the naval governors after Phillip, who attempted to curtail these abuses. 
Incidents such as the duel fought between Paterson and Macarthur and later the 
circumstances surrounding Macarthur being sent back to England under arrest, 
were unfortunate and poor examples to the troops. This was the atmosphere in 
which a struggle for supremacy between the civil and military powers became 
entrenched and was the background to the insurrection against Bligh in 1808. 
From the outset the military force on which the civil power in the colony had 
to depend for security, was not only a raw unit without a tradition of service, but in 
relation to the soldiers, possibly of a lesser calibre than that amongst line regiments. 
While it is possible to theorise on the standard of soldiers in the Corps' early 
period of service, in the trying circumstances of guarding convicts at sea on the 
Second and Third Fleets, all ranks performed creditably in a still experimental 
system of transportation. Additionally, in the colony, and serving alongside 
marines, no complaints about the Corps' behaviour or discipline have been noted. 
Phillip would not have hesitated to record his displeasure had he cause to do so. It 
is therefore notable (as discussed in Chapter 8) that his successor Hunter reported 
adversely to London in 1796:- 
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Soldiers from the Savoy [London's notorious military prison], and other 
characters who have been considered as disgraceful to every other regiment in 
his Majesty's service, have been thought fit and proper recruits for the New 
South Wales Corps ... to which the dregs and refuse of our native country 
are directed by its laws to be sent as a punishment 
The basis of this report was that from the time of France's declaration of war 
against the United Kingdom in February 1793, there was a noticeable lowering in 
the calibre of the Corps' officers and men. Wartime regiments soaked up the small 
available recruiting pool, mainly men who for a variety of misfortunes were forced 
to enlist. The Corps, which retained all its peacetime unattractive features for a 
potential recruit, would have been at the bottom of a competitive recruiting ladder. 
Yet the Horse Guards had to meet the continuing demands of the Home Office, 
requiring a flow of soldiers into the Corps for guard detachments on convict 
transports outward bound from England and Ireland. These factors go far to 
explain Hunter's critical, and accurate, report on the quality of many reinforcements 
posted to the Corps. For example, in 1796, the year in which Hunter wrote his 
adverse comments there were an estimated twenty-four soldiers in the colony who 
had been forcefully "recruited" from the notorious Savoy military prison. 
Additionally, other unsuitable soldiers, the 'dregs and refuse' of their regiments, 
were transferred to the Corps. A capable commanding officer, supported by sound 
regimental officers could have absorbed and disciplined such a steady influx. 
However, Grose and his successor Paterson, were apparently weak disciplinarians, 
while simultaneously many of the Corps' officers were distracted from their duties 
by their money-making pursuits. As a result, the efficiency with which the Corps 
carried out internal security tasks suffered. 
Two incidents which emphasise the weaknesses of the officers and men of 
the Corps, were the loss of the Lady Shore in 1797 and the circumstances 
surrounding the wrecking of an ex-convict's home in 1796. While the successful 
pirating of the Lady Shore was the direct result of forcefully enlisted non-
commissioned officers and men mutinying, it is argued that this would not have 
taken place except for the dilatory way in which Lieutenant Colonel Grose 
investigated complaints by the ship's captain before his vessel left home waters. 
Basically, this was because the guard commander, the newly commissioned (in 
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March 1797) Adjutant Minchin, had shown himself to be incompetent as a 
commander. Grose took no interest in any corrective action. Once at sea, 
Minchin's incompetency provided opportunity for the mutineers, and his apparent 
lack of determination resulted in a failure to immediately attempt to retake the ship. 
Frenchmen and other foreigners forcibly recruited in the Corps were the leaders 
and members of the coup Prior to the successful mutiny, Minchin's failure to heed 
the warnings of a woman convict about their intentions, was reprehensible. Officer 
inefficiency, and forced enlistments into the Corps, resulted in the loss of the Lady 
Shore. 
With the captured Lady Shore being sailed to an enemy port in Spanish 
South America, the external security aspects of the incident are clear. Regarding 
internal security in the colony, the implications were serious, with the successful 
mutiny indicating a level of disloyalty amongst some soldiers in the colony, who 
may side with the convicts in a major disturbance. Indeed in an Irish convict plan 
of 1800, the ringleaders were counting on the support of disaffected naval ratings, 
as well as soldiers who it was hoped would obtain a cannon to help defend an area 
around South Head until the insurgents obtained a ship to escape. While this plan 
contained a considerable element of wishful thinking, it indicates that there was a 
perception in the colony of troop disloyalty. 
In the case of the ex-convict's home, publicly destroyed by soldiers acting as 
an uncontrolled riotous mob, Governor Hunter was shown to be irresolute. In the 
face of difficulties with the Corps' officers, he capitulated to Macarthur's appeal 
not to severely punish the ringleaders as he had publicly undertaken to do. Also, 
when the officers, with Macarthur as their spokesman, obstructed the course of civil 
justice being pursued by Magistrate Balmain, Hunter, aware of the circumstances, 
did not intervene. Further, Captain Paterson, administering command of the Corps, 
failed to display leadership by allowing Macarthur to usurp his position in 
discussions with Hunter. After Hunter deferred to Macarthur, and in furtherance of 
Hunter's mildly expressed hope that 'the men might be paraded and spoken to by 
their officers', there is no evidence that Paterson took any military disciplinary 
action. The success of the military officers in imposing their will on Hunter, 
represented a high water mark for them in their struggle against the civil power. 
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This unsettled situation may well have been exploited by the convicts to the 
detriment of internal security. That this view is soundly based is indicated by the 
1797 reprimand of the governor by the Duke of Portland, who wrote that the 
conduct of the military directly endangered the safety of Hunter's government as 
there was no justifiable excuse for not bringing the ringleaders to a court martial 
and severely punishing them. Nevertheless, in the one case where the Corps was 
put to the test, at the time of the Castle Hill Rebellion in 1804, the troops involved 
carried out their duties satisfactorily. But this was a comparatively minor skirmish 
against a poorly armed untrained mob, and should not be held as an example of any 
high standards achieved by the Corps. 
A contributing factor to the 1804 rebellion was an apparently unrelated issue 
associated with international affairs. With successful negotiations between Britain 
and France leading to the Peace of Amiens in March 1802, the strength of infantry 
units of the British Army, including the New South Wales Corps, was reduced. 
The number of all ranks stationed on mainland Australia dropped from 547 in 
December 1802 to 399 at the time of the rebellion in March 1804, while at the same 
time the number of radicalised Irish convicts arriving in the colony was increasing. 
This reduction in troop strength resulted in an army detachment being withdrawn 
from Castle Hill, which was to become the centre of the rebellion. A free settler 
wrote of his surprise that while there were fifteen hundred or more prisoners, there 
was no military guard at the time of the uprising. As the Castle Hill Rebellion was 
not a spontaneous uprising, it is reasonable to speculate that the reduction in 
strength of the Corps, especially with no troops stationed at Castle Hill, was a factor 
in the decision to launch the insurrection. 
While demonstrating many weaknesses, the Corps' historical notoriety was 
secured by one event, the insurrection against Bligh when that unit, responsible 
under law to protect the civil power, rebelled on 26 January 1808. Many eminent 
scholars have written differing interpretations of the cause, or causes, of this 
insurrection, but it is worth bearing in mind the result of Governor Macquarie's 
contemporary investigation of this mutiny. Despite having no personal respect for 
Bligh, he reported to London that he had not been able to discover any 'Act' of 
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Bligh's which could in any way offer an excuse for the mutinous conduct of the 
Corps. So despite a wide range of reasons advanced by Major Johnston in his first 
dispatch to London, and by witnesses at Johnston's court martial in 1811, as well 
as by later writers, as to the cause of the mutiny, the episode can still be interpreted 
variously. 
While the catalyst for the rebellion was Macarthur's manipulation of the 
criminal court which he faced on 25 January 1808, the cause was the realisation by 
the Corps' officers and men that Bligh intended to lay a capital charge of treason 
against the six officers who demanded the trial judge-advocate be replaced. This 
intelligence brought the injured Johnston hurrying back into town on the afternoon 
of 26 January 1808. It is reasonable to assume that the whole unit was watching 
the unfolding sequence of events with great attention and concern. Men such as 
Sergeant Major Whittle and, although the accused, retired army officer Macarthur 
together with their military and civil supporters, would have been working to stir up 
sympathy for the six officers and for Macarthur himself. With unit loyalty, and 
esprit de corps, developed over the years in the colony, the soldiers would have 
resented the perceived "unfair" treatment of their six officers. While the men's 
attitude was probably relatively straightforward, a more complex motivation is 
considered probable for the remaining officers in Sydney. They would have felt 
obliged to show solidarity with their six threatened comrades, such an attitude 
would have been reinforced by the perception that a succession of naval governors 
had endeavoured to restrict the rights and privileges the army officers had enjoyed 
from the days when Grose and Paterson administered the colony. Additionally, 
they were probably already inflamed by Bligh's well known dislike of the Corps 
and the "injustices" claimed to have been inflicted under Bligh's administration - 
many listed as causes of the rebellion in Johnston's London dispatch. But while it 
is clear that these grievances inflamed the situation, they were not the primary cause 
of the mutiny. 
During the crisis Johnston had been derelict in his responsibilities by 
deliberately avoiding opportunities to discuss with Bligh a method to resolve the 
impasse. Unaware of Bligh's precise intentions late on the afternoon of 26 
January, Johnston's actions were not commendable and demonstrated a degree of 
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irrationality as they were influenced exclusively by the advice and prejudices of 
individuals strongly opposed to Bligh. Yet, it is argued that in risking the 
possibility of being charged with a capital offence, Johnston, encouraged by those 
around him, decided to mutiny to defend the interests of the Corps which he saw as 
being put into jeopardy by Bligh's intention to charge the six officers who were 
opposing the governor's instructions. While there was majority support amongst 
all ranks in the Corps to confront Bligh, as noted in A Atkinson's 'William Bligh's 
Chickens', there were dissenters amongst the other ranks. However, this minority 
would not have had an opportunity to air their concerns, and doubtless would not 
have dared to, when the troops were ordered out on parade prior to being marched 
to Government House. For all ranks, any order by their commander was an order 
which had to be obeyed, and as commander, Johnston apparently considered his 
men supported him in his determination to depose Bligh. It is argued that the 
greater majority of all ranks of the Corps' were not prepared to see their regiment 
denigrated by Bligh, and marched in the belief that insurrection was necessary to 
protect vital regimental interests. 
The 1808 insurrection was the culmination of a struggle by the military to 
stamp their supremacy on the civil administration. A confrontation, which in 
various forms, had been continuous from the time the marine officers first disputed 
the order that they form the criminal court. The appointment of an army officer as 
governor, who wore the same 'cloth' as the garrison, and whose arrival 
accompanied by the 73rd Regiment to replace the Corps, was seen by the War 
Office as a way of putting the colony 'on a more respectable footing'. 
Nevertheless tensions developed between Macquarie and the 73rd, and their 
replacement the 46th Regiment, leading to the governor requesting that both, in turn, 
be removed from the colony. The disruptive influence of quarrels, such as that 
between Macquarie, his former old comrade Lieutenant Colonel Molle of the 46th, 
and a clique of officers, would have disrupted the efficiency of the regiment and 
consequently its conduct of security duties. While confronting this internal dissent 
the governor faced two security issues; the serious situation regarding bushranging, 
and of lesser gravity, the confrontation (discussed earlier) between whites and 
Aborigines. 
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Following the Napoleonic Wars, when post-war economies dictated there be 
no increase in strength of the army forces in the colony, at the same time depressed 
socio-economic conditions in England led to an increase in convict transportation. 
This increased pressure saw more convicts "bolting" and surviving by 
bushranging. Van Diemen's Land was particularly vulnerable where, to ease 
starvation rations, armed convicts were ordered to hunt kangaroo, encouraging a 
spirit of bushranging in the island. Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, increasing 
numbers of redundant experienced servicemen were convicted of offences and 
transported to the colony. Bushranging ex-servicemen were formidable opponents 
for the security forces ordered to hunt them down. Additionally, some of the most 
intimidating bushrangers were regular soldiers who deserted while serving in the 
colony. In Van Diemen's Land, Peter Geary of the 73rd, was one who became 
leader of a notorious gang. Despite Macquarie's proclamations and optimistic 
dispatches to London, bushranging continued. Even with Lieutenant-Governor 
Davey's illegal, but sensible, declaration of martial law, and then Lieutenant-
Governor Sore11's carefully planned counter-measures, this scourge continued 
through to the administration of Sore11's successor, Colonel George Arthur. 
From its inception external security in the colony had two distinct phases, the 
wartime and post-war periods. Apart from the short lived Peace of Amiens during 
1802-1803, the British Empire was at war from 1793 to 1815. Initially this appears 
to have caused little concern in the colony, until Governor King became particularly 
concerned over French intentions with Captain Nicolas Baudin's expedition in 
Australian waters. He considered the greatest area of threat was in the region of 
newly discovered Bass Strait, where Britain's claim to sovereignty could be thrown 
into doubt. As a result the outpost at Risdon Cove was established, with London 
also deciding on a settlement at Port Phillip, to prevent that strategically placed port 
being claimed by the French. Therefore, external threat had the direct result of 
sovereignty being confirmed by settlement over southern parts of the eastern 
seaboard previously claimed by Britain in the proclamation of Phillip's 
Commission. It would appear that apart from taking these precautions to protect 
British sovereignty, the New South Wales authorities were not particularly 
concerned about warlike threats during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic 
Wars. In the same way as the War of American Independence inhibited 
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exploration around coastal Australia, from 1793, war deflected European interest 
away from the strategically unimportant Australian continent. Prior to the Battle of 
Trafalgar in 1805, the Royal Navy was struggling to survive in its battle for naval 
parity, but thereafter, it was better able to act as the world wide shield for Britain's 
possessions. This shield was seldom seen, but was none the less real. From this 
early colonial period, it is asserted that a persistent belief developed that the British 
navy guaranteed external security for the continent. 
When peace was declared in 1815, British sovereignty in Australia was still 
restricted to the original boundaries proclaimed for New South Wales. There had 
been no imperative to extend sovereignty to protect expanding settlement for, apart 
from Van Diemen's Land, this was limited to the coastal and Hunter regions until 
the road over the Blue Mountains was opened in 1815. Thereafter, except for 
outposts established for reasons of external security, settlement did not precede the 
post-war spread of British sovereignty. This is demonstrated by the October 1829 
order which limited mainland settlement to nineteen counties, all within a radius of 
about 150 miles of Sydney. Yet, five months before the signing of this order, for 
reasons of external security, the British had already claimed, and started to exercise 
sovereignty over the complete continent. This resulted from threats to British trade 
by the Dutch which led to the first outpost being established in northern regions of 
the continent in 1824. Meanwhile, French "scientific" expeditions had been 
resumed around coastal Australia. The increasing concern about these expeditions, 
not only led to the strengthening of shore batteries at Sydney and Hobart, but also 
London ordered that vulnerable uncolonised coastal regions be secured. As a 
result, in 1826, strategically placed outposts were established by Governor Darling 
at Westernport and King George's Sound. The process of claiming sovereignty 
over the entire continent was completed in 1829, when Captain Fremantle declared 
New Holland a British possession, at the site subsequently named after him. Only 
a few months later, this sovereignty was demonstrated when an approved 
commercially driven settlement was established on the Swan River. 
Both during and after the wars, outposts which developed into settlements, 
such as in Van Diemen's Land, or settlements like the Swan River, were established 
primarily as a result of external security concerns. Compared to other land masses, 
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such as India and northern America, where traders and settlers preceded the British 
flag, the reverse applied in Australia. The legacy of this continuing search for 
external security since 1788, is that the entire Australian continent came under 
British sovereignty. This took place despite tribulations, including near starvation, 
convict rebellion and insurrection, with the garrison maintaining that level of internal 
security which enabled development to proceed in the colony. The parallel 
evolution of the supremacy of the civil power over the military, together with the 
Bigge recommendations, ending autocratic rule after Macquarie's departure. These 
were initial steps in laying the framework for the development of modern 
constitutional government in the former penal colonies. 
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